MEC&F Expert Engineers : 06/10/15

Wednesday, June 10, 2015

County Denies ExxonMobil Emergency Request to Haul Oil by Truck. Energy Company Close to Exhausting Storage Capacity After Shutdown of Ruptured Plains All American Cheapskates Pipeline











Wednesday, June 10, 2015

With legal repercussions anticipated regardless of her decision, Dianne Black denied on Tuesday an emergency permit filed by ExxonMobil to truck crude oil from Las Flores Canyon Facility along Highway 101 to a refinery about 70 miles north.

Since Plains All American Pipeline’s Line 901 ruptured last month, spilling about 100,000 gallons of crude onto the Gaviota Coast, a 10.6-mile stretch of the 24-inch pipeline has been effectively shut down. This has forced Exxon to cut its production to about 10,000 barrels of oil a day, but in about two weeks, Exxon says it will exhaust its storage capacity.

Submitted on June 4, Exxon’s application proposed a maximum of eight trucks an hour — 24 hours a day, 7 days a week — each carrying 6,720 gallons of crude oil. As assistant director of the county’s Planning and Development (P&D), Black became sole decision-maker after P&D director Glenn Russell recused himself because he used to own stock in ExxonMobil; he divested it in the last few months, he said Monday.

Whether or not it is safe to transport crude on the highway depends on whom you ask. On Sunday evening, the county chief executive’s office opened the matter up for public comment; several dozen people wrote in less than 48 hours.

Environmentalists — including Center for Biological Diversity and newly formed Food & Water Watch — all but threatened a lawsuit if the county approved the emergency permits. They advocated for the customary permit process with proper environmental review. Two dozen or so activists rallied against trucks Monday afternoon at the courthouse, holding colorful signs that read “End Oil Now” and calling for clean energy.

Meanwhile COLAB’s Andy Caldwell took exception, calling it “absolutely incredulous” to oppose trucking a raw product on the freeway when gasoline is always tankered on the highway. In a similar school of thought, City Councilmember Dale Francisco said in an op-ed at independent.com, “Absent a scientific breakthrough,” modern industrial societies will continue to rely on fossil fuels. ExxonMobil spokesperson Dick Keil pledged the company would have used a new fleet with safer containers and fewer carbon emissions.

Exactly what constitutes an “emergency” was the endgame for Black. According to county zoning codes, an emergency is a “sudden unexpected occurrence demanding immediate action to prevent or mitigate loss or damage to life, health, property, or essential public services.” Exxon claimed, if shut down, its production of natural gas — separated from the oil and produced water, and scrubbed clean of hydrogen sulfide — would cease. This natural gas is supplied to residents in Santa Barbara, San Luis Obispo, and Ventura, and constitutes a public utility, Exxon claimed.

Not so, said Black. Based on a 2014 gas company report, Exxon provided less than one percent of Southern California Gas’s total supply last year. Plus, she wrote, the county permitted a storage expansion project for the gas company. Black found Exxon’s second argument — tax revenues — equally flawed.

Exxon generated nearly $4.2 million in taxes last year from its three offshore platforms, according to company spokesperson Keil. “That’s revenue that the county will have to make up on a monthly basis,” Keil said. Santa Ynez Valley High and Vista Del Mar school districts each rake in more than $700,000 from Exxon’s property taxes, according to Keil.

But school districts can file a claim with Plains, Black wrote; entities or individuals have three years to do so. Black also found that trucking oil does not fall within the emergency permits allowed by Governor Jerry Brown’s executive order regarding the oil spill.

“We are obviously disappointed in their decision,” Keil said Tuesday afternoon. “We are in the process of studying their response,” he said, without indicating Exxon’s next steps. Because the decision for the emergency application is not appealable, Exxon could take the matter to court. Otherwise, Exxon can apply for a customary permit, a months-long process that consists of CEQA review, policy analysis, and a public hearing.

Venoco — much smaller than ExxonMobil — was forced to shut down its 4,000-barrel production about a week after the spill. Venoco is currently evaluating transportation options, said spokesperson Keith Wenal, and is using the downtime to complete annual safety inspections. 

On June 26 at 2 p.m., Assembly member Das Williams and State Senator Hannah-Beth Jackson will hold a joint oversight hearing to look at the cause and response to the oil spill at the County Administration Building. Last week, Representative Lois Capps formally asked Rep. Fred Upton (R-MI), chair of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, for a field hearing in Santa Barbara. Also, a congressional committee is expected to review pipeline standards later this year.
Source:http://www.independent.com

Collision between Bulk Carrier Summer Wind and the Miss Susan Tow Houston Ship Channel, Lower Galveston Bay, Texas. NTSB blames Miss Susan captain’s attempt to cross the Houston Ship Channel ahead of the Summer Wind,




 NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Public Meeting of June 9, 2015
(Information subject to editing)

