MEC&F Expert Engineers : 08/13/15

Thursday, August 13, 2015

A Navy F/A-18C Fighter Jet Catches Fire While Refueling on USS Truman, injuring the pilot and a sailor on deck


f-18cd-hornet_002
A Navy F/A-18C refueling aboard the USS Harry S. Truman caught fire late Tuesday, injuring the pilot and a sailor on deck, the Navy said Wednesday.

The fire was quickly extinguished; the pilot ejected and landed on the flight deck. He was treated and taken to New Hanover Regional Medical Center, Wilmington, N.C., with non-life threatening injuries, the Navy said. A sailor on deck was also injured and sent to New Hanover with non-life threatening injuries.

Naval Air Force Atlantic spokesman Cmdr. Mike Kafka said the cause of the fire and the pilot's decision to eject will be part of the Navy's investigation.
The pilot was taking part in night flying training operations with Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 106 when the incident occurred around midnight Tuesday. The Truman, operating off the coast of Virginia in the Atlantic Ocean,  temporarily suspended training operations after the incident.

It's the third mishap this week for military aviation. An Army UH-60 Black Hawk made a hard landing onto the USNS Red Cloud off Okinawa on Wednesday, injuring seven servicemembers. 

On Monday, an Air Force F-16 assigned to Spangdahlem Air Base crashed near Bayreuth, Germany. The pilot safely ejected in that crash and was treated for minor injuries.

Public comments sought on $139 million in proposed oil spill restoration projects







Underwater seagrass beds are a vital habitat for juvenile fish, shrimp and crabs in Alabama's coastal waters. (Courtesy Dauphin Island Sea Lab)


Dennis Pillion | dpillion@al.com

on August 13, 2015 at 11:44 AM


The Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council released a draft Funded Priorities List (FPL) Thursday for public comment. This FPL details active restoration projects total $139.6 million, and recommends setting aside approximately $43.6 million for future projects.

According to a summary posted by the Council, the proposed projects on the list would "provide substantial near-term ecological benefits and would help set the stage for future success with large-scale, comprehensive Gulf restoration."

The FPL included eight projects in Alabama, totaling more than $12.6 million in up front or "Category 1" funding and $13.5 million in "Category 2" funding in the future. The fact sheets for those projects are linked below:
Coastal Alabama Comprehensive Watershed Restoration Planning Project
Alabama Living Shorelines Program
Comprehensive Living Shoreline Monitoring
Alabama Submerged Aquatic Vegetation Restoration & Monitoring Program
Marsh Restoration in Fish River, Weeks Bay, Oyster Bay & Meadows Tract
Mobile Bay National Estuary Program
Upper Mobile Bay Beneficial Use Wetland Creation Site
Enhancing Opportunities for Beneficial Use of Dredged Sediments

In addition to the Alabama projects, the FPL includes projects to fill in abandoned oil and gas canals and wells, work with land owners to prevent approximately 16,000 pounds of fertilizers per year from entering the Gulf, preserve 9,400 acres of "high value coastal habitat," and invest in Gulf-wide science, coordination and planning programs.

A group of local and national conservation organizations including National Audubon Society, the National Wildlife Federation, Environmental Defense Fund and the Nature Conservancy released a joint statement:

"While we haven't yet engaged on the details of the list, we are encouraged to see this first Funded Priorities List moving forward into the public comment period, and we congratulate the RESTORE Council and staff for their efforts to reach this point. The RESTORE Act is focused on comprehensive restoration for the Gulf of Mexico, and our organizations are eager to see strong projects progress to actual construction and implementation.

"With a final BP settlement on the horizon, the RESTORE Council and the Gulf states have a tremendous opportunity ahead to plan for and achieve meaningful restoration and lasting resilience for the essential ecosystems of the Gulf. Our organizations look forward to reviewing and providing comments on this first project list over the coming weeks and working with the Council on the next, more comprehensive FPL process."

Bethany Carl Kraft, director of Ocean Conservancy's Gulf Restoration Program said that the FPL marked an important step in the process of choosing which projects to fund through the RESTORE Act.

"While we are still reviewing the details of the draft list, we are encouraged by the approach they seem to be taking, including foundational investments in science and a commitment to funding projects that will begin to address the stressors that prevent our environment from functioning at its full potential," Kraft said in a news release. "The Council appears to have put politics aside, choosing to focus on prioritizing projects by watershed rather than by political boundary, but have unfortunately left out any consideration of the offshore waters of the Gulf of Mexico.

"The success of coastal restoration is intrinsically linked to a healthy marine ecosystem. We encourage the Council to extend their comprehensive approach beyond the salt line."

As established by the RESTORE Act, the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council will handle one portion of the Clean Water Act fine money paid by BP and other companies responsible for the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill. In Alabama, it is often referred to as the federal council to differentiate it from the state RESTORE council, which will administer Alabama's portion of the Clean Water Act fine money.

Government officials recently announced a settlement agreement with BP that set the final Clean Water Act fine amount at $5.5 billion, to be paid out in increments over 18 years. If that settlement is finalized as is, the federal council would receive approximately $1.32 billion in total to be put toward comprehensive ecosystem restoration projects, as laid out in the legislation.

Public comments on this draft FPL can be lodged online, or by mailing or emailing the Restoration Council. The deadline for making comments is Sept. 28. There will also be a series of public meetings to discuss the FPL across the Gulf Coast, including one at Mobile's Battle House Renaissance hotel on Sept. 1 at 6 p.m.

A shelter-in-place order has been lifted following a chemical spill of the dangerous isocyanate Wednesday night at Norcold Inc. in Sidney, Australia


Shelter order lifted in Norcold chemical spill


A member of a Shelby County regional hazmat unit works at the Norcold plant in Sidney on Wednesday night, Aug. 12, 2015, where a chemical spill occurred. (Jim Noelker/Staff)


Breaking News Staff

SIDNEY, AU —


UPDATE @ 2:25 a.m. Aug. 13: A shelter-in-place order has been lifted following a chemical spill Wednesday night at Norcold Inc., Sidney police dispatch confirmed.

There were no injuries reported, and residents and businesses in the area can resume normal activities.

UPDATE @ 10:30 p.m.: The chemical spill at Norcold Inc. has triggered a shelter-in-place order until further notice for residents living within a mile radius south of the facility, Sidney Fire Chief Brad Jones said.

The spill of the liquid form of isocyanate, used for expanded foam insulation inside air conditioning units, prompted the order because of the wind direction, Jones said.

Crews aren’t sure of the size of the spill, he said, and there have been no reported injuries, but the spill was large enough to trigger the order that residents close all windows and doors and have no open flames in their homes until further notice.

According to the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, isocyanates are a family of highly reactive, low molecular weight chemicals. They are widely used in the manufacture of flexible and rigid foams, fibers, coatings such as paints and varnishes, and elastomers, and are increasingly used in the automobile industry, autobody repair, and building insulation materials.

Isocyanates are powerful irritants to the mucous membranes of the eyes and gastrointestinal and respiratory tracts, according to NIOSH. Direct skin contact can also cause marked inflammation. Isocyanates can also sensitize workers, making them subject to severe asthma attacks if they are exposed again.

Death from severe asthma in some sensitized subjects has been reported.

NIOSH advises that workers potentially exposed to isocyanates who experience persistent or recurring eye irritation, nasal congestion, dry or sore throat, cold-like symptoms, cough, shortness of breath, wheezing, or chest tightness should see a physician knowledgeable in work-related health problems.

Chief Jones said the call reporting the spill inside the facility came in at 7:43 p.m., and first-arriving crews helped plant officials in isolating the spill. A regional hazmat unit and fire crews from Anna, Lockington and Port Jefferson were dispatched to assist the Sidney crews.

“We’re evaluating the situation,” Jones said. “We’re in the process of making it safe for the citizens of Shelby County and the city of Sidney. Once we have it secured and safe, we’ll hand it back over to the business owner.”

FIRST REPORT

Fire crews and a hazmat unit are at a chemical spill at Norcold Inc., a maker of RV gas/electric absorption refrigerators.

Crews were dispatched to the facility, 600 S. Kuther Road. sometime before 8 p.m.

