MEC&F Expert Engineers : 12/06/18

Thursday, December 6, 2018

BOMBSHELL: PASSAIC COUNTY SHERIFF USED VOID WRIT TO EVICT HOMEOWNER WHO OWED NO TAXES. AMERICAN TAX FUNDING, LLC, MATTHEW MARINI, KEITH BONCHI, ROBERT DEL VECCHIO, COLDWELL BANKER REALTORS, BMO CAPITAL MARKETS CORP. ARE CHARGED WITH CIVIL CONSPIRACY AND CIVIL RICO


____________________________________________________________
December 6, 2018

William T. Walsh
Clerk, United States District Court
District of New Jersey
M.L. King, Jr. Federal Building & U.S. Court House
50 Walnut Street
Room 4015
Newark, New Jersey 07101-0999
Tel.: 973-645-3730

THE HONORABLE JOHN MICHAEL VAZQUEZ
United States District Judge
Lautenberg U.S. Post Office & Courthouse
2 Federal Square, Room 417
Newark, New Jersey 07102
Tel.: 973-297-4851/973-645-2157(Deputy Clerk)
njdnef_vazquez@njd.uscourts.gov

RE:     PLAINTIFF’S REPLY BRIEF TO PASSAIC COUNTY AND WAYNE TOWNSHIP DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO ALLOW THE FILING OF AN AMENDED COMPLAINT
CIVIL ACTION COMPLAINT FOR COMPENSATORY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Civil Action No. 02:12-cv-01793 (JMV-JBC)

Dear Judge Vazquez:
Plaintiff, Basilis N. Stephanatos, PhD, JD, (“Plaintiff”, “Dr. Stephanatos”, “Stephanatos”) appearing pro se, respectfully files this reply brief to Passaic County and Wayne Township Defendants’ opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Relief from the October 16, 2018 Order, pursuant to rules 60(b)(2), (3), (5) and (6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  Herein, Plaintiff also includes his First Amended Complaint.
BOMBSHELL EVIDENCE DISCOVERED LAST WEEK: THE WRIT WAS VOID AB INITIO AND THE ATF, LLC AND PASSAIC COUNTY DEFENDANTS LIED AND CONCEALED THIS EVIDENCE FROM THE COURT TO STEPHANATOS’ DETRIMENT; IGNORANCE OR MISTAKE IS NOT A DEFENSE TO A WRONGFUL EVICTION.  THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS START TO RUN FROM THE DATE THE INJURY WAS DISCOVERED
As Plaintiff provided in his November 27, 2018 submittal, the ex-parte writ of possession was void ab initio because the Clerk of the Superior Court had no jurisdiction to enter the writ of possession the same day as the date of judgment on May 13, 2011.  This evidence was discovered last week by the Plaintiff.  Thus, under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations started to run upon the discovery that the writ was void and the actions of the Defendants was unlawful, violating Stephanatos’ Fourth and Fourteenth amendment constitutional rights. Soldal v. Cook County. 
It is a fact that the Defendants and their lawyers have been concealing, fraudulently, from this Court, from Judge Hochberg and from the state courts that the writ was void ab initio for many years to Stephanatos’ detriment.  There are consequences for lying to a judge and fraudulent concealing that the writ was void ab initio.  Thus, the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment doctrines both toll the statute of limitations.  See Williams, et al., v. BASF Catalysts LLC, No. 13-1089 (3rd Cir. 2014)
We conclude that the District Court erred when it dismissed the fraud and fraudulent concealment claims. The Amended Class Action Complaint properly alleges the elements of fraud and fraudulent concealment—namely that BASF lied about and destroyed the asbestos evidence to plaintiffs’ detriment. Neither the New Jersey litigation privilege nor pleading requirements stand in the way of these claims.”
See also Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 14-0826 (2d Cir. 2016), upholding the RICO judgment against lawyers who filled fraudulent evidence with the courts.  The Donziger district court concluded that Donziger and the LAPs' team of attorneys, investors, experts, and consultants constituted a RICO enterprise, and that Donziger had conducted the affairs of that enterprise in a pattern of racketeering activity. Having found that Donziger "and the Ecuadorian lawyers he led," in representing the LAPs, "corrupted the Lago Agrio case" by “submitting fraudulent evidence”, “coercing one judge”, telling “half-truths or worse to U.S. Courts in attempts to prevent exposure of wrongdoings”. 
Plaintiff alleges herein that similar to Donziger, the Defendants have:
·         submitted fraudulent evidence,
·         they have coerced state and federal judges and the Clerk of the Superior Court in New Jersey into issuing unlawful or void orders,
·         telling half-truths,
·         misleading the courts regarding the applicable law,
·         fraudulently concealing crucial facts from the courts (such the void ab inito writ of possession issued without jurisdiction by the Clerk of the Superior Court),
·         concealing the applicable law from the courts, and so on. 
The number of illegal acts of the Defendants is so great that perhaps has made Judge Vazquez’s head spinning.
The Clerk-issued ex-parte writ was in violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-57  The New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled under almost identical fact pattern (i.e., the issuance of an ex-parte judgment for possession without any notice to quit and the issuance of a writ of possession the same day the judgment was entered without any notice), in HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF WILDWOOD v. Hayward, et al., 406 A.2d 1318, 81 N.J. 311 (1979) the following:
Even if the judgment had been entered lawfully (we hold it was not), the clerk had no *316 jurisdiction to issue the warrant of removal the same day the judgment was entered. N.J.S.A. 2A:18-57 provides that in summary dispossess proceedings "[n]o warrant of removal shall issue until the expiration of 3 days after entry of judgment for possession."
The above statute and case law has been available for more than 50 years in New Jersey.  Thus, the ATF, LLC and Passaic County Defendants were aware of the law prior to trespassing onto Stephanatos’ residence.  A reasonable person in the position of the Defendants should have known that they cannot execute a void writ without violating Stephanatos’ constitutional rights (Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights), as they were trespassers in the eyes of the law.
