MEC&F Expert Engineers

Friday, August 14, 2015

1 killed after an aircraft impacted terrain in Okanogan County east of Oroville, Washington and a post-impact fire occurred




AUGUST 13, 2015

OKANOGAN COUNTY, Wash. -

UPDATE 9:20: According to the Washington Department of Natural Resources, 10-12 structures were lost in Nine Mile Fire. None were homes. The Okanogan County Emergency management says there are evacuations for homes on Nine mile Road, Wagon Wheel Road, Old Tressle Road, and Point Road. The Red Cross shelter for Nine Mile Fire will be opened at the Oroville High School.

UPDATE 8:50, Thursday: According to the Washington Department of Natural Resources, the fire is more than 3,500 acres. They say structures have been lost, and a type two team is helping to fight the fire.

UPDATE:

According to Sheriff Rogers there were about four fires that were burning along Chesaw Road that have now appeared to merge into one and is heading toward Canada. Investigators are trying to determine how these fires started.

People who live along Chesaw Road near Nine Mile Road, Old Tressle Road, Point Road and Old Wagon Wheel road were asked to evacuate.

Road closures are in place on Chesaw Road from Mile Post 4 to Mile Post 9. Nine Mile Road is also closed.

A Red Cross Shelter has been set up at Oroville High School for those evacuated because of this fire.

Responders are still trying to find out who the victim of that plane crash on Rise Road was, also where that plane took off and where it was headed before it crashed.

"There's no tail numbers of anything because the plane was destroyed in the fire," says Okanogan Sheriff Frank Rogers. "Crews are talking to the FAA and the NTSB trying to find out about an overdue plane or what planes are missing."

PREVIOUS COVERAGE: Okanogan County Sheriff Frank Rogers says fire personnel are responding to several reported fires in the Oroville area off of Chesaw Road.

Rogers said at one of the fires on Rise Road off of Chesaw, Deputies have confirmed the wreckage of an aircraft with at least one person confirmed dead at the scene.

Rogers says he has several units in the area attempting to determine what happened.


//-------------------------////

OKANOGAN COUNTY, Wash. --



The Okanogan County Sheriff's Office said fire personnel found the wreckage of a plane crash near Oroville while responding to a fire call.



Several fires started Thursday near the site of the crash, according to the Omak Chronicle.



Fire deputies have confirmed at least one dead at the scene. Several more units were ordered to the area and are investigating exactly what happened. The wreckage was found on Rise Road off Chesaw Road.

Evacuation notices have been sent to residents.



Investigators said they do not yet have further information on the plane crash or other injuries and deaths. The investigation is ongoing.


Date: 13-AUG-2015
Time: Morning
Type: Airplane
Owner/operator:

Registration:

C/n / msn:

Fatalities: Fatalities: 1 / Occupants: 1
Other fatalities: 0
Airplane damage: Written off (damaged beyond repair)
Location: Okanogan County east of Oroville, WA - United States of America
Phase: Unknown
Nature: Unknown
Departure airport:

Destination airport:

Narrative:
The aircraft impacted terrain in Okanogan County east of Oroville, Washington, and a post-impact fire occurred. The airplane sustained unreported damage and the sole pilot onboard received fatal injuries.
Sources: 

http://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=178609
http://www.kxly.com/news/spokane-news/one-dead-in-plane-crash-near-oroville-wildfire/34707218
http://t.omakchronicle.com/news/2015/aug/13/plane-crash-kills-one-sparks-multiple-fires/?templates=tablet

CHLORINE TANK LEAK AT A HARRISON COUNTY WATER WELL IN BILOXI, MISSISSIPPI










(Photo source: WLOX, Google Maps)




Posted: Aug 13, 2015
By Cassie Archebelle


BILOXI (WOOL MARKET), MS (WLOX) - 

Two hazmat certified firefighters made quick work of a chlorine tank leak at a Harrison County water well Thursday afternoon.  The leak was reported around 1:30 p.m.

Biloxi fire officials said the tank was in the Wool Market community near the intersection of Old Highway 67 and Joe Husley Road.

After securing the leak, the firefighters were checked out and given the all clear by AMR personnel.

Since then, Hazmat teams have repaired the leak.

No injuries were reported. 