Sidney Fire Chief Brad Jones said the building has been evacuated, mutual aid fire/rescue units are on scene as is the Shelby County Hazardous Materials Team.

“We’ve identified the chemical,” Jones said, declining to go into any detail.

There are no reports of any injuries.

Norcold is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Thetford Corporation. Headquartered in Ann Arbor, Mich., Thetford is the world’s leading supplier of sanitation and refrigeration products for the RV, marine and heavy-duty truck industries.

It is a privately-held company with seven manufacturing facilities in four nations.

We will stay on the scene and update this report as information becomes available. - See more at: http://www.whio.com/news/news/local/chemical-spill-reported-at-norcold-in-sidney/nnJWS/#sthash.liaP0w9K.dpuf

An oil pipeline leak sparked a fire in the Moscow River.


Moscow River In Flames




By MarEx 2015-08-13 10:20:12 

An oil pipeline leak sparked a fire in the Moscow River. According to reports, pillars of smoke could be seen up to 10 miles away. There were no deaths, but three people, including one child, are being treated for respiratory tract issues. The pipeline is owned by the Transneft oil pipeline company.

Authorities are still investigating the cause of the fire. Rescue workers say the flames were sparked after a nearby grass fire reached the spill.

Gazprom Neft, Moscow’s state-run oil refinery, says its operations have been unaffected by the fire. 

VIDEO ( WARNING: GRAPHIC.): Denmark Allows Slaughter of Pilot Whales on the Faroe Islands. 490 pilot whales have been killed in the archipelago since June. Boycott Danish Products to Force them to Stop the Killing of the Mammals





Denmark Pilot Whale Slaughter

By MarEx 2015-08-13 15:19:19 

Sea Shepherd crews were arrested for interfering with the slaughter of pilot whales on the Faroe Islands known as the “grindadráp.” Yesterday’s slaughter at Sandavágur is the fifth of the year in the Faroe Islands and a total of 490 pilot whales have been killed in the archipelago since June.

The practice of killing of pilot whales is protected by Denmark, which allows the practice of “grindadráp.” The images of the July 23 slaughter and arrests Sea Shepherd crews for trying to stop the killing got worldwide attention. 

About 12 Sea Shepherd volunteers have been arrested in the Faroe Islands.
Sea Shepherd has been leading opposition to the grindadráp since the 1980s. Operation Sleppid Grindini is the organization’s sixth pilot whale defense campaign in the Faroe Islands.

On August 12, a Sea Shepherd boat arrived on the scene as the pod of whales was being driven to the killing beach on the island of Vágar. The boat disrupted the hunt, maneuvering between the flotilla of boats that had surrounded the whale pod. The Sea Shepherd boat managed to re-direct the pod, causing great confusion to the hunt.

Meanwhile, on the beach, five more Sea Shepherd volunteers ran into the water in order to position themselves between the whales and the awaiting hunters. All five were tackled by police and dragged back to the sand where they were handcuffed.

Initial reports said the pod as large as 200, but about 61 pilot whales were dragged onto the beach and eventually slaughtered. The frenzied killing of the whale pod took two hours. The Faroe Islands tourist industry is linked to the latest slaughter as it sells Atlantic Airways helicopter services to transport people that want to participate in the killings from the islands in the archipelago.

The location was reported by local authorities who gave the green light for the hunt to proceed.

Last week, two major German cruise-liner companies, AIDA and Hapag-Lloyd, announced that they would be cancelling upcoming trips to the Faroe Islands because of the impact of the grindadráp, and the law that protects the slaughter, on its customers. Already, this backlash from the tourism industry is estimated to have caused a loss of 6,000 tourists to the archipelago.

The August 12 slaughter at Sandavágur is the fifth of the year in the Faroe Islands. A total of 490 pilot whales have been killed in the archipelago since June.

On July 23, more than 250 pilot whales were slaughtered on the killing beaches of Bøur and Tórshavn in two separate grindadráps. Five Sea Shepherd volunteers were arrested that day for standing up in the defense of the whales. All five, four of whom are citizens of the European Union, have since been charged with breaching the Pilot Whaling Act and with public disturbance.

The only way to stop the killing of the mammals is by boycotting all Danish products.  It works every time.

EPA Releases Plan to Address Pollution at San German Toxic Site in PR

Release Date: 08/13/2015
Contact Information: Brenda Reyes, (787) 977-5869, reyes.brenda@epa.gov

      (New York, N.Y.) The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has proposed a plan to address contaminated soil and groundwater at the San German Groundwater Contamination Superfund Site in San German, P.R. Sampling at the site showed that public water supply wells, soil and groundwater were contaminated with volatile organic compounds, including PCE, a widely used solvent in industrial processes. Exposure to PCE can have serious health impacts, including liver damage and increased risk of cancer.
      After discovering the contamination, the Puerto Rico Department of Health ordered the wells closed in 2006. Area residents are connected to safe sources of drinking water from other municipal water supplies in the area.
      The EPA will hold a public meeting to explain the proposed plan on August 19, 2015 at 6:00 p.m. at Santa Marta Basketball Court, Parque de Santa Marta, Carr. 102 Km 32.9 Interior, Urbanizacion Santa Marta San German, PR. Written comments will be accepted until September 11, 2015.
      The San German Groundwater Contamination Superfund Site includes the Retiro Industrial Park, and adjacent areas. Over 44 nearby industrial sites were part of the EPA’s investigation. The cleanup of the site has been divided into two phases. The first phase addresses contaminated soil and shallow, highly contaminated groundwater because they act as an ongoing source of contamination for a broader area of groundwater. The second phase deals with contamination of groundwater throughout the site.
      The proposed plan addresses the areas that are the potential source of PCE contamination in the soil and the groundwater. The EPA is proposing a combination of systems that use pumps and other methods to remove pollutants from the most contaminated areas of soil and groundwater. Prior to installing these systems, the EPA will conduct a study to determine exactly how the system should be designed.
      The EPA will also determine if the site needs to install caps on portions of the land to limit the ability of rainwater to soak into the ground. Throughout the process, the EPA will monitor the groundwater and soil to ensure the effectiveness of the cleanup plan.
      In addition, the EPA is investigating whether vapors from the groundwater and soil may have gotten into buildings on and near the site. This investigation is ongoing and the EPA will install ventilation systems in buildings where needed.
      Written comments on the EPA’s proposed plan may be mailed or emailed to: Adalberto Bosque, PhD, MBA, Remedial Project Manager, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, City View Plaza II - Suite 7000, 48 RD, 165 Km. 1.2, Guaynabo, PR 00968-8069, telephone: 787-977-5825, email: bosque.adalberto@epa.gov.
To view the proposed plan, please visit: http://www.epa.gov/region02/superfund/npl/sangerman.

No Injuries After NOx Leak At Brazilian Miner Vale’s Acid Plant In Copper Cliff in Toronto, Canada




Posted on August 13, 2015 by Angela.Gemmill




By Angela Gemmill

The Nitrogen oxide and nitrogen dioxide has dissipated around Copper Cliff after a leak at Vale’s Acid Plant early this morning.

The mining company enacted a Level 3 Emergency and sounded the air horns just after 6am to notify nearby residents.

That was downgraded to a Level 1 just before 8:30 as the wind speed and weather prevented the chemicals from traveling outside the town boundaries.

No one was injured since Vale was on a planned maintenance period and there were few staff around.

Anyone exposed to nitrogen oxide could experience nose, throat, eye, skin or respiratory irritation.

A news conference is scheduled for 1pm at the Lionel E Lalonde Centre in Azilda to provide local media with more information.





///------------------///






Vale says emergency at Copper Cliff smelter over 4




Thursday, August 13, 2015 10:51:27 EDT AM



MR 55 was closed heading to Copper Cliff because of leak at Vale. John Lappa/The Sudbury Star/Postmedia Network




UPDATE: Vale, police, health unit and city staff have scheduled a media briefing for 1 p.m. Watch this site and Friday's Sudbury Star for full coverage.

....

Vale has given the all clear following a dangerous leak at its Copper Cliff operations early Thursday.

