MARCH 22, 2014
HOUSTON SHIP CHANNEL, TEXAS
NTSB Accident
#DCA14FM008
At 1235 local time (CDT) on Saturday, March 22, 2014, the
Liberian registered bulker Summer Wind, inbound in the Houston Ship Channel
(HSC), collided with the lead tank barge (Kirby 27706) of a two barge tow that
was being pushed by the Kirby tow boat Miss Susan. The collision occurred in
the vicinity of buoys 25 and 26 just north of the intersection of the HSC and
the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway (ICW).
The 607 foot long Summer Wind which was anchored at Bolivar
Roads anchorage B for two days, had boarded a Houston pilot at about 1200 in
preparation for its transit up to the Cargill docks in Houston to load a cargo
of grain. The 70 foot long Miss Susan got underway at 1115 from NuStar Dock 19
Texas City and was outbound in the Texas City channel with two 300 foot long
barges loaded with 45,621 barrels (1,916,090 gallons) of intermediate fuel oil
(RMG-380) bound for Kirby’s Bolivar fleet area. The length overall of the Miss
Susan and her tow was 670 feet.
The accident occurred in the Bolivar Roads Precautionary
Area where the Galveston Channel, the Texas City Channel, and the Gulf ICW
intersect with the HSC. The area had been covered in fog and pilots had
suspended boarding deep draft vessels at 0740 that morning. Reports of
visibility slowly improving prompted the commencement of pilot boarding. Two
outbound (southbound) deep draft piloted vessels were underway in the HSC and
the Summer Wind departing anchorage was to be the first inbound transit of a
deep draft vessel.
At the time of the accident the port was open. There were 34
vessels operating in the Houston-Galveston Vessel Traffic Service Area, most of
which were tows maneuvering through all channels with barges of varying cargos
and different destinations.
Both vessels, the Summer Wind (pilot) and the Miss Susan (captain)
had stated their intentions several times via radio broadcasts. The pilot
radioed on VHF channel 13 the vessel was leaving anchorage heading for Houston
some 20 minutes before the accident. The captain on the Miss Susan radioed her
intention to proceed out of the Texas City channel bound for Bolivar about 15
minutes prior to the accident. Although the fog had cleared to about a mile of visibility north and south of the accident
area, there was a thicker area of patchy fog lingering around the intersection
of the ICW and HSC.
The pilot was using a portable pilot unit (PPU) laptop and
both vessels had working radars and automatic identification system (AIS), but
neither vessel contacted each other by radio until 3 minutes before the
accident. The two vessels were in a close quarters situation in restricted
visibility with the eastbound Miss Susan trying to cross the HSC in front of the
northbound Summer Wind. Just prior to and upon sighting each other (with less
than 800’ of visibility) both vessels tried evasive maneuvering to no avail.
The bulbous bow of the Summer Wind struck the lead barge 27706 on the starboard
side just forward of amidships, puncturing a hole through the double hull of
cargo tank #2 starboard containing 4,159 barrels and releasing approximately
4,000 barrels (168,000 gallons) of cargo fuel oil into the waterway. Two
crewmembers of the Miss Susan suffered injuries from exposure to the
hydrocarbon vapor.
The NTSB launched an investigator to the accident scene on
March 23, 2014. A second investigator on March 24th and as the size and scope
of the accident became more apparent an additional two more marine investigators
were dispatched to the scene on March 27th. The Coast Guard was the lead
investigative agency for the joint accident investigation. Investigators
retrieved and reviewed the voyage data recorder from the Summer Wind as well as
recorded data from the Sector’s Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) at Sector
Houston-Galveston’s Command Center in Ellington Field Houston, Texas.
While on
scene, investigators interviewed crewmembers from both vessels and other
vessels that witnessed the accident, as well as VTS watchstanders and
supervisors. Of issue is the captain of the accident towboat was not
interviewed until the CG Hearing 2-5 June 2014 and the Houston pilot aboard the
Summer Wind refused to turn over his PPU to the Coast Guard until ordered by a
judge almost nine months after the accident.
Alcohol testing was performed on relevant crewmembers of
both vessels, the watchstanders at the VTS station and the pilot. All alcohol
results were negative. Samples, for drug testing were collected from all
individuals with the exception of the Summer Wind’s engineering watch. All drug
test results were negative.
At the peak of the response on April 1st there were 2,233
personnel from 18 federal, state and local agencies; and contractors from about
80 businesses working on the salvage, containment, decontamination, clean-up
operations, and the organization and staffing of the command center. About 150
volunteers per day were enlisted to search for oiled beaches and wildlife.
The oil spill reached its greatest extent of impact on April
10, when shoreline cleanup and assessment teams determined that about 13 miles
of this shoreline were heavily oiled, while about 40 miles were impacted with
light to moderate amounts of oil. The oil spill that resulted from this
accident endangered several environmentally sensitive sites located on or along
about 160 miles of impacted coastline. On April 14, 2014, after 24 days of
operations, the incident command center in Texas City/Galveston was
demobilized.
In 2009, the Coast Guard’s Office of Waterways Management
conducted a waterway safety assessment of the Port of Houston-Galveston and
reported that the economic impact of closing the HSC was about $13.3 million
per hour or $330 to $400 million per day. The HSC was closed for three days
March 22-25, 2014.
