This blog presents Metropolitan Engineering Consulting & Forensics (MEC&F) claim management and claim investigation analyses of some of the typical claims we handle
US pilot ejects from jet near carrier headed for Korean peninsula
ELIZABETH MCLAUGHLIN Friday, April 21, 2017 10:47AMA pilot from the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier safely ejected from a fighter jet, according to a statement from the Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.
The pilot was quickly recovered by a helicopter and is being assessed by the medical team on board the carrier. There are no injuries at this time, the statement said.
The pilot ejected from his F/A-18E Super Hornet as it was on its final approach to land on the USS Carl Vinson. The Navy said the plane had been conducting "routine flight operations during a transit in the Celebes Sea." The body of water is north of Indonesia and south of the Philippines.
The statement did not detail what caused the pilot to eject or when the ejection occurred.
The USS Carl Vinson recently gained international attention for its location, after President Trump recently said that the U.S. was sending an "armada" toward North Korea.
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Super Hornet from USS Carl Vinson Crashes Near the Philippines, Pilot Safe By: Sam LaGrone
April 21, 2017 11:38 AM • Updated: April 21, 2017 3:27 PM
An F/A-18E Super Hornet from the “Kestrels” of Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 137 takes off from the aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) on April 10, 2017. US Navy Photo
This post has been updated with additional information from U.S. Pacific Fleet.
An F/A-18E Super Hornet on approach to land on aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) crashed on Friday near the Philippines, Navy officials told USNI News.
The pilot of the aircraft assigned to Carrier Air Wing 2, ditched the aircraft in the sea, safely ejected and was recovered by a helicopter flown from Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 4 “Black Knights,” according to a brief release from U.S. 7th Fleet.
“The incident is currently under investigation,” read the statement. “The pilot is being assessed by the medical team on board USS Carl Vinson and there are no apparent injuries at this time.”
The crash occurred at 6:55 P.M. local time (6:55 A.M. EDT).
The Vinson Strike Group is currently in the Celebes Sea and is in transit north for previously announced presence operations off the Korean Peninsula.
Earlier this week, strike group commander Rear Adm. Jim Kilby announced that strike group would extend their deployment by a month.
The strike group recently completed a bilateral training operation off of the coast Western Australia with the Royal Australian Navy.
The Vinson Strike Group deployment is being overseen by U.S. Third Fleet based in San Diego, Calif. as a test of the Navy’s ability to command and control forces in the Western Pacific, reported USNI News earlier this year.
The following is the complete April 21, 2017 statement from U.S. 7th Fleet.
USS Carl Vinson — A pilot safely ejected and was quickly recovered by a helicopter assigned to HSC-4 aboard USS Carl Vinson while conducting routine flight operations during a transit in the Celebes Sea.
The incident occurred as the F/A-18E assigned to Carrier Air Wing 2 was on final approach to USS Carl Vinson. The incident is currently under investigation. The pilot is being assessed by the medical team on board USS Carl Vinson and there are no apparent injuries at this time.
Travelers' Asbestos Exclusion Is Enforceable, 3rd Circ. Says
By Jeff Sistrunk
Law360, Los Angeles (April 21, 2017, 1:30 PM EDT) -- The Third
Circuit ruled Friday that an exclusion for asbestos-related claims in a
Travelers insurance policy is unambiguous and therefore enforceable,
overturning a $36 million judgment holding the insurer responsible for
some of policyholder General Refractories' $120 million worth of
asbestos liabilities.
In a unanimous decision, a panel of the
appellate court reversed a Pennsylvania district court's decision that
Travelers Surety & Casualty Co. cannot enforce a policy exclusion
for claims "arising out of asbestos" to deny coverage to General
Refractories Co. for scores of lawsuits.============ PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT _____________ No. 15-3409 _____________ GENERAL REFRACTORIES COMPANY v. FIRST STATE INSURANCE CO; WESTPORT INSURANCE CORPORATION, Successor to, or, f/k/a Puritan Insurance Company; LEXINGTON INSURANCE COMPANY; CENTENNIAL INSURANCE COMPANY; HARTFORD ACCIDENT And INDEMNITY CO; GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES INSURANCE CO; REPUBLIC INSURANCE COMPANY; SENTRY INSURANCE, Successor to, or, f/k/a Vanliner Insurance Company, f/k/a Great SW Fire Insurance Co; AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL INS. CO; AIU INSURANCE COMPANY; HARBOR INSURANCE COMPANY; TRAVELERS CASUALTY & SURETY CO, Successor to, or, f/k/a Aetna Casualty & Surety Company; AMERICAN EMPIRE INSURANCE CO; WESTCHESTER FIRE INSURANCE CO Travelers Casualty and Surety Company (f/k/a The Aetna Casualty and Surety Company), Appellant _____________ 2 On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania District Judge: Honorable L. Felipe Restrepo D.C. No. 2:04-cv-03509 ______________ Argued September 9, 2016 ______________ Before: JORDAN, VANASKIE and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges (Opinion Filed: April 21, 2017) Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr. [ARGUED] Richard J. Doren Blaine H. Evanson GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER 333 South Grand Avenue Los Angeles, CA 90071 Samuel J. Arena, Jr. Daniel T. Fitch William T. Mandia STRADLEY, RONON, STEVENS & YOUNG 2005 Market Street, Suite 2600 Philadelphia, PA 19103 Counsel for Appellant, Travelers Surety and Casualty Company
Michael Conley [ARGUED] Meghan Finnerty Mark. E. Gottlieb William H. Pillsbury OFFIT KURMAN 1801 Market Street, 23rd Floor Ten Penn Center Philadelphia, PA 19103 Howard J. Bashman Law Offices of Howard J. Bashman 2300 Computer Avenue Suite G-22 Willow Grove, PA 19090 Counsel for Appellee, General Refractories Company Laura A. Foggan, Esq. CROWELL & MORING 1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20004 Counsel for Amicus Appellant American Insurance Association and Complex Insurance Claims Litigation Association John N. Ellison, Esq. REED SMITH 1717 Arch Street Three Logan Square, Suite 3100 Philadelphia, PA 19103 Counsel for Amicus Appellant United Policyholders 4 ________________ OPINION ________________ VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. Decades of litigation over the effects of pervasive asbestos use have yielded a financial burden borne across an array of industries. Today we must decide which of two companies will bear costs associated with a staggering number of asbestos claims. These companies—a historical manufacturer of asbestos-containing products and its insurer—dispute the rightful allocation of asbestos-related losses under thirty-year-old excess insurance policies. While the policies are dated, the consequences of our interpretation are immediate both to the parties at hand and to those insurers and insureds whose relationships are similarly governed.