“During the planned maintenance period of the Vale Acid Plant in Copper Cliff, there was a release of nitrogen oxide and nitrogen dioxide (NOx) mist,” the company said in a release.

“Emergency measures were activated and as a precaution, a Level 3 emergency was called. The emergency air horn was sounded at approximately 6 a.m.to notify residents in the nearby area.

“Emergency and Vale personnel are now satisfied that the NOx mist has dissipated given the wind speed and weather conditions and there is no risk of additional substance traveling beyond company boundaries. Therefore, there is no risk to the community. The Level 3 emergency therefore was declared ‘all clear’ at 8:26 a.m.

“There are no reported injuries as a result of this incident.”

Vale said if a person is exposed to a NOx, symptoms can include nose, throat, eye, skin and respiratory irritation.

“If these symptoms should occur, a person should find fresh air and flush any irritated area with water,” the company said. “If symptoms persist, a person should seek medical attention.”

In a Level 3 emergency, “all residents are asked to remain indoors, close all doors and windows and turn off all furnaces, air conditioners and any other air intakes. Residents must remain inside until an ‘all clear message’ is broadcast and the air horn has stopped."

Roads around Copper Cliff had initially been closed, but are now open.

"Nitrogen dioxide affects the respiratory system and can be fatal in large doses,” Greater Sudbury Police said in a release.

A spokesman for Vale told Reuters the incident would not have an impact production as the leak occurred just as Vale was beginning a scheduled maintenance shutdown at the nickel smelter.

"It looks at this point in time like it may be related to some of the shutdown work that was being done," said Cory McPhee a spokesman for Vale in Canada. "Until we're able to investigate further, I can't say with any degree of certainty."

Vale initially declared a Level 3 emergency at the site, but it has now downgraded that to Level 2, meaning that it now only affects the plant, and it is safe for residents in the area to go outside, said McPhee.

Broadcaster CBC earlier reported a yellow plume was visible above the Vale complex - and that cars were being directed away from the smelter.

"The cloud is dissipating. The levels that we registered throughout the event were very low," said McPhee, adding that Vale has not received reports of any adverse effects outside the plant.

A Texas family is suing several companies involved in fracking after their water well exploded, injuring all four of them.




Family Burned by Explosion of Well Contaminated by Fracking


 
Thursday, August 13, 2015
 

Fracking operation (photo: Mladen Antonov, AFP/Getty Images)

A Texas family is suing several companies involved in fracking after their water well exploded, injuring all four of them.

In August 2014, Cody Murray and his father, Jim, went to inspect the family’s pump house after seeing pressurized water spraying from it. Upon entering the building and turning on a switch, a fireball erupted from inside the well. Cody sustained serious burns on his arms, upper back, neck, forehead and nose after pulling his father away from the explosion, which caused serious injuries to Jim, Cody’s wife and his 4-year-old daughter.

Cody says he is unable to work and may never be able to do so again.

Their attorneys say the explosion was caused by methane gas that leaked into the well from nearby fracking operations run by the defendants, EOG Resources, Fairway Resources LLC and three Fairway subsidiaries. Fairway Resources GP, LLC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Goldman Sachs, according to Courthouse News Service.

“This is a tragic case arising from the flash explosion of a private water well that had been contaminated with methane as a result of the defendants’ drilling and extraction activities,” the complaint states.

The Murrays, who live in Perrin, 35 miles west of Fort Worth, are seeking actual and punitive damages for negligence, trespass, nuisance, lost wages, physical impairment, pain and suffering, continuing medical care, disfigurement and loss of consortium.

“Rigorous scientific testing, including isotope testing, has conclusively demonstrated that the high-level methane contamination of the Murrays’ water well resulted from natural gas drilling and extraction activities,” the complaint states. “The high levels of methane in the Murrays’ well were not ‘naturally occurring.’”

-Noel Brinkerhoff

6 dead in offshore Bristow Helicopters crash in Nigeria






For illustration purposes
For illustration purposes
Bristow Helicopters (Nigeria) Limited today confirmed that six people have been killed in an offshore helicopter accident in Nigeria. 

Bristow Helicopters said that the aircraft, that was involved in an accident in Lagos, Nigeria, on August 12, 2015, carried 10 passengers and a crew of two. The company now confirmed that there were six survivors and six fatalities.

According to Bristow Helicopters, the Bristow flight crew was among the fatalities, comprised of Captain Joseph “Jay” Wyatt of Oklahoma, U.S., and First Officer Peter Bello, of Nigeria.

The company said that Captain Wyatt joined Bristow in 2006 and has spent his entire career flying with Bristow Helicopters out of Africa. First Officer Peter Bello joined Bristow in 2014 after graduating from Bristow Academy’s helicopter flight school. Bristow noted that both crewmen were experienced and qualified.

“We are shaken and deeply saddened by this tragic accident,” said Bristow’s Regional Director Africa, Duncan Moore. “Our thoughts and prayers go out to the families, friends and loved ones of all those on board.”

According to its press statement, Bristow has mobilized the full resources of its response team and is working closely with authorities on the investigation, including at the accident site to recover the aircraft. Medical treatment is being provided to those who are injured and trained coordinators have been assigned to the families of the crew members and passengers to support them with their every need and ensure that they receive the most current information and assistance.

“Bristow Nigeria would like to express its appreciation for the help and support it has received from the NCAA, the NAIB, NEMA and other industry stakeholders. The company would also like to thank the Lagos State Government and the traditional ruler and people of the community where the accident took place,” the company noted in the statement.

Shipments of oil and iron ore were disrupted at the northern Chinese port of Tianjin after a blast killed at least 50 people and injured hundreds.







Smoke rises over the site of the explosions at the Binhai new district in Tianjin August 13, 2015. REUTERS/Jason Lee
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Smoke rises over the site of the explosions at the Binhai new district in Tianjin August 13, 2015. REUTERS/Jason Lee

Tianjin Port Blast Disrupts Oil Tankers, Iron Ore


By Bloomberg News

(Bloomberg) — Shipments of oil and iron ore were disrupted at the northern Chinese port of Tianjin after a blast killed at least 44 people and injured hundreds.

Oil tankers and vessels carrying “hazardous products” are barred from calling at the port after multiple explosions rocked the city on Wednesday, according to a post from the official microblog of the Tianjin Maritime Safety Administration at 11:22 a.m. local time Thursday. BHP Billiton Ltd. and Rio Tinto Group said iron ore shipments were disrupted, while another vessel was prevented from loading steel.

Tianjin is the 10th-busiest container port globally and has become a northern gateway for shipments of ore, coal, automobiles and oil into China, the world’s biggest user of energy, metals and grains. About 17 percent of the nation’s ethylene imports, 15 percent of its wheat deliveries and 30 percent of steel exports in the first half of 2015 were transported via the Tianjin customs area, government data show.

“The blast will have some direct impact to port operators and commodities importers and exporters in the near term,” said Helen Lau, an analyst at Argonaut Securities (Asia) Ltd. in Hong Kong. “It will have little impact to commodities prices and imports as other ports across China’s eastern coastline, especially those ports in nearby Shandong and Hebei provinces, could easily digest the capacity Tianjin may not be able to handle.”
BHP Shipments

Total throughput at Tianjin rose 10 percent in 2014 to 445.8 million metric tons, according to Hong Kong-listed Tianjin Port Development Holdings Ltd. It handled 110.5 million tons of metal ore, 88.9 million tons of coal and 18.7 million tons of crude oil, the equivalent of 375,000 barrels a day. China National Offshore Oil Corp.’s Tianjin FLNG, the nation’s first floating liquefied natural gas terminal, is nearby.

BHP Billiton, the world’s biggest miner, is working with customers to minimize the potential impact from the disruptions to its iron ore shipments, the company said in an e-mailed statement. There was no damage to its discharging berths at the port, it said.

Rio Tinto said its five vessels anchored in the harbor were unaffected by the blast. The company said five fully-laden bulk carriers are being re-routed, without specifying where to or what would happen to future shipments.
Material damage to the port could result in meaningful short-term disruptions to iron ore deliveries as well as lost or damaged stockpiles, according to Clarksons Platou Securities, an investment bank that focuses on the energy, shipping and oil- service industries.

