THIRD MAN DIES IN DESOTO PARISH VEHICLE-TRAIN COLLISION IN LOUISIANA

FEBRUARY 17, 2015

LONGSTREET, DESOTO PARISH, LOUISIANA

A third man has died as the result of injuries sustained in a train-truck collision Monday, confirmed Sheriff Rodney Arbuckle.

Herbert Barras III, 35, of Charenton, was transported from the crash scene to University Health. He died overnight, Arbuckle said. 

Barras was a passenger in pickup truck driven by John Watson, 23, of Centerville. Michael Ryder II, 25, of Goldonna, was a passenger. Both died at the scene. 

The crash took place around 1 p.m. on a private lease road off state Highway 5 that leads to an oilfield site. The railroad crossing is not marked with lights, gates or bells but does have cross bucks and a stop sign.

Watson, driving a 2001 Dodge Ram, was traveling east and pulled into the path of a southbound Union Pacific freight train operated by Kenneth Charles, 59, of Humble, Texas. The truck was hit at the driver's side door and pushed off the tracks. 

Watson, Ryder and Barras were unrestrained. A routine toxicology sample was obtained from Watson and will be submitted for analysis but impairment is not suspected, state police said.

RAILROAD ACCIDENT BRIEF: COLLISION OF UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD FREIGHT TRAIN MSIDV 16 WITH STANDING RAILROAD CARS IN HAYS, KANSAS

Executive Summary On July 16, 2013, at about 1:20 a.m., central daylight time, westbound Union Pacific Railroad (UP) freight train MSIDV16 unexpectedly encountered a hand-operated main tracks witch at MP 288 in the reverse position diverting the train from the main track onto two adjacent tracks at the Sharon Springs subdivision in Hays, Kansas.  The switch was not equipped with technology to warn oncoming trains that it was in the reverse position.  At the time of the accident, the train was traveling in no signaled track warrant territory at a timetable speed of 49 mph.  The lead locomotive collided with standing cars on the spur track.   Diesel fuel leaked from the ruptured locomotive fuel tanks, ignited, and burned.  The three crew members were injured.  Damage was estimated by the UP to be $1.4 million. Probable Cause The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of the brakeman of train LDG8915 to return a main track switch to the normal position after the crew had secured the train on a siding track.  Contributing to the accident was the inability of the crew of train MSIDV 16 to determine the position of the main track switch in no signaled territory.

Previous NTSB Recommendations  

Following the January 6, 2005, accident at Graniteville, South Carolina, the NTSB made the following safety recommendation to the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) (aka: the railroad lobby):

Require that, along main lines in non-signaled territory, railroads install an automatically activated device, independent of the switch banner that will, visually or electronically, compellingly capture the attention of employees involved with switch operations and clearly convey the status of the switch both in daylight and in darkness. (R-05-14)

After completing the Bettendorf, Iowa, accident investigation, the NTSB reclassified Safety Recommendation (R-05-14) from “Open—Acceptable Alternate Response,” to “Closed―Superseded ”by Safety Recommendation (R-12-27), and issued the following new recommendations to the FRA, aimed at addressing the hazard of switch misalignments:

Require railroads to install, along mainlines in non-signaled territory not equipped with positive train control, appropriate technology that warns approaching trains of incorrectly lined main track switches sufficiently in advance to permit stopping. (R-12-27)

Revise Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Section 218.105(d) (1) to require that, until the appropriate switch position technology is installed on main track switches in non-signaled territories that are not equipped with positive train control, train crews releasing track authority to the dispatcher must hold job briefings with the dispatcher and clearly convey the position of all main track switches that were used prior to releasing track warrant authority. (R-12-28)

Require that until appropriate switch position warning technology is installed on main track switches (in non-signaled territory not equipped with positive train control), when a main track switch has been reported relined for a main track, the next train to pass the location approach the switch location at restricted speed. That train crew should then report to the dispatcher that the switch is correctly lined for the main track before trains are allowed to operate at maximum authorized speed. (R-12-29)

These recommendations are for additional layers of protection intended to prevent accidents due to single point failures.

However, in response to these recommendations, the FRA responded by letter to the NTSB on December 28, 2012, stating in part, “The preliminary cost-benefit analysis conducted related to this recommendation shows that rulemakings cannot be justified as having benefits outweighing cost.”

The NTSB replied to the FRA on April 18, 2013,“…we urge the FRA to consider an appropriate alternate means of warning approaching trains of incorrectly lined main track switches. ”Pending completion of a plan for doing this, Safety Recommendation R-12-27 is classified “Open—Unacceptable Response.”