AN UNLAWFUL EVICTION VIOLATES THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: SOLDAL V. COOK COUNTY, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992).  CURRENTLY BOTH DR. STEPHANATOS AND HIS PERSONAL PROPERTY HAVE BEEN SEIZED BY THE PASSAIC COUNTY DEFENDANTS AND THIS CONSTITUTES A CONTINUED VIOLATION.  THEREFORE, THE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS HAVE NOT RUN AND/OR HAVE BEEN TOLLED
An unlawful eviction (as the one performed here using the void ex-parte writ and the void ex-parte judgment for possession) can violate both the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (holding the seizure of property violates the Fourth Amendment); United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 62 (1993) (holding, absent exigent circumstances, due process entitles a homeowner to notice and an opportunity to be heard before seizure of real property); Thomas v. Cohen, 304 F.3d 563, 576 (2002) (finding an illegal eviction clearly violated the Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures). 
In fact, Dr. Stephanatos’ many personal and business property items are currently seized and retained by the Passaic County Sheriff in their headquarters in Wayne, New Jersey.  Dr. Stephanatos has been also seized for the last 7.5 years and counting because the criminal charges against him are still pending, he cannot find employment due to the pending charges and the damage to his name and reputation, and his movements are limited.  Thus, based on that ground as well (the continued seizure of his person and property that give rise to the continued violation doctrine), the statutes of limitations have not run and/or have been tolled.
UNDER NEW JERSEY LAW, THE SHERIFF HAD NO LEGAL AUTHORITY TO FORCIBLY REMOVE STEPHANATOS FROM HIS RESIDENCE WITHOUT VIOLATING THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS
Because the writ was void ab initio, any person or entity executing that writ was no more than a trespasser in the eyes of the New Jersey law (“if the sheriff had no authority under procedurally defective writ of execution, he could not, of his own volition, assume the authority to post and sell the subject realty” Mushback v. Ryerson, 11 N.J.L. 346, 351 (Sup.Ct.1830)), (“The proceeding is not simply void for some irregularity, but was void ab initio, for the want of jurisdiction, so the Plaintiff get into possession by an abuse of the process of the law. Can the Court countenance an abuse of the process of the law, by permitting the Plaintiff to retain the fruit of their wrongful act? The only mode to prevent such abuses of judicial process is to put the parties in statu quo. Perry v. Tupper, 70 N.C. 537 (N.C. 1874).)”).  Consistent with these court commands, Stephanatos is asking this Court to put him in the statu quo prior to the forceful taking of his property.  As the Court can see, these laws have been in existence for almost 200 years.  The New Jersey law also allows this Court to award punitive damages and triple damages as well.
A recent New Jersey Court decision that is also on point: Borromeo v. DIFLORIO, 976 A.2d 388 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009)
First, if the initial writ were void, any execution relying upon its apparent authority was not justified and cannot be sustained.   See Ryerson, supra, 11 N.J.L. at 352 (if the sheriff had no authority under procedurally defective writ of execution, he could not, of his own volition, assume the authority to post and sell the subject realty).   Issuance of the writ to the Mercer County Sheriff placed in the hands of the Somerset County Sheriff was as if there were no writ at all.   In posting the misdirected writ, the Somerset County Sheriff was no more than a trespasser on Migliaccio's property.
Because the Somerset County Sheriff had no authority when he posted the defective writ, the defective execution cannot be remedied by the Sheriff's receipt of an amended writ.   If the writ is  void, the levy is void.   A new writ must issue, and the process must begin anew.

No one disputes the initial writ was defective.   The question for our consideration is what effect results from misdirecting the writ to the Mercer County Sheriff.   We locate no authority determining to the precise issue of whether a misdirection in a writ of execution renders the writ void or merely voidable.   In answering this question, our review must begin with an examination of the language of the applicable statute.
In pertinent part, N.J.S.A. 2A:17-1 states:
In every writ of execution which shall be issued against real estate, the sheriff or other officer to whom such writ may be directed shall be commanded that he cause to be made, the whole or the residue, of such debt, damages and  costs or sum of money to be made of the real estate whereof such party was seized on the day when such real estate became liable to such debt[.]
[Emphasis added.]
Considering the plain language of the statute, Kimmelman v. Henkels & McCoy, Inc., 108 N.J. 123, 128, 527 A.2d 1368 (1987), a sheriff's authority to sell property located in the county to satisfy a judgment lien is granted solely by a valid writ of execution.  Mushback v. Ryerson, 11 N.J.L. 346, 351 (Sup.Ct.1830);  Stability Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Liebowitz, 132 N.J. Eq. 477, 479, 28 A.2d 653 (Ch.1942).   The writ is the equivalent of a court order, which grants a sheriff authority he otherwise does not possess, to enter the land of another.  Ibid.
“[A]t common law, no lien was acquired by a judgment.”  Sisco v. N.J. Bank, N.A., 158 N.J.Super. 111, 117, 385 A.2d 890 (App.Div.1978).   Thus, the statute that allows a sheriff's sale of real estate to satisfy a debt markedly departs from common law.  Vanderveere v. Gaston, 24 N.J.L. 818, 820 (E. & A. 1854);  Warwick v. Hunt, 11 N.J.L. 1, 7 (Sup.Ct.1829).   With this in mind, courts construing the legislative intent have required strict compliance with the statutory requirements.   See Chaffers, supra, 24 N.J.L. at 511 (“The only safe course is to pursue the directions, and to obey the command of the statute.”);  Gaston, supra, 24 N.J.L. at 821 (“recording of an execution against lands [is] an essential element in giving validity to the writ, as an authority for the officer to levy and make sale.”).  “[I]n New Jersey it has been the established principle, making lands liable to be sold for the payment of debts, that the right of the sheriff to sell and convey lands, is a mere naked power, so that to render a title under his deed available, every requisite of the law must be shown to have been complied with[.]”  Todd v. Philhower, 24 N.J.L. 796, 800 (E. & A. 1854).
