CONSTRUCTION DEFECTS INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES: COURT FINDS THAT KB HOME WAS ENTITLED TO COVERAGE AS AN “ADDITIONAL INSURED” UNDER INSURANCE POLICIES ISSUED TO A SUBCONTRACTOR HIRED BY KB HOME.
On November 25, 2014, the
Court of Appeals of Arizona said that because there was written evidence from
which a factfinder could conclude either that (1) there was a written agreement
between KB Homes and GRG requiring GRG to include KB as an additional insured
on GRG's general liability policies with Charter Oak, or (2) the “rules and
requirements” provision in GRG's written contract with KB contemplated the type
of requirement subsequently evidenced by written correspondence and completed
conduct of the parties. Accordingly, the
Court reversed the summary judgment granted in favor of Charter Oak.
_____________________________________________________________
Court of Appeals of
Arizona, Division 1.
KB HOME TUCSON, INC.,
an Arizona corporation, Appellant, v. The CHARTER OAK FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY;
Travelers Property Casualty Insurance Company; Drachman Leed Insurance Inc., an
Arizona corporation; American E & S Insurance Brokers Of California, Inc.,
a foreign corporation, Appellees.
No. 1 CA–CV 12–0681.
Decided: November 25,
2014
Judge KENT E. CATTANI
delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Presiding Judge MAURICE PORTLEY
and Judge JOHN C. GEMMILL joined. Dioguardi Flynn, LLP By JohnP. Flynn and
Peter J. Moolenaar, Scottsdale, Counsel for Appellant. Morales Fierro &
Reeves By WilliamC. Reeves, Phoenix, Counsel for Appellees Charter Oak and
Travelers. The Hassett Law Firm, PLC ByMyles P. Hassett and Julie K. Moen,
Phoenix, Counsel for Appellee Drachman Leed. Pak & Moring, PLC ByS. Gregory
Jones, Scottsdale, Counsel for Appellee American E & S. DeCiancio Robbins,
PLC ByChristopher Robbins, Tempe, Counsel for Amicus Curiae IiAbaz. Lorber
Greenfield & Polito, LLP By HollyP. Davies, Tempe, Counsel for Amicus
Curiae Leading Builders of America. Newmeyer & Dillion, LLP, Newport Beach,
CA, By AlanH. Packer, Bonnie T. Roadarmel, Clayton T. Tanaka, and Susannah M.
Eichele, Co–Counsel for Amicus Curiae Leading Builders of America.
OPINION
¶
1 KB Home Tucson, Inc. (“KB”) appeals from the entry of summary judgment in
favor of The Charter Oak Fire Insurance Company and Travelers Property Casual
Insurance Company (collectively, “Charter Oak”) on KB's claims for declaratory
relief, breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. KB also appeals from the entry of summary judgment in favor of
Drachman Leed Insurance, Inc. (“Drachman Leed”) and American E & S
Insurance Brokers of California, Inc. (“American E & S”) on KB's claims for
negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud. All of the claims relate to
whether KB was entitled to coverage as an “additional insured” under insurance
policies issued to a subcontractor hired by KB. For reasons that follow, we
reverse the entry of judgment in favor of Charter Oak, but affirm the entry of
judgment in favor of Drachman Leed and American E & S.
FACTS
AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶
2 KB hired GRG Construction Co., Inc. (“GRG”) in May 1999 to perform work at a
residential subdivision in Tucson. The contractual relationship continued for
approximately four years. Charter Oak provided liability coverage for GRG,
including “additional insured” coverage for any person or entity GRG was
obligated to cover by virtue of a written contract or agreement. Drachman Leed
and American E & S were GRG's insurance agents/brokers who—at GRG's
direction—issued Certificates of Insurance requested by KB relating to GRG's
policy with Charter Oak and with another insurer, Evanston Insurance Company
(“Evanston”).
¶
3 Charter Oak issued two annual general liability policies to GRG during the
relevant time periods. The policies included a blanket additional insured
endorsement, which provided as follows:
WHO
IS AN INSURED—(Section II) is amended to include any person or organization you
are required to include as an additional insured on this policy by a written
contract or written agreement in effect during this policy period and executed
prior to the occurrence of any loss.