Chinese Refineries

China Petroleum & Chemical Corp.’s Tianjin and Yanshan refineries may be affected if the outage lasts, according to Amy Sun, an analyst with Shanghai-based commodities researcher ICIS China.

A spokesman for the company, known as Sinopec, said its refinery near Tianjin was operating normally and that it didn’t see any immediate impact to plant logistics. The refinery has capacity of 251,000 barrels a day, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.

The port area is also home to manufacturing facilities, including construction-equipment makers Deere & Co. and Caterpillar Inc. Deere’s east campus at Tianjin had broken windows, according to an e-mail from spokesman Ken Golden. Lisa Miller, a Caterpillar spokeswoman in Peoria, Illinois, said the company had no updates on the situation in Tianjin.

Operations at PetroChina Co.’s Dagang refinery that’s in the southern part of Tianjin municipality aren’t affected, according to a spokesman. He declined to comment further.

The late-night blasts Wednesday, which may have been the result of a fire, spewed toxic material into the air and shattered windows in buildings for kilometers around. China’s earthquake center said the biggest explosion was equivalent to a 2.9-magnitude temblor.

Lack of standard power line markings led to a helicopter colliding with wires near Sept-ÃŽles, Quebec, in May 2014

Aviation Investigation Report A14Q0060

The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) investigated this occurrence for the purpose of advancing transportation safety. It is not the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or criminal liability.

Collision with wires
Héli-Boréal inc.
Eurocopter AS 350 BA (Helicopter), C-FHPC
Sept-ÃŽles, Quebec, 35 nm N

Summary

On 13 May 2014, the Héli-Boréal inc. Eurocopter AS 350 BA helicopter (registration C-FHPC, serial number 2395) was on a flight to inspect power-line vegetation encroachment with a pilot and an observer on board. The flight surveyed a 25-kilovolt power distribution line, which ran adjacent to a service road leading to Hydro-Québec’s Sainte-Marguerite power dam. While completing a right turn in a valley, the pilot noticed a 315-kilovolt power transmission line crossing perpendicular to the direction of flight. The right turn was increased to avoid the transmission line, but one of the helicopter’s main rotor blades struck the lower wire. The resulting damage to the rotor blade caused severe vibrations, which made it difficult to control the helicopter. While on approach to land in a small clearing under the 315-kilovolt transmission line, the helicopter’s skid gear contacted trees. The helicopter rolled to the left and fell approximately 50 feet through the trees, coming to rest on its left side in the snow. Both occupants sustained serious injuries, yet were able to exit the aircraft. The helicopter was substantially damaged. The 406-megahertz emergency locator transmitter activated on impact. The Cospas-Sarsat International Satellite System for Search and Rescue did not receive a signal until 25 minutes after the accident. There was no post-impact fire. The accident occurred in daylight hours at 1020 Eastern Daylight Time.
Le présent rapport est également disponible en français.

1.0 Factual information

1.1 History of the flight

On 13 May 2014, Héli-Boréal inc. (Héli-Boréal) operated a charter flight for Hydro-Québec using an AS 350 BA helicopter. The objective of the flight was to survey for encroachment of vegetation along a 25-kilovolt (kV) power distribution line in the area of Hydro-Québec's Sainte‑Marguerite (SM3) power plant.
At 0955,Footnote 1 the pilot and an Hydro-Québec employee (observer) departed SM3 to begin the distribution line survey flight. The survey was conducted at an altitude of about 50 feet above ground level along the right side of the road that was adjacent to the distribution line (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Survey route showing location of wire strike (Source: Google Earth, with TSB annotations)
While following the distribution line around a hill (arrow, Figure 1), the observer noticed the 315 kV power transmission lineFootnote 2 wires that crossed over and above the distribution line ahead. The observer indicated to the pilot that the survey was complete for that section. At that moment, the pilot noticed the transmission line straight ahead, running perpendicular to their flight path (Figure 2). The pilot immediately initiated a right turn to avoid a collision; but 1 main rotor blade hit one of the lower wires of the transmission line, was damaged, and this caused subsequent vibrations in the helicopter. The area under the transmission line was covered with mature trees, with a small cleared path approximately 6 metres wide directly below and parallel to the line. The pilot had limited control of the helicopter and attempted to slow the helicopter for a forced landing along the path. The helicopter's skid impacted the trees just short of the path, and the helicopter rolled to the left, descended into the trees, and came to rest on its left side. The cockpit was destroyed, and the pilot was suspended in the seat above the observer, who was in his seat against the snow-covered ground. The pilot quickly shut down the engine.
Figure 2. Intersection of distribution and transmission lines
Having been able to release both their seat belts, the pilot assisted the observer out of the wreckage. After locating the satellite phone, the pilot moved away from the helicopter to get a satellite signal and contacted Héli-Boréal's base at approximately 1030. The pilot used a thermal blanket located in the helicopter to keep the observer warm. Fifteen minutes later, the pilot proceeded toward the road where an Hydro-Québec vehicle was seen driving by about 150 metres away. The pilot managed to reach the road and met an Hydro-Québec employee who was working nearby. In the meantime, Hydro-Québec rescuers from the SM3 power plant were dispatched to the accident site, where they met the pilot at approximately 1050. Both the pilot and the observer were transported to hospital with serious injuries.

1.2 Injuries to persons

Table 1. Injuries to persons
  Crew Passengers Others Total
Fatal 0 0 0 0
Serious 1 1 0 2
Minor/None 0 0 0 0
Total 1 1 0 2

1.3 Damage to aircraft

One of the main rotor blades was significantly damaged when it struck the transmission wire.
The cockpit, instrument panel, radio console, and cabin roof were destroyed during the helicopter's descent through the trees and impact with the ground. All of the rotor blades separated at the main rotor head during the impact with terrain.
The pilot seat back separated, but kept supporting the pilot by the seat belt. The passenger seat broke from the floor seat track attachments. The helicopter was destroyed in the sequence of impact (Photo 1).
Photo 1. Impact site (Source: Héli-Boréal)

1.4 Other damage

Approximately 220 litres of Jet A-1 fuel spilled and were absorbed into the ground around the helicopter.
The lower wire of the transmission line was severed by one of the main rotor blades and fell on the distribution line, which caused a power loss in the electrical distribution system.

1.5 Personnel information

Table 2. Pilot information
  Pilot-in-command
Licence Commercial helicopter pilot
Medical expiry date 01 June 2015
Total flying hours (rotary-wing aircraft) 5847
Hours in the last last 90 days 72
Hours on type 4454
Hours on duty prior to accident 2.5
Hours off duty prior to work period 15
The pilot had been Héli-Boréal's chief training pilot since 2010.Footnote 3 Records indicate that the pilot was certified and qualified for the flight in accordance with existing regulations. There was no indication that fatigue, incapacitation, or physiological factors affected the pilot's performance.

1.6 Aircraft information

1.6.1 General

The Eurocopter AS 350 BA is a single-engine, single-pilot, Turbomeca turbine-powered helicopter with 6 seats and a maximum gross weight of 4630 pounds. It has 1 main rotor with 3 blades made of composite material.
Records indicate that the helicopter was certified, equipped, and maintained in accordance with existing regulations and approved procedures, and that there were no known deficiencies before the occurrence flight.
The investigation determined that the helicopter's weight and centre of gravity were within the prescribed limits.

1.6.2 Emergency locator transmitter

The helicopter was equipped with a Kannad model AF-COMPACT, 406-megahertz (MHz) emergency locator transmitter (ELT). The ELT was installed in the right rear baggage compartment, and its antenna was located on top of the main rotor transmission deck.
When activated, a 406 MHz ELT will transmit for a quarter of a second immediately, and then transmit a digital burst once every 50 seconds. The quality and strength of the signal can be affected by objects and antenna position. The Cospas-Sarsat International Satellite System for Search and Rescue (Cospas-Sarsat) Programme is a satellite-based search and rescue distress alert detection and information distribution system. According to its website:Footnote 4
To reach the Cospas-Sarsat satellites the beacon must have a relatively unobstructed view of the sky. A submerged beacon, or one with its antenna blocked by the body of an aircraft or vessel, is unlikely to be received by the satellites. Similarly, it may take longer to detect a beacon activated, for example, in a canyon as there may be a delay before a satellite passes within view overhead.
Examination of the helicopter revealed that the ELT was selected to the ARM position. No damage was noted on the ELT, the antenna, or the connecting wire. The helicopter came to rest with the antenna in the horizontal position. The antenna was shielded by the cowlings and trees. Cospas-Sarsat satellites received an ELT signal 25 minutes after the impact.

