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Friday, November 21, 2014

APPLICATION OF THE RESIDENTIAL CODE OF NEW YORK STATE (RCNYS) AS IT PERTAINS TO DESIGN SNOW LOADS



application of the Residential Code of New York State (RCNYS) as it pertains to design snow loads.  




This blog provides information regarding the application of the Residential Code of New York State (RCNYS) as it pertains to design snow loads.  It discusses two acceptable methods for determining roof design loads while emphasizing the need to consider unbalanced snow loads in engineered design.


List of Abbreviations

BCNYS; Building Code of New York State

CEO; Code Enforcement Official

GSL; Ground Snow Load

PSF; Pounds Per Square Foot

RCNYS; Residential Code of New York State



The determination of design snow loads under the Residential Code of New York State (RCNYS) is often confused with the requirements of the Building Code of New York State (BCNYS).  The RCNYS uses a prescriptive approach to meet the design requirements for snow loads whereas the BCNYS uses an analytical approach which includes the use of an equation and considers various roof configurations and design conditions such as exposure, thermal and importance factors, warm roofs vs. cold roofs, partial loading, unbalanced loads and drifting and sliding snow.  That which is often misunderstood in the RCNYS is the need to include unbalanced snow loads for common hip and gable roofs.




Snow Loads by Prescriptive Design

The RCNYS requires ground snow loads to be determined from Figure R301.2(5), based on the geographical location of a building.  The Ground Snow Load (GSL) and other climatic and geographic design criteria, must be established by the local jurisdiction as set forth in Table R301.2(1).  Section R301.5 requires roofs to be designed for the minimum snow load indicated in Table R301.2(1).  Since the snow load in Table R301.2(1) is the GSL, it follows that the roof must be designed for the GSL without any adjustments when using the prescriptive method and not a value determined from an engineered approach.  One exception is found in section R301.2.3 which requires buildings in regions with GSLs greater than 70 psf to be designed in accordance with accepted engineering practice and ASCE 7-98.  (“R301.2.3 Snow loads. Wood framed construction, cold- formed steel framed construction and masonry and concrete construction in regions with ground snow loads 70 pounds per square foot (3.35 kPa) or less, shall be in accordance with Chapters 5, 6 and 8. Buildings in regions with ground snow loads greater than 70 pounds per square foot (3.35 kPa) shall be designed in accordance with accepted engineering practice.”)


Therefore, under the RCNYS a house located in an area where the GSL is 55 pounds per square foot (psf), must have a roof designed as fully loaded for a minimum snow load of 55 psf.  In the alternative, section R301.1.2 allows for an engineered design for structural elements not conforming to the RCNYS. Therefore, a roof structure may be designed for either the full GSL by the use of the RCNYS prescriptive provisions or engineered in accordance with the BCNYS.




Snow Loads by Engineered Design

Snow loads for roofs engineered in accordance with the BCNYS is provided for in section 1608.  Section 1608.1 of the BCNYS requires design snow loads to be determined in accordance with section 7 of ASCE 7-98, entitled,“Minimum Design Loads for Buildings and Other Structures”.  This design option allows for adjustments to the GSL but is more complicated than the simplified prescriptive approach offered in the RCNYS. Section 1608 as well as ASCE 7 requires other factors to be applied in the design of a roof.  Those most often associated with residential construction include the exposure factor (Ce), thermal factor (Ct), and importance factor (I). These values are used to determine the flat roof snow load (pf) in equation 7-1 as follows:


pf = 0.7 Ce CtIpg

where pg = is the ground snow load determined from BCNYS Figure 1608.2 or RCNYS Figure R301.2(5).


The values for Ce, Ct, and I are obtained from Tables 1608.3.1, 1608.3.2, and 1604.5 respectively. For residential construction, these values are typically 1.0.  Therefore, in most cases the flat roof snow load is the product obtained by multiplying the GSL by 0.7 or 70% of the ground snow load.  As an example, the flat roof snow load for a roof located in a 55 psf snow zone (such as in many buildings in the Buffalo area) is typically 70 % of 55 or 38.5 psf.  In some cases this load may be reduced for a sloped roof to account for sliding snow and improved drainage of meltwater.  However, for roofs having a non-slippery surface such as conventional asphalt shingles, live load reduction for roof slope is not introduced until the slope exceeds a 7 on 12 pitch pursuant to Figure 7-2 of ASCE 7.  Therefore, the sloped-roof snow load (ps) would most often be equal to the flat-roof snow load (pf).