¶
4 GRG's written contracts with KB provided, in pertinent part:
7.
All work and materials must be acceptable to and comply with all rules,
regulations and requirements of [KB].
7.1
[GRG] shall protect and indemnify [KB] from any claims, liability, or losses suffered
by anyone wholly or partially through the negligence of [GRG] or any of his
agents or employees. [KB] shall retain a reasonable portion of all payments due
[GRG] until such claims are settled or suitable indemnity arrangements
acceptable to [KB] are provided by [GRG].
8.
[GRG] shall purchase and pay for all employer's liability and workman's
compensation insurance required by the State in which this work is performed
and shall also purchase and pay for public liability, property damage, products
liability, and product performance insurance [in specified amounts].
Certificates of coverage or copies of such policies shall be furnished to [KB]
prior to the commencement of work.
¶
5 After the parties signed the contract, KB sent annual letters to GRG describing
its insurance requirements. These letters detailed the minimum coverage
mandated by KB and stated that KB “must be named as an Additional Insured on
the General Liability Policy.” In response, GRG directed Drachman Leed to
provide KB a copy of Charter Oak's above-described blanket additional insured
endorsements, together with certificates of liability insurance listing KB as
an additional insured for COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY and AUTOMOBILE
insurance.
¶
6 Evanston also issued two annual policies insuring GRG for the relevant time
periods. Drachman Leed provided KB with certificates of liability insurance for
GRG's Evanston policies, obtained through producer/broker American E & S.
These informational certificates showed KB as an additional insured “As per
written contract,” and named KB as “certificate holder,” stating, “Any and all
jobs. Certificate Holder is an Additional Insured as per written contract,
General Liability Coverage, as respect work performed by the named insured.”
¶
7 The Evanston policies similarly contained blanket additional-insured
endorsements, which referenced the “Name of Person or Organization: AS PER
WRITTEN CONTRACT,” and provided:
WHO
IS AN INSURED (Section II) is amended to include as an insured the person or
organization shown in the Schedule, but only with respect to liability arising
out of “your Work” for that insured by or for you.
¶
8 In May 2001, the City of Tucson asserted a claim against KB alleging
deficiencies in streets and sidewalks within KB's residential subdivision
project. KB sued GRG and other subcontractors for reimbursement for repair
costs and attorney's fees incurred in defending against the City's claims. In
February 2005, several homeowners in the project sued KB for damage to their
homes allegedly resulting from construction defects. KB tendered its defense to
Charter Oak on all of the claims and to Evanston on the homeowners' claims.
¶
9 Charter Oak disclaimed coverage, stating that KB did not qualify as an
additional insured under the blanket additional-insured endorsement because
there was no written contract or agreement requiring that GRG add KB as an
additional insured. Similarly, Evanston disclaimed coverage for the homeowners'
suit because the underwriting file and policies did not contain an
additional-insured endorsement, and because any such endorsement would not have
conveyed additional-insured coverage in the absence of a written contract
requiring that KB Home be made an additional insured.
¶
10 KB filed a complaint against Evanston for declaratory relief, breach of
contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. KB
subsequently amended its complaint to include claims against Drachman Leed and
American E & S for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud.2
KB also filed a separate action against Charter Oak for declaratory relief,
breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. In January 2010, KB settled its claims against Evanston, and the
superior court subsequently consolidated the Charter Oak, Drachman Leed, and
American E & S actions.
¶
11 Charter Oak, Drachman Leed, and American E & S filed separate motions
for summary judgment on all of KB's claims. Among other arguments, Charter Oak
asserted that KB did not qualify as an additional insured under the policies
issued to GRG. Drachman Leed argued primarily that (1) the firm did not owe a
duty of care to KB because KB was not a client; and (2) the firm provided
accurate insurance information to KB and, therefore, did not misrepresent
coverage or commit fraud. American E & S argued that KB had not shown: (1)
a misrepresentation of coverage; (2) that American E & S was aware of the
falsity of any alleged misrepresentation; or (3) KB's right to rely on the
alleged misrepresentations. American E & S also joined Drachman Leed's
motion for summary judgment. After briefing and oral argument, the superior
court ruled in favor of Charter Oak, Drachman Leed, and American E & S, and
directed entry of final judgment in favor of all three defendants.