2 INJURED IN DIESEL FUEL SPILL, CRASH IN LANHAM, MD. BETWEEN A BOX TRUCK AND A TAXI CAB

Cab severely damaged after diesel spill in Lanham, Thursday, April 16, 2015. (WJLA photo)

 

Truck crashed into fence after diesel spill in Lanham, Thursday, April 16, 2015. (WJLA photo)

APRIL 16, 2015

LANHAM, MD. (WJLA)

Prince George's Fire Department officials reported two people were injured after a diesel fuel spill and crash.

  

The accident occurred when a box truck and taxi cab crashed on Cipriano Road and 4th Street in Lanham, Md. early Thursday morning.

Hazmat crews were called to the scene to clean up the diesel fuel spill and roads will be closed for an extended period of time.

PGFD officials don't know the extent of the people injured and the truck driver involved in the crash is at the scene being evaluated.

No additional details were provided as the investigation continues.

HAZARDS IN GRAIN HANDLING FACILITIES

OSHA has developed this webpage to provide workers, employers, and safety and health professionals useful, up-to-date safety and health information on grain handling facilities.

What are grain handling facilities?

Grain handling facilities are facilities that may receive, handle, store, process and ship bulk raw agricultural commodities such as (but not limited to) corn, wheat, oats, barley, sunflower seeds, and soybeans. Grain handling facilities include grain elevators, feed mills, flour mills, rice mills, dust pelletizing plants, dry corn mills, facilities with soybean flaking operations, and facilities with dry grinding operations of soycake.

What are the hazards in grain handling facilities?

The grain handling industry is a high hazard industry where workers can be exposed to numerous serious and life threatening hazards. These hazards include: fires and explosions from grain dust accumulation, suffocation from engulfment and entrapment in grain bins, falls from heights and crushing injuries and amputations from grain handling equipment.

Suffocation is a leading cause of death in grain storage bins. In 2010, 51 workers were engulfed by grain stored in bins, and 26 died-the highest number on record, according to a report issued by Purdue University (PDF) Suffocation can occur when a worker becomes buried (engulfed) by grain as they walk on moving grain or attempt to clear grain built up on the inside of a bin. Moving grain acts like "quicksand" and can bury a worker in seconds. "Bridged" grain and vertical piles of stored grain can also collapse unexpectedly if a worker stands on or near it. The behavior and weight of the grain make it extremely difficult for a worker to get out of it without assistance. OSHA has sent notification letters to approximately 13,000 grain elevator operators warning the employers to not allow workers to enter grain storage facilities without proper equipment, precautions (such as turning off and locking/tagging out all equipment used so that the grain is no being emptied or moving into the bin) and training.

Grain dust explosions are often severe, involving loss of life and substantial property damage. Over the last 35 years, there have been over 500 explosions in grain handling facilities across the United States, which have killed more than 180 people and injured more than 675. Grain dust is the main source of fuel for explosions in grain handling. Grain dust is highly combustible and can burn or explode if enough becomes airborne or accumulates on a surface and finds an ignition source (such as hot bearing, overheated motor, misaligned conveyor belt, welding, cutting, and brazing). OSHA standards require that both grain dust and ignition sources must be controlled in grain elevators to prevent these often deadly explosions.

Falls from height can occur from many walking/working surfaces throughout a grain handling facility. Examples of such surfaces include (but are not limited to) floors, machinery, structures, roofs, skylights, unguarded holes, wall and floor openings, ladders, unguarded catwalks, platforms and manlifts. Falls can also occur as workers move from the vertical exterior ladders on grain bins to the bin roof or through a bin entrance.

Mechanical equipment within grain storage structures, such as augers and conveyors, present serious entanglement and amputation hazards. Workers can easily get their limbs caught in improperly guarded moving parts of such mechanical equipment.

Storage structures can also develop hazardous atmospheres due to gases given off from spoiling grain or fumigation. Workers may be exposed to unhealthy levels of airborne contaminants, including molds, chemical fumigants (toxic chemicals), and gases associated with decaying and fermenting silage.

Fumigants are commonly used for insect control on stored grain and many have inadequate warning properties. Exposure to fumigants may cause permanent central nervous system damage, heart and vascular disease, and lung edema as well as cancer. These gases may result in a worker passing out and falling into the grain, thus becoming engulfed and suffocating or otherwise injuring themselves.

What can be done to reduce the hazards in grain handling facilities?

