MEC&F Expert Engineers : 11/14/17

Tuesday, November 14, 2017

Vermont State officials fine the town of Norwich $28,000 for 4 safety violations in connection with an October trench collapse that injured a worker on Beaver Meadow Road.


Norwich Facing Fines Following Trench Collapse That Injured Town Worker 


The worker was not, for instance, protected by a “trench box” 


 By Rob Wolfe
Staff Report
Monday, November 13, 2017


 

Norwich, VT — State officials are proposing to fine the town of Norwich $28,000 for four safety violations in connection with an October trench collapse that injured a worker on Beaver Meadow Road.

Town workers were helping a local contractor replace a culvert on Oct. 5 when a roughly 9-foot-deep trench gave way and fell on a municipal employee, sending that person, whom officials have declined to name, to the hospital.

The Vermont Occupational Safety and Health Administration last week found the town responsible for four safety violations. All were categorized as “serious” breaches, bringing a fine of $7,000 each.

A Nov. 7 citation from VOSHA says that Norwich failed to instruct employees on safety procedures, conduct daily inspections of the site, provide adequate protection for trench workers or use a proper traffic control plan when working in the road.

The worker was not, for instance, protected by a “trench box” — a metal frame that holds the earth in place and protects from cave-ins. Town officials have said they opted to slope the sides of the trench so as to avoid collapse.
Norwich has 20 calendar days after the state’s citation to pay the fine or file an appeal.



======================


Norwich Awaits Safety Findings
By Rob Wolfe
Valley News Staff Writer
Tuesday, October 24, 2017



Norwich VT


Norwich, VT — As they prepare to spend nearly $1.8 million on repairs to roads damaged during a July 1 storm, town officials are waiting for results of a state safety investigation into a roadwork accident earlier this month.

A town employee on Oct. 5 was helping an area contractor replace a culvert on Beaver Meadow Road when a 9-foot-deep trench collapsed, trapping and injuring the worker, who was not protected by a trench box, according to Town Manager Herb Durfee.

Officials at the Vermont Occupational Safety and Health Administration confirmed that the incident had occurred but said an ongoing inquiry prevented them from describing it in detail.

“It’s under investigation,” Les Burns, chief compliance officer for VOSHA, said in a telephone interview on Monday, adding that state officials may reach a conclusion as soon as next week.

Burns said a town employee had gone to the hospital, but declined to describe the person’s injuries. Durfee said the employee had undergone “some pretty significant surgery” for injury to his ribcage.


“He is recovering,” Durfee said of the employee, whom he declined to name. “He’ll be out of work for a while until he’s fully recovered.”

Durfee said state regulations require people working in trenches more than 4 feet deep to either use a trench box, which is a metal cage that keeps them from being crushed, or to slope the sides of the trench to avoid collapse.


Norwich employees and contractors used the latter precaution, Durfee said. The town manager added that the state official investigating the incident had told him a finding of “willful” injury was unlikely in VOSHA’s investigation.

Last month, VOSHA fined the city of Burlington $44,000 after a surprise inspection of a worksite in June revealed that city employees had not properly shored up a trench that was more than 5 feet deep. Workers also left soil too close to the trench opening, according to Seven Days.

Meanwhile, the Norwich Selectboard last week voted unanimously to approve nearly $1.8 million in expenditures for storm repairs to Turnpike Road, Upper Turnpike Road, Needham Road and Tigertown Road.

A chain of rainstorms that swept across the Twin States on July 1 caused tens of millions of dollars in damage and sparked presidential disaster declarations that made federal aid available for affected Vermont and New Hampshire counties.

Norwich officials intend to apply for reimbursement for that roadwork from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, but first they must bid out and pay for the repairs, Durfee said.

“It does present a little bit of a cash flow issue,” he said.

The town may need to open a line of credit to cover the costs, which for now are coming out of the municipal undesignated fund and reserve funds, Durfee said.

Selectboard members last week accepted a recommendation from their engineering consultants, Pathways Consulting, that the town go with a bid of just under $1.8 million from Nott’s Excavating in White River Junction for the latest work.

Durfee said town officials were planning to complete these fixes by year’s end. If weather interferes, the fallback will be to widen one-lane roads to two lanes, he said.

“We’re very pleased with the continuing patience of the folks who live off these roads,” he said on Monday.

In the immediate aftermath of the July storms, the Public Works Department billed about $500,000 in emergency repairs that the town also hopes FEMA will help cover.

It may be well into 2018 before money arrives from the federal agency, Durfee said. FEMA typically reimburses 75 percent of applicable costs, with the state picking up another 12.5 percent and the remainder falling to municipalities.

More work is to come. Washouts on Beaver Meadow Road are so deep — down to bedrock, in some places — that intensive engineering will be necessary, pushing the start date for those repairs to 2018, Durfee said.

Roofing worker electrocuted after his shoulder touched live wire as he was on a hydraulic lift that got too close to the wires that run behind City Hall in Durant, OK






Worker seriously hurt after touching Durant power line 


 November 13, 2017
By Walt Zwirko, KTEN News




DURANT, Okla. -- A worker was airlifted to OU Medical Center in serious condition after being shocked by a power line in downtown Durant on Monday.

The Durant Fire Department said the worker was on a hydraulic lift that got too close to live wires that run behind City Hall. The worker was shocked when his shoulder touched one of them.

The Durant battalion chief credited OG&E for its quick response to get the power turned off so they could get the truck away from the lines.

The name of the injured worker was not released.



=======================



Just after noon Monday, an out-of-town worker contracted by the City of Durant to do work on the roof of City Hall was severely electrically burned when the bucket lift he was using to access the roof touched a power line.

The man’s shoulder and hand suffered third-degree burns with possible internal injuries.

The man is currently in serious condition after he was flown to an Oklahoma City hospital for treatment as well as tests because his body took a massive amount of electricity.

Monday afternoon, power was cut at Durant City Hall and a portion of the surrounding area which concerned everyone in the area.

For a short time the man was stranded between power lines, scared and disoriented.

The man is from Bosnia working in the United States.

Durant City Manager Tim Rundel said, “One of the crew members came running into our office here saying someone was electrocuted. We instantly ran outside and we found the man obviously in a lot of pain. Marty Cook and myself were one of the first ones to get to the scene.

Cook is with the Community Development Department and with his years of experience at the City, it was fortunate he was there for the emergency, Rundel said.