In most cases for residential buildings, the design snow load is substantially less than the prescriptive GSL determined from RCNYS Table R301.2(1).  However, the engineered roof design is subject to other snow loading conditions identified in ASCE 7-98.  One such condition that is most often overlooked and has a substantial impact on a roof design is accounting for unbalanced snow loads.





Unbalanced Snow Loads

Unbalanced roof snow loading occurs as a result of wind.  Winds carry snow from the windward side to the leeward side.  Section 7.6.1 of ASCE 7-98 requires a roof with an eave to ridge distance of 20 feet or less to be designed to resist an unbalanced uniform snow load on the leeward side equal to 1.5 ps/Ce.  Since the exposure factor Ce is typically 1.0, the leeward side of a sloped roof in most cases must be designed for a uniform load of 1.5ps or 50 % more than the load determined from equation 7-1.  Since it is not possible to determine wind direction, each side of the roof should be considered. It should be noted that the windward side is considered not to be covered with snow.

This is illustrated in Figure 7-5 of ASCE 7-98 and in the diagrams below:





Therefore, the roof of a house located in an area where the GSL is 55 psf and the flat or sloped-roof snow load is 38.5 psf, would have to be designed for both balanced and unbalanced conditions with a load of 57.8 psf [1.5x38.5] applied on the leeward side of the roof.


Inspection Recommendations

Rafters can be checked using the rafter span tables R802.5.1(1) through R802.5.1(8).  These tables only list live loads of 20, 50, and 70 psf whereas actual GSLs for New York State include 45, 50, 55, 65, 70 and 85 psf. Where a GSL does not equate to a live load given in the tables, it is necessary to use a table with the next highest load. This may result in a conservative roof design. Rafters for other design loads, spacings, species and grades, and spans not found in the tables, may be designed as fully loaded with the GSL or designed using equation 7-1 and all loading conditions prescribed in ASCE 7-98. Construction drawings should always identify the GSL for the roof. If the design is based on an engineering analysis, the drawings should also reference compliance with the BCNYS and ASCE 7-98 and include the flat-roof snow load (pf), snow exposure factor (Ce), snow load importance factor (I), and the thermal factor (Ct). The unbalanced snow load should also be identified to ensure that it has been considered in the design.


For wood trusses, section R802.10.1 requires design drawings to be provided to the code enforcement official.  Such drawings should be stamped and sealed by a professional engineer or registered architect licensed to practice in New York State and must provide sufficient information to allow a determination by the code enforcement official that the truss has been designed to comply with the RCNYS. It is important to verify whether the design load is for a live load equal to the GSL or determined in accordance with ASCE 7-98. Drawings for trusses designed in accordance with ASCE 7-98 should include the following information:


1.     An indication that the design is based on reference standard ASCE 7-98.

2.     A statement that the design has been analyzed separately for both balanced and unbalanced load conditions.

3.     The flat-roof snow load (pf), snow exposure factor (Ce), snow load importance factor (I), and the thermal factor (Ct).

4.     An indication that the unbalanced snow load factor is 1.5 or 1.5/Ce.

It should also be noted that RCNYS section R802.10.1 further requires truss design drawings to include at a minimum the following additional information:

1.   Slope or depth, span and spacing.

2.   Location of all joints.

3.   Required bearing widths.

4.   Design loads as applicable.

4.1.      Top chord live load (including snow loads).

4.2.      Top chord dead load.

4.3.      Bottom chord live load.

4.4.      Bottom chord dead load.

4.5.      Concentrated loads and their points of application.

4.6.      Controlling wind and earthquake loads.

5.   Adjustments to lumber and joint connector design values for conditions of use.

6.   Each reaction force and direction.

7.   Joint connector type and description (e.g., size, thickness or gage) and the dimensioned location of each joint connector except where symmetrically located relative to the joint interface.