¶
12 KB timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under Article 6, Section 9, of the
Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections
12–120.21(A)(1) and –2101(A)(1).3
DISCUSSION
¶
13 KB challenges the grant of summary judgment in favor of each named
defendant.4
Summary judgment is appropriate only if there are no genuine issues as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Ariz. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 305, 802 P.2d 1000,
1004 (1990).
¶
14 We review de novo the superior court's grant of summary judgment, viewing
the facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom judgment is
entered. United Bank of Arizona v. Allyn, 167 Ariz. 191, 193, 195, 805 P.2d
1012, 1014, 1016 (App.1990). We will affirm summary judgment if it is correct
for any reason supported by the record, even if not explicitly considered by
the superior court. See Mutschler v. City of Phx., 212 Ariz. 160, 162, ¶ 8, 129
P.3d 71, 73 (App.2006).
I.
Charter Oak.
¶
15 Charter Oak's obligation to provide additional-insured general liability
coverage to KB turns on whether GRG was required under a written contract or
agreement to include KB as an additional insured. KB argues the superior court
erred by finding that there was no such contract or agreement. KB asserts in
particular that its written instructions to GRG regarding additional-insured
coverage, coupled with GRG's conduct in conformity with those instructions, is
evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could find the existence of an
“executed” “written agreement” between KB and GRG. KB further asserts that a
reasonable fact-finder could conclude that GRG's contract with GRG obligated
GRG to comply with KB's “rules, regulations and requirements,” which, as
evidenced by other writings, included an agreed-upon requirement that KB be
named as an additional insured under GRG's insurance policies. In contrast, Charter
Oak argues that coverage was not contemplated under GRG's contract with KB, and
further asserts that during the life of the contract, KB “concocted a plan of
surreptitiously attempting to supplement its admittedly (and strategically)
deficient contract” in an effort to “unilaterally modify the subcontract.”
¶
16 We conclude that a reasonable fact-finder could find that KB had an
“executed” written agreement with GRG requiring GRG to provide
additional-insured coverage. Although there is not a specific document signed
by both parties, written documents prepared by or at the direction of KB and
GRG establish such an agreement. KB's correspondence makes clear the
requirement that GRG add KB as an additional insured on its general liability
policies, and GRG carried out and completed the agreement by directing its
agents to provide certificates of insurance listing KB as an additional
insured. See Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed.2009) (defining “execute” as “To
perform or complete (a contract or duty)” or as “To make (a legal document)
valid by signing; to bring (a legal document) into its final, legally
enforceable form”).
¶
17 Moreover, even assuming the above-described correspondence did not establish
the existence of a written agreement, GRG's signed contract with KB
specifically required that GRG comply with KB's “rules and requirements.” In
light of the subsequently executed written documents evidencing an
additional-insured requirement, we conclude that there is evidence from which a
reasonable juror could find that the subsequently-discussed rules and
requirements were incorporated into the contract.
¶
18 We note that under GRG's insurance policies with Charter Oak, GRG was not
required to obtain Charter Oak's permission before obligating Charter Oak to
provide additional-insured coverage to contractors for which GRG was providing
services. The policies instead contemplated that Charter Oak would make an
after-the-fact assessment (through evidence of a written contract or agreement)
of whether GRG was obligated to provide additional-insured coverage to such
contractors.
¶
19 GRG has never disputed that it was required, per the written subcontract and
KB's insurance requirements, to add KB as an additional insured on GRG's
general liability insurance policies. A GRG representative in fact testified
that GRG understood that it needed to comply with KB's insurance requirements
as a condition to payment under its contract with KB and as a condition to
continuing to work with KB. But even without such testimony, the subcontract at
issue mandated compliance with KB's rules and requirements. And the written
correspondence between KB and GRG, coupled with GRG's conduct in response to
that correspondence, clearly evidenced an understanding and agreement that one
of those requirements was that KB be named as an additional insured on GRG's
Charter Oak policies.