//-------------------------///

Orientation and General Overview:

The City of Biloxi has twenty three (23) water well sites that are utilized to produce drinking water for the citizens and businesses of the City. Fifteen (15) of these water wells have two (2) cylinders each of liquid chlorine, each of which contains 2,000 pounds, for a total of 4,000 pounds of liquid chlorine at each well site. This RMP is for one of those fifteen (15) water well sites.

The City of Biloxi operates and maintains the City's water production and distribution system, and its wastewater collection system. The City owns the utility facilities and is therefore responsible for the submission of this RMP.


Nature of Facility Risk Imposed and Risk Minimization:

The primary facility risk to the public is that liquid chlorine could be released into the atmosphere as a toxic gas (a vapor). A total rupture of the chlorine cylinders or a total failure of the process equipment is highly unlikely; therefore a sudden and total release of all of the chlorine is also highly unlikely. The more likely scenario is the slow release of chlorine due to a leak of some type. Although great measures have been taken to prevent such leak event, such leak would result in the dispersal of chlorine gas to about .1 mile from the facility, according to the RMP*Comp Model, Version 1.06. To minimize this risk, numerous steps and measures have been taken and documented throughout this Executive Summary and the RMP. A specific example not noted in the RMP is the change-out of the chlorination system from pressure regulators to vacuum regulators, which is a far safer and more reliable system.


RMP*Submit - Data Entry Explanations:
Section 1.11 asks the question "Number of full time employees on site". The described facility is inspected every single day of the year by a city employee that holds a current and valid Waterworks Operator Certification as promulgated by the State of Mississippi Department of Health. Each daily inspection generally takes
20 to 30 minutes. The data field will not accept a "fraction of an employee" expressed in a decimal value. The EPA hotline attendant for the RMP program suggested that a "1" be entered in this data field and then explained with an entry in the Executive Summary, which this paragraph accomplishes.


Below are summaries of selected elements of the RMP, as specifically requested in the RMP User's Manuals, Pages 2.1 through 2.2:

Accidental Release and Prevention Emergency Response Policies:
At this facility, chlorine is handled, which is considered by the EPA to be a hazardous material. The same qualities that make chlorine valuable as a commodity also make it necessary to observe certain safety precautions in handling chlorine to prevent unnecessary human exposure, to reduce the threat to the personal health of persons working with and around the chlorine, and to reduce the threat to nearby members of the community.

It is the policy of the City to adhere to all Federal and state rules and regulations. Safety depends upon the manner in which the chlorine is handled, the safety devices inherent in the design of the facility, the safe handling procedures that are used, and the training of personnel.

The accidental release prevention and emergency response policies were modeled from various professional sources, such as the Chlorine Institute's Pamphlet 64, Emergency Response Plans for Chlorine Facilities, J. J. Keller and Associates, Inc.'s Keller-Soft Safety Plans, and OSHA documentation.


Facility and the Regulated Substances Handled:
Two (2) cylinders of liquid chlorine, containing 2,000 pounds each, are located at this facility, for a total of 4,000 pounds of liquid chlorine.

The primary purpose of this facility is to distribute chlorine into the public water system in a safe and reliable manner that is in conformance with regulations as established by the Mississippi Department of Health, the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality, and the U. S. Env
ironmental Protection Agency. Two (2) cylinders are maintained at the facility to ensure a constant supply of chlorine when one of the tanks becomes empty. The chlorine is provided by a licensed and certified vendor and is delivered in vehicles that are in conformance with Department of Transportation regulations.

A chain link fence that allows visibility secures this facility. This fence is chained and locked. There is also another chain link fence immediately surrounding the chlorine cylinders. It is also chained and locked. The grounds are mowed and maintained in such a manner that the facility is in full view and easily accessible by authorized personnel. The site is restricted to authorized facility employees, authorized management personnel and authorized contractors only. There are signs clearly posted (including a telephone number) for notification in the event of an emergency

There are established written procedures for changing chlorine cylinders, as follows:

CHANGING A CHLORINE CYLINDER

STEP 1: Notify dispatch to advise your location and that you are changing a chlorine cylinder, and the size of the cylinder.

STEP 2: There must be two certified operators present to change a chlorine cylinder.

STEP 3: The operators must use Self-Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) when changing chlorine cylinders.

STEP 4: Turn the well on manual to ensure that it remains running. Wait until the pump starts and the chlorine booster pump is running.

STEP 5: Turn the chlorine cylinder off.