The chief issue on appeal is whether a policy exclusion that disclaims losses “arising out of asbestos” will prevent a manufacturer from obtaining indemnification for thousands of negotiated settlements with plaintiffs who have suffered adverse health effects from exposure to its asbestos-containing products. The answer hinges on whether the language of the exclusion is ambiguous. After a bench trial, the District Court found that the phrase “arising out of asbestos” contained latent ambiguity because the exclusion could reasonably be read to exclude only losses related to raw asbestos, as opposed to losses related to asbestos-containing products. We disagree. The phrase “arising out of,” when used in a Pennsylvania insurance exclusion, unambiguously requires “but for” causation. Because the losses relating to the underlying asbestos suits would not have occurred but for asbestos, raw or within finished products, we will reverse the judgment of the District Court.
I.
Plaintiff-Appellee General Refractories Company (“GRC”) is a manufacturer and supplier of refractory products that are designed to retain their strength when exposed to extreme heat. To serve this purpose, GRC previously included asbestos in some of its products. GRC’s use of asbestos brought about approximately 31,440 lawsuits alleging injuries from “exposure to asbestos-containing products manufactured, sold, and distributed by GRC” dating back to 1978. (J.A. 199.) GRC’s insurers initially fielded these claims. During the 1970s and ‘80s, GRC had entered into primary liability insurance policies with a number of different insurers. GRC also secured additional excess insurance policies to provide liability coverage beyond the limits of its primary insurance policies, including several excess policies issued by Defendant-Appellant Travelers Surety and Casualty Company, formerly known as the Aetna Casualty and Surety Company. As the number of asbestos-related injury claims against GRC began to grow, the primary insurers continued to defend and indemnify GRC. But this arrangement came to a halt in 1994 when GRC’s liabilities from thousands of settled claims far exceeded the limits of its primary insurance coverage. In 2002, after years of continued settlements, GRC tendered the underlying claims to its excess insurance carriers, including Travelers, all of whom denied coverage on the basis of exclusions for asbestos claims.
GRC commenced this action against its excess insurers seeking a declaration of coverage for losses related to the underlying asbestos claims, as well as breach of contract damages. Gen. Refractories Co. v. First State Ins. Co., 94 F. Supp. 3d 649, 652 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 2015). GRC eventually settled with all of the excess insurance defendants—except Travelers—by means of a stipulated dismissal with prejudice. Id. Travelers is the only excess insurer remaining in this litigation. Travelers’ contractual relationship with GRC is governed by two substantively identical excess insurance policies providing coverage from 1985 to 1986. Each policy obliges Travelers to indemnify GRC “against EXCESS NET LOSS arising out of an accident or occurrence during the policy period” subject to the stated limits of liability and additional terms.1 (J.A. 370, 381.) In maintaining that it need not compensate GRC for losses related to the underlying asbestos claims, Travelers relies on an “Asbestos Exclusion” contained within the excess insurance contracts, which reads: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 Both Travelers policies define “EXCESS NET LOSS” as “that part of the total of all sums which the INSURED becomes legally obligated to pay or has paid, as damages on account of any one accident or occurrence, and which would be covered by the terms of the Controlling Underlying Insurance, if written without any limit of liability, less realized recoveries and salvages, which is in excess of any self-insured retention and the total of the applicable limits of liability of all policies described in [the] Schedule of Underlying Insurance; whether or not such policies are in force.” (J.A. 370, 381.) -------------------------------------------------------------------- It is agreed that this policy does not apply to EXCESS NET LOSS arising out of asbestos, including but not limited to bodily injury arising out of asbestosis or related diseases or to property damage. (J.A. 377, 388.) The policies do not define the terms “arising out of” or “asbestos.” Gen. Refractories Co., 94 F. Supp. 3d at 654. At its core, the parties dispute the meaning of four words within the Asbestos Exclusion: “arising out of asbestos.” (J.A. 377, 388.) The District Court held a one-day bench trial specifically to interpret this language. GRC took the position that at the time the policies were drafted “arising out of asbestos” had a separate meaning than “arising out of asbestos-containing products.” Gen. Refractories Co., 94 F. Supp. 3d at 653. In GRC’s view, the term “asbestos” plainly referred to the raw asbestos mineral that is “mined, milled, processed, produced, or manufactured for sale in its raw form.” Id. There is no dispute that GRC made and sold refractory products that sometimes contained asbestos components. But the parties also agree that GRC “never mined, milled, processed, produced, or manufactured raw mineral asbestos.” Id. at 654. Thus, GRC argued that the exclusion did not encompass claims based on exposure to its finished asbestos-containing products. To support its narrow interpretation of the Asbestos Exclusion, GRC presented several types of extrinsic evidence, including: examples of comparable insurance policies that other insurers had issued in the late
1970s through 1985, which explicitly excluded “asbestos” and products containing asbestos; examples of comparable insurance policies that explicitly defined the term “asbestos” broadly as “the mineral asbestos in any form”; six consecutive policies sold by Travelers (as Aetna Casualty) to other policyholders from 1978 to 1985 which contained a more comprehensive and explicit asbestos exclusion2 than the one included in the two policies sold to GRC; the Wellington Agreement,3 which defined “Asbestos-Related Claims” as “any claims ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 The broader asbestos exclusion read: “[T]his insurance does not apply to bodily injury which arises in whole or in part, either directly or indirectly, out of asbestos, whether or not the asbestos is airborne as a fiber or particle, contained in a product, carried on clothing, or transmitted in any fashion whatsoever.” Gen. Refractories Co., 94 F. Supp. 3d at 655. 3 In the early 1980s, meetings between the plaintiffs’ bar, target defendants in asbestos-related litigation, and six major insurance carriers (including Aetna Casualty) were moderated by Harry Wellington, Dean of Yale Law School. As a result, a settlement process emerged which came to be ------------------------------------------------------------------------ or lawsuits . . . alleged to have been caused in whole or in part by any asbestos or asbestos-containing product”;
the expert testimony of Gene Locks, a lawyer who represented over 15,000
asbestos claimants and was the lead negotiator at the Wellington meetings, in which Locks explained that the terms “asbestos” and “asbestos-containing product” had distinct meanings to the parties involved in asbestos litigation during the relevant timeframe. Id. at 654–57.