¶
20 KB did not “unilaterally modify” its contract with GRG by clarifying the
additional-insured requirement. The contract specifically noted a duty to
comply with other “rules and requirements,” and nothing about GRG's response to
KB's correspondence detailing the additional-insured requirement suggests that
GRG was surprised in any way or believed that an additional-insured requirement
was beyond the scope of their contractual agreement. Moreover, GRG's contract
with Charter Oak specifically contemplated that additional-insured coverage
would be provided in connection with GRG's work for any number of contractors.
Thus, the additional-insured requirement did not unilaterally change the
responsibilities of KB or GRG or otherwise modify their subcontract.
¶
21 Nor did KB's exercise of the “rules, regulations, and requirements”
provision of the contract alter the nature of Charter Oak's relationship with
and responsibilities to GRG. As noted previously, Charter Oak did not require
pre-approval to add additional insureds to its policy with GRG. Charter Oak
thus understood that GRG would be adding as additional insureds individuals or
entities that hired GRG to perform work on their behalf. And the
additional-insured language specified that Charter Oak was only providing
coverage “as respect work performed by the named insured [GRG].” Thus, the
“requirements” referenced in GRG's contract with KB and spelled out in KB's
correspondence with GRG did not unfairly deprive Charter Oak of any anticipated
right under its insurance policies with GRG or expand its obligations to
provide coverage based on GRG's alleged negligence.
¶
22 Charter Oak nevertheless asserts that the superior court correctly applied
Lennar Corp. v. Auto–Owners Ins. Co., 214 Ariz. 255, 151 P.3d 538 (App.2007),
in finding that KB was not entitled to coverage. In Lennar, this court held
that “the requirement that [a contractor] indemnify [a developer] is not an
agreement that [the contractor] obtain insurance that could provide a defense
for [the developer].” Id. at 267, ¶ 45, 151 P.3d at 550. But the contract at
issue in Lennar did not contain a provision specifying additional obligations;
nor were there writings and conduct evidencing an agreement to add the
contracting developer as an additional insured on the contractor's insurance
policies. Thus, Lennar's holding is not controlling here.5
¶
23 Although Arizona appellate courts have not addressed the issue before us,
case law from other jurisdictions supports the conclusion that KB was entitled
to coverage in this case. For example, in Mid–Am Builders, Inc. v. Federated
Mutual Ins. Co., a subcontractor's insurance company conditioned
additional-insured endorsements to the subcontractor's policy on the existence
of a “written contract” requiring the subcontractor to name the other party as
an additional insured. 194 F.Supp.2d 822, 824 (CD.Ill.2002). The contract
between the subcontractor and the contractor did not contain such a
requirement, but a contemporaneous transmittal letter asked the subcontractor
to issue a certificate of insurance naming the general contractor as an
additional insured. Id. at 823–24. The subcontractor thereafter called its
insurance agent to request that the general contractor be added as an
additional insured, and the subcontractor provided the general contractor with
the requested certificate of insurance. Id. at 824. The district court found
that notwithstanding the “written contract” requirement in the endorsement, the
general contractor was entitled on summary judgment to additional-insured
status because the transmittal letter, together with the subcontract, provided
sufficient evidence of mutual assent to allow for additional-insured status.
See id. at 827 (noting that under Illinois law, when instruments are executed
together as part of one transaction or agreement, they are to be construed as a
single instrument).
¶
24 Here, additional-insured status was conditioned on the existence of a
written contract or a written agreement, which as detailed above could be
established without a specific document signed by both parties. Moreover, although
KB's correspondence regarding rules and requirements was not contemporaneous
with the contract, the contract referenced such rules and requirements. Thus,
even assuming the written documents do not establish the existence of a
separate written agreement, under Mid–Am Builders, the subsequent
correspondence would be relevant to establish that the “rules and requirements”
provision in KB's contract with GRG included an additional-insured requirement.