8.   Lumber size, species and grade for each member.

9.   Connection requirements for:

9.1.      Truss to truss girder.

9.2.      Truss ply to ply.

9.3.      Field splices.

10.        Calculated deflection ratio and/or maximum deflection for live and total load.

11.        Maximum axial compression forces in the truss members to enable the building designer to design the size, connections and anchorage of the permanent continuous lateral bracing. Forces shall be shown on the truss design drawing or on supplemental documents.

12.        Required permanent truss member bracing location.



Metropolitan Engineering, Consulting & Forensics (MECF)

Providing Competent, Expert and Objective Investigative Engineering and Consulting Services
P.O. Box 520
Tenafly, NJ 07670-0520
Tel.: (973) 897-8162
Fax: (973) 810-0440
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SAMPLE SNOW DESIGN ANALYSIS FOR DETERMINING THE CAUSE OF ROOF FAILURE IN BUFFALO, NEW YORK


SNOW DESIGN ANALYSIS FOR DETERMINING THE CAUSE OF ROOF FAILURE IN BUFFALO, NEW YORK






This blog and an associated blog posted in this website provides information regarding the application of the Residential Code of New York State (RCNYS) as it pertains to design snow loads.  It discusses two acceptable methods for determining roof design loads while emphasizing the need to consider unbalanced snow loads in engineered design.

List of Abbreviations

BCNYS; Building Code of New York State

CEO; Code Enforcement Official

GSL; Ground Snow Load

PSF; Pounds Per Square Foot

RCNYS; Residential Code of New York State



The determination of design snow loads under the Residential Code of New York State (RCNYS) is often confused with the requirements of the Building Code of New York State (BCNYS).  The RCNYS uses a prescriptive approach to meet the design requirements for snow loads whereas the BCNYS uses an analytical approach which includes the use of an equation and considers various roof configurations and design conditions such as exposure, thermal and importance factors, warm roofs vs. cold roofs, partial loading, unbalanced loads and drifting and sliding snow.  That which is often misunderstood in the RCNYS is the need to include unbalanced snow loads for common hip and gable roofs.
  


An adequately designed roof structure should be capable of handling a snow load of 30 psf.  In western New York (where Buffalo is located), the design code requires a minimum of 50 pounds per square foot (psf) snow load.  While the weight of snow varies and changes with temperature it has been determined through various studies that heavy wet snow can weigh from 12 pounds per cubic foot to 20 pounds per cubic foot.  This would suggest that a properly designed roof should be capable of handling a snow pack of 50” (4.2’) of light snow (12 pounds/cubic foot) and 30” (2.5’) of heavy snow (at 20 pounds/cubic foot being the weight of the heavy snow).  Assuming that the entire snow pack from all the Lake-effect snowstorms remained on the roof (no snow melt) there would have been 50” or less of snow accumulation.  This analysis does not include drifting snow (i.e., an unbalanced snow load, as per the NYS regulations), that could create even greater snow accumulations.



However due to the fluctuating water content of snow the actual weight is computed on the water equivalent of the snow.  Based on climatological data these storms produced an equivalent of approximately 4.0” of liquid precipitation in the area where this failed structure was located which would equate to an approximate total weight of less than 20.8 pounds per square foot (water weighs approximately 62 pounds per cubic foot or approximately 5.17 pounds per square foot per inch of water height), which is well under the design capacity of a structurally sound roof and roof framing and therefore the weight of snow was not the root cause of the failure.  Inspection of the structural members showed that the downward displacement/deflection of the ridge beam of the right roof is the result of a long term progressive condition also referred to as “creep deformation” that also resulted in the outward rotation and movement of the laterally unsupported right wall.



THE EXPLOSIVE DANGER OF THE ASPHALT FUMES – A REMINDER AFTER THE ASPHALT TANK EXPLOSION AT LA CROSSE, WISCONSIN



THE EXPLOSIVE DANGER OF THE ASPHALT FUMES – A REMINDER AFTER THE ASPHALT TANK EXPLOSION AT LA CROSSE, WISCONSIN




Over a half-million workers are exposed to fumes from asphalt, a petroleum product used extensively in road paving, roofing, siding, and concrete work. Health effects from exposure to asphalt fumes include headache, skin rash, sensitization, fatigue, reduced appetite, throat and eye irritation, cough, and skin cancer.