1.6.3 Fuel

When the helicopter took off from the Sept-ÃŽles, Quebec, base, it was fuelled to its full capacity of 540 litres. At the time of the accident, there was about 70% (or 370 litres) of fuel left on board, enough for about 2 hours of flying time.

1.7 Meteorological information

The 1000 aviation routine weather report (METAR) for Sept-ÃŽles, about 35 nautical miles (nm) southeast of the accident site, recorded the weather as surface wind 360° True, variable 290° to 030° at 8 knots, and surface visibility 30 statute miles (sm) in clear sky conditions. According to the graphic forecast area, the weather was forecast to be clear sky in the area. The weather was not considered a factor in this occurrence.

1.8 Aids to navigation

The Héli-Boréal company operations manual (COM) requires that pertinent charts be on board. The company used visual flight rules (VFR) navigational charts (VNC). The current VNC applicable for the area was the AIR 5010 Chicoutimi, Edition 14, issued October 2010. The VNC for Chicoutimi was not carried on board during the accident flight, as the pilot was very familiar with the area, nor was it required by regulations.
NAV CANADA publishes the VNCs for Canadian airspace in accordance with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standard Annex 4.Footnote 5, Footnote 6
ICAO Annex 4, Section 17.7.4, states, “Natural and cultural landmarks, such as bridges, prominent transmission lines […] when considered to be of importance for visual air navigation, should be shown.”Footnote 7
Section 17.9.3.2 states “When considered of importance to visual flight, prominent transmission lines, […] which are obstacles, shall be shown.”Footnote 8
NAV CANADA updates aeronautical information products such as the VNCs using a combination of federal, provincial, private, and commercial data. In 2009, NAV CANADA started digitalizing this informationFootnote 9 to enable the use of digital cartography to maintain charts. Cartography is a human process which involves making decisions on the portrayal of information; on occasion, certain features may not be included. This process is governed largely by the purpose of the products being generated. According to ICAO, all structures over 300 feet high are considered obstacles and must be shown on a VNC. NAV CANADA considers that reference to a man-made feature below that limit is for navigation purposes rather than obstacle avoidance. Not all obstacles will be shown, as it is impracticable to guarantee all obstacles have been included, and not all geographical or aeronautical features can be shown.
The VNC AIR 5010 Chicoutimi chart did not show the 315 kV transmission line, even though the transmission line had been in place for more than 15 years. The 315 kV transmission line was less than 300 feet high.
NAV CANADA is the official provider of Canadian VNC data to numerous electronic digital navigation system manufacturers.
NAV CANADA receives obstacle information on a voluntary basis, as it does not have the legal authority to mandate individual parties to provide that information. According to the Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs) Standard 621, Chapter 1.2, “Any person planning to erect an obstruction should also provide information to Nav Canada, using the ‘Land Use Proposal Submission Form' […].”Footnote 10
Furthermore, any individual who notices a discrepancy in the charts can inform NAV CANADA so that it may be addressed. The investigation noted discrepancies in other VNCs, which were brought to the attention of NAV CANADA and addressed.
Another way that NAV CANADA gathers information is to request data from individual parties, such as Hydro-Québec. The investigation revealed that NAV CANADA had made a few requests to Hydro-Québec for information on transmission lines within the last 3 years with mixed results. As the exchange of information is voluntary, NAV CANADA is limited to making the request.
During the occurrence flight, the observer used a global positioning system (GPS) to record areas where vegetation encroached along power lines. The observer also carried detailed geographical charts that identified Hydro-Québec's infrastructure, including transmission lines and towers. These charts were carried in case of GPS failure. Although aware of these charts, the pilot did not use them for navigation.

1.9 Communications

N/A

1.10 Aerodrome information

N/A

1.11 Flight recorders

The helicopter was not equipped with a flight data recorder or a cockpit voice recorder, nor was either required by regulations.

1.12 Wreckage and impact information

The airframe wreckage was examined, and no indication was found of any pre-accident anomaly or malfunction with the flight controls, the drive train, or other aircraft system that could have contributed to the accident.
The cockpit canopy, doors, instrument panel, instrument console, and windshield were ripped off the cabin and found under the cabin floor.

1.13 Medical and pathological information

N/A

1.14 Fire

There was no post-impact fire.

1.15 Survival aspects

1.15.1 General

The helicopter's cabin roof was ripped off the cabin aft wall and floor structures during the fall. The helicopter was on its left side on the snow-covered ground. Both the pilot and the passenger front seats failed by lateral loads at impact and held occupants in their position.
After falling about 50 feet, the helicopter impacted the frozen ground, with both the pilot and the observer held in their seats by the 4-point safety belt system. The pilot's seat back fractured and separated near the seat base. The observer's seat broke free of the cabin floor in a lateral direction to the left (Photo 2).
Photo 2. C-FHPC cabin floor (Source: Héli-Boréal)
The injuries sustained by both occupants were caused by the breakup of the cockpit and cabin roof during the fall through the trees.

1.15.2 Flight helmets

The pilot was wearing a flight helmet, but it came off the pilot's head during the impact.
Examination of the helmet revealed several impact marks visible on the left side and at the top of the helmet. The sun-visor part of the helmet showed 2 severe scratches starting from the left cheek and temple and going toward the left eye and the nose. Photo 3 and Photo 4 show the helmet condition after impact damage. The visor was cracked and scratched by impact loads on its surface. Examination of the helmet chin strap webbing material adjacent to the visor showed severe rubbing marks. However, it could not be determined how the helmet had come off the pilot's head.
Photo 3. Pilot's helmet impact damage to left side visor (Source: Héli-Boréal)
Photo 4. Pilot's helmet close-up view of the left side visor with impact damage (Source: Héli-Boréal)
The second most-frequently injured area of the body in survivable helicopter crashes is the head.Footnote 11 According to United States military research, the risk of fatal head injuries can be as much as 6 times greater for helicopter occupants not wearing head protection.Footnote 12 The effects of non–fatal head injuries range from momentary confusion and inability to concentrate, to full loss of consciousness.Footnote 13 Incapacitation can compromise a pilot's ability to escape quickly from a helicopter and assist passengers in an emergency evacuation or survival situation.
In 1988, the United States National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) reviewed 59 emergency medical services (EMS) aviation accidents that occurred between 11 May 1978 and 03 December 1986. This study resulted in NTSB's recommendations A-88-009 to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and A-88-014 to the American Society of Hospital Based Emergency Aeromedical Service asking them to require that flight crew and medical personnel wear protective helmets, and encourage them to do so, to reduce the chance of injury and death.
Transport Canada recognized the safety benefits of using head protection in its 1998 Safety of Air Taxi Operations Task Force (SATOPS) report, in which it committed to implementing the following recommendations:
Recommend Transport Canada continue to promote in the Aviation Safety VortexFootnote 14 newsletter the safety benefits of helicopter pilots wearing helmets, especially in aerial work operations, and promote flight training units to encourage student pilots to wear helmets.Footnote 15
In addition, SATOPS directed the following recommendation to air operators:
Recommend that helicopter air operators, especially aerial work operators, encourage their pilots to wear helmets, that commercial helicopter pilots wear helmets and that flight training units encourage student helicopter pilots to wear helmets.Footnote 16
The TSB has documented a number of occurrencesFootnote 17 where the use of head protection likely would have reduced or prevented the injuries sustained by the pilot. There is no regulation requiring helicopter pilots to wear head protection.
TSB Aviation Investigation Report A09A0016 found that despite the well-documented safety benefits and the challenging nature of helicopter flying, the majority of helicopter pilots continue to fly without head protection. Likewise, the investigation found that most Canadian helicopter operators do not actively promote or require the use of head protection by company pilots.
On 27 June 2011, in recognition of the benefits of head protection, a resolution passed by the Helicopter Association of Canada (HAC) Board of Directors stated that:
HAC strongly recommends to its Operator-Members that they should promote the use of helmets for helicopter flight crew members under all operational circumstances which permit their use. HAC also points out, however, that certain pilot/aircraft type configurations may preclude safe helmet use.
At Héli-Boréal, although there is no written company policy for the use of a helmet, approximately 80% of the pilots own and wear them.