See also Mt. Hawley Ins. Co. v. Robinette Demolition, Inc., 994 N.E.2d 973,
983, ¶ 50 (Ill.App.Ct.2013) (stating that certificates of insurance provide
additional support for finding a written agreement that the parties intended to
name other entities as additional insureds).6
¶
25 In sum, because there was written evidence from which a factfinder could
conclude either that (1) there was a written agreement between KB and GRG
requiring GRG to include KB as an additional insured on GRG's general liability
policies with Charter Oak, or (2) the “rules and requirements” provision in
GRG's written contract with KB contemplated the type of requirement
subsequently evidenced by written correspondence and completed conduct of the
parties. Accordingly, we reverse the summary judgment granted in favor of
Charter Oak.
II.
Drachman Leed and American E & S.
¶
26 KB argues that the superior court erred by granting summary judgment on KB's
negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud claims against Drachman Leed
and American E & S. For reasons that follow, we affirm the superior court's
rulings on those claims.
A.
Negligence.
¶
27 To establish negligence, a plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) the
defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant breached that
duty; (3) the breach proximately caused the plaintiff's injury; and (4)
resulting damages. Gipson v. Kasey, 214 Ariz. 141, 143, ¶ 9, 150 P.3d 228, 230
(2007). An action for negligence cannot be maintained in absence of a duty owed
by a defendant to a plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 11.
¶
28 Here, KB could not establish a claim for negligence against Drachman Leed
and American E & S because they did not owe a duty of care to KB. Absent
special circumstances in which a foreseeable and specific third party is
injured, insurance producers/agents owe no duty of care to third-party
non-clients. Napier v. Bertram, 191 Ariz. 238, 242, ¶ 15, 954 P.2d 1389, 1393
(1998). Although such special circumstances may include an enhanced relationship
between the insurance producer/agent and the non-client, the record here does
not reflect such a relationship. Instead, Drachman Leed simply provided
insurance information regarding GRG's policies in a normal business transaction
through certificates and additional-insured endorsements to KB. See Ferguson v.
Cash, Sullivan & Cross Ins. Agency, Inc., 171 Ariz. 381, 385, 831 P.2d 380,
384 (App.1991). See also Gipson, 214 Ariz. at 145, 119, 150 P.3d at 232;
Ferguson, 171 Ariz. at 385, 831 P.2d at 384 (noting that the mere existence or
discussion of third parties with the insured does not create a special
relationship with the agent).
¶
29 Moreover, even assuming Drachman Leed and/or American E & S owed some
type of duty to KB as a third-party non-client, KB has not established a breach
of duty, because Drachman Leed and American E & S simply provided
certificates of insurance requested by their insured, but with the following
proviso:
THIS
CERTIFICATE IS ISSUED AS A MATTER OF INFORMATION ONLY AND CONFERS NO RIGHTS
UPON THE CERTIFICATE HOLDER. THIS CERTIFICATE DOES NOT AMEND, EXTEND OR ALTER
THE COVERAGE AFFORDED BY THE POLICIES BELOW.
KB
was provided a copy of the relevant insurance policies, and KB has not
established that the defendants provided inaccurate information. Thus, the
superior court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Drachman Leed and
American E & S on KB's negligence claim.
B.
Negligent Misrepresentation.
¶
30 “A claim for relief for negligent misrepresentation is one governed by the
principles of the law of negligence. Thus, there must be ‘a duty owed and a
breach of that duty before one may be charged with the negligent violation of
that duty.’ “ Van Buren v. Pima Cmty. Coll. Dist. Bd., 113 Ariz. 85, 87, 546
P.2d 821, 823 (1976) (citation omitted).7
Here, as described above, neither Drachman Leed nor American E & S owed a
duty to KB, a third-party non-client, and KB did not establish a
misrepresentation. See supra ¶¶ 24–27. Under these circumstances, the superior
court appropriately granted summary judgment against KB on this claim.
C.
Fraud.