We would like to remind you of some of the safety practices that need to be followed when storing, handling, heating, and spraying liquid asphalt products.  First, it must be recognized that all asphalt products, when heated enough, are flammable.  That means that if you heat any asphalt hot enough, whether it is a cut back, an asphalt cement, or an emulsion, hazardous vapors will be produced.

When these vapors are mixed in proper proportion with oxygen in the air, and come in contact with a source of ignition, a flash fire can occur.  The flash may be quite violent, and if enough vapors are present a raging fire may develop. These types of fire can and have burned people very badly, and have killed some.



Many of the asphalt products we use every day are used at temperatures above their flash points.  The flash point is the product temperature where a source of ignition will cause the vapors produced to catch on fire.  RC and MC cut back asphalts are commonly used at temperatures above their flash points, where flammable vapors are produced. The flash points of asphalt cements may be above the temperatures at which they are used, but they are not far away. You may be using an asphalt cement (AC) at a temperature which is only 20 to 25°F below its flash point. If that AC is overheated in a small area, flammable vapors may be produced.  If the water is boiled off of a bit of emulsion, the remains may be asphalt cement or there may be solvents in the asphalt which can produce flammable vapors.  In either case the remains are dangerous if overheated. You may overheat a small amount of emulsion, boil off the water, overheat the remaining asphalt, and be producing flammable vapors without even realizing it.  If the vapors mix with oxygen and reach a source of ignition, a fire will develop.

The flammable nature of asphalt vapors, and the quick, violent fires which can develop lead us to recommend the following safety precautions.




When heating asphalt in a transport tank, distributor, or tack truck, position the tank broadside to the wind
If any flammable vapors are present, the vapors must escape from the tank through the vent pipe. Typically the vent pipe exits at the bottom of the asphalt tank. Positioning the tank broadside to the wind will allow the wind to disperse the vapors safely away from the burners and other sources of ignition on the truck. If the tank is parked facing into the wind or with its back to the wind, the wind may carry vapors to the burners at the rear, or to other sources of combustion near the engine. If you heat the asphalt tank in a confined area flammable vapors can collect in combustible concentrations.

Always be sure that the heating flues are covered by at least six inches of asphalt before lighting the burners
If the heating flues are not sufficiently covered, the asphalt near the flues will be overheated.  Flammable vapors will be produced.  ACs will be heated above their flash points.  Emulsions will be broken and heated above the flash point of their base asphalt.  The flue pipe may be heated hot enough to provide a source of ignition. When this happens, an explosion can occur, which may rupture the tank or blow the man hole cover off.  Before lighting the burners it is very important to be sure that the flues are covered over their entire length. Many asphalt tanks are built with a slope or pitch for better drainage. If the tank is parked on a grade, one end or one side of the tank may be higher than the other. You must be sure that the highest point on the flue is covered according to the equipment manufacturer’s recommendation.
Never, under any circumstances light the burners without the flues covered to the depth recommended! If the tank is partially loaded you may need to add more asphalt before heating.




Never spray asphalt while the burners are running
If you spray asphalt with the burners running, you may uncover the flue causing a fire inside the tank. Running the burners while spraying will provide a source of ignition for vapors produced while spraying, causing a fire outside the tank. Be sure the burners are completely out before spraying.
LPG burners will support a flame for several minutes after the valves are shut off.

Keep all sources of ignition away from manholes and tank vents
When you open the manhole flammable vapors may escape.  There may be flammable vapors in the tank which are too concentrated to burn. When you open the manhole fresh air or oxygen is introduced.  The cigarette in your hand becomes a source of ignition and you may be additional fuel. Flammable vapors are intended to escape out of the tank vent. Keep hand torches, cigarettes, engine exhaust, and other sources of ignition away from these vapors.




Keep vent pipes clear and open
Keeping the vent pipe clear and open will allow the vapors to escape and will keep them from building pressure inside the tank.

Do not operate or weld on a tank which is leaking
A leaking tank must be repaired before continuing use. The repair should be performed by an experienced tank repair shop. An “empty” tank may contain flammable vapors or residual asphalt. You would never consider welding on a gasoline tank. You should never consider welding an asphalt tank either. A tank repair shop will have sensors which can determine if there are flammable vapors present and if the tank is safe to weld.
The hazards identified are very real and very dangerous. Do not take these hazards lightly, as you will see from a small sampling of the asphalt tank explosions or fires that have happened over the years.

