VOID WRIT OF POSSESSION AND JUDGMENT OF POSSESSION LANGUAGE INSERTED IN FINAL JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF WILDWOOD v. Hayward, et al., 406 A.2d 1318, 81 N.J. 311 (1979) - Case Number: F-9241-09

____________________________________________________________

November 29, 2018

Hon. Paul Innes

Presiding Judge

Civil Courthouse

175 South Broad Street

3^rd Floor

Trenton, NJ 08650

Phone: 609-571-4200, ext 74204

Fax: (609) 571-4233

Clerk of Superior Court
Michelle M. Smith

R.J. Hughes Justice Complex
Superior Court Clerk's Office
P.O. Box 971
Trenton, NJ 08625-0971

RE:  VOID WRIT OF POSSESSION AND JUDGMENT OF POSSESSION LANGUAGE INSERTED IN FINAL JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO THE AUTHORITY OF HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF WILDWOOD v. Hayward, et al., 406 A.2d 1318, 81 N.J. 311 (1979) - Case Number: F-9241-09

Dear Judge Innes and Clerk of the Superior Court:

Pursuant to the authority of HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF WILDWOOD v. Hayward, et al., 406 A.2d 1318, 81 N.J. 311 (1979), Basilis N. Stephanatos, PhD, JD, files this instant request to officially enter a record of void writ of possession and void judgment of possession that was wrongly and unlawfully entered by the former Clerk of the Superior Court on May 13, 2011 in the case F-9241-09.  See Exhibit A.

The application for that ex-parte judgment for possession and writ for possession was made by the antitrust conspirators American Tax Funding, LLC.  The ATF, LLC Defendants include but are not limited to: ATF, LLC, ATFH Real Property, LLC, Matthew Marini (the owner of these entities), all officers and directors of ATF, LLC and its subsidiaries, Harris Nesbitt Corporation (n/k/a BMO Capital Markets Corporation), Keith Bonchi, Esq., Robert Del Vecchio, Esq., Coldwell Banker Realtor, Donald Fanelli, and John Does 1-20.

Its existence against Stephanatos and thousands of New Jersey homeowners was determined and confirmed by the federal judge Michael A. Shipp in the federal antitrust case IN RE NEW JERSEY TAX SALES CERTIFICATES ANTITRUST LITIGATION, Master Docket No. 3:12-CV-01893-MAS-TJB  (see http://www.njtaxliensettlements.com/

 and by the conviction of at least 15 individuals and entities in New Jersey, including Passaic County, by the U.S. Attorney’s Office (See https://www.fbi.gov/newark/press-releases/2014/former-new-york-tax-liens-investment-company-executive-pleads-guilty-to-role-in-bid-rigging-scheme-at-municipal-tax-lien-auctions

Both the Robert U. Del Vecchio, Sr. (now deceased) and Robert A. Del Vecchio, Jr. are accused of being participants in the antitrust conspiracy.  They are both active in the tax lien business, they are both lawyers, they are related by blood (father and son), and they both share common place of business and place of residence in Hawthorn, Passaic County, New Jersey.  The Del Vecchios also established similar “pension plans” to hide their ill-gotten gains, such as the Robert Del Vecchio Pension Plan, LLC.  The Pension plans will be added as Defendants in this action to recover the millions in damages caused by the Del Vecchios.  Robert Del Vecchio, Sr. has pleaded guilty to a felony charge in Federal Court in Newark on September 30, 2013.

According to the court documents, Del Vecchio, Sr. and Michael Mastellone, of Cedar Knolls, New Jersey were involved in the conspiracy with others not to bid against one another at municipal tax lien auctions in New Jersey or to do mock biddings on select liens that were of small amounts and would refrain from bidding on the premium phase of the bidding. Since the conspiracy permitted the conspirators to purchase tax liens with limited competition, each conspirator was able to obtain liens that earned a higher interest rate or lower paid premium to the municipality or through the monopoly would obtain rights for charging the highest possible interest rate (18 percent) for all subsequent liens without any bidding on the subsequent liens. Property owners were therefore made to pay higher interest on their tax debts than they would have paid had their liens been purchased in open and honest competition, the department said.