On the other hand, Travelers contended that the only reasonable interpretation of the Asbestos Exclusion is that claims for injuries related to asbestos in any form were excluded. Travelers asserted that this is the “natural, plain, and ordinary meaning of the terms, ‘arising out of asbestos.’” Id. at 652–53. Thus, Travelers asserted that GRC’s losses associated with the underlying asbestos claims were precluded by the Asbestos Exclusion. For support, Travelers presented “GRC’s corporate records, as well [as] its communications with Travelers and its own insurance broker,” as evidence of “the parties’ intent to exclude—or their awareness, belief, or knowledge that the purchased insurance did exclude—all injuries related to asbestos in any form.” Id. at 656–57. --------------------------------------- known as the Wellington Agreement. Gen. Refractories Co., 94 F. Supp. 3d at 656.
After weighing the evidence and arguments, the District Court issued a memorandum and order concluding that the Asbestos Exclusion contained a latent ambiguity “because the terms [were] reasonably capable of being understood in more than one sense.” Id. at 660. The District Court agreed that GRC’s interpretation of “asbestos” as referring only to the raw mineral asbestos rather than other finished products containing asbestos was “consistent with the plain meaning of the written policy,” and therefore “objectively reasonable,” and that Travelers had not met its burden of showing that GRC’s interpretation was unreasonable. Id. Having found ambiguity, the District Court observed that GRC’s industry custom and trade usage evidence supported the assertion that “[d]uring the relevant era, industry participants used the phrase to denote losses arising from mining, milling, producing, processing, or manufacturing the raw mineral,” not from “finished products.” Id. at 663. The District Court found no evidence in the record contradicting this interpretation, and further rejected Travelers’ characterization of its course of performance evidence. Id. at 663–664. Ultimately, the District Court concluded that Travelers had failed to “show not only that its interpretation is reasonable, but also that GRC’s interpretation is not reasonable.” Id. at 664. Accordingly, the District Court deemed the Asbestos Exclusion unenforceable to preclude indemnification to GRC for its losses in the underlying asbestos-related lawsuits, and issued a memorandum and order to this effect. The parties subsequently stipulated that, under the District Court’s interpretation of the exclusion, Travelers must cover $21,000,000 of GRC’s losses—the combined limit of the two excess insurance policies. The District Court accepted this stipulation, awarded GRC an additional $15,273,705 in prejudgment interest, and entered final judgment for GRC. Travelers now appeals the District Court’s interpretation of the Asbestos Exclusion.
II.
The District Court had diversity jurisdiction over this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Pennsylvania contract law governs. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–80 (1938). In Pennsylvania, “[t]he interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of law.” Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baumhammers, 938 A.2d 286, 290 (Pa. 2007) (quoting Kvaerner Metals Div. of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 908 A.2d 888, 893 (Pa. 2006)). Thus, we engage in plenary review of the District Court’s determination. Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc. v. Pitterich, 805 F.2d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 1986). In the first instance, the insured bears the burden of demonstrating that its claim falls within the policy’s affirmative grant of coverage. Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 98 F.3d 1440, 1446 (3d Cir. 1996); Miller v. Boston Ins. Co., 218 A.2d 275, 277 (Pa. 1966). Where an insurer seeks to disclaim coverage on the basis of a policy exclusion—as Travelers does here—the insurer bears the burden of proving the applicability of the exclusion as an affirmative defense. Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 735 A.2d 100, 106 (Pa. 1999).
III.
We now review the District Court’s interpretation of the Asbestos Exclusion. In doing so, we must “ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the language of the written instrument.” Id. (quoting Gene & Harvey Builders v. Pa. Mfrs. Ass’n, 517 A.2d 910, 913 (Pa. 1986)). Thus, the language of the contract must be the “polestar” of our inquiry. Id. When the language is clear and unambiguous, we give effect to that language. Id. But when the language is ambiguous, the provision should “be construed in favor of the insured and against the insurer.” Id.
A.
We begin by deciding whether the language of the Asbestos Exclusion is ambiguous. Pac. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Glob. Reinsurance Corp. of Am., 693 F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Hutchison v. Sunbeam Coal Corp., 519 A.2d 385, 390 (Pa. 1986)). Ambiguity exists where the language of the contract is “reasonably susceptible of different constructions and capable of being understood in more than one sense.” Madison Constr. Co., 735 A.2d at 106 (quoting Hutchison, 735 A.2d at 390). After a bench trial, the District Court found the language of the Asbestos Exclusion to contain latent ambiguity. We disagree with the District Court’s penultimate conclusion because the Court’s analysis overlooked the phrase “arising out of,” which has an established, unambiguous meaning under Pennsylvania insurance law. The District Court properly began its analysis by determining whether the text of the Asbestos Exclusion, which precludes indemnification for “EXCESS NET LOSS arising out of asbestos,” was ambiguous. GRC had asserted that “asbestos” refers only to mineral asbestos in its raw, unprocessed form. Travelers, on the other hand, maintained that “asbestos” is a purposefully broad term which encompasses both asbestos in its raw form and products which contain asbestos—such as those manufactured and sold by GRC.
Driven by the parties’ arguments, the District Court largely focused on whether the word “asbestos” was reasonably susceptible of differing interpretations. After examining various dictionary definitions and grammatical uses of “asbestos,” it concluded that the term’s common usage “reveal[ed] a latent ambiguity as to what it denotes.” Gen. Refractories Co., 94 F. Supp. 3d at 658–59. Without deciding which of the parties’ views was more reasonable, the District Court found that both were consistent with the plain meaning of the language and objectively reasonable. Because “asbestos” was “reasonably capable of being understood in more than one sense,” the District Court held that the exclusion was ambiguous. Id. at 660.