1.16 Tests and research

The TSB laboratory was provided with the observer's handheld GPS, which was used to document the region covered. The TSB laboratory downloaded the GPS data for the accident flight, and investigated the time delay between the GPS time of the accident and the time the ELT signal was received at the Canadian Mission Control Centre (CMCC).
The GPS data download indicated the flight track and the position of the accident under the 315 kV transmission power line at 1020:51. The CMCC occurrence ELT case report showed an initial satellite reception at 1045:38, which corresponds to a delay of about 25 minutes with the GPS time. The TSB laboratory concluded that a combination of ELT signal attenuation due to the helicopter location under the forest canopy and data signal degradation due to the antenna being in the horizontal position and shielded under the helicopter cowlings may have resulted in the time delay in decoding the ELT signal by the satellite system.

1.16.1 TSB laboratory reports

The TSB completed the following laboratory report in support of this investigation:
  • LP105/2014 – GPS [global positioning system] Analysis

1.17 Organizational and management information

1.17.1 General

Héli-Boréal operates 7 helicopters (6 Eurocopter AS 350 and 1 EC120) and 2 fixed-wing aircraft (Beech King Air 90 and Cessna 206U), and holds a valid Air Operator Certificate. Its base is located about 7 nm northwest of Sept-ÃŽles. The helicopters are operated under Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs) Subpart 703 - Air Taxi Operations.
The majority of the flights that Héli-Boréal performs are for Hydro-Québec, and are for construction, inspection, and maintenance projects.

Although not yet required by regulations, Héli-Boréal has adopted an in-house safety management system (SMS), in which the president of the company is the accountable executive. Since Héli-Boréal is a small organization, all employees are involved in the discussions of reported unsafe conditions and take action through an informal process. The SMS management team, which consists of the president, chief pilot, director of operations, and director of maintenance, meet formally and informally to address safety issues as topics arise.
In April 2014, a Héli-Boréal helicopter collided with a communication tower guy wire. The company immediately initiated an SMS investigation and implemented corrective action, including additional training on the dangers of low-altitude flying. This training presentation, developed by the chief training pilot (13 May 2014 occurrence pilot), covered the identification of visual cues and markings near power lines and towers, the dangers associated with different phases of flight, the methods to approach power lines, and the importance of remaining vigilant to hazards inherent to low-altitude operations. This presentation was given to all company pilots, and indicated that the occurrence pilot was well informed and trained in the dangers of low-level flying.

1.17.2 Regulatory oversight

Transport Canada (TC) develops and administers policies and regulations for the civil aviation system. Its aviation safety program aims to control the risks at acceptable levels through a systemic approach. The introduction of SMS in the aviation industry is fundamentally changing the way TC approaches its oversight responsibilities.
Traditional surveillance methods have been replaced with assessments and program validation inspections (PVI)Footnote 18 as the primary surveillance tools. Assessments and PVIs are used to measure operational effectiveness and CARs compliance, but the PVI is a routine surveillance method.Footnote 19 TC conducts additional inspections and interventions as needed and based on available resources, including occasional field audits of the operator's aircraft present at the base.
Implemented properly, an SMS allows aviation companies to identify hazards, manage risks, and develop and follow effective safety processes. Canada's large commercial air carriers operating under Subpart 705 of the CARs have been required to have an SMS since 2005. However, for smaller air carriers, such as those that provide aerial work under Subpart 702 of the CARs, provide air taxi services under Subpart 703 of the CARs, or provide commuter services under Subpart 704 of the CARs, SMS implementation has been delayed to provide additional time to refine procedures, guidance material, and training. Yet this group accounted for 92% of commercial aircraft accidents and 95% of commercial aviation fatalities from 2004 to 2013.
In its 2014 Watchlist, the TSB called for TC to implement regulations requiring all operators in the air industry to have formal safety management processes, and for TC to oversee these processes.
Héli-Boréal has an SMS. However, because the SMS is not required by the CARs, its effectiveness has not been verified by TC.
TC performed a PVI of Héli-Boréal in October 2009 to determine the effectiveness of the company's quality assurance system. The PVI was conducted in accordance with TC Staff Instruction SUR-001, Safety Management System Assessment and Program Validation Procedures. The outcome of the PVI revealed no non-compliance with any operational control aspects as all the measurement criteria were met. In December 2010, TC conducted another PVI of Héli-Boréal to determine that the company had a COM, that the COM complied with the regulations, that personnel followed the COM directives, and that the company had a control system process for the COM. The PVI had only 1 finding, concerning the operation and resetting of electric circuit breakers.

1.17.3 Surveillance by frequent users of helicopter services

In general, clients who use commercial helicopter services rely on the operator and on the pilot to ensure flight safety. However, the employer is responsible for the health and safety of its employees and must take reasonable precautions to ensure the workplace is safe. Consequently, some frequent users of helicopter services, including Hydro-Québec, have chosen to implement their own surveillance measures and criteria over and above CARs standards.

1.17.4 Hydro-Québec

Hydro-Québec's Air Transport Unit uses the services of several operators in Quebec to perform aerial work by helicopter. Hydro-Québec has approximately 35 000 kilometres of electrical distribution power lines across Quebec. The annual flight time averages between 11 000 and 15 000 hours, of which approximately 5000 hours are for power line inspections and maintenance. Hydro-Québec is the helicopter services industry's biggest customer in Quebec. In 1992, following a series of accidents, Hydro-Québec set up a qualification and technical audit program to evaluate the helicopter companies it uses and to ensure these companies maintain their aircraft and operations in accordance with the CARs.
In 2005, Hydro-Québec developed a technical assessment method to evaluate its carriers. This method was implemented in collaboration with the École nationale d'aérotechnique (ÉNA), which conducts a quality audit every 18 months on average and produces a report. Hydro-Québec then completes an assessment based on the carrier's past performance and compliance with contractual requirements. The result is expressed as a percentage, which is then used to assign a qualification level to the carrier.Footnote 20 Hydro-Québec indicates the minimum qualification level in calls for tender for helicopter services.
Héli-Boréal underwent a qualification audit on 30 April 2013, obtaining an R1 rating (highest level) with a 100% score. It was the first time in Hydro-Québec's audit of helicopter operators that a perfect grade was given.
1.17.4.1 Flight following
Since Hydro-Québec has a flight following department, Héli-Boréal pilots contracted to fly for Hydro-Québec use that system for flight following. At the time of the accident, the helicopter flight following equipment was being serviced; therefore, the pilot had to call Hydro-Québec flight dispatch once airborne, and then check in at least every 60 minutes. If there was no contact with a helicopter, Hydro-Québec would initiate its emergency procedures.
The occurrence helicopter left the SM3 dam at 0955 and was only on patrol for about 25 minutes prior to the accident. By the time Hydro-Québec would have considered the helicopter overdue and started its emergency procedures, the pilot had already contacted the company to report the accident.