From these authorities, we conclude the requirements in the statute are not merely directory but mandatory, such that the failure to comply with a statutory provision affects subsequent actions.   Examining this matter, we do not agree with Migliaccio  that the error presented-directing the writ to the Sheriff of one county (Mercer) for execution and process of realty purportedly located in that county, but actually delivering the writ to the Sheriff of another county (Somerset) for execution and process of realty located therein-falls within the category of “clerical error.”   The misdirection is more than a purely technical mistake.   We conclude the error is substantive and deprives the sheriff of all authority to take any action.
 Clerical errors include misspellings, Black v. Seabrook Assocs., Ltd., 298 N.J.Super. 630, 637, 690 A.2d 142 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 149 N.J. 409, 694 A.2d 194 (1997);  administrative mistakes, Playmates Toys v. Dir., Div. of Tax., 162 N.J. 186, 187, 742 A.2d 968 (1999);  typographical errors and errors in transposing, H.G.K.W. Corp. v. East Brunswick Tp., 8 N.J. Tax 454, 462 (Tax 1986);  or mathematical miscalculations, McNair v. McNair, 332 N.J.Super. 195, 199, 753 A.2d 147 (App.Div.2000);  Lockwood v. Walsh, 137 N.J. Eq. 445, 450, 45 A.2d 305 (Prerog.Ct.1946);  see also R. 1:13 (“Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight and omission may at any time be corrected by the court[.]”).

Stephanatos provides herein many instances of deliberate lies to the courts where the lawyers of the Defendants certified (i.e., swore under oath) that all proper procedures required by state law were used in the issuance of the ex-parte possession judgment, in the issuance of the ex-parte writ of possession, the entering into a residential property occupied by the person in possession as a residence, and the forceful taking of Stephanatos’ home on June 28, 2011 using a void writ.  Justice has not and cannot be served under these circumstances.  These Defendants have been lying to the courts for years.  Their arguments in opposition are nothing more than frivolous gibberish as New Jersey courts require no hyper-technical compliance with the statutes of limitations.
THE ANTITRUST AND CIVIL RICO CONSPIRATORS CONTINUE TO CONCEAL THEIR CONSPIRACY AND RACKETEERING ACTIVITIES TO THIS DATE, AS THEY HAVE BEEN DENYING THAT THEY BROKE ANY FEDERAL AND STATE LAWS.  THEREFORE, THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAS NOT RUN.
The ATF Defendants willfully and corruptly intended to enter into a criminal and fraudulent transaction through the anti-trust and RICO conspiracies using the USPS mail (sending letters and briefs to the courts and the Plaintiff, mailing checks) and the wires (wire transfers of ill-gotten gains, telephone calls, email, internet, faxes) to commit their fraud against Stephanatos.
Its existence against the Plaintiff and thousands of New Jersey homeowners was determined and confirmed by the federal judge Michael A. Shipp in the federal antitrust case IN RE NEW JERSEY TAX SALES CERTIFICATES ANTITRUST LITIGATION, Master Docket No. 3:12-CV-01893-MAS-TJB  (see http://www.njtaxliensettlements.com/
 and by the conviction of at least 15 individuals and entities in New Jersey, including Passaic County, by the U.S. Attorney’s Office (See https://www.fbi.gov/newark/press-releases/2014/former-new-york-tax-liens-investment-company-executive-pleads-guilty-to-role-in-bid-rigging-scheme-at-municipal-tax-lien-auctions
Both the Robert U. Del Vecchio, Sr. (now deceased) and Robert A. Del Vecchio, Jr. are accused of being participants in the antitrust conspiracy.  They are both active in the tax lien business, they are both lawyers, they are related by blood (father and son), and they both share common place of business and place of residence in Hawthorn, Passaic County, New Jersey.  The Del Vecchios also established similar “pension plans” to hide their ill-gotten gains, such as the Robert Del Vecchio Pension Plan, LLC.  The Pension plans will be added as Defendants in this action to recover the millions in damages caused by the Del Vecchios.  Robert Del Vecchio, Sr. has pleaded guilty to a felony charge in Federal Court in Newark on September 30, 2013.
According to the court documents, Del Vecchio, Sr. and Michael Mastellone, of Cedar Knolls, New Jersey were involved in the conspiracy with others not to bid against one another at municipal tax lien auctions in New Jersey or to do mock biddings on select liens that were of small amounts and would refrain from bidding on the premium phase of the bidding. Since the conspiracy permitted the conspirators to purchase tax liens with limited competition, each conspirator was able to obtain liens that earned a higher interest rate or lower paid premium to the municipality or through the monopoly would obtain rights for charging the highest possible interest rate (18 percent) for all subsequent liens without any bidding on the subsequent liens. Property owners were therefore made to pay higher interest on their tax debts than they would have paid had their liens been purchased in open and honest competition, the department said.
Robert A. Del Vecchio, Esq. an attorney at law of Hawthorn, New Jersey provided false certifications to the Office of Foreclosure that this was an uncontested case, despite the fact that Stephanatos had fully contested this case; this way, Del Vecchio managed to circumvent the Anti-Eviction Act, the Summary Dispossess Act of New Jersey and fooled the Acting Law Clerk, Jennifer Perez, and the Office of Foreclosure into issuance of an ex-parte judgment for possession and an ex-parte writ of possession.  Del Vecchio also made false representations to this Court that Stephanatos had no possessory interests and that there are no tenants or residents on the property that must be protected by the Anti-Eviction Act and/or the Summary Dispossess Act, when in fact Metropolitan Environmental Services, a business owned by Stephanatos, and Metropolitan Engineering Services, PC were tenants in the premises.  Del Vecchio also fraudulently certified to the Chancery Court that Stephanatos had not paid any taxes since 1993, an entirely fraudulently assertion.  Del Vecchio also fraudulently certified to the Passaic County Court and to the Sheriff of that County that Stephanatos had threatened him with violence, an entirely fraudulent assertion.  Del Vecchio also fraudulently certified to that Court that this was a mortgage foreclosure case, when in fact Stephanatos had no mortgage (he fully owned the property) and this was a tax sale foreclosure case, using an illegal in rem tax foreclosure procedure (a private entity cannot perform an in rem procedure in New Jersey for occupied properties, only the municipality is authorized to perform in rem procedures for occupied properties) camouflaged as an in personam tax foreclosure.
