MEC&F Expert Engineers : PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE LAUNCH CAPSIZING OF THE YACHT BAADEN IN ANACORTES, WASHINGTON

Wednesday, August 5, 2015

PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE LAUNCH CAPSIZING OF THE YACHT BAADEN IN ANACORTES, WASHINGTON














Executive Summary
The newly built yacht Baaden was being launched stern first down the Fidalgo Marina boat ramp in Anacortes, Washington, with eight shipyard personnel on board when it capsized after entering the water at 2050 on Sunday, May 18, 2014. The yacht was salvaged but was declared a total constructive loss, estimated at $10 million. Three shipyard personnel who were trapped below decks for up to half an hour were treated for minor cuts and injuries at local hospitals. No pollution was reported. 

Vessel and Builder
New World Yacht Builders began construction of the Baaden in December 2011, working from an existing 80-foot-hull mold built in 2002 by Northern Marine. Like other large Northern Marine yachts, the vessel was custom designed. The 80-foot mold was lengthened in the midsection and stem, the bow was given more flare, and a swim platform was added. The resulting 85-foot vessel was designated Northern Marine model 8501 and was the first of its kind. New World described the Baaden as having commercial fishing vessel roots in an 85-foot European-style, luxury, long-range, oceangoing expedition yacht. The builder, the buyer’s representative, and an interior design firm collaborated on the vessel design and styling. Several sister vessels built to the 80-foot-hull design were completed and are in operation.

Northern Marine was an established builder of large resin-infused composite motor yachts from 57 to 152 feet long, building more than 25 hulls since its inception in 1995. Following the company’s bankruptcy in 2010, New World Yacht Builders, founded the previous year, acquired Northern Marine’s assets and kept the company name and construction techniques, taking over the model lines, boat styles, equipment, and maintenance of existing Northern Marine boats. The management and employees of New World included several former Northern Marine personnel. At the time of the accident, New World employed 52 people, primarily at its Anacortes yard. Following the accident, the builder entered receivership and ceased operations in August 2014.

Salvage
The day after the accident, the salvage team placed two righting straps around the vessel, rolled it to an upright position, dewatered it, and removed the 120 gallons of fuel on board in preparation for a stability assessment by naval architects. On May 21, a test of the yacht’s ability to float without straps and a stability assessment determined that the vessel could not be towed without support straps as it was unstable and would roll to port. This assessment of the vessel’s stability was not an accurate comparison to its stability during its launch, however, as 2 long tons (LT) of unsecured ballast and other unsecured items had shifted to port and water remained trapped in pockets and in absorbent materials on the port side of the vessel.

On May 23, the Baaden was towed while secured with supporting straps and was lifted and placed ashore on cradles at a nearby dock in Anacortes. In July, the yacht was transported back to New World’s shed.

Damage
Due  to  water  damage  to  interior  woodwork,  machinery,  and  electrical  systems  and expenses  associated  with  repairing  the  vessel,  at  the  time  of  this  report  the  Baaden  was considered a total constructive loss with an estimated value of $10 million.

Launch team members inspected the launch cradles, dollies, and equipment after the incident and noted that one of the tires on the forward dolly was flat, and witnesses said they saw bubbles coming from the forward dolly at the time of the launch. The tire likely was damaged during the initial port roll at 2037.

Project Personnel and Oversight
Interviews indicated that New World used three project managers during the Baaden construction. Not all of the project managers had an engineering background, as their job was to communicate and implement the yacht buyer’s requests as well as interface with the production manager and maintain project finances and scheduling. The overall design engineering and naval architecture was primarily overseen by New World’s owner/general manager. Initially, a New World engineer and a designer, each with several years of experience, worked directly with New World’s owner. The engineer departed early in the project, and thereafter the designer served as the primary contact for the offsite stability naval architect.

The buyer’s onsite “build captain” participated actively in styling and interior layouts of the Baaden design and requested the first weight estimate of the vessel during construction. In late 2013, the build captain’s position was terminated, and his role was performed by a less active yacht management group. In January 2014, following the sudden illness of New World’s owner, a consulting naval architect became acting general manager of New World in the owner’s absence. Although the acting general manager had worked several years for Northern Marine in the past and was working on site for New World in various capacities, he had not previously been specifically involved with the Baaden.

In April 2014, the designer who worked on the weight estimates and directly provided information to the stability naval architect left New World. New World’s owner returned to the Baaden project in May, just prior to the launch. New World personnel interviews indicated that the responsibility for overall vessel engineering was unclear in the final months of the project. The company’s acting general manager stated that the Baaden project had more discontinuity in technical personnel and a greater amount of subcontracted work compared to past builds.

Engineers, managers, and other personnel involved with the design and construction of the Baaden were experienced and had successfully built and launched similar vessels in the same manner in the past. However, New World’s transcription error from the reading on a load cell and incorrectly reported ballast weight resulted in the contracted offsite naval architect inaccurately assessing launch stability. These errors indicate a breakdown in the technical oversight of the design and build process.

Probable Cause
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the capsizing of the yacht Baaden during its initial launch was the vessel’s low margin of stability due to the combined effects of a recording error during the final vessel weigh, which resulted in an incorrect assessment of the vessel’s center of gravity, and an overestimation of the weight of installed ballast.