Rundel continued, “I grabbed Marty because I thought there many be a need to shut the power off. We didn’t know inside whether he could still be receiving the electrocution. We then found out that he was not engaged directly with electrical wires but that his bucket lift was dangerously close, between two sets of high voltage electrical wires.”

The electrical jolt the man received when his shoulder touched the live electric wire and his being two stories up in the air, made communication with the man difficult.

Rundel said upon his arrival to the man behind City Hall, “He was wobbly and disoriented and we told him to sit down. We thought he might fall out of the bucket. You could see the fear in his eyes. There was a translation problem, also.”

The man is from Bosnia and his English isn’t good which made an already bad situation even worse.

Rundel said a fellow worker was sent who could communicate with the man.

He said he told the worker to tell the man to sit down in the bucket.

Rundel said, “The man was lightheaded and we had to keep talking to him to keep him awake.”

The bucket was two stories in the air when this took place.

Rundel then made the decision to contact OG&E to cut power.

“They tripped the breaker down the street from City Hall. Then we could get the rescue crew safely to the man and get him rescued.”

Rundel said he knew it inconvenienced several businesses at the noon hour on a Monday.

He said, “We had someone’s life in the balance. I knew we might have someone lose a Word document, but we had to do it to save the man’s life.”

He said he knew business owners would understand when they knew what happened and would be happy he survived.

Many in Durant saw the first responders blocking the street on the west side of City Hall between there and the Bryan County Courthouse.

It’s not known at this time whether the man was using all OSHA workplace safety precautions when using the lift bucket. It was reported at the scene that the bucket can be controlled by the person inside the bucket, but there were no other workers nearby helping the man access the roof using the unit. It’s not expected the city is liable for the accident because the worker was contracted and they were using their equipment.

The man was witnessed awake at the scene, but he was not talking to firemen. It’s not known if it’s because of the language barrier or if the man had injuries which made communication impossible.

Humberto Vasquez, maintenance worker at the Bryan County Courthouse, was working across the street when he was alerted to someone yelling for help.

Vasquez said, “I was working across the street when I saw the bucket truck and heard the man yelling ‘“help!”’

Vasquez said he could see the burns on the man’s shoulder and tried to calm him down until he could be rescued.

The City Manager credits first responders with saving the man’s life.

Rundel said, “He was still in a lot of pain. We couldn’t see what internal damage may have been done. We hope and pray he’ll recover fully from this. It was one of those things that could have been much worse.”

Water main breaks in Kearny, New Jersey



KEARNY, New Jersey (WABC) --

A water main break caused a geyser in New Jersey Monday night.

The main broke on 2nd Street in Kearny just after 11:30 p.m.

The geyser drenched roads and roofs in the industrial area.

Officials say it took more than an hour to cap the main.

Crews are trying to figure out what caused the break.



===============

Utility crews spent the overnight repairing a water main break that erupted in a section of Kearny.

Police arrived at the 20's block of 2nd Street shortly before 11:45 p.m. after they received reports of a water main break at that location.

Upon their arrival, they immediately contacted utility crews after witnessing a geyser-like condition with water shooting more than 10-feet into the air.


There were no reports of the break causing no to low water pressure to residential homes in the area.

The cause remains under investigation.

The cause of a fatal fire last week in Wirt County, WV that killed Richard Cline, 57, and his loyal dog Angel, has been officially classified as undetermined by the state Fire Marshal’s Office.






ELIZABETH, W.Va. — The cause of a fatal fire last week in Wirt County has been officially classified as undetermined by the state Fire Marshal’s Office.

A 57-year-old man died when his mobile home on Peewee Hill near Elizabeth caught fire last Friday morning.

The Fire Marshal’s Office tweeted about the investigation Monday:

“Investigators have determined a fatal fire from 11/10 in Peewee Hill, Wirt Co. to be undetermined in cause. The victim is a 57 yo male. Smoke alarms were present, it is unknown if they were operational”.



===================

ELIZABETH — One man died in a Wirt County fire Friday.


Elizabeth/Wirt County Volunteer Fire Department Chief Steve Settle said the department was called out to the fire off Pee Wee Road at 9:27 a.m. Friday.

“At the time of the call we were told the trailer had been destroyed,” he said.

Settle said a body was recovered from the scene and has been sent to the state medical examiner for identification. He added the fire was investigated by the state fire marshal, the West Virginia State Police and the Wirt County Sheriff’s Department. Settle said there is no indication of foul play.





===================




WIRT COUNTY, W.Va. (WTAP) - Authorities have released the name of a person killed in a trailer fire in Wirt County on Friday.


===================

Wirt County Sheriff Travis Corbitt says the Elizabeth-Wirt Volunteer Fire Department was called to a trailer home fire off of Peewee Hill Road at 9:00 A.M. Friday.

Corbitt says one person was killed in the blaze, and the home is a total loss.

Richard Cline, 57, was identified as the victim.

The State Fire Marshal's office is investigating the cause of the fire.





Richard (Dickie) E. Cline, age 57, passed away in a tragic accident on Nov. 10, 2017, along with his loyal dog Angel at his home in Pee Wee, W.Va.

He was born March 11, 1960, to Elden and the late Janice (Canary) Cline also of Pee Wee.

He is survived by his son, Bradley Cline (Robin Shamblin); his longtime girlfriend, Carol Edwards; sisters Valerie Cline (Roger Woodyard) and Deborah Cline (Shawn Ryan); brother, David Cline; nephews, Shaun Murray (Sarah), Ethan Cline and Garrett Cline; nieces, Kristen Cline and Lucie Cline; great-nephew, Luke Murray; great-nieces, Chloe Murray and Ruby Murray; a special aunt and uncle, Donna and Keith Archer; and many other aunts, uncles and cousins. He is also survived by many wonderful friends who he loved like family.

He loved life and believed in living it to the fullest. He always seemed to have endless energy and loved spending time with family and friends. He especially loved working on the farm and raising, selling and hauling livestock. He was most comfortable in the outdoors and enjoyed deer hunting and trout fishing in the mountains. No matter what task at hand, his beloved dog Angel was always at his side.

He will be sorely missed by all that knew and loved him, especially family, friends and neighbors in the small community in which he lived as he was always willing to give a helping hand to anyone who needed it.

Lambert-Tatman Funeral Home on south side in Parkersburg is helping the family with the arrangements. A memorial service will be held at a later date.