STEP 6: Check the rotameter to ensure that it drops to zero and stays there. If the rotameter does not drop to zero, perform maintenance as needed on the poly tubing to ensure that the rotameter drops to zero.

STEP 7: With the well still running, slowly loosen the regulator. Do not take it off immediately. If no chlorine is released, remove the regulator yolk.

STEP 8: Check the valve on the new replacement cylinder to assure that it is off. Slowly loosen the valve cap on the replacement chlorine cylinder. Check for leaks using an ammonia solution. If there is a leak, tighten the cap to stop the leak and notify dispatch to notify the vendor to retrieve the cylinder and leave a replacement cylinder. If there is no leak, then remove the cap. Then clean the face of the valve outlet.

STEP 9: Remove the lead washer from the yolk. Clean the area and always use a new washer!

STEP 10: Put the yolk over the cylinder and tighten it. Make sure that the nipple fits properly in the socket. Do not over-tighten the nipple.

STEP 11: Open slowly the cylinder valve and check for a leak. If there is a leak, close the valve and slightly tighten the yolk assembly. Then slowly open the valve and check again for a leak. Repeat this procedure until there is no leak. If there still is a leak and this procedure does not stop it, then tighten the cap to stop the leak and notify dispatch to notify the vendor to retrieve the cylinder and leave a replacement.

STEP 12: Turn the well back to the automatic mode.

STEP 13: Record in the daily logbook the date, time, personnel present and the maintenance performed.

STEP 14: Call dispatch to notify them that you have completed changing the cylinder.


Worst -Case Scenario and Alternate Release Scenario:

Worst-Case Scenario - Total failure of either or both cylinders is highly unlikely. However, if such an event did occur, then 4,000 pounds of liquid chlorine could be released into the atmosphere as a toxic gas (a vapor), which is heavier than air. According to the RMP*Comp Model, Version 1.06, the distance to the endpoint would be 1.9 miles. Based on guidelines as published by The Chlorine Institute, Inc., this scenario assumes a release rate of 400 pounds per minute for release duration of 10 minutes, wind speed of 3.4 miles per hour, air temperature of 77 degrees, air stability class F, no mitigation measures and urban surroundings.

Alternate Case Scenario - A malfunction occurs during a cylinder change-out and there is a slow release of liquid chlorine into the atmosphere as a toxic gas (a vapor), which is heavier than air. Although also remote, this scenario was selected because it is probably the most likely incident to occur that would cause a release of chlorine gas. Based on guidelines as published by The Chlorine Institute, Inc., this scenario assumes a release rate of 10 pounds per minute for release duration of 400 minutes, wind speed of 6.7 miles per hour, air temperature of 77 degrees, air stability class D, no mitigation measures and urban surroundings. Under this scenario, according to the RMP*Comp Model, Version 1.06, the distance to the endpoint would be .1 mile.


General Accidental Release Program and Chemical-Specific Prevention Steps:
This facility complies with the EPA's Accidental Release Prevention Rule and with all applicable state codes and regulations, including the rules and regulations as promulgated by the EPA, Mississippi Department of Health, Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality, and OSHA. The facility also follows guidelines as established by the American Water Works Association and the Chlorine Institute.


Five Year Accident History:
There have been no accidents to report at this facility within the last five years.


Emergency Response Program:

This facility's Emergency Response Program is based on the Chlorine Institute's Pamphlet 64, Emergency Response Plans for Chlorine Facilities. The program addresses the requirements of 40CFR 68 pertaining to notification, medical treatment, response procedures, planning, use and maintenance of emergency equipment, employee safety training, and emergency response evaluation. This program has been discussed, reviewed and coordinated with the City of Biloxi Fire Department. A representative of the City of Biloxi Fire Department visits the facility on an annual basis, at a minimum, to inspect the facility for fire prevention and overall safety. There is a formally designated and documented Chlorine Emergency Response Team (CERT). The team is highly trained, performs periodic practice drills, and is on notice 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. In the event of an emergency, the City of Biloxi Fire Department in cooperation with the City of Biloxi Police Department notifies the public.

Planned changes to improve safety.

Biloxi will continue to provide in house and out sourced training to all employes who deal with chlorine.

ACIDIC FERRIC CHLORIDE WAS DISCHARGED FROM THE WOLCOTTVILLE WASTEWATER PLANT AND INTO ELKHART RIVER IN INDIANA





AUGUST 13, 2015


WOLCOTTVILLE, Ind. (WANE) – 


The Indiana Department of Environmental Management is monitoring a discharge of acidic ferric chloride from the Wolcottville Wastewater Treatment Plant.

