Statutes of limitations: In Strauss v. Chubb Indemnity
Insurance Company,1 the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals found a
loss in Wisconsin that continued for sixteen years could proceed pursuant to
the “continuous trigger theory” and was not time-barred.
The plaintiffs constructed a home in
Wisconsin in 1994 and insured it with Chubb from 1994 to 2005, changing
carriers in 2005. The policy stated that coverage is limited “only to
occurrences that take place while this policy is in effect.” It also contained
a clause that stated “Legal Action Against Us” must take place “within one year
after a loss occurs.” In 2010, plaintiffs discovered a water infiltration had
been causing damage, seemingly since the home was constructed. In December
2010, they submitted a claim to Chubb who denied coverage because,
- the damage was not discovered during the policy period;
- the claim was time-barred as the statute of limitation had run, and
- the “Legal Action Against Us” clause was violated.
Plaintiffs filed suit within one
year of finding the damage. The court concluded that the “continuous trigger
theory” applied such that coverage existed for the entire loss and that the
claims were not time-barred.
Coverage
For an insurance policy to provide
coverage to an insured, a triggering event must occur during the policy's
period of enforcement.2 There are four theories to determine this:
exposure, manifestation, continuous and injury-in-fact.3 Chubb
argued that the manifestation trigger theory applied such that only the insurer
at the time the loss is found can be held responsible. Plaintiffs argued that
the continuous trigger theory applied such that all policies in effect from the
time the loss began would owe coverage. The court looked to the language of the
policy rather than rely on a general theory. The court applied the continuous
trigger theory because the policy covered “all risk of physical loss to [the]
house or other property covered under this part of [the policy], unless stated
otherwise or an exclusion applies.” The policy applied “only to occurrences
that take place while this policy is in effect.” Once such an occurrence takes
place, the policy protects against “all risk of physical loss” to the home. The
water infiltration was found to constitute a single occurrence under the policy
with continual and recurring damage to the property with each rainfall.
Timeliness of the Suit
Chubb argued that the plaintiffs
filed their suit too late, past a statutory deadline and/or a time limit
imposed by the policy. Parties to an insurance contract are free to alter the
length of a statute of limitations and the date that the limitation period
begins to run.4 Rather than require claims to be filed within one
year “after the inception of the loss,” the policy permitted claims to be filed
“within one year after a loss occurs.” “After a loss occurs” is fundamentally
different from “after the inception.” The court concluded that plaintiffs could
bring their claim at any point until a year after the water infiltration damage
stopped.
In Wisconsin, under the continuous
trigger theory, a progressive loss “occurs continuously from exposure until
manifestation.”5 Here, because the loss was ongoing and occurred
with each rainfall and because the policy itself stated that “[c]ontinuous or
repeated exposure to substantially the same general conditions unless excluded
is considered to be one occurrence,” the loss, for purposes of the statute of
limitations, occurred all the way until the damage manifested in October 2010.
Therefore, suit was timely.
1 Strauss v. Chubb Indemnity Ins. Co., 771 F.3d 1026
(7th Cir., Nov. 18, 2014).
2 Society Ins. v. Town of Franklin, 607 N.W.2d 342, 345–46 (Wis.Ct.App. 2000).
3 The “exposure” theory fixes the date of injury as the date on which the injury-producing agent first contacted the body or the date on which pollution began. The “manifestation” theory holds that the compensable injury does not occur until it manifests itself in the form of a diagnosable disease or ascertainable property damage. The “continuous trigger” theory, also known as the “triple trigger” theory, provides that the injury occurs continuously from exposure until manifestation. Finally, the “injury-in-fact” theory allows the finder of fact to place the injury at any point in time that the effects of exposure resulted in actual and compensable injury.
4 See Keiting v. Skauge, 198 Wis.2d 887, 543 N.W.2d 565, 567 (Wis.Ct.App.1995) (“Public policy in this state permits parties to bind themselves by contract to a shorter period of limitation than that provided for by statute.”)
5 Town of Franklin, 607 N.W.2d at 346.
2 Society Ins. v. Town of Franklin, 607 N.W.2d 342, 345–46 (Wis.Ct.App. 2000).
3 The “exposure” theory fixes the date of injury as the date on which the injury-producing agent first contacted the body or the date on which pollution began. The “manifestation” theory holds that the compensable injury does not occur until it manifests itself in the form of a diagnosable disease or ascertainable property damage. The “continuous trigger” theory, also known as the “triple trigger” theory, provides that the injury occurs continuously from exposure until manifestation. Finally, the “injury-in-fact” theory allows the finder of fact to place the injury at any point in time that the effects of exposure resulted in actual and compensable injury.
4 See Keiting v. Skauge, 198 Wis.2d 887, 543 N.W.2d 565, 567 (Wis.Ct.App.1995) (“Public policy in this state permits parties to bind themselves by contract to a shorter period of limitation than that provided for by statute.”)
5 Town of Franklin, 607 N.W.2d at 346.
UPDATE
The Seventh Circuit has refused to disturb its ruling
that Chubb Indemnity Insurance Co. is on the hook to pay a couple's claim
seeking recovery for continuous water damage their home sustained over a period
of 16 years.
In a Jan. 15 order made public Tuesday, the appeals court denied Chubb's motion for rehearing or rehearing en banc of a panel's in November that the insurer must cover progressive water damage to policyholders Randal and Diane Strauss' home under a first-party property policy.
In a Jan. 15 order made public Tuesday, the appeals court denied Chubb's motion for rehearing or rehearing en banc of a panel's in November that the insurer must cover progressive water damage to policyholders Randal and Diane Strauss' home under a first-party property policy.