Accident: 201345337 - Two Employees Are Injured In Asphalt Tank Explosion
At approximately 7:45 a.m. on May 12, 2010, Employee #1, the senior maintenance member of a two-man crew, and Employee #2 were working from an elevated work platform. The platform was mounted on the back of a trailer, which was mounted to an asphalt tank. The employees had begun bypassing the normal asphalt storage tank to prepare for its five-year to seven-year cleaning. They placed a bypass valve in position to route the asphalt from the permanent tank to the temporary, trailer-mounted tank. Most of the asphalt piping was heated with a steam jacket encircling the pipes. 

However, the piping that ran from the bypass valve to the temporary tank was encircled with tubing that was heated by steam. The employees complained that the steam tubing, also referred to as steam tracing, was not wrapped tight enough, thereby preventing the pipe from getting hot enough to turn the hardened asphalt back to its liquid (melted) state. The employees then attempted to repair the clogged pipe. As was reported to be the normal practice, Employees #1 and #2 went to the end of the asphalt piping outlet and began heating the last bend of the piping with a propane torch. The piping outlet was located directly over the top of the manhole opening of the heated asphalt tank. The tank was reported to be 300 degrees to 400 degrees Fahrenheit, at that time. 




During the site visit, approximately five hours later, the tank temperature gauge read approximately 260 degrees Fahrenheit. After an undetermined amount of time that Employees #1 and #2 were using the propane torch to heat the piping, an explosion occurred in the asphalt tank. A witness described the explosion as a flame which shot 30 feet above the manhole cover and quickly descended back into the tank. This witness also stated that he could no longer observe the employees standing on the platform. Employee #1 remained on the platform and suffered asphalt burns and fractures to his face, where an item impacted it during the explosion. Employee #2 fell from the work platform, approximately 9 feet 5 inches to the concrete surface. 

Employee #2 suffered asphalt burns to his body and face, in addition to a hip fracture. A radio call for emergency response was broadcast throughout the company. The company Emergency Response Team doused the flames and provided initial first aid to Employees #1 and Employee #2. Both employees were transported to the University of Kansas Burn Unit and were hospitalized. At the time this report was written, they were currently being treated. Both employees were in critical but stable condition and were expected to recover. The safety leader stated that Employees #1 and #2 were wearing coveralls, steel toed shoes and safety gloves. However, they did not find evidence that the employees were wearing face shields and/or chemical goggles, as called for in the PPE hazard assessment


Worker dies in explosion of tank at asphalt plant
January 30, 2006
WEST SIDE — An explosion at a Chicago asphalt company Sunday killed one worker.
The explosion occurred just after 1 p.m. Sunday at Gardner Asphalt Corp., 4718 W. Roosevelt Rd., where one of four outdoor tanks caught fire, said Kevin MacGregor of the Fire Department.
The nearly 30-foot-tall tank most likely contained asphalt, which ignited for an unknown reason, MacGregor said, adding that firefighters prevented the other tanks from catching fire.
"We will be doing an investigation for cause and the origin of the fire," he said.
The worker, who was pronounced dead at the scene at 2:35 p.m., was not publicly identified because his family had not been notified, said a spokesman for the Cook County medical examiner.
No one at Gardner was available for comment Sunday.

Asphalt tank in Jessup explodes
January 31, 2006
A liquid-asphalt storage tank exploded into flames at an Owens Corning shingle plant in Jessup yesterday evening, drawing dozens of firefighters from Howard, Anne Arundel and Prince George's counties to prevent the blaze from spreading to adjacent tanks. There were no injuries.
The cause of the blaze on the grounds of the Baltimore-Washington Industrial Park, off U.S. 1, could not be immediately determined, said Bill Mould, a spokesman for Howard County's Department of Fire and Rescue Services. The fire was reported at 5:33 p.m. and was declared contained about two hours later. But firefighters planned to stay to monitor the situation throughout the night.
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/images/pixel.gif
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/images/pixel.gif
"There was an explosion and the roof continued to burn," said Jason Saragian, a spokesman for Owens Corning. "How and why is still the focus of the investigation."