Robert A. Del Vecchio, Esq. an attorney at law of Hawthorn, New Jersey provided false certifications to the Office of Foreclosure that this was an uncontested case, despite the fact that Stephanatos had fully contested this case; this way, Del Vecchio managed to circumvent the Anti-Eviction Act, the Summary Dispossess Act of New Jersey and fooled the Acting Law Clerk, Jennifer Perez, and the Office of Foreclosure into issuance of an ex-parte writ of possession.  Del Vecchio also made false representations to this Court that Stephanatos had no possessory interests and that there are no tenants or residents on the property that must be protected by the Anti-Eviction Act and/or the Summary Dispossess Act, when in fact Metropolitan Environmental Services, a business owned by Stephanatos, was a tenant in the premises.  Del Vecchio also fraudulently certified to the Court that Stephanatos had not paid any taxes since 1993, an entirely fraudulently assertion.  Del Vecchio also fraudulently certified to the Passaic County Court and to the Sheriff of that County that Stephanatos had threatened him with violence, an entirely fraudulent assertion.  Del Vecchio also fraudulently certified to this Court that this was a mortgage foreclosure case, when in fact Stephanatos had no mortgage (he fully owned the property) and this was a tax sale foreclosure case.  Del Vecchio fraudulently submitted forms and papers to the Office of Foreclosure that pertain to mortgage foreclosures, although he knew that this was a tax sale foreclosure.  Del Vecchio fraudulently presented and certified to the state Court mortgage foreclosure cases as the basis of his certifications to the Court, although he knew that this was not a mortgage foreclosure case.  Del Vecchio also fraudulently represented to the state court the amount allegedly owed by Stephanatos in the form of taxes, when he knew that no taxes were due because of the impermissible over-assessment of Stephanatos’ residence by more than 40 percent (properties proven fair market value was $330,000 but it had impermissibly over-assessed at $475,000, making all taxes void ab initio). 

The New Jersey Court In Village of Ridgefield Park et al., v. Bergen County Board of Taxation et al., 62 N.J.Super. 133, 162 A.2d 132 said that any assessment levied in violation of the constitutional mandate of uniformity is absolutely void Ab initio.  Thus, the taxes were void, as a matter of New Jersey law.  Therefore, all subsequent acts of the municipal, antitrust and county personnel were illegal, as a matter of law.

Del Vecchio fraudulently certified to the Chancery Court that ATF had lawfully obtained the tax sale certificate at zero percent (0%) interest rate, when ATF colluded with Del Vecchio and others to rig the bids.  ATF in fact charged at least eighteen percent (18%) interest for all years but the first year. Del Vecchio and Bonchi also fraudulent failed to notify this Court that the writ was void because it was issued by the Clerk in Mercer County in violation of state statutes. N.J.S.A. 2A:18-57 provides that in summary dispossess proceedings "[n]o warrant of removal shall issue until the expiration of 3 days after entry of judgment for possession."

THE WRIT OF POSSESSION WAS VOID AB INITIO BECAUSE THE CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO ISSUE THE EX-PARTE WRIT OF POSSESSION THE SAME DAME THE JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED.  HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF WILDWOOD v. Hayward, et al., 406 A.2d 1318, 81 N.J. 311 (1979)

ATF Defendants engaged in "knowing concealment, suppression and omission of material facts," and made a false representation of fact and law which the Chancery Court and the Mercer County Clerk relied upon.  Former Judge Hochberg also coerced by the fraudulent certifications of the Defendants into dismissing the timely filed Section 1983 suit in 2012.

Plaintiff has demonstrated that he had several cognizable equitable and property interests under New Jersey law of which he could not have been deprived without due process.

It is well-established that where former owners of real property remain in possession after a foreclosure sale, they become tenants at sufferance. See In re Atlantic Business & Community Corporation 901 F.2d at 328 (3^rd Cir. 1990) where the Third Circuit stated that a tenancy at sufferance creates a property interest that is protected by federal and state laws and the U.S. Constitution.