While the District Court engaged in a thorough analysis of the breadth of the term “asbestos,” its focus was misplaced. The rest of the language at issue—“arising out of”—has an unambiguous legal meaning that renders any uncertainty concerning the meaning of the word “asbestos” immaterial. Pennsylvania courts have long construed the phrase “arising out of”—when used in the context of an insurance exclusion—to “[m]ean[] causally connected with, not proximately caused by.” McCabe v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 228 A.2d 901, 903 (1967); Forum Ins. Co. v. Allied Sec., Inc., 866 F.2d 80, 82 (3d Cir. 1989). A policy provision containing the phrase “arising out of” is satisfied by “‘[b]ut for’ causation, i.e., a cause and result relationship.” Mfrs. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Goodville Mut. Cas. Co., 170 A.2d 571, 573 (Pa. 1961).
Recognizing that Pennsylvania courts consistently interpret “arising out of” to require “but for” causation, we have previously observed that this formulation is “wellsettled,” having been applied in numerous insurance law contexts. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Squires, 667 F.3d 388, 391–92 (3d Cir. 2012). This understanding of the phrase is entrenched in Pennsylvania jurisprudence. See, e.g., Forum Ins. Co., 866 F.2d at 82 (holding that “arising out of” requires “but for” causation in the context of an exclusion for injury or death arising in the course of employment); Smith v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 572 A.2d 785, 787 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (requiring “but for” causation in interpreting an uninsured motorist provision); Erie Ins. Exch. v. Eisenhuth, 451 A.2d 1024, 1025 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (no-fault automobile insurance policy); Tuscarora Wayne Mut. Ins. Co. v. Kadlubosky, 889 A.2d 557, 563 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (commercial general liability insurance policy); Roman Mosaic & Tile Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 704 A.2d 665, 669 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (same). Not only have courts applying Pennsylvania law interpreted “arising out of” to require “but for” causation, they have also held that the phrase is unambiguous. See Madison Constr. Co., 735 A.2d at 110 (finding that “arising out of” language was not ambiguous); McCabe, 228 A.2d at 903 (same); see also Forum Ins. Co., 866 F.2d at 82 (relying on McCabe in rejecting an argument that a policy exclusion containing the phrase “arising out of . . . his employment” was ambiguous).
With this consistent interpretation in mind, we find that the plain language of the Asbestos Exclusion, disclaiming “EXCESS NET LOSS arising out of asbestos,” is unambiguous on its face and is not “reasonably susceptible of different constructions.” Madison Constr. Co., 735 A.2d at 106. The provision plainly encompasses losses that would not have occurred but for asbestos or which are causally connected to asbestos. Pennsylvania law permits no other interpretation.
B.
Although we find the language of the policy to be clear on its face, our inquiry does not immediately end when the plain meaning of the provision is unambiguous. Evidence of industry custom or trade usage “is always relevant and admissible in construing commercial contracts,” and does not depend on the existence of ambiguity in the contractual language. Sunbeam Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 781 A.2d 1189, 1193 (Pa. 2001). Where it can be shown that words have a special meaning or usage in a particular industry, “members of that industry are presumed to use the words in that special way, whatever the words mean in common usage and regardless of whether there appears to be any ambiguity in the words.” Id. In the course of arguing that “asbestos” had a separate and distinct meaning from “asbestos-containing products,” GRC presented industry custom and trade usage evidence which was ultimately credited by the District Court as supporting GRC’s narrow interpretation of the exclusion. Gen. Refractories Co., 94 F. Supp. 3d at 654–57. While GRC’s evidence may bear on the ambiguity of the word “asbestos,” it does not cloud the meaning of the phrase “arising out of.”4 GRC even agrees that “arising out of”
requires “but for” causation. In its brief, GRC explains that its proffered “interpretation of the Asbestos Exclusion itself utilizes a ‘but for’ causation standard.” (Appellee Br. at 32.) GRC clarifies that its argument has been that the Asbestos Exclusion “excludes losses related to (or ‘but for’) the mineral asbestos, as opposed to losses related to or ‘but for’ GRC’s asbestos-containing products.” (Appellee Br. at 32.) This argument by GRC incorrectly presumes that the meaning attached to “asbestos” would have a material effect on the outcome of this coverage dispute. But assigning “but for” causation to the phrase “arising out of” carries the important consequence of negating any material ambiguity that the term “asbestos” may introduce into the clause. Even the narrowest interpretation of “asbestos”—as referring only to raw mineral asbestos—leads to the conclusion that coverage for losses associated with the claims against GRC is disclaimed by the Asbestos Exclusion. While we express no opinion about whether the term “asbestos” is ambiguous here, if we were to credit GRC’s theory that “asbestos” only referred to mineral asbestos in its raw, unprocessed form—as the District Court did—the asbestos claims against GRC would still fall within the Asbestos Exclusion. The application of “but for” causation compels the conclusion that GRC’s losses are excluded under the policy as a matter of law. “But for” causation “requires the plaintiff to show ‘that the harm would not have occurred’ in the absence of—that is, but for—the defendant’s conduct.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2525 (2013) (citing Restatement (First) of Torts § 431 cmt. a (1934)); see also Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 366 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that “[c]ause in fact or ‘but for’ causation requires proof that the harmful result would not have come about but for the conduct of the defendant”); First v. Zem Zem Temple, 686 A.2d 18, 21 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (quoting E.J. Stewart, Inc. v. Aitken Prods., Inc., 607 F. Supp. 883, 889 (E.D. Pa. 1985)) (“Cause in fact or ‘but for’ causation provides that if the harmful result would not have come about but for the negligent conduct then there is a direct causal connection between the negligence and the injury.”). “But for” causation “is a de minimis standard of causation, under which even the most remote and insignificant force may be considered the cause of an occurrence.” Takach v. B.M. Root Co., 420 A.2d 1084, 1086 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