Del Vecchio fraudulently submitted forms and papers to the Office of Foreclosure that pertain to mortgage foreclosures, although he knew that this was a tax sale foreclosure where there were legal tenants present.  Del Vecchio fraudulently presented and certified to the state Court mortgage foreclosure cases as the basis of his certifications to the Court, although he knew that this was not a mortgage foreclosure case.  Del Vecchio also fraudulently represented to the state court the amount allegedly owed by Stephanatos in the form of taxes, when he knew that no taxes were due because of the impermissible over-assessment of Stephanatos’ residence by more than 40 percent (properties proven fair market value was $330,000 but it had impermissibly over-assessed at $475,000, making all taxes void ab initio). 
The New Jersey Court In Village of Ridgefield Park et al., v. Bergen County Board of Taxation et al., 62 N.J.Super. 133, 162 A.2d 132 said that any assessment levied in violation of the constitutional mandate of uniformity is absolutely void Ab initio.  Thus, the taxes were void, as a matter of New Jersey law.  Therefore, all subsequent acts of the municipal, antitrust and county personnel were illegal, as a matter of law.
Del Vecchio fraudulently certified to the Chancery Court that ATF had lawfully obtained the tax sale certificate at zero percent (0%) interest rate, when ATF colluded with Del Vecchio and others to rig the bids.  ATF in fact charged at least eighteen percent (18%) interest for all years but the first year; the conspirators also charged Stephanatos with 6-7 percent penalty per year on top of the unlawful assessment amount.  Del Vecchio and Bonchi also fraudulent failed to notify this Court that the writ was void because it was issued by the Clerk in Mercer County in violation of state statutes. N.J.S.A. 2A:18-57 provides that in summary dispossess proceedings "[n]o warrant of removal shall issue until the expiration of 3 days after entry of judgment for possession."  They also failed to provide any evidence that they gave the requisite notice to quit as is required by statute prior to entering an ex-parte judgment for possession, also in violation of state law.  The fraud on the court of these individuals continues to this date.  It is critical to note that these two have not refuted the bombshell evidence found last week that the writ was void ab initio.  These two “officers of the court” concealed this extraordinary evidence from this Court, from Judge Hochberg and from the New Jersey state courts.  This Court cannot possibly allow this fraud, this fraudulent concealment, on the court to continue and remain unpunished.  Under New Jersey Law, fraudulent concealment is one of the basis for tolling the statute of limitations.  This is the case here.
THE SHERIFF IS LIABLE AS A TRESPASSER WHEN HE EXECUTES VOID WRITS OR VOID JUDGMENTS
According to well-established New Jersey law (see above), the Writ of Possession was VOID AB INITIO and as result the Passaic County Sheriff was a trespasser (see Mushback v. Ryerson, 11 N.J.L. 346, 351 (Sup.Ct.1830); Borromeo v. Diflorio, A-3979-07T2, decided August 9, 2009  “[I]n New Jersey it has been the established principle, making lands liable to be sold for the payment of debts, that the right of the sheriff to sell and convey lands, is a mere naked power, so that to render a title under his deed available, every requisite of the law must be shown to have been complied with[.]”  Todd v. Philhower, 24 N.J.L. 796, 800 (E. & A. 1854).From these authorities, we conclude the requirements in the statute are not merely directory but mandatory, such that the failure to comply with a statutory provision affects subsequent actions.).  
As defined by the New Jersey Supreme Court in James v. Francesco, 61 N.J. 480, 485 (1972),
"a judgment is void if there has been a failure to comply with a requirement which is a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the court."

A void judgment is one rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction with regard to the party against whom it is rendered or lacking jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action, Restatement, Judgments (2d) Section 1 pp 30-33 (1982), and it may be set aside without the need of showing a meritorious defense. See Jameson v. Great Atlantic, 363 N.J. Super. 419, 425 (App. Div. 2003). Moreover, a judgment is void if there is lack of personal jurisdiction or notice absent intervening rights of a third party, City of Newark v. (497) Block, 1854, 244 N.J. Super. 402 (App. Div. 1990). In this case, the Mercer County Court and/or its acting law clerk had no personal jurisdiction over the Defendant.  Neither the Clerk nor the Mercer County court had any subject matter jurisdiction because the Stephanatos’ residence was located in Passaic County.  The Clerk also entered the Writ the same day as the final judgment on May 13, 2011 (See Exhibit A of Plaintiff’s Reply Brief to ATF, LLC Defendants Opposition, filed December 27, 2018).  This was in violation of the mandatory state law: N.J.S.A. 2A:18-57 that provides that in summary dispossess proceedings "[n]o warrant of removal shall issue until the expiration of 3 days after entry of judgment for possession."
Therefore, the judgment and the subsequent fraudulently-obtained writ were void for reasons of lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction, and for lack of jurisdiction or lack of authority by the Clerk to enter such judgments or orders, as well.
A judgment is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court has no authority to adjudicate the controversy. See Bank v. Kim, 361 N.J. Super. 331, 339 (App. Div. 2003) (mortgage foreclosure judgment void in violation of bankruptcy automatic stay).  