¶
31 To prove fraud, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) [a] representation; (2) its
falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or
ignorance of its truth; (5) [the speaker's] intent that it should be acted upon
by the person and in the manner reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's
ignorance of its falsity; (7) [the hearer's] reliance on its truth; (8) [the
hearer's] right to rely thereon; and (9) [the hearer's] consequent and
proximate injury.” Nielson v. Flashberg, 101 Ariz. 335, 338–39, 419 P.2d 514,
517–18 (1966).
¶
32 We agree with the superior court that the certificates and endorsements
delivered by Drachman Leed and American E & S truthfully indicated that KB
was an additional insured if it had a written contract as required by the
relevant insurance policies. Thus, KB's fraud claim fails for lack of a false
statement.
¶
33 KB argues that it established the requisite false statement because the
certificate issued by Drachman Leed that referenced the additional-insured
endorsement was not authorized by Evanston and was not in Evanston's
underwriting file. But Evanston's denial of coverage was not based on those
facts. Evanston's denial letter stated that the endorsement could not have
conveyed additional-insured coverage because the KB–GRG subcontract “does not
set forth any requirement that KB Home be made an additional insured, or be
named as an additional insured, under the liability policy GRG was to procure.”
Accordingly, the superior court correctly entered summary judgment in Drachman
Leed's favor on the fraud claim. Because the judgment was correct on this
basis, we do not address KB's arguments regarding reliance and damages.
¶
34 As to the judgment in favor of American E & S, KB acknowledged being
unaware of any involvement by American E & S in GRG's policies with
Evanston. As such, KB cannot now successfully claim that American E & S
made any representations to KB, much less false representations on which KB
relied. See St. Joseph's Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 154 Ariz. 307, 312, 742 P.2d 808,
813. Thus, the superior court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor
of American E & S.
III.
Attorney's Fees & Costs.
¶
35 KB has requested its attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. §
12–341.01(A) and ARCAP 21(c). In our discretion, we award KB its reasonable
attorney's fees relating to its arguments against Charter Oak upon compliance
with ARCAP 21. American E & S also requests attorney's fees on appeal
pursuant to A.R.S. § 12–341.01(A). Because KB's tort claims against American E
& S did not arise out of contract, we deny American E & S's fee
request. See Barmat v. John & Jane Doe Partners A–D, 155 Ariz. 519, 524,
747 P.2d 1218, 1223 (1987). As the successful parties on appeal, KB is entitled
to its costs relating to its claims against Charter Oak, and Drachman Leed and
American E & S are entitled to their costs upon compliance with ARCAP 21.
CONCLUSION
¶
36 For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the superior court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Charter Oak; vacate the court's award of costs, fees, and
Rule 68 sanctions to Charter Oak; and remand for further proceedings consistent
with this decision. We affirm the court's grant of summary judgment in favor of
Drachman Leed and American E & S.
FOOTNOTES
4. Independent Insurance
Agents and Brokers of Arizona and Leading Builders of America submitted amicus
curiae briefs, which this court has considered.
5. In Lennar, this court
noted that this type of dispute can be avoided if a contract between a
contractor and subcontractor includes more specific language delineating
additional-insured status. 214 Ariz. at 268 n. 15, 151 P.3d at 551 n. 15. But
the KB–GRG contract predated the Lennar decision by several years.
6. Other courts have rejected
claims to additional-insured status under arguably similar circumstances. See,
e.g., Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London v. Am. Safety Ins. Servs.,
Inc., 702 F.Supp.2d 1169 (C.D.Cal.2010). But those cases, like Lennar, do not
involve the type of contractual provision at issue here referencing additional
rules and requirements, and they do not address correspondence from or at the
direction of both parties evidencing an agreement to add a contractor as an
additional insured on the subcontractor's insurance policy.
7. The elements of negligent
misrepresentation are: (1) the defendant provided false information in a
business transaction; (2) the defendant intended for the plaintiff to rely on
the incorrect information or knew that it reasonably would rely; (3) the
defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in obtaining or communicating the
information; (4) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the incorrect information;
and (5) resulting damage. Mur–Ray Mgmt. Corp. v. Founders Title Co., 169 Ariz.
417, 422–24, 819 P.2d 1003, 1008–09 (App.1991).
CATTANI,
Judge.