NEW JERSEY TRANSIT BUS REAR-ENDS ANOTHER PRIVATE BUS INSIDE LINCOLN TUNNEL; 18 INJURED

JUNE 10, 2015

WEEHAWKEN, N.J.

A New Jersey Transit bus rear-ended a private bus inside the Lincoln Tunnel on Wednesday morning, injuring at least 18 people and slowing traffic on one of the busiest routes for commuters entering and leaving New York City, authorities said.
The crash happened at around 9:30 a.m. in the center tube on the New York side of the tunnel connecting it with New Jersey, said Joe Pentangelo, spokesman for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey police.
The extent of the injuries is not known. At least two people were taken out of the tunnel on stretchers and two others walked out with the help of emergency personnel.
There are delays of up to one hour heading into New York because traffic is being diverted to the south tube.
The Port Authority says 42 million vehicles a year travel through the tunnel. The tunnel is comprised of three tubes built beneath the Hudson River.

NTSB Issues Recommendation to Address Electrical Short Circuiting Hazards on Washington’s Metro System

JUNE 8, 2015

​ WASHINGTON, DC In its ongoing investigation of the Metro train accident at L’Enfant Plaza on January 12, 2015, National Transportation Safety Board investigators found problems with certain electrical connections in Washington’s Metro system that require “immediate action.” The NTSB issued a safety recommendation today to address the situation. Investigators found that some electrical connections associated with the power supply to the third rail were improperly constructed and installed, which can allow moisture and contaminants to enter the components. Such conditions can create the potential for electrical short circuiting, which could result in fire and smoke events in the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority system. The safety issue was further substantiated during the investigation of the February 11 smoke event in the tunnel near the Court House station. Investigators found that cable connectors were missing “sealing sleeves” designed to keep moisture and contaminants away from the high-voltage conductors. Further, investigators have found instances in other locations in the Metro system where the cable connector assemblies were missing the sleeves. The NTSB has learned that WMATA does not have a program to ensure that the sleeves, which are in its design specifications, are used and installed properly. To remedy these hazards, the NTSB has asked WMATA to promptly develop and implement a program to ensure that all power cable connector assemblies are constructed and installed in accordance with its engineering design specifications.  “We are hopeful that WMATA management will act on this recommendation in a timely manner so that the hazards we identified can be mitigated as soon as possible," said NTSB Chairman Christopher A. Hart. Because so much of the evidence in the January 12 L’Enfant Plaza accident was thermally damaged or consumed in the electrical short circuiting event, investigators have so far not been able to determine whether the cable connector assembly was protected by sealing sleeves. The investigation into this accident is ongoing; the findings, safety recommendations and probable cause will be issued when the investigation is completed.  On June 23-24, the NTSB will hold a fact-finding investigative hearing on the January 12 accident in which issues involving WMATA’s programs and maintenance procedures will be explored in detail. More information about the hearing is available at http://go.usa.gov/3PBdw. The safety recommendation letter is available at http://go.usa.gov/3PBvj.

Metropolitan Engineering & Forensics and NTSB Calls for Immediate Action on Collision Avoidance Systems for Vehicles; Cites Slow Progress as Major Safety Issue

JUNE 8, 2015

​ WASHINGTON, DC In a report released today, the National Transportation Safety Board outlined the life-saving benefits of currently available collision avoidance systems, and recommended that the technology become standard on all new passenger and commercial vehicles.  “You don’t pay extra for your seatbelt,” said Chairman Christopher A. Hart. “And you shouldn’t have to pay extra for technology that can help prevent a collision altogether.” NTSB’s Special Investigation Report, The Use of Forward Collision Avoidance Systems to Prevent and Mitigate Rear-End Crashes, stresses that collision avoidance systems can prevent or lessen the severity of rear-end crashes, thus saving lives and reducing injuries. According to statistics from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), rear-end crashes kill about 1,700 people every year and injure half a million more. More than 80% of these deaths and injuries might have been mitigated had the vehicles been equipped with a collision avoidance system. The NTSB has made 12 recommendations over 20 years in favor of forward collision avoidance technologies, including 10 recommendations resulting from an earlier Special Investigation Report in 2001. The progress on these recommendations, however, has been very limited. The report notes that a lack of incentives and limited public awareness has stunted the wide adoption of collision avoidance technology. Only 4 out of 684 passenger vehicle models in 2014 included a complete forward collision avoidance system as a standard feature. When these systems are offered as options, they are often bundled with other non-safety features, making the overall package more expensive.  “The promise of a next generation of safety improvements has been used too often to justify inaction,” Hart said. "Because there will always be better technologies over the horizon, we must be careful to avoid letting perfection become the enemy of the good." In the report, the NTSB recommends that manufacturers make collision avoidance systems standard equipment in newly manufactured vehicles, beginning with collision warning systems, and adding autonomous emergency braking once NHTSA completes standards for such braking systems. Furthermore, the NTSB recommends that NHTSA develop tests and standards in order to rate the performance of each vehicle’s collision avoidance systems and to incorporate those results into an expanded NCAP 5-star safety rating scale. The NTSB is also issuing a companion Safety Alert for consumers and commercial fleet owners that urges them to consider vehicles with collision warning and autonomous emergency braking functions.  To view Chairman Hart’s statement, click on the following link: https://youtu.be/CpRXnXcdQh8. To view the full report, including the conclusions and recommendations to NHTSA and to passenger vehicle, truck-tractor, motorcoach, and single-unit truck manufacturers, click on the following link: http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-studies/Documents/SIR1501.pdf. To view “Safety Alert: Addressing Deadly Rear-End Crashes” click on the following link: http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-alerts/Documents/SA-046.pdf.