Plumber Helper John Thomas Dillon IV, 27, with Plumbing Experts, was killed Nov. 10, 2017 after an explosion of an inflatable sewer plug at Sun Valley East, west of Boynton Beach, Florida










John Thomas Dillon, 27, was killed Nov. 10, 2017 after an explosion at Sun Valley East, west of Boynton Beach. (Handout: Clem Winke)  







‘Freak’ air bag rupture kills man working on sewer line west of Boynton

Alexandra Seltzer Palm Beach Post Staff Writer
Monday, Nov. 13, 2017 Southern Palm Beach County




 




John Thomas Dillon IV, 27, spent his days working at The Plumbing Experts in Delray Beach and his nights at school studying his trade.

This is what he wrote in his Facebook profile:

The 27-year-old had been with the company only two years when he was killed Friday afternoon in a “freak accident” at the Sun Valley East retirement community west of Boynton Beach, said the company’s owner, Clem Winke.

Dillon was one of four men working to repair a broken storm sewer line that had caused a small sinkhole. The crew tried plugging a pipe with an 18-inch air bag to stop water from the community lake from coming in to the 8-foot wide by 3-foot deep hole.

But the air bag exploded, killing him.


Three days later, Winke still doesn’t know what went wrong.


“I wasn’t there but I think once the air bag burst then the water behind it pushed the air bag out of the pipe and hit John,” said Winke, whose company has been in business for 42 years.


Winke said he spent Friday talking with investigators from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and has met with Dillon’s family.


“We’ve been very open and transparent,” he said.


Winke said he’s never heard of this happening and has never had an employee injured in a major accident.


When reached by phone, Dillon’s mother, Lynda Scarberry Dillon, declined to comment.


“It’s a real tragic loss here at the company,” Winke said. “Everybody is very sad. A lot of people were crying. He was very well liked by everybody and a great guy.”


Dillon of Fort Lauderdale was in the plumbing apprenticeship program, which lasts four years. As part of that, he went to school two nights a week to learn the trade and worked during the day. He recently had been promoted to service plumber and had his own truck.


The explosion happened just before 2 p.m. Friday on Pavarotti Terrace just north of Boynton Beach Boulevard between Military Trail and Jog Road. Dillon died at the scene. Two other workers were treated for injuries but didn’t have to go to the hospital, said Palm Beach County Fire Rescue Capt. Albert Borroto.


Jean Manuel, 78, who lives in Sun Valley East, said she heard the explosion.


“I’m right in front of it,” she said. “They were standing in my yard.”


Manuel said there was a small caved-in part of the street where it wouldn’t be safe to drive so community leaders put cones around it. She said she hadn’t seen anyone work on the hole Monday morning.


Winke said the air bag procedure is standard and the only way to fix something that’s under water.


“You have to stop the water from coming in,” he said.


Winke said the crew was working with rented equipment and used the air bag to stop water from the lake from entering the pipe and filling the hole. They were also using a pump to get the water out but the ground water was coming in faster than the pump could pump it out. They turned to the air bag procedure to stop the water from coming in. Then the pump would be able to work.


“I don’t know why it burst,” he said.



=======================

SUBURBAN BOYNTON BEACH, Fla. - One person died in a construction accident in suburban Boynton Beach Friday afternoon, according to Palm Beach County Fire Rescue.

The incident happened just before 2 p.m. on Pavarotti Terrace inside the Sun Valley East development, fire rescue said.

The location was in a construction drain area where an airbag was being used and it exploded, first responders said.

The name of the victim has not been released.

Two other workers were treated at the scene but did not require hospitalization, fire rescue said.

Some residents who live in the development said water leaks happen frequently so crews are often seen working on drainage problems.

"When you mention the word water around here everyone's like, 'don't mention the word water because we have leaks, everything leaks.' So now that it went to this extent it really worries me, it really does," said resident Patricia Flynn.

The Palm Beach County Medical Examiner was called to the scene and will determine the cause of the worker's death.


=================




BOYNTON BEACH, FL - 


A man died Friday afternoon in an industrial explosion at a retirement community west of Boynton Beach, the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office said.


A crew, possibly one of plumbers, was working in an 8-foot-wide, 3-foot-deep hole the Sun Valley East condominiums near Boynton Beach Boulevard and Military Trail when the explosion happened just before 2 p.m., sheriff’s spokeswoman Teri Barbera said.


The man — whose identity was not available Friday evening — had been working near a construction drain when an air bag exploded, said Capt. Albert Borroto, spokesman for Palm Beach County Fire Rescue.


Paramedics confirmed he was dead at the scene, in the 9700 block of Pavarotti Boulevard. Two additional workers were treated at the scene, Borroto said. A crew from the Palm Beach County Medical Examiner arrived at the community just before 3:30 p.m.


A 68-year-old woman, one of several out in the community in the explosion’s aftermath Friday afternoon, said she was putting things into her car in the community when she heard “a loud bang” clearly from about a block away.

“The next thing I know, the street was full” of emergency vehicles, she said.

Barbera said no roads outside Sun Valley East were blocked as authorities investigated the incident.



Sun Valley East is a 55-plus community of about 500 condominiums built in the mid-1980s.


=================

Explosion Kills Worker at Florida Retirement Community
Authorities say a man was killed in an explosion at a Florida work site.


November 10, 2017

Explosion Kills Worker at Florida Retirement Community


BOYNTON BEACH, Fla. (AP) — Authorities say a man was killed in an explosion at a Florida work site.


The Palm Beach Post reports that blast occurred Friday afternoon in a Boynton Beach retirement community.


The Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office says a crew had been working in an 8-foot-wide, 3-foot-deep hole at Sun Valley East. The victim had been near a construction drain when an air bag his crew was using exploded.


Besides the one fatality, two other workers received medical treatment at the scene. It wasn't immediately clear what the crew had been working on.




These inflatable drain plug explosion are not unusual, if the workers do not follow the proper safety procedures.  See a case study below and some recommendations on how to prevent such tragic accidents.

Sewer Worker Dies When Inflatable Sewer Plug Bursts in Washington, D.C.



SUMMARY

A sewer maintenance worker died while working inside a sewer gate chamber. An inflatable sewer plug downstream from the victim was overinflated and burst allowing sewage to flood the chamber. The worker was part of a 10-man sewer maintenance crew assigned to divert the flow of sewage in a branched, 6-foot diameter sewer main. The crew lowered an inflatable sewer plug into a diversion gate chamber and anchored it several feet into the right leg of the sewer main. An air line, connected to an air compressor at the surface, was attached to an air valve on the inflatable sewer plug. The victim, who was operating the compressor, left it running unattended and entered the gate chamber to inspect the sewer plug. Within a few minutes the plug burst, forcing water and air into the chamber, fatally injuring the worker. NIOSH investigators concluded that, in order to prevent future similar occurrences, employers should:
  • use slide gates instead of, or in conjunction with, inflatable sewer plugs
  • follow sewer plug manufacturers' recommendations and other safety precautions on the installation and use of inflatable sewer plugs
  • develop and implement specific confined space entry and work procedures.