The claims that underlie this litigation stem from exposure to the asbestos incorporated into the finished products that GRC manufactured or sold. GRC “only paid settlements and incurred damages when the underlying claimants alleged exposure to GRC’s asbestos-containing products.” (Appellee Br. at 37; J.A. 36.) For each such settlement, a claimant was required to produce “sworn evidence of exposure to a GRC asbestos-containing product” and “medical verification of an asbestos-related disease.” (Appellee Br. at 5; J.A. 36.) GRC’s own expert, Gene Locks, testified that asbestos exposure is a necessary precursor to asbestos-related disease. (J.A. 316:18–21.) Locks further agreed that “[w]hatever disease [the asbestos plaintiffs] had would have been caused by whatever asbestos fiber they were exposed to, whether it came from the raw asbestos . . . or it was in the end product.” (J.A. 302:7–20.) This is true both of plaintiffs working in a profession that required exposure to raw asbestos—such as a miner or miller—and those who were exposed to asbestos-containing products. (Id.) Locks also testified that the fiber released from a product containing asbestos is “[t]he same fiber that’s ultimately milled.” (J.A. 303:6–9; see also id. at 302:21–303:5; 304:3–5; 304:18–20; 317:12–22 (stating that asbestos is contained within the end product).) It is clear that there is an appropriate causal connection between asbestos and the losses GRC suffered in asbestos litigation, and applying GRC’s narrow interpretation of “asbestos” as referring only to raw mineral asbestos does not affect the outcome. Even setting aside Lock’s testimony, there is no dispute that some of GRC’s products contain asbestos, that the plaintiffs in the underlying asbestos lawsuits were exposed to GRC’s asbestos-containing products, and that these plaintiffs allege injuries from asbestos-related diseases. These facts alone compel the conclusion that asbestos in its raw mineral form is causally connected to the losses GRC has incurred as a result of these lawsuits. But for the inclusion of asbestos in GRC’s products—which was originally mined or milled as a raw mineral—the plaintiffs exposed to those products would not have contracted asbestos-related diseases. In order to find that losses relating to exposure to asbestos-containing products are not causally connected to raw asbestos, we would need to assign a different standard of causation to the phrase “arising out of,” which is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the language in this Pennsylvania insurance exclusion.
C.
GRC finally contends that Travelers waived the causation argument by not raising it before the District Court. Appellate courts will generally refuse to consider issues that the parties did not raise below. Freeman v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 709 F.3d 240, 249 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976)). To preserve an argument, a party must “unequivocally put its position before the trial court at a point and in a manner that permits the court to consider its merits.” Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. United States, 182 F.3d 212, 218 (3d Cir. 1999). But while parties may not raise new arguments, they may “place greater emphasis” on an argument or “more fully explain an argument on appeal.” United States v. Joseph, 730 F.3d 336, 341 (3d Cir. 2013). The parties may even “reframe” their argument “within the bounds of reason.” Id. Travelers has argued throughout this litigation that GRC’s losses associated with asbestos claims “arise out of asbestos” because the claims were caused by exposure to the asbestos in GRC’s products. (See, e.g., Travelers’ Post-Trial Br. at 8, E.D. Pa. Docket No. 631; Travelers’ Proposed Findings of Fact at 9, E.D. Pa. Docket No. 630; Travelers’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 10–11, E.D. Pa. Docket No. 338; Travelers’ Reply Br. on Mot. for Summ. J. at 2, E.D. Pa. Docket No. 397.) The causal connection between the claims for which GRC seeks indemnification and asbestos in whatever form has been an integral part of Travelers’ argument as to why the Asbestos Exclusion is applicable. While Travelers has focused on this argument with greater specificity on appeal, the causation analysis required by the Asbestos Exclusion has always been at issue. GRC is correct that Travelers had never before specified that “arising out of” is legally synonymous with “but for” causation, but GRC also acknowledged that this theory is the “latest iteration of [Travelers’] argument that the claims are excluded by the ‘plain meaning’ of the Asbestos Exclusion.” (Appellee Br. at 20.) In GRC’s own words, Travelers has consistently “maintained that the ‘plain-meaning’ of the exclusion has only one reasonable interpretation to exclude claims relating to asbestos in any form.” (Appellee Br. at 22.) Travelers’ plain-meaning theory has always hinged on whether the underlying lawsuits were caused by asbestos. But even if Travelers’ argument had not been placed before the District Court, we would nonetheless consider it in reaching our conclusion. In “exceptional circumstances,” the “public interest can require that the issue be heard.” Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n of Se. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 671 (3d Cir. 1999). This is just such an occasion. The language found within this exclusion is prevalent in insurance contracts, and our interpretation may affect a wide range of insurers and insureds beyond the immediate parties to the suit. See Selected Risks Ins. Co. v. Bruno, 718 F.2d 67, 69–70 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that exceptional circumstances were present where proper application of Pennsylvania public policies with respect to insurance contracts would affect “every inhabitant . . . and the insurance companies that serve them”). The language in Travelers’ policies is far from unique; it is found in numerous Pennsylvania insurance policies that have been issued in the fifty years since the decision in Goodville established the meaning of “arising out of.” Were we to ignore the consistent and explicit meaning assigned to the phrase in Pennsylvania insurance exclusions, we would cast doubt on a tradition of interpretation that many parties have relied upon in defining their contractual obligations. Parties to an insurance contract must be able to place faith in consistent interpretations of common language when drafting their policies if they are to properly allocate the risks involved. While future parties may present evidence demonstrating a meaning of “arising out of” that is unique to their contract, the phrase is not ambiguous on its face when used in a Pennsylvania insurance contract.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the District Court’s judgment and remand with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Travelers. NOTES:
4 GRC explains that it “has offered custom and trade usage evidence to support its assertion that ‘asbestos’ and ‘asbestos-containing products’ were distinct terms and that ‘asbestos’ was not used to unambiguously subsume ‘asbestos-containing products.’” (Appellee Br. at 43 n.5, 44–45.) No mention is made of how the evidence bears on the meaning of “arising out of.” =====================
3rd Circ. Set To Decide If Asbestos Exclusion Is Enforceable
By Jeff Sistrunk
Law360, Los Angeles (September 8, 2016, 3:32 PM EDT) --
The Third Circuit is set to hear oral arguments Friday on whether a
common exclusion for asbestos-related claims in a Travelers insurance
policy is ambiguous and therefore unenforceable in a case that could
have a broad impact on insurers' liabilities for litigation over the
toxic mineral. Here, Law360 reviews the history of the case in advance
of the hearing. What's at Stake
The Third Circuit has been asked to review a Pennsylvania district
court's decision that Travelers Surety & Casualty Co. cannot enforce
a policy exclusion for claims "arising out of asbestos" to deny
coverage to policyholder General Refractories Co. for scores of lawsuits
brought by plaintiffs who allege they were injured by exposure to
asbestos contained in the company's fire-resistant industrial products.