March 22, 2014
This is a synopsis from the NTSB’s report and does not include the Board’s rationale for the conclusions, probable cause, and safety recommendations. NTSB staff is currently making final revisions to the report from which the attached conclusions and safety recommendations have been extracted. The final report and pertinent safety recommendation letters will be distributed to recommendation recipients as soon as possible. The attached information is subject to further review and editing.
Executive Summary
On March 22, 2014, about 1235 central daylight time, the 607-foot-long bulk carrier Summer Wind with a Houston pilot on board collided with the 670-foot-long Miss Susan tow (a 70-foot-long towing vessel and two 300-foot-long tank barges loaded with fuel oil) in the Houston Ship Channel, Lower Galveston Bay, Texas. The visibility was restricted at the time due to fog. The bulk carrier was inbound to Houston, traveling in a north direction. The tow was bound for Port Bolivar on the east side of the Houston Ship Channel, traveling in an east direction.
The collision breached the hull of the forward tank barge in the Miss Susan tow, and about 168,000 gallons of fuel oil spilled into the waterway. Two crewmembers on board the Miss Susan sustained minor injuries related to inhalation of fuel vapor. The total estimated damage was nearly $1,378,000 (excluding oil response and recovery efforts).
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the collision was the Miss Susan captain’s attempt to cross the Houston Ship Channel ahead of the Summer Wind, thereby impeding the passage of the bulk carrier, which could transit only within the confines of the channel. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the Houston pilot and the Summer Wind master to set a safe speed given the restricted visibility and nearby towing vessel traffic, and the failure of the Miss Susan captain and the Houston pilot to establish early radio communication with one another. Also contributing to the accident was the failure of Vessel Traffic Service Houston/Galveston to interact with the two vessels in a developing risk of collision, and the lack of a Coast Guard vessel separation policy for the Bolivar Roads Precautionary Area.
The report identifies the following safety issues:

Lack of vessel separation in Houston Ship Channel precautionary areas with intersecting waterways: The NTSB has previously noted that insufficient distance between vessels when they turn, pass, and overtake one another near intersections can create unsafe situations. This accident once again highlights the need for separation between vessels in such areas of the Houston Ship Channel.
Inadequate oversight and training related to the safety and health of uninspected towing vessel crews responding to hazardous materials releases: In assessing why two Miss Susan crewmembers suffered inhalation injuries when responding to the oil spill, the NTSB found that both federal oversight and company training of personnel exposed to hazardous materials were insufficient.

Findings
1. Vessel propulsion and steering systems, medical conditions and medication use, alcohol and illegal drug use, and distraction from personal electronic devices were not factors in this accident.
2. The Miss Susan captain should not have attempted to cross the Houston Ship Channel ahead of the Summer Wind’s passage, especially given the restricted visibility and the bulk carrier’s ability to navigate only within the confines of the channel.
3. Given the restricted visibility and the towing vessel traffic in the Bolivar Roads Precautionary Area at the time, the pilot on the Summer Wind should not have given an order for the bulk carrier to transit at full-ahead speed.
4. The Summer Wind master should have questioned the pilot’s decision to transit at full-ahead speed given the restricted visibility and nearby towing vessel traffic.
5. Sufficient information existed via radar, automatic identification system, and radio communications from both the Miss Susan and the Summer Wind for the vessel operators to know of each other’s intended passages, but despite the availability of this information neither the Miss Susan captain nor the pilot on the Summer Wind took early action to avoid the collision.
6. Vessel Traffic Service Houston/Galveston did not effectively follow its own internal operating procedures to guard channel 13.
7. In the minutes leading up to the collision, Vessel Traffic Service Houston/Galveston did not maintain an effective watch, diminishing its ability to recognize a developing risk of collision and to interact with the vessel operators.
8. With several intersecting waterways, high-density vessel traffic, and diverse types of vessels with differing speeds and maneuvering characteristics, the Bolivar Roads Precautionary Area is a high-risk section in Vessel Traffic Service Houston/Galveston’s area of responsibility, and the Coast Guard’s failure to develop and implement a vessel separation policy for this section contributed to the collision.


9. Consistently entering the complete dimensions of tow configurations for individual transits into automatic identification systems would alleviate misinterpretation and possible confusion from inaccurate information, and thus enhance safety.
10. In response to the oil spill, effective communications and coordination were established and maintained between the responsible parties, the Coast Guard, local and state response agencies, and oil spill removal organizations.
11. The actions taken to recover spilled oil to minimize further environmental damage were timely and appropriate.
12. Because of the Miss Susan crewmembers’ incomplete assessment of the material safety data sheet, lack of being provided required direct-reading testing equipment, and their assumptions about the nature of the cargo, the Miss Susan crewmembers did not fully assess the need for respiratory protection during their emergency response following the collision.
13. The Miss Susan crewmember training did not adequately prepare them to safely respond to the hazardous materials release.
14. The inadequate federal oversight of mariner work safety on board uninspected towing vessels places crewmembers at greater risk of injury from exposure to hazardous materials and other safety hazards.