IDEM was notified early Wednesday morning that the plant was discharging the chemical and officials are working to dilute the chemical.

The plant discharges into the north branch of the Elkhart River approximately 4 1/2 miles west of the plant in Noble County. The facility is located at 604 West County Line Road in LaGrange County on the western edge of Wolcottville.

IDEM said during the day Wednesday approximately 1,200 to 1,400 gallons of the chemical was released within the plant, but an unknown amount was being released with the plant’s discharge. IDEM has not said if it has contaminated the Elkhart River. Ferric chloride is an orange-colored liquid. IDEM some of the the chemical has been contained within the facility.

Ferric chloride is used in small quantities to treat wastewater, but can pose a danger to humans if it comes in contact with skin or is ingested.

IDEM said residents in the area of Wolcottville should avoid the water near the discharge site, including pets and livestock.

IDEM is working with Wolcottville officials, local health and emergency officials and the Indiana Department of Natural Resources.

326,166 POUNDS OF 1,3-BUTADIENE WERE RELEASED INTO THE AIR FROM SHELL'S OIL REFINERY IN DEER PARK, TEXAS

 



Tons Of Chemicals Leak From Pressure Relief Valve at Shell Oil Refinery In Deer Park, Texas

More details are surfacing about a big leak of a potentially cancer-causing chemical from a refinery near Houston. 

This past Sunday morning at the Shell Oil refinery in Deer Park, one the complexes big, spherical tanks over-filled with a flammable and toxic liquid. According to a report Shell made to state regulators, emergency relief valves began venting vapors into the air. For nearly an hour before workers stopped the over-flow, 180 tons of vapors leaked. The vapors contained butane, vinylacetylene, but by far the biggest component of the mix was butadiene.  

Here is the report summary posted at TCEQ web pages:

On August 9, 2015 at approximately 10:55am at the Shell Deer Park site, operating personnel discovered relief valves on Sphere V-BD-933 lifting to atmosphere due to a liquid-full condition. The initial start of the release was 10:40am based on process and operating information. An investigation will be conducted to determine the cause of the release. Based on the information known at the time of this initial report, Shell is not aware of any confirming information that would indicate that the affirmative defense criteria could not be met for this emission event. However, because the investigation of the emission event has not yet been completed, Shell's "YES" response to the affirmative defense question below may not represent a final response for determining application of the affirmative defense. The indicated response to the question was required for purposes of completing and submitting this initial report in a timely manner. Additional information regarding the basis for Shell's response to the affirmative defense question may be provided upon request when available.


“The emission plume would likely have traveled over the Ship Channel and could have impacted communities to the north,” said Adrian Shelley, executive director of the community group, Air Alliance Houston.

“Butadiene is invisible, it is released as a gas, and it would not have been detectable by the human eye,” Shelley said.

But state air monitors a couple miles northeast of the refinery did detect it, showing butadiene spiking at noon though not above levels considered dangerous for short-term exposure.

Butadiene is of special concern in Houston. It leaks from a number of chemical plants along the Ship Channel. A study done by the UT School of Public Health found children living within two miles of the Ship Channel in areas with elevated levels of butadiene in the air had substantially higher rates leukemia.

Both Shell and Texas environmental regulators say they’re investigating Sunday’s big leak.




Air Emission Event Reporting Database

Regulated entity name SHELL OIL DEER PARK Physical location KEY MAP 538E
Regulated entity RN number RN100211879 City, County DEER PARK, HARRIS
Type(s) of air emissions event: EMISSIONS EVENT Event began: 08/09/2015 10:55AM
This is based on the: INITIAL REPORT Event ended: 08/09/2015 11:50AM
Cause On August 9, 2015 at approximately 10:55am at the Shell Deer Park site, operating personnel discovered relief valves on Sphere V-BD-933 lifting to atmosphere due to a liquid-full condition. The initial start of the release was 10:40am based on process and operating information. An investigation will be conducted to determine the cause of the release. Based on the information known at the time of this initial report, Shell is not aware of any confirming information that would indicate that the affirmative defense criteria could not be met for this emission event. However, because the investigation of the emission event has not yet been completed, Shell's "YES" response to the affirmative defense question below may not represent a final response for determining application of the affirmative defense. The indicated response to the question was required for purposes of completing and submitting this initial report in a timely manner. Additional information regarding the basis for Shell's response to the affirmative defense question may be provided upon request when available.
Action taken The source of flow to V-BD-933 was isolated, and material in V-BD-933 was pumped to another vessel to reduce sphere pressure and allow the relief valves to reseat.
Emissions estimation method Emissions estimates are based on engineering calculations and process information.