As stated above, the Mercer County Court had no jurisdiction over contested cases.  See Plaintiff’s Exhibit P-3 that shows a letter from Judge Jacobson stating that her office only had jurisdiction over uncontested cases, while here the Plaintiff had contested the proceedings and had challenged the validity of the assessment or the taxes or the proceedings where the certificate was acquired or the standing of the tax lien holder to perform an in rem foreclosure or the standing of an LLC entity to take possession of residential properties.  See also Riverview Towers Assocs. v. Jones, 358 N.J. Super. 85, 88 (App. Div. 2003) in which the court held that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue judgments of possession against tenants where the landlord failed to comply with HUD lease termination notice requirements.  Such requirements are mandated by state law for jurisdiction for summary dispossession of protected HUD tenancies.  Here, the criminal conspirators (Robert Del Vecchio, ATF, the sheriff, etc.) failed to obey several New Jersey statutes prior to applying for a Judgment of Possession and/or Writ of Possession.  In fact, the RICO and antitrust conspirators never applied for a judgment for possession; conspirator Del Vecchio included the judgment for possession language into the final judgment by providing such document for the Clerk to sign.  No notice to quit was ever provided in violation of state law prior to entering the judgment for possession language.  This was another major fraud on the court by the antitrust and RICO conspirators, by fooling the overcrowded Office of Foreclosure.
Thus, the judgment and/or Writ were void ab initio for lack of subject matter jurisdiction by the Clerk or the Mercer County judge to enter such judgments or orders, as well.
Furthermore, American Tax Funding and/or Passaic County Sheriff failed to obtain a mandatory Warrant of Removal in violation of New Jersey Law for entry into residential dwellings (see N.J.S.A. 2A:39-1 Unlawful entry prohibited into residential properties) and they also used the void writ to trespass onto Stephanatos’ residence and assault him in his own home.

THE EXECUTION OF A VOID WRIT BY THE SHERIFF MADE THE SHERIFF A TRESPASSER ON JUNE 28, 2011 AND LIABLE FOR DAMAGES
The arguments of the sheriff officers and Passaic County are frivolous, to say the least.  The sheriff had no authority to execute a void writ.  Ignorance of the law is not a defense. In the seminal case Nathan v. Virginia, the court said: “when the court had no jurisdiction, the writ was void, and the sheriff was a trespasser if he dared to obey it; a void authority being the same as none”
Upon the second point, authorities were read to explain the case produced by the plaintiff's council, and to show a distinction between an erroneous and a void writ. That the sheriff was bound to execute and return the writ, although erroneous, if the court had jurisdiction. But when the court had no jurisdiction, the writ was void, and the sheriff was a trespasser if he dared to obey it; a void authority being the same as none.  NATHAN v. VIRGINIA. 1 U.S. 77 (1 Dall. 77, 1 L.Ed. 44) 
This law is as old as our Republic and was derived from the English Law that was part of the law in the colonies.  Thus the liability of the sheriff has been established for hundreds of years and ignorance or good faith is not a defense for what the Passaic County Sheriff and his officers did by trespassing onto Stephanatos’ property, seizing him and his property and then filing fraudulent criminal charges that are still pending.
Indeed it seems agreed as a general rule, that wherever a sheriff or other authority has a person in custody by virtue of an authority from a court having jurisdiction over the matter, the officer cannot judge of the validity of the process, and, therefore, cannot take advantage of any errors in them.  But if the court had no jurisdiction in the matter, then all is void, and an escape upon such void authority is not actionable. This distinction has been laid down in Moore 274, Dyer 175, Poph. 202, Leon. 80 and numerous other cases. See also 3 Bac. Abr. 392.  THE AMERICAN LAW REGISTER. SEPTEMBER 1878. THE LAW OF ESCAPE IN CIVIL ACTIONS. (Concluded from the August No., ante, p. 486.)
Thus, if the landlord evicts a tenant without first filing a dispossessory action and obtaining a writ of possession, or without following the dispossessory procedures for handling the tenant's personal property, the landlord “can be held liable for wrongful eviction and trespass.”   Ikomoni, 309 Ga.App. at 84(2); see also Steed, 301 Ga.App. at 805(1)(a) (“[A] landlord who forcibly evicts a tenant without filing a dispossessory action and obtaining a writ of possession is subject to damages in tort for the wrongful eviction.”).  Court of Appeals of Georgia.  FENNELLY v. LYONS.  No. A15A0506.     Decided: July 13, 2015
If the officer acting under this VOID writ, by the direction of the appellants, took actual charge of the cattle, or prohibited appellees from looking after them, and during this time some of them, through his negligence, were lost by straying, being stolen, or dying from want of proper attention, all parties thus acting together would, of course, be liable for the resulting damage.
The point is also made, that inasmuch as the court from which the attachment was issued was without jurisdiction of the case, the writ was void, and consequently an attempted levy thereof in compliance with the statutes above quoted would not place the property in custodia legis. This position seems to us to be sound, and presents an additional reason why appellees' case is dependent upon the acts done by the parties, in addition to the mere office indorsement of the attempted levy upon the writ. The mere entry of such a levy upon a void writ would not ordinarily create liability.  Donald Cobb V. Carpenter  8 Tex. Civ. App. 32127 S.W. 1053
Liability for Execution of Void Writ
The Sheriff will be liable to the tenant for any damages resulting from the execution of a writ that was given to the Sheriff beyond the 30-day period.  The Sheriff will also be liable for any resulting damages if the Sheriff executes a writ beyond the 10-day period.  Wolfe-Lille v. Kenosha County Sheriff, 699 F. 2d 864 (7th Cir. 1983).
THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE IS NOT APPLICABLE AS A DEFENSE TO FRAUDULENT ACTIONS OF THE DEFENDANTS. SEE IN RE PHILADELPHIA ENTM’T & DEV. PARTNERS, 17-1954, 2018 WL 358216 (3D CIR. JAN. 11, 2018).  FURTHERMORE, THE CIVIL RICO AND ANTITRUST CLAIMS WERE NOT BEFORE THE STATE COURT.  FINALLY, AN UNLAWFUL EVICTION (THE CLAIM THAT STEPHANATOS IS MAKING) CAN VIOLATE BOTH THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION. SOLDAL V. COOK COUNTY, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) AND IS NOT BARRED BY ROOKER-FELDMAN
Stephanatos has alleged that the state court foreclosure judgment was obtained by fraud on the court.  Thus, the Rooker Feldman doctrine does not apply here. Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 167 (3d Cir. 2010) ("[A] claim that a judgment was procured by fraud is independent of the judgment and, therefore, does not fall within the Rooker-Feldman doctrine"). Id.