PROBABLE CAUSE
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the collision was the Miss Susan captain’s attempt to cross the Houston Ship Channel ahead of the Summer Wind, thereby impeding the passage of the bulk carrier, which could transit only within the confines of the channel. Contributing to the accident was the failure of the Houston pilot and the Summer Wind master to set a safe speed given the restricted visibility and nearby towing vessel traffic, and the failure of the Miss Susan captain and the Houston pilot to establish early radio communication with one another. Also contributing to the accident was the failure of Vessel Traffic Service Houston/Galveston to interact with the two vessels in a developing risk of collision, and the lack of a Coast Guard vessel separation policy for the Bolivar Roads Precautionary Area.
New Recommendations
To the United States Coast Guard:
1. Include in your new towing vessel inspection regulations requirements for (1) availability and use of personal protective equipment, (2) hazardous materials training, and (3) identification and mitigation of health and safety hazards posed by exposure to hazardous materials. (M-15-XX)

To Kirby Inland Marine:
2. Provide direct-reading air monitoring equipment and applicable training to your towing vessel crews that transport hazardous materials, so that crews can identify combustible or explosive atmospheres, oxygen deficiency, and toxic substances that may present risk of serious injury. (M-15-XX)
3. Revise your initial and refresher Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response training to include demonstration of competence, and ensure that crewmembers complete this training before serving on vessels that transport hazardous materials. (M-15-XX)

To the American Waterways Operators:
4. Inform your members of the circumstances of this accident and the need for towing vessels that transport hazardous materials to carry direct-reading air monitoring equipment, so that crews can identify combustible or explosive atmospheres, oxygen deficiency, and toxic substances that may present risk of serious injury. (M-15-XX)

Previously Issued Recommendation Reiterated in this Report
To the United States Coast Guard:
Finalize and implement the new towing vessel inspection regulations and require the establishment of safety management systems appropriate for the characteristics, methods of operation, and nature of service of towing vessels. (M-07-6)
Previously Issued Recommendations Reiterated and Reclassified in this Report
As a result of this accident investigation, the National Transportation Safety Board reiterates and reclassifies from “Open―Acceptable Response” to “Open―Unacceptable Response” the following two safety recommendations:

To the United States Coast Guard:

Develop and implement a policy to ensure adequate separation between vessels operating in the Bayport Channel and Bolivar Roads Precautionary Areas and any other similarly configured precautionary areas in the Houston Ship Channel. (M-12-6)

Graphically delineate precautionary areas on appropriate Houston Ship Channel nautical charts so they are readily identifiable to mariners. (M-12-7)

WILLIAMS GAS PIPELINE RUPTURE EXPLOSION FORCES EVACUATION OF 130 PEOPLE IN JORDAN TOWNSHIP, PA




JUNE 9, 2015

JORDAN TOWNSHIP, PA

Emergency crews evacuated homes for a time near the Lycoming/Columbia County line because of a reported natural gas line explosion.

According to Columbia County EMA officials, there was a gas rupture and leak around 9:30 p.m. on Wilson Road in Jordan Township near Unityville. There was initially a fire, but it was put out.

An initial evacuation radius of three miles was reduced to one and a half miles. About 130 people went to shelters set up at two nearby fire stations.

Just before midnight, the evacuation order was lifted and those residents were allowed to return to their homes.

There are no reports of any injuries.

“It almost sounded like an airplane crash,” said Craig Seely of Unityville. “It just started roaring. It sounded kind of like about 500 freight trains running down the track at the same time. Windows started rattling in the house. It shook the house.”

“It was very loud, kind of a roar, almost a little bit like an explosion followed by a loud roar,” said Benton Borough EMA Coordinator Dan Jankowski. “Actually my thought at the time was that it might have been a gas line that is in that area. 

There was some conjecture that it was a plane crash. It was that loud.”

EMA officials said the gas was quickly shut off by Williams Gas workers who were called to the scene.

Fire crews tell me gas leak is slowed. Evacuees at Benton Fire building…no known injuries at this point. @WNEP
— Sarah Buynovsky WNEP (@SarahBuynovsky) June 10, 2015

DRIVER INJURED WHEN TRACTOR-TRAILER HAULING APPLE JUICE CRASHES ON I-295 IN BURLINGTON TWP., N.J.




A tractor-trailer hauling apple juice crashed and overturned early Wednesday, jamming traffic on I-295 in Burlington Township, N.J.

Wednesday, June 10, 201

BURLINGTON TWP., N.J. (WPVI)

A tractor-trailer hauling apple juice crashed and overturned early Wednesday, jamming traffic on I-295 in Burlington Township, N.J.
It happened in the northbound lanes at 4:45 a.m. Wednesday near Exit 47 for Route 541.

Police tell Action News the big rig was transporting 80,000 lbs. of packaged apple juice when the driver lost control

Images from Chopper 6 HD broadcast live on Action News at 6:00 a.m. showed the truck lying on its side across 2 lanes of the 3-lane highway.

The side of the trailer was split open, and boxes of cargo had spilled out onto the road.

Action News is told the driver was injured and transported to an area hospital.

There was no immediate word on that person's condition.

One lane of vehicles was squeezing by in the left shoulder.

Traffic was backed up for miles approaching the scene.