Aerial tower trucks were used to pour water onto the nearby tanks of liquid asphalt, which is used to make roof shingles. Plumes of black smoke filled the air, and the exterior of the 3,300-gallon asphalt tank appeared to be on fire.
Fire officials said they did not put water directly on the blaze for fear of bursting the tank. Instead, they sprayed water on the exterior to keep it cool. A chemical powder, typically used for aircraft fires, was brought from Baltimore-Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport to help extinguish the fire.
The fire erupted in an industrial area in the 8200 block of Patuxent Range Road. No homes are in the immediate vicinity. Officials from the Maryland Department of the Environment were on the scene, assessing the risk from runoff and smoke.



Too Much Pressure in Storage Tank Blamed For Bango Oil Explosion
Updated: Wed 9:23 PM, Jan 08, 2014

FALLON, NV - It was nearly one month ago that an explosion and fire rocked the Bango Oil plant west of Fallon, sending a thick plume of black smoke into the chilly morning air.
One worker was severely burned.
It took firefighters from Churchill County and the Fallon Naval Air Station two hours to extinguish the flames.

A preliminary report from the investigation by the fire department and the state fire marshal's office released Wednesday says it all began with too much pressure in an asphalt storage tank.
Churchill County Fire Chief Fred Rogne says that led to some of the hot asphalt oil being vented from the top of the tank.
The oil splashed down on 24 year old Daniel Snodgrass who was working below. The oil, which had been heated to 500 degrees as part of the recycling process, burned him.
Snodgrass was apparently heating pipes in the bitter cold, using a hand held burner with an open flame.

That flame ignited the oil, causing the fire and the explosion that followed as the tops of storage tanks blew off as they're designed to do.
The statement leaves some questions unanswered including the still unexplained high pressure in the storage tank. In a press release issued the day after the incident, the company says the plant was operating normally at the time.
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration is conducting its own investigation. Results could be available in two weeks.
Snodgrass suffered second, third and fourth degree burns over more than half of his body.
He was flown to the burn center at UC Davis Medical Center in Sacramento in critical condition.
A hospital a spokesperson tells us he's now listed in good condition meaning his vital signs are stable and indications are excellent.
His parents, Kevin and Lois Snodgrass, say he has good days and bad, but is enduring a daily routine of painful treatment and rehabilitation.
Daniel Snodgrass is the oldest sibling in a family of nine which now faces months of unexpected expenses.
An account has been set up to aid them. Donations can be made at any Wells Fargo Bank branch.



Fatal Explosion Brings Framingham Employer OSHA Citations
HARTFORD -- A July 3 explosion of an asphalt tank at a Framingham, Mass. company that killed a worker could have been prevented if the company had taken the proper safety precautions, according to the U.S. Labor Department's Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).
As a result of the agency's investigation of the fatal explosion, OSHA has issued citations alleging willful and serious safety violations to Triram Corporation of 721 Waverly St., including proposed penalties totaling $52,500.

The investigation revealed that a contractor was directed to do welding work on top of a 10,000-gallon tank without being told about the tank's volatile contents.

"This was a tragedy that could have been avoided," said Richard Fazzio, OSHA's area director for northeastern Massachusetts. "The company should have followed required safety procedures and informed workers about the dangers of the hazardous materials in the workplace."
The alleged "willful" violation, which carries a proposed penalty of $35,000, charges Triram Corporation with failing to implement a hazard communication program. The company did not inform the welding contractor about hazards related to flammable vapors produced by heated asphalt and chemicals in the tank being welded.

The company is also charged with five alleged "serious" violations of OSHA safety standards for: failing to ensure containers of hazardous chemicals were labeled with proper contents and hazard warnings; failing to assure that containers of toxic or flammable substances were either filled with water or cleaned thoroughly and vented and tested prior to welding, cutting or heating; failing to equip above-ground storage tanks with a pressure release device; and exposing employees to fire or explosion from a tank that stored flammable liquid adjacent to a main building. Proposed fines for these alleged violations total $17,500.