On January 11, 2018, the Third Circuit issued a decision in In re Philadelphia Entertainment & Development Partners[1] that limited the reach of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as a defense to bankruptcy avoidance actions. The court’s reasoning, however, has implications that go well beyond the particular facts of the case and may limit the use of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as a threshold defense in federal court litigation more broadly, whether in bankruptcy cases or otherwise, like the present suit that involves RICO and Antitrust (Sherman Act) violation claims that were not part of the state court proceedings.
Factual Background
PEDP was a company that had planned to operate a Foxwoods-branded casino in Philadelphia. As part of PEDP’s casino plans, it applied for one of only two available slot machine licenses and, in 2006, the Pennsylvania Gaming Control Board awarded one of the licenses to PEDP. PEDP paid a $50 million fee to the commonwealth for the license. However, as time went on, PEDP was unable to meet the board’s requirements for maintaining the license, and the board revoked it. PEDP unsuccessfully appealed the board’s revocation order to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, and then the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied PEDP’s application to review that decision. PEDP, having exhausted its other options, filed for bankruptcy protection.
Subsequently, the fiduciary appointed to pursue claims for the benefit of PEDP’s creditors (the “litigation trustee”) brought an adversary proceeding against the commonwealth in an attempt to recover the $50 million license fee PEDP had paid for the now-revoked license. The litigation trustee argued that the license revocation should be avoided because it was a fraudulent transfer under Sections 544 and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, as well as under Pennsylvania law. The bankruptcy court rebuffed the litigation trustee, holding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to consider the trustee’s claims because they were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.[2]
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives federal district and bankruptcy courts of jurisdiction over suits that are essentially appeals from state court judgments. The policy is based on the idea that a litigant should not be able to challenge state court orders in federal court as a means of relitigating matters that already have been considered and decided. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies when four requirements are met: (1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court, (2) the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by the state court judgment, (3) that judgment issued before the federal suit was filed, and (4) the plaintiff invites the district court to review and reject the state court judgment.
The bankruptcy court explained that it believed the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divested subject matter jurisdiction from the court because undoing the revocation and obtaining compensation for the revocation were “opposite sides of the same coin”; that is, the right to be compensated for the value of the license is the “functional equivalent” of the right to retain the license.[3]  And because the state courts had already ruled that PEDP had no right to retain the license, the bankruptcy court held it could no longer consider the litigation trustee’s lawsuit.
Unsatisfied with the bankruptcy court’s ruling, the trustee appealed to the district court, which affirmed the bankruptcy court’s analysis of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The trustee then appealed the district court’s decision to the Third Circuit.
The Third Circuit’s Reversal
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the bankruptcy and district courts, concluding that the bankruptcy court erred when it held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred its review of the fraudulent transfer claims.
The appeal primarily focused on the counts of the litigation trustee’s claims to recover alleged constructive fraudulent transfers under Sections 544 and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. However, the Third Circuit expressly declined to rule on the merits of these claims. Instead, the opinion only addressed whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was properly applied to bar the action from proceeding.
The Third Circuit’s analysis focused on the fourth prong of the Rooker-Feldman test, which asks whether the plaintiff has invited the federal court to review and reject the state court judgment. As the Third Circuit noted, there is some tension between the application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the prosecution of avoidance claims under the Bankruptcy Code. This is because the avoidance of a judgment seems to authorize what the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits — appellate review of state court judgments by federal courts other than the Supreme Court. However, the tension may be more apparent than real: The U.S. Supreme Court has cautioned against applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine too broadly. Rather, the doctrine is supposed to be confined to “limited circumstances” where “state-court losers complain[ ] of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and invit[e] district court review and rejection of those judgments.”[4] Thus, as understood by the Third Circuit in PEDP, a federal court has jurisdiction “as long as the ‘federal plaintiff present[s] some independent claim,’ even if that claim denies a legal conclusion reached by the state court.”[5]
The Third Circuit disagreed with the bankruptcy court’s analysis that because payment for the value of the license was the functional equivalent to invalidating the state court decision, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applied. The Third Circuit explained instead that because the fraudulent transfer claim stood independently of the Gaming Act and due process claims previously advanced in the state court, it did not matter for Rooker-Feldman purposes that the relief that the trustee sought, if granted, would frustrate the Pennsylvania court’s order. The important thing was that the trustee’s fraudulent transfer claims did not ask the bankruptcy court to conduct an appellate review of the revocation order.
The Commonwealth Court considered whether the board had authority under the Gaming Act to revoke the slot machine license due to PEDP’s noncompliance with the board’s orders, and whether the requirements were sufficiently clear and afforded due process to the licensee during the revocation proceedings. On the other hand, a constructive fraudulent transfer claim in bankruptcy asks an entirely different question: whether a transfer, which may have been otherwise lawful, can nonetheless be avoided for the benefit of creditors where there was not a reasonably equivalent exchange of value. For that reason, the Third Circuit explained that the constructive fraudulent transfer analysis could be conducted without deciding the same question as the Commonwealth Court or the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had already decided, and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine was therefore not implicated.
Analysis
PEDP is an important decision, both from the perspective of federal civil procedure generally as well as specifically in the Chapter 11 context. In the context of federal civil procedure generally, the decision confirms the limits of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine which, when stretched beyond its natural limits, begins to read like a de facto exception to the supremacy clause of the Constitution.