See the definition of tenant in the New Jersey statutes: "Tenant" includes, but is not limited to, a lessee or tenant at will or at sufferance or for any duration, or any subtenants, assigns, or legal representatives of the lessee or tenant. Title 46A – Landlord and tenant law. Article 5, eviction, chapter 14, eviction generally.  46A:14-1: Tenant, landlord, residential rental premises; what is included.  New Jersey law considers a homeowner who remains in a home lost to foreclosure to be a tenant at sufferance.  We have found that a tenant at sufferance is "'one who comes into possession of land by lawful title, usually by virtue of a lease for a definite period, and after the expiration of the period of the lease holds over without any fresh leave from the owner.'" Xerox Corp. v. Listmark Computer Sys., 142 N.J. Super. 232, 240 (App. Div. 1976) (citing Standard Realty Co. v. Gates, 99 N.J. Eq. 271, 275 (Ch. 1926)).  WA GOLF COMPANY, LLC v. ARMORED, INC, Appellate Division, August 6, 2014.

The ATF Defendants fraudulently certified to state and federal courts that Stephanatos had no possessory rights.

No motion and notice was provided to Stephanatos for substituting the foreclosing plaintiff ATF, LLC to ATFH Real Property, LLC.  As a result, ATFH Real Property, LLC lacked the standing to apply for final judgment and to apply for a writ of possession from the office of foreclosure. 

Furthermore, as the New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled, in HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF WILDWOOD v. Hayward, et al., 406 A.2d 1318, 81 N.J. 311 (1979).  Even if the judgment had been entered lawfully (we hold it was not), the clerk had no *316 jurisdiction to issue the warrant of removal the same day the judgment was entered. N.J.S.A. 2A:18-57 provides that in summary dispossess proceedings "[n]o warrant of removal shall issue until the expiration of 3 days after entry of judgment for possession."

THE EX-PARTE JUDGMENT FOR POSSESSION WAS ALSO ENTERED UNLAWFULLY BECAUSE NO NOTICE TO QUIT WAS PROVIDED TO STEPHANATOS PRIOR TO ENTERING THAT LANGUAGE INTO THE FINAL JUDGMENT ON MAY 13, 2011

The following language was entered into that judgment by the conspirator Robert Del Vecchio:

“AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the plaintiff dully recover against the said defendant …possession of the premises… and that a Writ of Possession issue thereon”. 

There was no hearing on property possession.  Possession is the subject matter of the Law Division.  This case was not a mortgage foreclosure.  It was a tax lien foreclosure.    Furthermore, my small business, Metropolitan Environmental Services was located in the premises, a legal tenant.  The order you signed did not call for the removal of my business from the property.  Why did you do it?

The question to you is: why was that language was entered by the Office of Foreclosure that has no jurisdiction over contested cases?  Why there was no compliance with 2A:18-56. Proof of notice to quit prerequisite to judgment, the Summary Dispossess Act, N.J.S. 2A:18-53 (for me/family) and no compliance with the Anti-Eviction Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 et seq. that was applicable to the legal tenant of the premises, Metropolitan Environmental Services.

State law requires that prior to the issuance of a judgment for possession, the owner must provide proof of notice to quit, followed by an eviction proceeding before a judge who has jurisdiction over the property and the person.  Here are the state statutes:

2A:18-56. Proof of notice to quit prerequisite to judgment

No judgment for possession in cases specified in paragraph "a." of section 2A:18-53 of this Title shall be ordered unless:

1. The tenancy, if a tenancy at will or from year to year, has been terminated by the giving of 3 months' notice to quit, which notice shall be deemed to be sufficient; or
2. The tenancy, if a tenancy from month to month, has been terminated by the giving of 1 month's notice to quit, which notice shall be deemed to be sufficient; or
3. The tenancy, if for a term other than at will, from year to year, or from month to month, has been terminated by the giving of one term's notice to quit, which notice shall be deemed to be sufficient; and
4. It shall be shown to the satisfaction of the court by due proof that the notice herein required has been given.