OSHA defines a willful violation as one committed with intentional disregard or plain indifference to the requirements of the Occupational Safety and Health Act and regulations. It defines a serious violation as one in which there is substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result, and the employer knew, or should have known, of the hazard.
Triram Corporation has 15 business days from receipt of these citations to either elect to comply with them, to request and participate in an informal conference with the OSHA area director, or to contest them before the independent Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. OSHA's Methuen area office conducted this inspection. Its telephone number is 617-565-8110.
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration is dedicated to saving lives, preventing injuries and illnesses, and protecting America's workers. Safety and health add value to business, the workplace and life. For more information, visit www.osha.gov.


Accident: 550509 - Employee Dies In Explosion After Using Torch On Asphalt Tank
Employee #1 was directed to use an open-flame propane torch to unclog a pipe line/elbow on top of an asphalt tanker trailer. The pipe line/elbow was blocked with solidified asphalt. The blockage was suspected to be located at the pipe elbow on the gasoline-powered submerged pump. The employee checked the side motor mount area with a live, open-flame propane torch while the internal asphalt tanker heaters were operating (heating the asphalt and creating off-gassing within the tank's interior). It is suspected that the torch ignited combustible vapors/gases that were seeping out around the motor mount. The explosion blew the submerged pump off its mount and into the employee's upper body and head. The employee was blown off the platform and landed on the ground. He was burned over his upper body by the flash fire. He was pronounced dead upon arrival at a local hospital.



Employee Killed, Others Injured In Asphalt Tanker Explosion
Accident: 14333595 -- Report ID: 0420600 -- Event Date: 05/11/1992  - Florida Tank Services, Inc.
Employee #1 was at an establishment that repairs bulk fuel transport trucks, repairing a small leak on the rear bulkhead of an aluminum tanker that had last contained an asphalt emulsion. Employee #4 was assigned as his helper. Other welders recommended opening and venting the tanker and then entering the tank to repair the leak from the inside. The company had no specific procedures for "safing" asphalt tankers, and Employee #1 apparently chose to try to repair the leak from the outside. Once the tanker was backed into the workbay, Employee #1 attempted the repair with an arc welder. The repair failed because of product contamination around the leak. Employee #1 then lowered the tanker at the front to force the remaining product to the front and away from the leak, and used an oxygen/acetylene torch in an attempt to melt the asphalt emulsion away from the leak, but did not open the top hatches and vent the tank. An explosion occurred and Employee #1 suffered fatal head injuries. Employee #4, who was next to the tanker, was knocked to the floor and suffered from ringing in the ear, dizziness, and headaches from inhalation of asphalt fumes and smoke. Employee #2 sustained bruises to his ribcage when thrown into a work bench by the explosion. Employee #3 sprained his left knee when the explosion knocked him from the top of a nearby tanker. The building was heavily damaged and the tanker was destroyed. Causal factors include: a lack of established procedures for safing an asphalt tanker before cutting/welding; inadequate supervision of welding operations; absence of employee hazard training and unsafe work practices.


Employee Is Killed When Tank Explodes While Cutting On It
Blacklidge Emulsions Inc
Employee #1 was cutting on a tank that contained SSI Asphalt emulsion using acetylene and oxygen. The tank exploded killing him.

Firefighters battle blaze at Monroe asphalt plan in Michigan
September 2014
Firefighters from Frenchtown and Monroe Townships and the City of Monroe doused a liquid asphalt holding tank that caught fire at the Michigan Paving & Materials’ plant at the Port of Monroe Tuesday evening that sent large plumes of black smoke into the air.
The three departments knocked the fire down quickly with both foam and water after arriving about 5:45 p.m. at the plant off E. Front St. just west of the DTE Monroe Power Plant.
The plant is the largest liquid asphalt blending facility in the world, according to Paul LaMarre, director of the port who spotted the blaze and called 9-1-1. The cause of the blaze was not available.




Metropolitan Engineering, Consulting & Forensics (MECF)
Providing Competent, Expert and Objective Investigative Engineering and Consulting Services
P.O. Box 520
Tenafly, NJ 07670-0520
Tel.: (973) 897-8162
Fax: (973) 810-0440
We are happy to announce the launch of our twitter account. Please make sure to follow us at @MetropForensics or @metroforensics

Metropolitan appreciates your business.
Feel free to recommend our services to your friends and colleagues.