PEDP confirms that fraudulent transfers and other unlawful acts of the Defendants may independently operate to affect transactions that, under state law, could not otherwise be challenged.  Similar analysis and reasoning applies to Stephanatos’ claims of civil RICO, conspiracy to violate the RICO statutes and the Sherman Act violations.
The same logic is applicable in this case.  Although this Court may conclude that the foreclosure judgment was erroneously entered, Stephanatos is not asking this Court to rule as such.  Stephanatos does not claim that Judge McVeigh or Judge Hochberg need to be found that they issued incorrect orders or judgments.  Stephanatos is only presenting his Antitrust (Sherman Act violations) and RICO law violations, along with a myriad of other claims (including fraud-on-the court claims) for violation of his constitutional rights that are independent of the foreclosure judgement.  Stephanatos is also complaining for an illegal eviction that was made pursuant to a void order (ex-parte writ of possession) issued by the Clerk of the Superior Court who had no jurisdiction entering writs the same day as the final judgment.  HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF WILDWOOD v. Hayward, et al., 406 A.2d 1318, 81 N.J. 311 (1979).  Even if the judgment had been entered lawfully (we hold it was not), the clerk had no *316 jurisdiction to issue the warrant of removal the same day the judgment was entered. N.J.S.A. 2A:18-57 provides that in summary dispossess proceedings "[n]o warrant of removal shall issue until the expiration of 3 days after entry of judgment for possession."
An unlawful eviction can violate both the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (holding the seizure of property violates the Fourth Amendment); United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 62 (1993) (holding, absent exigent circumstances, due process entitles a homeowner to notice and an opportunity to be heard before seizure of real property); Thomas v. Cohen, 304 F.3d 563, 576 (2002) (finding an illegal eviction clearly violated the Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from seizures).  The illegal eviction is the heart of the matter here and the violations of the RICO/Antitrust laws by the Defendants.  Stephanatos is not asking this Court to void any state court judgments.
Stephanatos is not asking this Court to rule on the foreclosure judgment issued by the state court, no matter that it was in violation of the state constitution and the court’s own rules: The Chancery Court never issued an application of the law to the facts in violation of Rule 1:7-4(a).  Furthermore, R. 4:64-6 states that in foreclosure of tax sale certificates, if the defendant's answer sets up the defense of the invalidity of the tax or other lien, or the invalidity of the proceedings to sell, or the invalidity of the sale, those questions shall be tried in the action.  However, here there is neither fact finding nor a trial on any of the issues raised by Dr. Stephanatos.  Finally, state law requires that prior to the issuance of a judgment for possession, the owner must provide proof of notice to quit, followed by an eviction proceeding before a judge who has jurisdiction over the property and the person.  Here are the state statutes: 2A:18-56. Proof of notice to quit prerequisite to judgment.  Therefore, many state statutes and court rules have been violated, giving rise to procedural due process claims against the defendants.
In addition, retaliation may be shown without a finding that the seizure was unlawful, and, thus, without what would in essence be a reversal of the state court’s order; for example, Plaintiff will present evidence that other property owners were not subject to the same treatment as evidence of retaliation or may point to defendants’ course of conduct as a whole, including preventing the conduct of a trial at the state court level, to show retaliation. See Ernst, 108 F.3d at 491-92 (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not preclude the district court from deciding those claims because a ruling that the defendants violated [Plaintiff’s] right to substantive due process by making recommendations to the state court out of malice or personal bias would not have required the court to find that the state court judgments made on the basis of those recommendations were erroneous.”).
Again, Stephanatos is asking this Court to address the violations of the Fourth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution (the illegal eviction based on a void writ and/or void judgment for possession and the illegal search and seizure, the First Amendment violations, the abuse of process, and so on), along with his RICO and Sherman Act violations and the fraudulent conveyance claims.  Stephanatos is not asking this Court to conclude that the state judgment was erroneous.

THE CIVIL RICO AND SHERMAN ANTI-TRUST CLAIMS ARE NOT IMPLICATED UNDER THE TAX INJUNCTION ACT, 28 U.S.C. §1341, OR THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT, 28 U.S.C. §2283, BECAUSE PLAINTIFF IS NOT ASKING THIS COURT TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE OR TO ENJOIN ANY STATE TAX AND THERE ARE NO PENDING STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS.
The Anti-Injunction Act
The Anti-Injunction Act limits the power of federal courts to interfere with state court proceedings:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
28 U.S.C. § 2283. “The statute . . . ‘is a necessary concomitant of the Framers’ decision to authorize, and Congress’ decision to implement, a dual system of federal and state courts.’” Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2375 (2011) (quoting Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 146 (1988)). As such, the statute is designed to “forestall the inevitable friction between the state and federal courts that ensues from the injunction of state judicial proceedings by a federal court.” Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 630 (1977).
The Anti-Injunction Act does not bar Stephanatos’ requested relief. The Act applies to a narrow set of circumstances:
“[W]hen (1) a court of the United States (2) grants an injunction (3) to stay proceedings (4) in a state court.” U.S. Steel Corp. Plan for Emp. Ins. Benefits v. Musisko, 885 F.2d 1170, 1175 (3d Cir. 1989). Those circumstances do not exist here because there are no ongoing proceedings in a state court with which the District Court’s judgment would interfere. Accordingly, § 2283 “has no application.”  Thus, while the Supreme Court has admonished that “[p]roceedings in state courts should normally be allowed to continue unimpaired by intervention of the lower federal courts,” the named plaintiffs in this case have no other proceedings pending anywhere. See Atl. Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng’rs, 398 U.S. 281, 287 (1970). Perhaps in the future the parties to this case will return to state court in an effort to reactivate their concluded proceedings. But they have not yet done so, and the Act aims to avoid “needless friction between state and federal courts” not to prevent a district court from deciding issues that may affect future state court litigation. See Okla. Packing Co. v. Okla., Gas & Elec. Co., 309 U.S. 4, 9 (1940).