Source 1: BD-3 / North Tank Farm , FIN number

Source 2: Butadiene Sphere , FIN number V-BD-933

Source 3: Relief Valves RV955/9001/2/26 , EPN number N/A

ContaminantAuthorizationLimitAmount Released
1,3-BUTADIENE 3217 0.0 326166.0 lbs (est.)
1-Butene 3217 0.0 7604.0 lbs (est.)
2-Butene-cis 3217 0.0 2294.0 lbs (est.)
2-Butene-trans 3217 0.0 2789.0 lbs (est.)
Butane, N- 3217 0.0 16372.0 lbs (est.)
Isobutane 3217 0.0 1394.0 lbs (est.)
Isobutene 3217 0.0 2768.0 lbs (est.)
Vinylacetylene 3217 0.0 844.0 lbs (est.)

 //-------------------///

Deer Park is the sixth largest refinery in the United States.

In 1929, just before the Great Depression, Shell Oil Company became the first manufacturer to call Deer Park home.  At the time, there were no other businesses or buildings in what is now a bustling community about 20 miles east of downtown Houston.

In February 1993, Shell Oil Company and PMI Norteamerica, S.A. de C.V., a subsidiary of Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex), formed a 50-50 joint venture--Deer Park Refining Limited Partnership (DPRLP)--and in March 2001 completed a $1 billion capital upgrade. The project improved DPRLP’s global competitiveness, operating efficiency and long-term economic viability while significantly reducing air emissions.

The assets of the refinery are managed and operated by Shell Oil Company through Shell Deer Park Refining Company, a division of Shell Oil Products Company, a Shell Oil subsidiary.

Today, Shell Deer Park is home to the sixth largest refinery in the United States with a crude oil capacity of 340,000 barrels a day (42 gallons per barrel).


What is butadiene?

Butadiene, also known as 1,3-butadiene, is a colourless gas that condenses to a liquid at minus 4.5 degrees centigrade. Butadiene is derived, using an extractive distillation process, from the crude C4 stream, one of the cracker by-products of ethylene and propylene production. 

How is butadiene used?

The largest single use for butadiene is in the production of styrene-butadiene rubber (SBR) which, in turn, is principally used in the manufacture of automobile tyres. SBR is also used in adhesives, sealants, coatings and in rubber articles like shoe soles. Polybutadiene is also used in tyres and can be used as an intermediate in the production of acrylonitrile-butadiene-styrene (ABS). ABS is widely used in items such as telephones, computer casings and other appliances. 

Other polymers made from butadiene include styrene-butadiene latex, used for example in carpet backings and adhesives; nitrile rubber, used in hoses, fuel lines, gasket seals, gloves and footwear; and styrene-butadiene block copolymers which are used in many end-uses ranging from asphalt modifiers (road and roofing construction applications), to adhesives, footwear and toys. 
Chemical intermediates made from butadiene include adiponitrile and chloroprene which are used, respectively, in the manufacture of nylon and neoprene. 


//------------------///


Preliminary epidemiologic investigation of the relationship between the presence of ambient hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) and cancer incidence in Harris County.

Executive Summary

Title:
  A preliminary investigation of the association between hazardous air pollutants and lymphohematopoietic cancer risk among residents of Harris County Texas

Authors:
Kristina M. Walker, Ann L. Coker, Elaine Symanski, Philip J. Lupo

Affiliation:
  University of Texas Health Science at Houston, School of Public Health

In the recent months, there has been a great deal of interest surrounding Houston’s air quality and the potential for high levels of pollutants in the ambient environment to adversely affect citizens’ health.  Historically, attention has focused on criteria pollutants such as ozone.  However, there is increasing concern regarding another group of pollutants, known as hazardous air pollutants (HAPs).  HAPs are a class of 189 chemicals which are known or suspected to have adverse effects on health.1  Unlike criteria pollutants, there are no national standards regulating acceptable levels of these compounds in the ambient environment.  Two HAPs, benzene and 1,3-butadiene, may be of particular concern in Houston due to the large volume of emissions as well as their potential to cause cancer in humans. 