INTRODUCTION

On November 29, 1989, a 45-year-old male municipal sewer maintenance worker died while working inside a 12-1/2-foot-deep sewer chamber when an inflatable sewer plug burst, allowing sewage to flood the chamber. On November 30, 1989, officials of the Water Pollution Control Federation (WPCF) notified the Division of Safety Research (DSR) of the death, and requested technical assistance. On December 14, 1989, a research industrial hygienist from DSR traveled to the incident site to conduct an investigation. The DSR investigator met with a representative for the municipality, and reviewed a report from the OSHA compliance officer assigned to this case. Photographs and diagrams of the incident site were obtained during the investigation.
The employer involved is a municipal utility with 1100 public works employees. Approximately 200 of the employees are sewer maintenance workers and wastewater treatment plant operators. The victim had been employed by the municipality for 23 years as a sewer maintenance worker. The public works department has a full-time safety and health manager and a full-time safety and health specialist. A safety policy exists but there are no confined space entry procedures for sewer maintenance workers. However, the victim and other sewer maintenance workers had participated in a 2-hour training session on confined space safety within the past year.

INVESTIGATION

A crew of 10 sewer maintenance workers (including the victim) was assigned the task of diverting the flow of sewage in a 6- foot- diameter sewer main branch in preparation for installing some adjustable weirs (weirs are flow diversion devices). Access into the sewer main was provided by a diversion gate chamber located below a concrete drive area in an underground parking garage for a large building. The gate chamber was 12½ feet deep and approximately 10 feet wide by 16 feet long and located on top of a sewer main diversion branch which formed a "Y" configuration (Figures 1 and 2). The chamber had a 2-foot by 4-foot hatch with hinged steel covers and steel rungs built into the side of the chamber for access. The bottom of the chamber consisted of a removable aluminum grating over the sewer main and a concrete floor between the branches of the "Y". The top of the grating in both branches was approximately 12 inches above the surface of the sewage, which normally flows at a height of 5 feet. The chamber housed a 3/8-inch-thick, 6-foot by 9½-foot aluminum slide gate in each branch of the sewer main (Figures 1 and 2). The purpose of the slide gates is to divert the flow of sewage for sewer maintenance purposes. Since the slide gates had not been operated for several years they had become stuck in the "open" position. Therefore, the crew used an inflatable sewer plug to block off the right branch of the sewer main, diverting all of the flow to the left branch of the sewer main (Figures 1 and 2). 

The workers installed the sewer plug by lowering the deflated plug into the gate chamber, floating it several feet downstream into the right branch of the sewer main and anchoring it in place with a tethering line. An air line connected to an air compressor (rated at 90 PSI) on the surface was attached to an air valve on the sewer plug. The victim, who was initially above ground, began operating the compressor to inflate the plug and checking a pressure gauge on the air line at the compressor to ensure that the pressure in the sewer plug did not exceed 7 PSI (according to the sewer plug manufacturer's recommendations). The foreman sent a sewer maintenance worker (co-worker) into the chamber to check on the plug. The foreman then walked about 30 feet away to examine a manhole. The victim left the compressor running unattended (for unknown reasons), entered the gate chamber, and began inspecting the installation of the sewer plug. By this time, the plug had expanded and closed off the right branch of the sewer main. 
The diverted sewage was flowing at its normal height of 5 feet into the left branch of the sewer main. The bottom edge of the slide gates were level with the surface of the sewage flow. The victim was standing on the grating between the plug and the right sewer branch slide gate, while the co-worker was standing on the grating in the left sewer branch on the opposite side of the right branch slide gate (Figures 1 and 2). A few minutes later (after the compressor had been running for approximately 20 minutes), the plug burst, forcing sewage and air into the chamber and out the access hatch. The force of the explosion broke and lifted the grating the victim was standing on, bulged out (approximately 6 inches) the 3/8-inch-thick aluminum slide gate in the right sewer branch, and broke a fluorescent light fixture on the ceiling of the parking garage 10 feet above the chamber access hatch. 

Evidence gathered after the incident suggests that the force of the explosion pushed the victim up against the concrete ceiling of the chamber. The victim then fell into the right branch of the sewer main and was washed downstream with the surge of sewage. The co-worker was not injured and was able to climb up the chamber rungs where he was helped out by the foreman. 

The rescue squad from the city emergency medical service (EMS) was notified and arrived at the site in 5 minutes. After a 40- minute search, EMS personnel discovered the body of the victim submerged under the sewage flow, against the bar screen of a sewage pumping station approximately 200 yards downstream from the gate chamber. EMS personnel noted that the victim was dead at the scene.

CAUSE OF DEATH

The coroner listed the causes of death as asphyxiation by aspiration of food bolus, and blunt force injuries.

RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION

Recommendation #1: Where worker entry into sewers is necessary, slide gates should be used instead of, or in conjunction with, inflatable sewer plugs. 

Discussion: Slide gates provide a more positive method for diverting/controlling the flow of sewage for maintenance purposes, and should be utilized where possible. In this incident, because the slide gates had not been used for quite some time, they had become inoperative. Slide gates of this type should be properly maintained and operated regularly to ensure their proper function. 

Recommendation #2: Employers should ensure that sewer workers follow all sewer plug manufacturer's safety recommendations and other safety precautions relevant to the safe installation and use of inflatable sewer plugs. 

Discussion: Although some of the plug manufacturer's recommendations were followed, an important precaution for the use of this type of sewer plug was not followed. The following precaution is stated on the first page of the sewer plug installation instructions: "Under no circumstances should anyone be in the pipe or manhole when the stopper (plug) is being inflated or deflated." The victim left the air compressor running unattended. He had been trained in the manufacturer's recommendations which stipulate that this size plug was to be inflated to only 7 PSI. 