1.17.5 Power line markings

1.17.5.1 General
There is no federal regulatory requirementFootnote 21 to give indication of an upcoming power line crossover as may be encountered during line inspections. However, Hydro-Québec TransÉnergieFootnote 22 has a document of standardsFootnote 23 containing a policy to identify the location of power lines and obstacles which aims to optimize and standardize marking installation. The purpose of the markings is to ensure flight safety and to provide individuals performing inspections along the lines with standardized warnings for obstacle avoidance. Markings are mainly installed on flight paths located in rural and forested areas.
According to the document, the crossing of power lines is to be identified by a yellow and black triangular markingFootnote 24 attached to the tower or poles preceding the intersection. Therefore, every intersection is identified by 4 triangular markings, one from each direction. Each triangular marking is positioned to be visible during the flight and pointing in the direction (danger above or below) of the power line that will be encountered. Triangular markings had not been installed at the occurrence intersection. For aviation in Canada, the recognized paint standardFootnote 25 colours are orange and white. Even if this standard is not applicable to the identification of crossing power lines, it provides maximum visibility of an obstruction by contrast colours.
The Hydro-Québec TransÉnergie document mentions that Hydro-Québec employees (observers) must be able to identify the various types of markings in order to warn the pilot, by hand gestures or verbally, of any approaching obstacle. In this occurrence, the observer was aware that the crossing power line was coming up and indicated to the pilot that the inspection was complete. This was communicated at the same time as the pilot saw the wires, and did not provide sufficient warning.
The investigation also revealed that power lines in other areas of the network had some missing and non-compliant markings on approach of crossing power lines.
1.17.5.2 Clearing of vegetation around power lines
Hydro-Québec TransÉnergie has a document identifying the standardsFootnote 26 for right-of-way (ROW)Footnote 27 clearings under power lines. It indicates the size of the area to be cleared under power lines, taking into consideration various factors, such as the environmental protection standard,Footnote 28 the reliability of the network, and the safety of the public and workers (i.e. the people involved in maintaining and inspecting the power lines).
The usual ROW clearing covers the whole area under the transmission lines. For areas that are only accessible by helicopter, an extra 26 metres is added to one side of the power line to allow for the safe landing of an helicopter.
The investigation revealed that only a 6-metre-wide area around the short segment of the transmission line on the hillside where the accident occurred was cleared of trees because of the Hydro‑Québec TransÉnergie complementary environmental protection standard established by the Programme de maîtrise intégrée de la végétation (integrated vegetation control programme).

1.18 Additional information

Wire strike accidents are not normally related to a pilot's flying experience. According to the FAA, the average age and experience of pilots involved in such accidents is 43.5 years of age and 4000 flight hours.Footnote 29 As well, the majority (86%)Footnote 30 of such accidents in the United States happened in daytime visual meteorological conditions (VMC).
According to the FAA, the normal field of vision for each eye is about 160° horizontally and 135° vertically. However, outside of a 10° cone of the point of focus, visual acuity drops by 90%.Footnote 31
According to Flight Safety Australia, when discussing fields of vision, “A pilot approaching wires between 2 visible poles would mostly be too far away to discern the wires, or too close to see both the poles at once. Clues within the field of vision would be outside the range of vision and vice versa.”Footnote 32
During the occurrence flight, the helicopter was following a road to the right of the distribution line being surveyed, around a hill. The terrain was up-sloping to the right, with the right-hand tower of the crossing transmission line at a higher altitude than the helicopter (Figure 3).
Figure 3. View from helicopter passenger seat approaching the transmission line (Source: Héli-Boréal, with TSB annotations)
In addition, many factors can increase the difficulty of seeing wires in the low-level environment:
A pilot's ability to see and avoid collision with wires is complicated by the flood of visual cues seen from a different perspective as low-level work is carried out; by vegetation, shadows and landforms blocking the pilot's view of wires and wire support structures; by cockpit ergonomics; and by seemingly minor things like smudged handprints on the windscreen and insects that speckle the windscreen.Footnote 33
Because of these limitations of human vision, it is important to have other references and visual cues in order to avoid striking wires. It is partly for these reasons that Hydro-Québec implemented standards for markings to help helicopter pilots recognize upcoming obstacles. Furthermore, the clearing of trees under power lines is done to help in building the power lines and performing maintenance. As well, these clearings are used as a visual reference for aircraft performing surveys and patrols. The clearings also provide a safe place to land in case of an emergency.

1.19 Useful or effective investigation techniques

N/A

2.0 Analysis

2.1 General

The examination of the wreckage and components of the aircraft revealed no evidence of any structural failure, flight control malfunction, or loss of power that could have caused the accident. The examination of the maintenance records and maintenance program indicated no issues with the aircraft maintenance that could have contributed to the accident. The investigation of the company regulatory oversight and the safety culture indicated no shortcomings. The company showed a pro-active approach to safety management.
The helicopter took off in good visual meteorological conditions (VMC), and all operational requirements were met for the flight. The analysis will therefore focus on the circumstances surrounding the flight, the power line markings, the clearing under the power lines, the emergency locator transmitter (ELT), the visual flight rules (VFR) navigation chart (VNC) deficiencies, the survivability, and the use of a helmet.

2.2 Power line markings

The pilot was flying low, following a 25- kilovolt power distribution line at an altitude of approximately 50 feet above ground level, close to the tree tops and in valleys. This task required deep concentration. At the time of the occurrence, the flight was following the distribution line around a hill to the right. The crossing 315 kV transmission line came in sight at the end of the turn. In flight conditions such as these, the pilot has narrower peripheral cues than when flying at a higher altitude away from ground obstacles. At the time the observer indicated that the survey was completed for the area, the towers of the crossing power line were likely outside of the pilot's field of vision. There was not enough time to react prior to hitting the wires.
The cues from triangular markings allow pilots to be forewarned of impending hazards. The distribution line being surveyed did not have the standard markings to indicate the upcoming intersection with the transmission line located above it. The investigation revealed that other intersections of power lines throughout the Hydro-Québec network were also lacking the triangular markings. Furthermore, on some of the lines with markings, those markings did not meet Hydro-Québec TransÉnergie's standard as to size and colour. Also, when in place, the yellow and black markings reduce the chances of the markings being seen in a timely manner, compared to markings painted orange and white, which is the recognized paint colour standard in aviation. If power distribution companies do not enforce their power line marking standards, there is an increased risk of collision with wires from low-level flying aircraft.
Hydro-Québec TransÉnergie has established an industry standard to ensure that all crew involved in power line inspection, maintenance, and other work have safety knowledge of the work involved when flying around power lines. An observer can be a great asset in the cockpit as an extra set of eyes. Observers are taught to recognize the markings on towers and poles indicating the impending crossing of power lines. If hazards are not effectively communicated to the pilot in a timely manner, there is an increased risk that a collision with an obstacle may occur, which would jeopardize the safety of the flight.

2.3 Clearing of power lines

Hydro-Québec TransÉnergie has established a standard for clearing trees under and around power lines to allow for their construction and maintenance, and to maintain the reliability of the electrical power distribution system. The clearing of trees is considered essential for the safety of the helicopter flights that must be performed to support the distribution system.
Due to environmental considerations, the short area on the hill under the transmission line was only partially cleared. This condition reduced the opportunity for the pilot to be warned of the presence of the transmission line and it limited the space available to perform an emergency landing.

The helicopter pilot and observer did not receive any of the visual cues normally offered by tree clearings. After impacting the wire, the pilot aimed for the small path under the power line, but hit the bordering trees. If vegetation under power lines is not cleared, there is a risk that low-level survey helicopter flights may not have an adequate landing area in an emergency.

2.4 Emergency locator transmitter

The helicopter came to rest on its left side in a forested area. In order to make a satellite telephone call to the company, the pilot had to move away from the helicopter into a cleared area so that a satellite could receive the telephone's signal. Therefore, it is likely that the emergency locator transmitter (ELT) signal was not immediately received by the satellite because the signal was being shielded by the trees and the helicopter cowlings. If the ELT signal is not received in a timely manner, this could delay rescue operations which risks compromising survivability.

2.5 Navigation charts

In many flight operations, whether in commercial or general aviation, charts are relied upon to assist in identifying potential hazards and navigating accurately. The accuracy of the information provided in the VNC must allow a pilot to safely perform a flight. NAV CANADA is responsible to provide accurate aeronautical data to the user or pilot. Many electronic digital navigation system manufacturers use NAV CANADA's information for their databases. Any erroneous or missing information is therefore propagated throughout the aviation community. The existing request process for obstacle data showed mixed results. If the data collection process to update aeronautical information products does not function effectively, there is a risk that these products may not contain the information required to ensure the safety of flight. If available navigation information is not used, there is a risk that a collision with an obstacle may occur.