The lower court held that the exclusion was ambiguous, and therefore
unenforceable, because GRC had reasonably argued that the language of
the exclusion applies only to asbestos in its raw form, not products
incorporating the mineral.
A pair of insurance industry groups, the American Insurance Association
and Complex Insurance Claims Litigation Association, warned in an
amicus brief that the district court's ruling flouts the commonly
accepted meaning of the term "asbestos" and could unfairly put insurers
on the hook for asbestos injury claims that they clearly meant to
exclude from coverage.
Moreover, the groups said, a decision by the Third Circuit affirming the
lower court could give policyholders a foothold to challenge the
enforcement of other unambiguous exclusions for risks tied to harmful
substances.
"Asbestos exclusions are not the only exclusions that are tied to a
known harmful substance. Such exclusions are designed to broadly bar
coverage for all harms associated with that substance," the insurance
groups argued. "A decision by this court indicating that this is not the
case could have seriously troubling implications for numerous other
insurance provisions."
On the other hand, nonprofit policyholder advocacy group United
Policyholders said in its own amicus brief that the lower court's
decision was consistent with precedent requiring courts to resolve any
ambiguities in policy language in favor of the insured.
"It is not for this court now — or for any court — to rewrite these
policies to contain an exclusion (i.e., an asbestos-containing products
exclusion) which was available to Travelers but which Travelers chose
not to incorporate in the policies," United Policyholders contended.
An attorney for GRC and a Travelers spokesman did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
How We Got Here
GRC has been locked in a decadelong battle to obtain coverage from
Travelers and its other insurance carriers for tens of thousands of
claims brought by plaintiffs who say they were injured after being
exposed to the company's asbestos-containing products. The company
previously settled with all the other insurers involved in the
litigation.
The asbestos exclusion in the Travelers policies eliminates coverage for
amounts that GRC becomes legally obligated to pay for injuries or loss
arising out of asbestos.
Travelers contended that the exclusion is subject to only one reasonable
interpretation — that claims for injuries related to asbestos in any
form are excluded from coverage. GRC countered that the term "asbestos"
plainly connotes the physical substance in its raw form, which the
company did not produce.
During a November 2014 bench trial before U.S. District Judge L. Felipe
Restrepo, GRC presented evidence indicating that it was standard
practice in the insurance industry between the late 1970s and 1985 to
distinguish between claims stemming from direct exposure to asbestos
fibers and exposure to asbestos-containing products.
From 1978 to 1985, Travelers itself used a different asbestos exclusion
in policies sold to other insureds, GRC asserted. That exclusion barred
coverage for bodily injury arising out of asbestos, "whether or not the
asbestos is airborne as a fiber or particle, contained in a product,
carried on clothing or transmitted in any fashion whatsoever," according
to court papers.
In March 2015, Judge Restrepo found that GRC had set forth a reasonable
interpretation of the asbestos exclusion, without ruling on which
party's interpretation was more reasonable. As such, the judge
determined that the exclusion is ambiguous and must be construed in
GRC's favor.
After the district judge issued his ruling, GRC and Travelers decided to
forgo a trial over damages and stipulated to cap the insurer's
potential payout at $21 million. Judge Restrepo tacked on an additional
$15.3 million to that sum in September 2015, and Travelers appealed to
the Third Circuit the following month.
Travelers' Stance
The insurer contended in briefs filed with the appellate court that
Judge Restrepo erred in applying a strict causation requirement between
raw mineral asbestos and the injuries alleged in the suits against GRC.
Instead, Travelers said, Third Circuit and Pennsylvania Supreme Court
precedent have firmly established that the phrase "arising out of" calls
for the looser "but-for" causation standard. Applying that standard to
GRC's case, it is impossible to say that the underlying claims did not
result from the inhalation of asbestos fibers in the company's products,
according to the insurer.
Furthermore, the lower court impermissibly narrowed the "unambiguously
broad" term "asbestos" to encompass only the raw, relatively unprocessed
form of the mineral, Travelers said.
"The Travelers exclusion precludes coverage for all injuries 'arising
out of asbestos,' and does not further limit the term 'asbestos,'" the
insurer argued. "It was error for the district court to nonetheless
interpret the exclusion to apply only to asbestos fibers released during
the process of milling, mining and manufacturing raw mineral asbestos."
GRC's Stance
GRC shot back that its outside evidence of insurance industry customs
and practices showed that asbestos exclusions broader than the one
included in the Travelers policies existed in the marketplace back in
the late 1970s and early 1980s.
According to GRC, if Travelers had intended to exclude coverage for
claims related to all risks involving asbestos, including those "arising
from asbestos-containing products," the insurer would have included
language to that effect in its policies.
"Because, under Pennsylvania law, Travelers was required but has failed
to establish that its exclusion was clear, exact and unambiguous for the
exclusion to be given effect, this court should affirm the district
court's ruling," GRC contended.
Counsel
General Refractories is represented by Michael Conley and Meghan Finnerty of Offit Kurman and Howard J. Bashman of Law Offices of Howard J. Bashman.
Travelers is represented by Samuel Arena Jr., Daniel Fitch and William Mandia of Stradley Ronon Stevens & Young LLP and Theodore Boutrous Jr., Richard Doren, Blaine Evanson and Cameron Kistler of Gibson Dunn.
United Policyholders is represented by John N. Ellison and Lisa A. Szymanski of Reed Smith LLP and in-house counsel Amy Bach.
The insurance industry amici are represented by Laura Foggan of Wiley Rein LLP.