On August 4, 2010 and again on February 1, 2011, OSHA issued warning letters to the grain handling industry following a series of incidents including the recent suffocation of 2 teenagers in Illinois grain elevator. In response to the rising number of workers entrapped and killed in grain storage facilities, OSHA has also issued a new fact sheet, Worker Entry Into Grain Storage Bins (PDF^*) in August 2010 for workers and employers emphasizing the hazards of grain storage bin entry and the safe procedures that all employers must follow. 

Additionally, OSHA issued a safety and health information bulletin (SHIB) entitled, Combustible Dust in Industry: Preventing and Mitigating the Effects of Fire and Explosions, and a Hazard Alert: Combustible Dust Explosions (PDF^*) fact sheet.

The control of worker's exposure to hazards in grain handling facilities are addressed in the OSHA standard for grain handling facilities (29 CFR 1910.272), as well as in other general industry standards. These standards reduce the risk to workers by requiring that employers follow established, common sense safety practices when working in grain handling facilities.

When workers enter storage bins, employers must (among other things):

1. Turn off and lock out all powered equipment associated with the bin, including augers used to help move the grain, so that the grain is not being emptied or moving out or into the bin. Standing on moving grain is deadly; the grain can act like "quicksand" and bury a worker in seconds. Moving grain out of a bin while a worker is in the bin creates a suction that can pull the workers into the grain in seconds.
2. Prohibit walking down grain and similar practices where an employee walks on grain to make it flow.
3. Provide all employees a body harness with a lifeline, or a boatswains chair, and ensure that it is secured prior to the employee entering the bin.
4. Provide an observer stationed outside the bin or silo being entered by an employee. Ensure the observer is equipped to provide assistance and that their only task is to continuously track the employee in the bin. Prohibit workers from entry into bins or silos underneath a bridging condition, or where a build-up of grain products on the sides could fall and bury them.
5. Train all workers for the specific hazardous work operations they are to perform when entering and working inside of grain bins.
6. Test the air within a bin or silo prior to entry for the presence of combustible and toxic gases, and to determine if there is sufficient oxygen.
7. If detected by testing, vent hazardous atmospheres to ensure that combustible and toxic gas levels are reduced to non hazardous levels, and that sufficient oxygen levels are maintained.
8. Ensure a permit is issued for each instance a worker enters a bin or silo, certifying that the precautions listed above have been implemented.

To prevent dust explosions and fires, employers must (among other things):

1. Develop and implement a written housekeeping program with instructions to reduce dust accumulations on ledges, floors, equipment and other exposed surfaces.
2. Identify "priority" housekeeping areas in grain elevators. The "priority" housekeeping areas include floor areas within 35 feet of inside bucket elevators, floors of enclosed areas containing grinding equipment and floors of enclosed areas containing grain dryers located inside the facility. Dust accumulations in these priority housekeeping areas shall not exceed 1/8th inch. Employers should make every effort to minimize dust accumulations on exposed surfaces since dust is the fuel for a fire or explosion, and it is recognized that a 1/8 inch dust accumulation is more than enough to fuel such occurrences.
3. Inside bucket elevators can undergo primary explosions. OSHA's grain handling standard requires that belts for these bucket elevators purchased after March 30, 1988 are conductive and have a surface electrical resistance not exceeding 300 megohms. Bucket elevators must have an opening to the head pulley section and boot section to allow for inspection, maintenance, and cleaning. Bearings must be mounted externally to the leg casing or the employer must provide vibration, temperature, or other monitoring of the conditions of the bearings if the bearings are mounted inside or partially inside the leg casing. These bucket elevators must be equipped with a motion detection device which will shut-down the elevator when the belt speed is reduced by no more than 20% of the normal operating speed.
4. Implement a preventative maintenance program with regularly scheduled inspections for mechanical and safety control equipment, which may include heat producing equipment such as motors, bearings, belts etc. Preventive maintenance is critical to controlling ignition sources. The use of vibration detection methods, heat sensitive tape or other heat detection methods can help in the implementation of the program.
5. Minimize ignition sources through controlling hot work (electric or gas welding, cutting, brazing or similar flame producing operations).
6. Install wiring and electrical equipment suitable for hazardous locations.
7. Design and properly locate dust collection systems to minimize explosion hazards. All filter collectors installed after March 1988 shall be located outside the facility or located in an area inside the facility protected by an explosion suppression system or located in an area that is separated from other areas by construction having at least a one hour fire resistance rating and which is located next to an exterior wall vented to the outside.
8. Install an effective means of removing ferrous material from grain streams so that such material does not enter equipment such as hammer mills, grinders and pulverizers.

For more information, see OSHA standard (29 CFR 1910.272).