2.6 Helmets

The pilot's helmet came off during the impact sequence. The helicopter canopy was no longer protecting the occupants during the fall. The helmet provided sufficient protection to allow the pilot to remain conscious after the impact, to shut down the engine, and to provide help to the observer, who was seriously injured. Examination of the helmet revealed it had sustained a significant impact that would have caused severe injuries to the head and face had the pilot not been wearing it. Not wearing helmets and visors places pilots at greater risk of incapacitation due to head injuries following a ditching or crash. This type of injury jeopardizes a pilot's ability to assist in the safe evacuation and survival of the passengers.
If helicopter pilots do not wear helmets, there is an increased risk of severe injuries, which could affect not only their own survival, but also their ability to assist passengers and to seek help.

3.0 Findings

3.1 Findings as to causes and contributing factors

  1. The 25-kilovolt distribution line being surveyed did not have the Hydro-Québec TransÉnergie standard triangular markings, which failed to warn of the upcoming intersection with a 315-kilovolt transmission line.
  2. The helicopter was following the distribution line around a hill and this reduced the opportunity for the pilot to see the upcoming intersection with a 315-kilovolt transmission line in sufficient time to avoid collision.
  3. A main rotor blade hit a power line wire, which caused vibrations and required the initiation of an emergency landing.
  4. The trees located under the power line were not cleared; the helicopter hit the trees and fell to the ground.

3.2 Findings as to risk

  1. If the emergency locator transmitter signal is not received in a timely manner, this could delay rescue operations which risks compromising survivability.
  2. If the data collection process to update aeronautical information products does not function effectively, there is a risk that these products may not contain the information required to ensure the safety of flight.
  3. If available navigation information is not used, there is a risk that a collision with an obstacle may occur.
  4. If helicopter pilots do not wear helmets, there is an increased risk of severe injuries, which could affect not only their own survival, but also their ability to assist passengers and to seek help.
  5. If power distribution companies do not enforce their power line marking standards, there is an increased risk of collision with wires from low-level flying aircraft.
  6. If hazards are not effectively communicated to the pilot in a timely manner, there is an increased risk that a collision with an obstacle may occur, which would jeopardize the safety of the flight.
  7. If vegetation under power lines is not cleared, there is a risk that low-level survey helicopter flights may not have an adequate landing area in an emergency.

3.3 Other findings

  1. A combination of emergency locator transmitter (ELT) signal attenuation due to the location of the helicopter under the forest canopy and to data signal degradation caused by the antenna being in the horizontal position and shielded under the helicopter cowlings may have resulted in the time delay in decoding the ELT signal by the satellite system.

4.0 Safety action

4.1 Safety action taken

4.1.1 NAV CANADA

NAV CANADA has published a formal fit-for-purpose document (Aeronautical Information Circular 1/15, dated 08 January 2015). The goal of this document is to provide clarity as to the intended use of individual Aeronautical Information Publications (AIP). Use of publications in a manner that does not align with their intended purpose can significantly and negatively impact safety. This document is available on the NAV CANADA website.
NAV CANADA has reached an agreement with Hydro-Québec for the exchange of power line data that may be used as navigational reference on selected charts. In addition, in January 2015, Transport Canada and NAV CANADA exchanged letters confirming nation-wide support for the data acquisition program that will ensure accurate data from authoritative sources.

4.1.2 Héli-Boréal inc.

Héli-Boréal inc. implemented a safety program to provide financial compensation to its pilots for the purchase of flight helmets.
Héli-Boréal inc.'s flight training program has been amended to include flight training improvement techniques for power line inspection flights. The training includes integration of recent study results for visual scanning concepts, pre-flight review of the flight environment, and other tasks in the cockpit that could generate possible distractions. The training also includes flight training for obstacle avoidance.
This report concludes the Transportation Safety Board's investigation into this occurrence. The Board authorized the release of this report on 10 June 2015. It was officially released on 13 August 2015.

Footnotes

Footnote 1
All times are Eastern Daylight Time (Coordinated Universal Time minus 4 hours).
Footnote 2
The 315-kilovolt (kV) power transmission line was not energized at the time of the occurrence.
Footnote 3
The pilot had been instructing at various other companies since 2005.
Footnote 4
Cospas-Sarsat International Satellite System for Search and Rescue's website, available at: http://www.cospas-sarsat.int/en/beacon-ownership/what-happens-when-i-activate-my-beacon (last accessed 10 August 2015)
Footnote 5
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Annex 4 — Aeronautical Charts, The Aeronautical Chart, Eleventh Edition, July 2009
Footnote 6
The Aeronautical Chart (ANC) – ICAO 1:500 000 supplies more detail and provides a suitable medium for pilot and navigation training. This series is most suitable for use by low-speed, short- or medium-range aircraft operating at low and intermediate altitudes
Footnote 7
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Annex 4 — Aeronautical Charts, Section 17.7.4 Landmarks, Recommendation, Eleventh Edition, July 2009
Footnote 8
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Annex 4 — Aeronautical Charts, Section 17.9.3.2 Obstacles, Eleventh Edition, July 2009
Footnote 9
NAV CANADA took over production from Natural Resources Canada in 2007.
Footnote 10
Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs), Standard 621, 1.2 – Notification Responsibilities, Information Note
Footnote 11
D. Shanahan and M. Shanahan, “Injury in U.S. Army Helicopter Crashes October 1979 – September 1985”, The Journal of Trauma, 29(4), 1989, pp. 415-423
Footnote 12
J.S. Crowley, “Should Helicopter Frequent Flyers Wear Head Protection? A Study of Helmet Effectiveness”, Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 33(7), 1991, pp. 766-769
Footnote 13
Brain Injury.com [online], “Ways the Brain is Injured”, available at: http://www.braininjury.com/injured.html (last accessed 10 August 2015)
Footnote 14
The Aviation Safety Vortex newsletter has been discontinued, but is now combined with the Aviation Safety Letter.
Footnote 15
Transport Canada, SATOPS Final Report - Spring 1998, TP 13158E
Footnote 16
Ibid
Footnote 17
TSB Aviation Investigation Reports A12W0088, A12W0031, A12C0084, A12A0085, A11W0152, A11W0070, and A09A0016
Footnote 18
A process comprising a documentation review and an on-site review of 1 or more components of a safety management system (SMS) or other regulated areas of a certificate holder.
Footnote 19
Transport Canada, Staff Instruction (SI) No. SUR-001, Subsection 13.1, p. 40
Footnote 20
The qualification levels range from R1 to R5, R1 being the highest.
Footnote 21
Aerial power line inspection is a specialized activity performed at very low altitudes, in complex environments, and is outside the scope of the CARs Standard 621.
Footnote 22
TransÉnergie is a division of Hydro-Québec and is responsible for the transportation of electricity through the network in Quebec.
Footnote 23
The document (identification number TET-LIA-N-SUP0010), titled “Balisage des lignes aériennes de transport” (Marking of aerial transmission power lines), was developed in 1970, and the current version is dated 04 November 2005.
Footnote 24
The triangular marking is described in the Hydro-Québec TransÉnergie standard document TET-LIA-F-OUYTM2b.
Footnote 25
Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs), Standard 621, 3.2 – Paint Standards.
Footnote 26
The document (identification TET-EMP-N-VEG0001) is titled “Programme de maîtrise intégrée de la végétation dans les emprises de lignes aériennes de transport”(integrated vegetation control programme in the rights-of-way of aerial transmission lines).
Footnote 27
A right-of-way (ROW) refers to the strip of land under and around power lines.
Footnote 28
Requirement from the “Encadrements complémentaires, Norme TET-EMP-N-VEG0001”.
Footnote 29
Federal Aviation Administration, Safety Study of Wire Strike Devices Installed on Civil and Military Helicopters, DOT/FAA/AR-08/25, September 2008
Footnote 30
Ibid
Footnote 31
Federal Aviation Administration, “Pilot Vision”, available at: http://www.faa.gov/pilots/safety/pilotsafetybrochures/media/pilot_vision.pdf (last accessed 10 August 2015)
Footnote 32
Robert Wilson, Flight Safety Australia, “Watching the Wire”, March-April 2011
Footnote 33
Robert L. Cassidy, Flight Safety Australia, “One Strike and You're Out”, November-December 2005