The air pressure inside the plug may have exceeded the recommended pressure of 7 PSI, thus causing the plug to rupture. (The burst test pressure for this plug is 21 PSI.) Another safety recommendation given by the plug manufacturer (also stated on the first page of the sewer plug instructions) was not followed: "When working under submerged conditions, as a safety precaution, the stopper should be filled with water to its appropriate pressure." According to the manufacturer, filling the plug with water instead of air when the plug is submerged will greatly reduce the force of a rupture.
Recommendation #3: Employers of sewer maintenance workers should develop and implement a comprehensive confined space entry program as outlined in NIOSH publication 80-106, "Working in Confined Spaces," and 87-113, "A Guide to Safety in Confined Spaces." 

Discussion: Confined space entry procedures should address each type of confined space that sewer maintenance workers are required to enter (i.e., diversion chambers, wet wells, lift stations, utility vaults, sewer manholes, sewer mains, etc.). At a minimum, the following items should be addressed:
1. Is entry necessary? Can the assigned task be completed from the outside? For example, a sewer monitoring camera could be lowered into a sewer diversion gate chamber which would allow workers to perform inspections from the outside.
2. Is a confined space safe entry permit issued by the employer before each confined space is entered.
3. Are confined spaces posted with warning signs and are confined space procedures posted where they will be noticed by employees?
4. If entry is to be made, has the air quality in the confined space been tested for safety based on the following criteria:
  • Oxygen supply at least 19.5%
  • Flammable range less than 10% of the lower explosive limit
  • Absence of toxic air contaminants
5. Have employees and supervisors been trained in the selection and use of:
  • respiratory protection
  • lifelines
  • emergency rescue equipment
  • protective clothing
6. Have employees been trained for confined space entry?
7. Are confined space safe work practices discussed in safety meetings?
8. Have employees been trained in confined space rescue procedures?
9. Is ventilation equipment available and/or used?
10. Is the air quality tested when the ventilation system is operating?


The above items may not have had a direct bearing on preventing this fatality. However, the incident was a routine sewer maintenance procedure having the potential of several additional and more common types of confined space work hazards (i.e., oxygen-deficient atmosphere, toxic and flammable vapors, etc.). These hazards would be safely controlled by following established NIOSH recommendations on working in confined spaces.

REFERENCES

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Criteria for a Recommended Standard ... Working in Confined Spaces. DHHS (NIOSH) publication number 80-106, December 1979.
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, A Guide to Safety in Confined Spaces. DHHS (NIOSH) publication number 87-113, 1987.
Return to In-house FACE reports
===================




Pipefitter/Project Foreman Died When Struck by Ruptured Sewer Pipe/Mechanical Plug

Michigan Case Report: 07MI024
Get Acrobat Reader
The free Adobe Acrobat Reader is needed to open some of the files on this page. You can download Acrobat Reader from adobe.com


Summary

On March 30, 2007, a 53-year-old male pipefitter and project foreman for a mechanical contractor died when a storm sewer pipe and inflatable plug dislodged and struck him causing fatal injuries to his chest and abdomen. The three-person crew was in a county park's lift station to replace two pumps. The water was pumped down and the decedent and Coworker #1 went down to the bottom of the manhole to install a mechanical plug into a 26-inch diameter storm sewer pipe that drained into the lift station. The plug was inflated and the water stopped flowing into the station. Coworker #2 was at the top of the 10- x 10-foot manhole monitoring the situation. The decedent and Coworker #1 installed a pump base anchor in the floor directly in front of the mechanical plug they had installed in the sewer line. No blocking or bracing was installed in front of the plug. While the decedent and Coworker #1 were drilling anchor holes in the floor, the wall, sewer pipe and plug exploded into the manhole, striking both employees (Figure 1). The decedent was knocked unconscious and Coworker #1 was thrown across the lift station. Coworkers #1 and #2 lifted the decedent to the 2nd level of the lift station and started CPR. When emergency response arrived, they extricated the decedent from the 2nd level and transported him to a local hospital where he later died.

Pipe plug in broken sewer pipe at base of lift station
Figure 1. Pipe plug in broken sewer pipe at base of lift station
Recommendations:
  • Employers should ensure that workers follow all pneumatic pipe plug manufacturer's safety recommendations and other safety precautions relevant to the safe installation and use of pneumatic pipe plugs.
  • Employers should develop written confined space programs that contain specific procedures for all tasks to be performed and ensure employees follow the procedures.
  • Employers should institute a Health and Safety (H&S) committee as part of their health and safety program.
  • Employers should provide workers with training in the recognition and avoidance of unsafe conditions and the required safe work practices that apply to their work environments.


Introduction

On March 30, 2007, a 53-year-old male pipefitter/project foreman for a mechanical contractor died when storm sewer pipe and inflatable pneumatic plug ruptured and struck him in his chest and abdomen. On the same day as the fatal incident, MIFACE investigators were informed by the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Administration (MIOSHA) personnel, who had received a report on their 24-hour-a-day hotline that this work-related fatal injury had occurred. On July 10, 2007, MIFACE interviewed the company owner at the company headquarters and was given a tour of the facility. During the course of writing this report, the police report and pictures, fire response report, medical examiner report, and the MIOSHA file and citations were reviewed. The pictures used in Figures 1 and 3 are courtesy of the company owner. Figures 2, 4, 5, and 6 are courtesy of the MIOSHA file.
The employer, a mechanical installation contractor for commercial, industrial, and institutional facilities had been in business for over 25 years. The firm employed 85 individuals, 12 of whom had the same job title as the decedent, project foreman. The decedent had been employed with this firm for 20 years and worked full time. Employees worked 9 hours per day, starting work at 6:00 a.m. and concluding at 4:00 p.m.
The employer had a written health and safety program, but no specific procedures for the task being performed. The company did not have a Health and Safety Committee. The firm participated in the National Associated Builders and Contractors Inc. 2007 Safety Training and Evaluation Process (STEP) program and had been awarded a "Gold Level Achievement Award." The company had a written progressive disciplinary procedure: 1st violation resulted in a verbal warning, the 2nd violation resulted in a written warning, and the 3rd violation resulted in possible termination.
The company's safety director was a health and safety consultant employed by a consulting firm. The safety director had many responsibilities, including conducting regular safety inspections of shop and field operations, as well as holding safety meetings with all employees and conducting safety training of supervisory personnel. The safety director visited company job sites two times per month and provided the company owner a written report on noted violations. Crew foremen were responsible for safety at the job site (instruct crew in proper and safe operation of tools, equipment and procedures for every job) and to correct all noted violations at the time of the consultant's site visit. The foreman was responsible for conducting adequate safety briefings and inspection of tools as well as equipment before any job was started. The crew foreman observed work in progress to ensure that safety precautions were taken at all times, and was required to take immediate steps to correct any unsafe procedure or hazardous condition. The employer, safety consultant, and crew foreman presented health and safety training and topics to company employees. Employees received health and safety training on an annual basis by the safety consultant. The crew foreman was responsible for presenting specific health and safety topics during monthly safety meetings and weekly toolbox talks, and for maintaining training documentation. Supervisors and foreman were responsible for determining if an employee needed retraining.
The company had a written confined space entry program. The decedent had been trained and authorized to use the confined space gas monitor in 1997. A confined space entry permit had been developed to monitor for oxygen, carbon monoxide, and LEL.
At the conclusion of their investigation, MIOSHA Construction Safety and Health Division issued the following Serious citations to the employer:
SERIOUS: ACT 154 ACT OF 1974, 408.1011(a)
An employer should furnish to each employee, employment and a place of employment which is free from recognized hazards that are causing, or are likely to cause, death or serious physical harm to the employee.