The case is General Refractories Co. v. First State Insurance Co., case number 15-3409, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Qantas to investigate foam alternatives after Brisbane hangar spill
April 21, 2017 by australianaviation.com.au File image of a (now-retired) Qantas 767 landing at Brisbane Airport with one of the airline’s maintenance hangars in the background. (Rob Finlayson)
Qantas says it is investigating the use of alternative fire retardants after a foam spill at one of its Brisbane Airport maintenance hangars on Sunday evening.
The hangar’s sprinkler system released a reported 22,000 litres of PFOA fire retardant foam, some of which entered a nearby creek. The spill saw the Queensland Government issue a public warning to not eat seafood caught near the airport.
The Queensland Government banned the use of PFOA foam last year, but Brisbane Airport is covered by federal government regulations as it is on Commonwealth-owned land.
“While the foam we use in Brisbane meets our current requirements under federal safety regulations, we have been working through a process to replace it with a type that meets the Queensland Government’s updated requirements,” Qantas said in a statement on its website on Thursday evening.
“There are few fire retardant products available around the world that meet aviation standards for use in an aircraft hangar. We are working as quickly as possible to replace it,” Qantas said.
The federal government, meanwhile, says it is investigating transitional arrangements to firefighting foams that do not include PFAS substances such as PFOA and PFOS.
“While it is known PFAS can persist for a long time, there is no consistent evidence that PFAS exposure is harmful to human health,” Minister for Infrastructure Darren Chester said in a statement on Friday.
“The government is considering management options for PFOS and PFOA transitional removal from use, improved management and appropriate disposal of PFOS-containing firefighting foams at all facilities in Australia, consistent with the listing of the chemical under the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants,” he said.
Queensland Environment Minister Steven Miles has called for the Commonwealth to ban the use of firefighting foams containing PFOA and PFOS.
“As we are not the regulator of Commonwealth-controlled sites such as Brisbane Airport, our ban doesn’t apply to Qantas,” Miles said in a statement on Thursday.
“As a result of the foam spill from a Qantas hangar at Brisbane Airport last week, Brisbane residents have been put at risk, which is a position that could have been prevented,” the Minister asserted.
“What I want to know is why one of the country’s largest and most reputable companies is still using firefighting foams containing PFOS and PFOA right here on our doorstep?”
Queensland introduced its PFOS and PFOA foam ban in July 2016 after they were linked to ground water contamination surrounding the Army Aviation Centre at Oakey, near Toowoomba, while in June 2016 the federal government announced it would spend $65 million remediating chemical contamination from firefighting foam at Oakey and RAAF Base Williamtown.
PFOS (perfluorooctane sulfonate) and PFOA (perfluorooctanoic acid) are per- and poly-fluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) that have been commonly used in firefighting foams. While media reports label PFAS as “toxic”, the federal government has said there is, at least as yet, no proven link between PFAS contamination and problems to human health.
“Whether PFOS or PFOA cause health problems in humans is currently unknown, but on current evidence from studies in animals the potential for adverse health effects cannot be excluded. Because the elimination of PFASs from the human body is slow there is a risk that continued exposure to PFOS and PFOA could cause adverse health effects,” a June 2016 federal government factsheet on PFASs notes.
Meanwhile, Qantas says it is investigating the cause of the foam spill.
“Together with the state and federal governments and Brisbane Airport, we’re acting to understand the impact of the spill and are not able to draw any conclusions until the investigation is complete,” the airline’s statement reads.
“We appreciate there are members of the community who are concerned, and we are responding as quickly as we can to determine the extent of any pollution and are committed to keeping all stakeholders updated through the process.”
A screengrab from Google Maps shows the Tuscarawas River just outside of Navarre, Ohio.
Energy Transfer Partners, the Texas-based pipeline operator that owns the controversial Dakota Access Pipeline, is coming under renewed scrutiny for two spills that released more than 2 million gallons of drilling fluid into Ohio wetlands earlier this month.
A violation notice made public this week indicates about 50,000 gallons of drilling fluid — a thick gel-like substance used to cut through rock during pipeline construction — was released near Richland County, Ohio. The spill was discovered April 14, according to the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency. An estimated 2 million gallons spilled in another incident discovered April 13 near the Tuscarawas River south of Navarre. Both spills were connected to the company’s construction of the Rover Pipeline, a $4.2 billion dollar project that will route through Ohio, Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Michigan and Ontario, Canada.
Energy Transfer Partners said the Richland County leak has been completely cleaned up.
“We are currently working to complete the cleanup at the other site in Stark County and anticipate returning to construction shortly,” Alexis Daniel, a spokesperson for Energy Transfer Partners, told NewsHour.
Daniel said the leak was “not harmful to the environment,” but an Ohio Environmental Protection Agency filing notes the spills “impacted water quality.” Both spills contain “bentonite,” a mineral used to help cat litter clump when it gets wet and does not break down easily in water, making it difficult to remove large clumps from aquifers.
After this story was published, the Ohio EPA told NewsHour the Richland County and Stark County Rover pipeline releases of bentonite clay mud have been contained; cleanup is ongoing, according to a spokesman
Construction on the Rover Pipeline began two weeks ago after the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), which controls the natural gas industry, granted Energy Transfer Partners a permit in February.
The Sierra Club is calling for the halt of the Energy Transfer Rover, saying the two spills “prove that the fossil fuel industry is unable to even put a pipeline into use before it spills dangerous chemicals into our precious waterways and recreation areas.”
The Dakota Access Pipeline was halted by the Obama administration after concerns from Standing Rock Sioux and other Native American tribes said the pipeline threatened tribal drinking water.
Three days into his presidency, Trump reinstated DAPL, which is now laid underneath Lake Oahe.
Energy Transfer CEO Kelcy Warren told NewsHour pipeline approvals would happen after Inauguration Day. Trump, considered friendly to the oil and gas industry, said he planned to expedite environmental reviews — including the one that allowed DAPL to move forward Trump also gave the green light to the Keystone XL pipeline, a project Obama had also rejected in 2015.
“The process is so long and cumbersome that they give up before the end. Sometimes it takes many, many years and we don’t want that to happen,” Trump said while signing an executive order in January.