NTSB: Defective Joint, Lack of Supporting Soil Caused East Harlem Gas Main Leak That Killed Eight, Destroyed Two Buildings

JUNE 9, 2015

 

WASHINGTON, DC

The National Transportation Safety Board found today that a natural gas explosion that destroyed two five-story buildings in the East Harlem section of New York City was caused both by a defective pipe joint that allowed gas to leak from a gas main into the building, and an earlier breach in a sewer line that caused the gas main to sag and overstress the defective joint.

The explosion on March 12, 2014, killed eight, injured 50 and displaced more than 100 families.

Among the findings by the Board was that the surfaces of the service tee and the gas main were not adequately prepared before the tee was fusion-welded to the gas main in 2011 by a contractor to Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., resulting in a defective fusion joint. The Board today also issued a Safety Alert regarding the proper cleaning and surface preparation procedures to ensure strong joints in plastic natural-gas pipelines.

The Board also found that the New York City Department of Environmental Protection (NYC DEP) had learned of a sewer main breach in front of the building on Park Avenue in 2006, but had never repaired it. The supporting soil under the gas line and a water main, in front of the buildings was washed into the sewer through a large hole in the sewer wall. 

The sagging gas main led to a crack in the defective service-tee fusion joint, allowing natural gas to escape into the ground and migrate into 1644 Park Avenue.

“We made recommendations to the City of New York, the New York State Public Services Commission, and Con Edison to prevent this from happening again,” said NTSB Chairman Christopher A. Hart. “The public’s safety would be greatly advanced by these safety improvements, and the public needs to insist on them.”

The investigation also examined the effectiveness of Con Edison’s gas odor public awareness program, the adequacy of its gas odor report response, the effectiveness of NYC DEP’s sewer integrity program and the effectiveness of federal and state oversight.

“But even if all these recommendations are acted upon, they will not stop every leak,” Hart said. “Don’t assume your neighbor reported the gas leak. If you smell gas, first evacuate and move away from the building and then report the leak, either to 911 or to the gas company.”

The link to the safety alert is here: http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/safety-alerts/Documents/SA_047.pdf
The link to the probable cause and recommendations is here: http://www.ntsb.gov/news/events/Documents/2015_Manhattan_BMG_DCA14MP002_Abstract.pdf

NTSB on Deadly Amtrak Derailment in Philadelphia: Analysis of the phone records does not indicate that any calls, texts, or data usage occurred during the time the engineer was operating the train

NTSB Issues Second Update on its Investigation Into the Amtrak Derailment in Philadelphia

JUNE 10, 2015

 

WASHINGTON – As part of its ongoing investigation into the May 12, 2015, derailment of Amtrak Train 188 in Philadelphia, the NTSB today provides this update on the analysis of the engineer’s cell phone and related records. The NTSB is conducting a detailed examination of the engineer’s cell phone calls, texts, data and cell phone tower transmission activity records from the phone carrier; and records from Amtrak’s on-board Wi-Fi system. Analysis of the phone records does not indicate that any calls, texts, or data usage occurred during the time the engineer was operating the train. Amtrak’s records confirm that the engineer did not access the train’s Wi-Fi system while he was operating the locomotive. To determine whether the phone was in “airplane mode” or was powered off, investigators in the NTSB laboratory in Washington have been examining the phone’s operating system, which contains more than 400,000 files of meta-data. Investigators are obtaining a phone identical to the engineer’s phone as an exemplar model and will be running tests to validate the data. The engineer provided the NTSB with the passcode to the cell phone, which allowed investigators to access the data without having to go through the phone manufacturer. Last year the NTSB lab processed about 80 electronic devices and more than 40 cell phones. The phone records analysis of the Amtrak 188 investigation has been more complicated than anticipated because the phone carrier has multiple systems that log different types of phone activity, some of which are based in different time zones. Investigators worked with the phone carrier to validate the timestamps in several sets of records with activity from multiple time zones to correlate them all to the time zone in which the accident occurred, Eastern Daylight Time. NTSB’s Amtrak 188 accident webpage has links to all of the reports, videos, images, testimony and other related materials can be accessed: http://go.usa.gov/38MUB Additional updates will be issued as events warrant.