The employees engaged in mechanical activities failed to follow the manufacturer’s installation instruction of a Lansas® pneumatic pipe plug. The employees were exposed to serious injury/death when the sewer pipe and pneumatic pipe plug failed.
The employees failed to:

  1. Read the manufacturer’s installation instructions.
  2. Perform head/test pressure calculations.
  3. Install the pipe plug in a clean dry pipe.
  4. Install shoring/bracing in front of the pipe plug to prevent dislodgement.
  5. Check the calibration of the air pressure gauge.
  6. The employees were working in the danger zone.
Method of abatement would be to follow Lansas® manufacturer’s instructions for pneumatic pipe plugs.

SERIOUS: GENERAL RULES, PART 1, RULE 114(2)(g)
An accident prevention program shall, as a minimum, provide for the following: Instruction to each employee who is required to enter a confined space regarding all of the following:
  1. The hazards involved.
  2. The necessary precautions to be taken.
  3. The use of required personal protective equipment.
  4. Emergency equipment.
  5. The procedures to be followed in an emergency occurs.
Employees engaged in mechanical activities failed to address hazards associated with confined spaces. The employees failed to recognize engulfment hazards, wear a safety harness with a lifeline attached, and have the proper emergency equipment available. The employees were exposed to injury and drowning hazards when the sewer pipe and plug failed.
SERIOUS: TOOLS, PART 19, RULE 1931(1)(a)(b)
An employer shall do all of the following: (a) Ensure that an employee has been trained in the use of tools before authorizing their use and (b) maintain, or require to be maintained, tools free of defects that could cause injury to an employee. The employees engaged in mechanical work activities were not properly trained in the installation and use of a Lansas® inflatable pipe plug. The employees were exposed to serious injury/death when the sewer pipe and plug failed.
Back to Top


Investigation

The company for whom the decedent (Company A) worked had been contracted by a county parks department to replace two old and failing pumps and a ladder at a park lift station. Company B was subcontracted to install the ladder. The park's storm water drains into the lift station and the lift station then lifts the water to a local river. The manhole had corrugated metal walls. The base of the lift station was 30 feet deep. There was a 2nd level, accessible by ladder approximately 15 feet down. The 2nd level had a 2-foot walk around. A ladder provided access to the base of the manhole where the work was to be performed.
On the day before the incident, Company A's field superintendent conducted an informal inspection of the lift station and found nothing out of the ordinary. The superintendent did find that the sewer pipe, which was installed in the 1920s, was larger than expected.
Company A usually used Cherne® Best Ball 18"-1 ½" mechanical plugs, installing them per manufacturer's instructions. Because Company A did not have the properly sized plug for the pipe, the field superintendent borrowed a Lansas® 24-48-inch pneumatic pipe plug from a local contractor. According to the MIOSHA file, no safety instructions were given to the Company A employee who picked up the Lansas® plug. The company from whom the plug was rented did not have records of gauge calibration. According to the MIOSHA file, if the gauges appeared to be faulty, they were discarded and replaced. The superintendent did not obtain any manufacturer's installation instructions from the local contractor. The decedent and Coworker #1 transported this larger plug to the lift station.
The decedent and Coworker #1 arrived at the company shop location at 5:45 a.m. They loaded a truck with a generator, air compressor, air line, safety harnesses, hoist block (chain fall), test equipment for air monitoring, and other miscellaneous tools. They arrived at the worksite at approximately 7:30 a.m. The weather was sunny and chilly.
The decedent and Coworker #1 began to unload the truck. They set up a 2-inch sump pump. After evaluating the air in the confined space, the decedent descended into the manhole as Coworker #1 lowered the sump pump into manhole. The decedent placed it in the rear corner of work area. They turned on the pump and water began to discharge through a hose onto the above ground street.
The decedent left the work site and traveled to another nearby project to pick up rubber thigh-high boots. Coworker #1 began to set up the chain fall, hooked up the test plug and began to lower it into the manhole, and set up the air compressor, generator, and tools. He also opened up the electrical cabinet.
At approximately 8:00 a.m., Coworker #2 arrived at the jobsite (Figure 2). Coworker #1 and Coworker #2 began to discuss the work plan. A representative from the county's park department arrived and asked "What are you doing today?" and "What is the game plan?" Coworkers #1 and #2 responded and then prepared for the confined space documentation and equipment. They went through the checklist, turned on the atmospheric testing equipment (sniffer) and lowered it down into the manhole. Coworker #2 checked the readings from the sniffer and verbalized the readings.