Note: Unlike residential tenants, who are mostly protected by the Anti-Eviction Act, commercial tenants (like Metropolitan Engineering Services, PC and Metropolitan Environmental Services) may be evicted at the end of their lease terms. However, a Notice to Quit is still required before the eviction action may be filed.  No such notice was ever provided.  That the eviction of Stephanatos’ businesses from the property was unlawful.

The landlord-tenant law also requires the same notice for removal of residential tenants (like Dr. Stephanatos):

2A:18-61.2 Removal of residential tenants; required notice; contents; service.

No judgment of possession shall be entered for any premises covered by section 2 of this act, except in the nonpayment of rent under subsection a. or f. of section 2, unless the landlord has made written demand and given written notice for delivery of possession of the premises.

Here, no notice to quit and no eviction hearing ever took place.  What the conspirator Robert Del Vecchio did was to include language in the judgment for foreclosure order that also included a judgment for possession, without any notice for such possession hearing ever provided to Stephanatos, as is required by state law: 2A:18-56. Proof of notice to quit prerequisite to judgment.  HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF WILDWOOD v. Hayward, et al., 406 A.2d 1318, 81 N.J. 311 (1979). 

The state law N.J.S.A. 2A:39-1 cited by Judge Jacobson, prohibits the unlawful entry in any real property occupied solely as a residence by the party in possession, unless the entry and detention is made pursuant to legal process as set out in N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53 et seq.  The Defendants failed to do so and instead circumvented that statutory process and applied for an ex-parte writ.

Thus, this intentional violation of state law represents a violation of Stephanatos’ procedural due process rights for both the judgment for possession and the writ of possession.  Since the Defendants’ lawyers certified (i.e. swore under oath) to Judge Hochberg that “all the proceedings were done in accordance with the law”, they lied to that judge, successfully coerced the judge into dismissing the timely-filed suit and therefore committed fraud on the court.

DEVIATION FROM SERVICE OF PROCESS RULES' TYPICALLY MAKES A JUDGMENT OR ORDER VOID.

The requirements of the Rules with respect to service of process go to the jurisdiction of the court and must be strictly complied with." Berger v. Paterson Veterans Taxi Serv., 244 N.J. Super. 200, 204, 581 A.2d 1344 (App. Div. 1990) (quoting Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, 493, 86 A.2d 201 (1952)). "'[S]ubstantial deviation from service of process rules' typically makes a judgment void." M & D Associates v. Mandara, 366 N.J. Super. 341, 353, 841 A.2d 441 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting Jameson v. Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co., 363 N.J. Super. 419, 425, 833 A.2d 626 (App. Div. 2003)).

IT IS EXTREMELY CRITICAL THAT YOU RESPOND ASAP AND OFFICIALLY VACATE THE VOID WRIT AND THE VOID JUDGMENT OF POSSESSION.  I AM AVAILABLE 24/7.  I AM IN FACT BEGGING YOU TO HELP ME FIND OUT WHAT HAPPENED.  YOU CAN CONTACT ME VIA FAX, VIA PHONE, VIA EMAIL, VIA US MAIL.

WHEREFORE, Basilis N. Stephanatos requests this Court and/or the Clerk of the Superior Court to officially void the illegal writ of possession entered on May 13, 2011 in violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-57 that provides that in summary dispossess proceedings "[n]o warrant of removal shall issue until the expiration of 3 days after entry of judgment for possession." HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF WILDWOOD v. Hayward, et al., 406 A.2d 1318, 81 N.J. 311 (1979).  Even if the judgment had been entered lawfully (we hold it was not), the clerk had no *316 jurisdiction to issue the warrant of removal the same day the judgment was entered.

Respectfully Submitted,

Basilis (Bill) N. Stephanatos

Thank you in advance for your consideration.

Very Truly Yours,

 

Basilis N. Stephanatos

CERTIFICATION OF BASILIS N. STEPHANATOS

I hereby certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements made by me are true and correct.  I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment. NJ Court Rule R. 1:4-4(b); 28 U.S.C. §1746.

DATE:  November 29, 2018

Respectfully Submitted,

___________________________________

Basilis N. Stephanatos, PhD, PE, JD