Democratic lawmakers, including Massachusetts Sens. Elizabeth Warren and Ed Markey, are urging the government step in to stop construction of other FERC approved pipelines across the country.
======= ROVER PIPELINE LLC
Rover Pipeline LLC (Rover) is a new interstate natural gas pipeline company designed to transport natural gas from processing facilities located in the prolific Marcellus and Utica Shale areas to market hubs that can reach Midwest, Gulf Coast, Canadian, and U.S. Northeast markets.
Rover Pipeline Project
The Rover Pipeline is designed to transport 3.25 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf\day) of natural gas through approximately 710 miles of 24-inch, 30-inch, 36-inch and 42-inch pipeline. Rover Pipeline will build four mainline compressor stations, six supply lateral compressor stations and other ancillary facilities along its route. Additionally, the Rover Pipeline Project will construct a pipeline segment from the Midwest Hub in Defiance County, Ohio area through Michigan to an interconnection with Vector Pipeline thereby enabling deliveries to additional points in Michigan and to the Union Gas Dawn Hub in Ontario, Canada.
A young worker died after "being exposed to electricity" Thursday morning at a house in Shadyside, a Pittsburgh Public Safety spokeswoman said.
The victim was identified as Dakota Marshall, 21, of Ford City. He was with Ski Masonry, a masonry restoration specialist business out of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. An autopsy will determine the official cause of death. Pittsburgh police and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration were investigating.
A neighbor on Morewood Avenue said masons were working on the home's chimney, which is next to power lines. She saw first responders treating the victim on a scaffold before bringing the man down to take him to a hospital, where he died a little more than an hour later.
The scaffolding was so close to the electrical lines that Duquesne Light crews had to be called in to remove the scaffolding.
The house is empty while the owner, who does not live in Pennsylvania, is having work done on the home so it can be sold, the neighbor said.
SKI MASONRY
Business Description Ski Masonry is located in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. This organization primarily operates in the Masonry and other Stonework business / industry within the Construction - Special Trade Contractors sector. This organization has been operating for approximately 5 years. Ski Masonry is estimated to generate $93,000 in annual revenues, and employs approximately 2 people at this single location.
Contact Information Ski Masonry
442 Mower Dr Pittsburgh, PA 15239
Contact: Jeffrey Dzikowski Title: Principal Phone: 412-758-1772
Contact Information
5037 Bahama Drive , Pittsburgh, PA 412-758-1772
Ski Masonry
5037 Bahama Drive, Pittsburgh, PA 15239
Phone: (412) 758-1772
Service: Masonry, Restoration
HIC #: PA091168
Status: Active
Type: Masonry Restoration, Brick Stone And Block Pointing, Brick And Stone Cleaning, Chimney Repair, Brick Stone And Block Laying, More. We Can Match Mortar Color And Texture Better Than Anyone
Verified: Status:Verify Date:August, 2015 Source:Pennsylvania Office of the Attorney General
Ski Masonry Overview
No overviews for Ski Masonry yet.
Reviews
No reviews for Ski Masonry yet. Permits (2)
2223 Murray Ave, Pittsburgh, PA 15217
Date: Jun 10, 2015
Permit type: Residential
Description: Masonry repairs rebuild chimney and relay coping stones
14-year veteran FDNY firefighter dies after fall in Ridgewood, Queens
Eyewitness News Thursday, April 20, 2017 11:27PM RIDGEWOOD, Queens (WABC) -- A 14-year veteran firefighter of the FDNY fell to his death while battling a fire at an apartment building in Queens Thursday.
The routine fire call came in at 2:20 p.m. Fire was burning in the second floor of 1615 Putnam Avenue, a five-story apartment building just off Wyckoff Avenue in Ridgewood.
Firefighter William Tolley, 42, of Bethpage, responded with Ladder 135. FDNY officials said he and other firefighters were on the roof to help ventilate the upper floors of the building, when Tolley somehow lost his balance and fell off.
"I feel sad for his family, because I saw everything," said Norberto Arellano, an eyewitness.
The fire truck's ladder was extended to the roof, and the firefighters were moving between the bucket and the roof at the time. Multiple eyewitnesses say the tower ladder suddenly jerked.
PHOTOS: Firefighter killed in the line of duty
FDNY Firefighter William Tolley, 42, of Bethpage, New York Though, a witness said he was exiting the roof and was in the process of hooking his safety line when the truck moved for some reason, causing the ladder to rock and throwing the firefighter off balance.
"The ladder shake, when it was up in the air, it shake, he lost his balance," said Edwin Rivera, an eyewitness.
They watched in horror as the veteran firefighter lost his footing and plunged to his death.
Tolley was rushed to Wyckoff Heights Medical Center in Bushwick, Brooklyn, in critical condition. He died a short time later.
"Hearing the impact, you knew he couldn't survive that. It just sounded like a very big bang," said Angie Cordero, an eyewitness.
The fire, which a city official characterized as a relatively minor second-alarm fire, was placed under control at 3 p.m. with three other minor injuries.
"There was nothing about the fire that really had anything to do with the accident that occurred," FDNY Commissioner Daniel Nigro said. "It was really in the operation he was performing on the roof, which is a routine operation for us, and somehow he fell from the roof."
There was no immediate answer for how such a normal, practiced maneuver could go so wrong. Investigators spent hours on the scene searching for a reason.
But for now, there's just shock after one of New York's Bravest lost his life, in the blink of an eye.
Tolley is survived by his wife, Marie; 8-year-old daughter, Isabella; brother, Bobby; and both of his parents. He spent his entire FDNY career with Ladder 135.
Mayor de Blasio and fire officials arrived at the hospital late Thursday afternoon, shortly after the incident. They spoke about Tolley and the incident.
"To his family we say, we stand with you, not only today, but the days ahead and for years to come," de Blasio said.
Thoughts & prayers from all #NYPD are with the men & women of @FDNY following line-of-duty firefighter death today in Queens. Rest in peace.
The last firefighter killed in the line of duty was Deputy Chief Michael Fahy, who died in an explosion at a marijuana grow house in the Bronx on September 27, 2016.
FDNY Commissioner Daniel Nigro held a plaque ceremony earlier Thursday adding Fahy to the list of names on the department's Memorial Wall.