Lift station building
Figure 2. Lift station building
The decedent arrived with the boots as Coworkers #1 and #2 were finishing the confined space readings. The decedent and Coworker #2 put on the rubber boots. At approximately 9:00 a.m., the decedent and Coworker #2 entered the manhole while Coworker #1 stayed above ground at the open manhole to observe and listen. Coworker #1 released the hoist while lowering the plug.
With constant verbalization and teamwork between the three men, it took approximately 15 to 17 minutes to lower the test plug into the manhole and to place it into the sewer pipe. Coworker #2 used the shovel to clean the 26-inch cast iron sewer pipe. The decedent guided the plug into the sewer pipe while Coworker #2 used the wooden handle of the shovel to help insert the plug. After the pipe plug was positioned, they told Coworker #1 to turn on the air compressor to inflate the plug. Coworker #1 did so and monitored the air gauge. Employee statements provided to the MIFACE researcher stated that the plug was pumped per manufacturer's recommendations to eight pounds. Statements made to the MIOSHA compliance officer differed from the employee statements given to the MIFACE researcher. The employee statements given to the MIOSHA compliance officer at the time of the investigation indicated that the employees did not know the required plug inflation pressure or the plug's inflation pressure at the time of the incident. The decedent and Coworker #2 stayed in the bottom of the lift station and yelled up to Coworker #1 when the water stopped flowing from the sewer pipe. Coworker #1 communicated to the decedent and Coworker #2 that all systems were good. Coworker #1 then collected the necessary tools in a bucket, and while watching the air gauge, he lowered the bucket to the crew below.
Coworker #1 was at the top of the manhole monitoring the situation and the pump. The decedent and Coworker #2 then proceeded to install a pump base anchor in the floor directly in front of the mechanical plug they installed in the sewer line. No blocking or bracing was installed in front of the plug as required by the manufacturer to protect the workers in case of a plug failure
Coworker #2 used the shovel to clear six to eight inches of sand away from the working area to determine what kind of anchors were required. The 2-inch sump pump continued to keep the water level under control. They decided what anchors were needed and then headed back up out of the manhole.
Employees from Company B arrived at the pump house. Company B's employees entered the well house and descended to the second level to discuss the installation procedure for the new ladder. A Company B employee reviewed the ladder installation procedure with the decedent and then left the jobsite. The decedent left the jobsite to obtain materials needed for the anchor and ladder installation. Coworker #2 went back down into the manhole after discussing the game plan with the Company B. Coworker #2 chopped out the old ladder and it was pulled out and then the new one was dropped into the manhole. Coworker #2 exited the manhole and Company B employees entered and after determining that the ladder was properly set, left the manhole.
When the decedent arrived back at the jobsite, the decedent and Coworker #2 descended to the lower level of the manhole to install the anchors. They took a small drill with them. They discovered the drill had the wrong size bit. After discussing various options, the decedent and Coworker #2 still could not drill with the small drill. They yelled up to Coworker #1 to get the big drill, which was already loaded and ready to go. Coworker #1 lowered the drill down while continuing to monitor the air.

Manhole wall at location of pipe explosion
Figure 3. Manhole wall at location of pipe explosion
Within the next 60 seconds, they noticed the sump pump was not keeping up and water was coming in and had risen to their ankles. Water was leaking from the wall, not out of the pipe. The decedent knelt down to drill the second hole with the drill. Coworker #2 saw brownish water in the bottom corner near the plug. Coworker #2 told the decedent to move out of the way, he would take care of the anchor. He was on his knees 15 inches away from the decedent.
When Coworker #2 knelt down, he felt air by his face as the force of the explosion picked him up and blew him to the other side of the manhole (Figure 3). Coworker #2 was uncertain if he was knocked unconscious or if so, the length of time he was unconscious. He got up from a fetal position and water in the manhole was chest high. As he came to, he went to the decedent who was visibly injured. Coworker #2 looked up toward the top of the manhole, but it was "raining" air - the air was filled with white powder and dust particles. Coworker #1 could not see the two individuals in the manhole. Coworker #2 yelled to Coworker #1,"we're in trouble." He instructed Coworker #1 to call 911, and then to call the company office.
Coworker #2 had difficulty in pulling the decendent above the water because of the height of the water/mud/sand. Coworker #2 told Coworker #1 to turn the big pumps on; Coworker #1 complied. Coworker #2 asked Coworker #1 for a pipe strap so he could hoist the decedent. He lassoed the decedent under the arms to pull him up. Coworker #1 began hoisting the decedent out of the water while Coworker #2 yelled instructions from below. Coworker #2 ascended to the 2nd level and laid the decedent on two 2x10 boards. He asked Coworker #1 to come down to the 2nd level because he realized the decedent was not breathing. Coworker #2 held the decedent against his leg as Coworker #1 administered CPR. The decedent began to breathe.
The police arrived first. Then an EMT arrived and inquired if it was sewage in the hole. Coworker #2 responded that it was groundwater. When individuals from a local fire department technical rescue team arrived, they assumed command. After assessing the situation, they entered the manhole, assisted the EMT and asked Coworkers #1 and #2 to leave. The rescue workers moved the decedent from the boards to a stokes basket and the decedent was lifted from the manhole. EMT personnel transported the decedent by ambulance to a local hospital where he died several hours later.

Pipe and plug at base of manhole
Figure 4. Pipe and plug at base of manhole after water was pumped

pipe plug
Figure 5. Picture of pipe plug after it was removed from the manhole
The pipe plug was found laying on the floor of the manhole and recovered. When the water was pumped out, the plug in the pipe could be seen (Figure 4). Part of the concrete pipe was still attached to the plug. The plug was over eight feet long and had metal plugs on both ends (Figure 5). Pictures indicate that the concrete gave way causing the plug to shoot out due to water pressure (Figure 3). The plug had an approximately 16-inch cut that appeared to happen when the pipe broke. The cut looked as though it was done by a sharp object and not from blowing under pressure (Figure 6). The entire plug would have been inside of this pipe prior to it blowing out.

16-inch cut on pipe plug
Figure 6. 16-inch cut on pipe plug
The MIOSHA file documentation indicated that both surviving Company A employees had never used or installed this type of large inflatable plug before, had not read the manufacturer's instructions (including installation instructions), and had not received any formal training about this plug from their employer. They stated they had used the smaller pipe plugs that their company owned many times before and that they did not install this pipe plug any differently from their work practice in the past. Company A had the manufacturer's installation instruction for the pipe plugs usually used at the company's office.
The employees also indicated that they did not know if the pressure gauge on the rented pipe plug had been calibrated. The work crew had not made any back test pressure calculations or head pressure/back pressure calculations.
Back to Top

Cause of Death

The cause of death as stated on the death certificate was multiple blunt injuries of chest and abdomen. Toxicology was negative for alcohol and illicit drugs.
Back to Top