While recent reports have commented on the elevated ambient levels of hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) in certain areas of Houston, relative to other cities, few studies have assessed the health effects of HAPs for Houstonians and none have evaluated the association between ambient levels of these pollutants and lymphohematopoietic cancer risk in this population.

Accordingly, we conducted a population based analysis of ambient environmental levels of HAPs and leukemia and lymphoma incidence in Harris County.  We identified all cancer cases, including adult and childhood cases, diagnosed and reported to the Texas Cancer Registry from 1995-2003.  We then used existing air monitoring data collected from 1992-2003 by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) to estimate ambient census tract levels to benzene and 1,3-butadiene.  Additionally, we estimated risk of developing leukemia and lymphoma associated with residential proximity to the Houston Ship Channel (HSC) as another surrogate of HAP exposure.  We assigned cancer cases to a particular census tract based on their residence at diagnosis as reported to the TCR.  We then calculated cancer rates separately for adult and childhood cancers for each census tract.  We further accounted for gender, age, socio-economic status, and ethnicity.  

We found a 56% increased risk of acute lymphocytic leukemia among children living within two miles of the HSC (p-value=0.01) compared with children living more than 10 miles from the HSC.  We found no increased risks of developing any other childhood leukemia or lymphoma associated with living within two miles of the HSC.  We did, however, find that compared with children living in areas with the lowest estimated 1,3-butadiene levels estimated from monitoring data collected by the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), children living in areas with the highest levels had a 40% (p-value=0.02), 38% (p-value=0.05) and 153% (p-value=0.03) increased risk of developing any type of leukemia, acute lymphocytic leukemia and acute myeloid leukemia, respectively.  Higher 1,3-butadiene levels were not associated with childhood lymphoma or with adult leukemia or lymphoma.  Higher estimated ambient benzene levels based on TCEQ monitoring data were not associated with childhood leukemia or lymphoma rates.  

At the suggestion of several environmental scientists, we repeated our analyses for childhood leukemia using the United States Environmental Protective Agency’s 1999 National Air Toxics Assessment (NATA) modeled ambient 1,3-butadiene and benzene levels.  In general, we saw a similar pattern to that observed using the TCEQ monitoring data.  When comparing childhood leukemia rates in those census tracts with the highest 1,3-butadiene levels with those in the lowest, a 32% increase in cancer risk was noted (p=0.09).  This compares with a 40% increase (p=0.02) in risk for all types of leukemia in children based on the TCEQ monitoring data estimates for 1,3 butadiene. 

Among adults, neither proximity to the Houston Ship Channel, nor levels of benzene or 1,3-butadiene was consistently associated with leukemia or lymphoma risk.  Additional analytic studies with more refined exposure assessment methods are planned.  However, observing a specific health effect of HAPs in light of recently documented elevated levels of two known carcinogens, benzene and 1,3 butadiene, in Houston,2 strongly suggests a need to explore this issue further and possibly take action to limit potential exposure to HAPs in Houston.
  1. About Air Toxics, Health and Ecological Effects. 2006. Retrieved On: 4-2-06. http://www.epa.gov/air/toxicair/newtoxics.html
  2. A closer look at air pollution in Houston.  Identifying priority health risks: Report of the Mayor's task force on the health effects of air pollution. Houston, Texas: University of Texas, Health Science Center. Institute for Health Policy.



Employees at the Noble Americas Ethanol Plant in South Bend, Indiana were evacuated Thursday after a fire broke out at the plant on West Calvert Street


No injuries in fire at ethanol plant in South Bend, Indiana


 Steam rolls through this dryer unit


Typical rolling steam dryer unit for the processed corn




 






Posted: Aug 13, 2015
By Melissa Hudson
 

SOUTH BEND, INDIANA -

Employees at the Noble Americas Ethanol Plant were evacuated Thursday after a fire broke out at the plant on West Calvert.

The fire started just before noon.

According to firefighters, the fire was contained to one of the rolling steam dryers for the processed corn.

"This plant here we had six engines companies 2 ladders a couple ambulances. It is a larger scale. And then upon arrival the majority of the fire was out. Very little water was used. The employees here activated their system and extinguished most of the fire," said Gerard Ellis of the South Bend Fire Department.