Recommendations/Discussion

Employers should ensure that workers follow all pneumatic pipe plug manufacturer's safety recommendations and other safety precautions relevant to the safe installation and use of pneumatic pipe plugs.
The employer usually used Cherne® pipe plugs, but for this worksite, they used a Lansas® pipe plug. The employer had the Cherne® safety literature at the company headquarters, but had not obtained any Lansas® pipe plug literature.
MIFACE conducted an Internet search and found safety information for both the Lansas® and Cherne® pipe plugs. The Lansas® Products website (http://www.lansas.com/index.htm) had both written safety instructions and viewable safety videos (in both English and Spanish). The Cherne® Safety Manual may be found at: http://www.cherneind.com/data/. (Link updated 3/26/2009) Click on Literature, and scroll down to Safety Information.
The company and the safety director should obtain and review the safety literature for any pipe plugs they use and ensure that the safety protocols are understood and followed. Safety precautions identified in the installation instructions for the Cherne® plugs and the Lansas® pipe plug used in the incident were strikingly similar. Table I highlights some of these precautions.
Table I
Cherne Pipe Plugs Lansas Pipe Plug
Death/bodily injury may result if plug failsSame
Read and understand installation instructions prior to useSame
Determine back-test pressuresSame
Always use calibrated gaugesRequired use of calibrated gauges
Insert plugs in clean dry pipesSame
Unclean pipes may affect holding capabilities of pipe plugsSame
Stay out of Danger ZoneSame
Never rely on pipe plugs as the only means to prevent injury. Bracing is required.Always block/brace to prevent movement of pipe plugs.
The crew stated to the MIOSHA compliance officer that they installed the Lansas® plug in the same manner as they would have installed the Cherne® plug (the plug they usually used). The "normal" manner was in violation of the Cherne® Safety Instruction manual. For example:
  • The decedent and his coworker were in the danger zone during plug installation. The danger zone is the area that exists in front of the plugged pipe opening in an area, which expands outwardly in a cone shape).
  • The employer did not consult a registered professional engineer for the design, construction, and maintenance of an operational backup system to safely stop a dislodged plug, and the pipeline media that will discharge upon plug failure, to protect employees while performing the pump/ladder replacement working in the danger zone. Blocking/bracing must be used to prevent the movement or complete dislodging of pipe plugs. Employers should consult the engineer on a case-by-case basis.
The employees indicated that no water was flowing from the pipe after the plug was inflated. This may have placed undue pressure on the pipe, potentially contributing to its failure. Although it is unknown if the plug was over inflated, over inflation will not provide a better seal and the plug may rupture catastrophically and dislodge at high velocity.
Employers should develop written confined space programs that contain specific procedures for all tasks to be performed and ensure employees follow the procedures.
A confined space means any space having a limited means of egress that is subject to the accumulation of toxic or flammable contaminants or has an oxygen deficient atmosphere. Confined or enclosed spaces include, but are not limited to, storage tanks, process vessels, bins, boilers, ventilation or exhaust ducts, sewers, underground utility vaults, tunnels, pipelines, and open top spaces more than four feet in depth such as pits, tubs, vaults, and vessels.
Some of the company's confined space protocols were followed, for example, evaluating the air prior to entry and having an employee available in the immediate vicinity to assist in rendering assistance. A hazard assessment of a job that requires working in a lift station manhole should identify possible engulfment if the plug or wall should fail. With this hazard identification, the confined space procedure should identify that safety harnesses be worn by each of the employees in the manhole. Although the wearing of the safety harnesses would not have prevented the fatality, the rescue of the injured worker would have proceeded more quickly and at less risk to the injured.

Employers should institute a Health and Safety (H&S) committee as part of their health and safety program.

An H&S Committee, comprised of both management and hourly employees provides a forum for management and employees to regularly discuss health and safety issues in the workplace. An H&S Committee is an important way for employees to help manage their own health and safety and assist the employer in providing a safer, healthier workplace. The formation of the Committee provides a process for open communication on health and safety issues and enhances the ability of employees and management to resolve safety and health concerns reasonably and cooperatively.
Much of the potential value of an H&S Committee can be lost without careful development of the purpose, functions and activities of the Committee. The Committee will function effectively only after the need for the committee is recognized and employees, supervisors and managers welcome its services. At their worst, Health and Safety Committees can be a "negative-minded" group confining their approach primarily to (after-the-fact) placing of blame. However, at their best, they can become an effective tool to help prevent unsafe practices and conditions, reduce the risk of injury and illnesses and to help motivate employees and supervisors to become actively involved.
MIOSHA has several resources that can be accessed for development of an effective Health and Safety Committee. The Good Safety and Health Programs are Built with Good Safety Committees brochure details the advantages of having an effective Health and Safety Committee (www.michigan.gov/documents/cis_wsh_cet0140_103132_7.pdf). (Link no longer available 4/21/2009) The MIOSHA Safety and Health Toolbox contains materials that focus on the major components of a health and safety system. Module 2 of the Toolbox focuses on employee involvement and contains several resources for Health and Safety Committee development (http://www.michigan.gov/lara/0,4601,7-154-61256_11407_15317-124535--,00.html) (Link updated 4/1/2013).
The State of Wisconsin "Guidelines for Developing an Effective Health and Safety Committee" (www.doa.state.wi.us/docs_view2.asp?docid=665) and the Canadian Centre for Occupational Health and Safety, Occupational Safety and Health Answers: Health and Safety Committees (www.ccohs.ca/oshanswers/hsprograms/hscommittees/) both provide valuable resources and a framework for selection of H&S Committee membership, purpose, function and activities.

Employers should provide workers with training in the recognition and avoidance of unsafe conditions and the required safe work practices that apply to their work environments.

Employers should ensure that all employees are trained to recognize and avoid hazardous work conditions. Employers should also ensure that the training in recognizing and avoiding hazards is coupled with employer assessment that workers are competent in the recognition of hazards and safe work practices.
Because jobsite conditions change on a daily basis, MIFACE recommends that employers discuss the day's work with the employees prior to the start of the work to discuss the day's work. This could be accomplished in daily and weekly "tailgate" talks, covering applicable health and safety issues, weather issues, equipment issues, etc.
Back to Top


References

MIOSHA standards cited in this report may be found at and downloaded from the MIOSHA, Michigan Department of Labor and Economic Growth (DLEG) web site at: http://www.michigan.gov/mioshastandards. MIOSHA standards are available for a fee by writing to: Michigan Department of Labor and Economic Growth, MIOSHA Standards Section, P.O. Box 30643, Lansing, Michigan 48909-8143 or calling (517) 322-1845.
  • MIOSHA Construction Safety and Health Standard, Part 1, General Rules.
  • MIOSHA Construction Safety and Health Standard, Part 622. Control Measures For Hazardous Atmospheres In Confined Spaces For Construction.
  • NIOSH FACE REPORT #9017. Sewer Worker Dies When Inflatable Sewer Plug Bursts in Washington, D.C. Internet Address: https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/face/In-house/full9017.html
  • Cherne Industries. Internet Address: http://www.cherneind.com/ (Link updated 3/26/2009)
  • Lansas Products. Internet Address: http://www.lansas.com/