Acknowledging that no state court proceedings are currently pending, The Passaic County and the Wayne County Defendants assert that the Anti-Injunction Act further prohibits the District Court from acting to deprive [past] state-court judgments of legal significance. None of the decisional law cited by The Passaic County and the Wayne County Defendants supports this argument.
First, in Hill v. Martin, cited by the Defendants, a pre-New Deal Supreme Court opined that the Anti-Injunction Act “applies not only to an execution issued on a judgment, but to any proceeding supplemental or ancillary taken with a view to making the suit or judgment effective.” 296 U.S. 393, 403 (1935) (footnote omitted). That comment appears to address which types of state court proceedings may not be enjoined. (The answer: any type.) But Hill does not constrain the District Court because this case does not feature ongoing state court proceedings of any type.
Second, The Passaic County and the Wayne County Defendants reference Atlantic Coast Line for the idea that the district courts may not sidestep the Anti-Injunction Act by preventing the parties from using “the results of a completed state proceeding.” 398 U.S. at 287. Atlantic Coast Line did not, however, expand the Act to circumstances, like this one, where the named plaintiffs have no ongoing state court cases. Rather, Atlantic Coast Line focused on the impropriety of a federal court nullifying an active and continuing state-court order. Id. Neither Defendant has identified any active orders from the concluded foreclosure judgment suit. To the contrary, it appears that those cases simply ended with the enforcement by the Defendants of the void writ and the incurring constitutional violations from the seizure of Stephanatos’ person and property and the continued criminal proceedings. Accordingly, Atlantic Coast Line does not constrain the District Court because there are no continuing state court orders with which the District Court could interfere.
Third, in U.S. Steel, also cited by The Passaic County and the Wayne County Defendants, this Court disapproved of a district court’s declaratory judgment that conflicted with a state appellate court’s ruling on the same issue between the same parties. See 885 F.2d at 1176. The panel reasoned that “[t]he practical result of the district judge’s order . . . was to cast doubt on the effectiveness of the [state appellate court’s] ruling and on any judgment that might result from it.” Id. at 1175. Unlike this case, however, U.S. Steel involved ongoing state litigation. The case there had traveled from the state trial court to the appellate court and back again, and the federal court intervened in the midst of the remand. Thus, “[t]he district court’s order could [have] effectively prevent[ed] the state trial judge from proceeding in accordance with the Superior Court’s direction.” Id. The District Court’s orders in this case could not have such an effect because the state court litigation ended long ago.
At bottom, The Passaic County and the Wayne County Defendants appear to construe § 2283 to forbid federal courts from criticizing completed state proceedings. The statute enshrines no such rule. Of course, as defendants themselves note, a state-court loser may not appeal his judgment to a federal district court. See Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 464 (2006) (discussing Rooker-Feldman doctrine). But § 2283 does not purport to displace doctrines, such as res judicata, that might guide a federal court’s analysis of the effect to be given a past ruling of a state court. It cannot be, as The Passaic County and the Wayne County Defendants imply that when a federal court decides that the claim before it has not been precluded by a prior state court judgment, it has thereby violated the Anti-Injunction Act by limiting the effect of the prior state court judgment. Nor can it be that when a new federal suit seeks redress for harms suffered during old state proceedings, but not because of them, the Anti-Injunction Act stands in a federal court’s way. To use the Anti-Injunction Act in this way would be new, burdensome, and incorrect.  Williams, et al., v. BASF Catalysts LLC, No. 13-1089 (3rd Cir. 2014).
Importantly, Plaintiff alleges that the ATF Defendants committed mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. §1341.  The same Defendants are alleged to have committed wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. §1343.  The civil RICO claims are not implicated under the Tax Injunction Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1341, because Plaintiff is not asking this Court to set aside the judgment of foreclosure.  when a lawsuit does not directly threaten the ‘ultimate . . . public benefit’ of raising tax revenue, . . . the [Tax Injunction] Act does not apply.” BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc. v. Farris, 542 F.3d 499, 502 (6th Cir. 2008). 
The Wayne Township Defendants and the ATF Defendants have already satisfied the tax liens by foreclosing on Plaintiff’s property and collecting $340,000 from the sale of Plaintiff’s residential property, massively enriching themselves by collecting illegal taxes and with 26 percent in interest and penalties per annum and an additional $190,000 in windfall profits from the unconstitutional taking of Stephanatos’ residence.  Furthermore, Plaintiff in no way whatsoever is asking this Court to enjoin the tax lien collection, or declare it illegal, or rescind it, or perhaps obtain damages on the ground of its illegality. 
Plaintiff does not seek to “enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law” despite the fact that there is no plain, speedy, and efficient remedy in the state courts, based on the facts of this case.
A remedy is considered plain, speedy, and efficient if the state provides a “full hearing and judicial determination” at which “any and all constitutional objections to the tax” can be raised. Rosewell v. La Salle Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 515 n.19 (1981).  As Plaintiff has alleged and the factual record is uncontroverted in that respect, the unconstitutional overassessment (See Plaintiff’s Exhibit P-5) of Stephanatos’ property was not addressed by the state courts due to the fraudulent conduct of the Wayne and ATF Defendants.  In fact the state’s own laws and case law clearly show that assessments made in violation of the Uniformity Clause provisions are null and void ab initio and that a tax lien holder shall be liable to the property owner for divulging the tax sale certificate along with the ill-gotten gains and excessive fees and charges.  In addition, Plaintiff already went back to Chancery Court in June 2018 to ask for a refund of his money obtained through the windfall profits, but the court refused to do it, because, relying on the fraudulent statements by Defendant Keith Bonchi, stated that Plaintiff had assaulted the sheriff officers, and so on.  Thus, the fraudulent and false statements of the Defendants have prejudiced the state courts against the Plaintiff to the point it has become a mockery of justice.  Plaintiff only trusts that the federal courts will be fair in adjudicating his claims.

VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 ET SEQ. PROVIDES A FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION INDEPENDENT OF ANY STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS
The application of FDCPA to the instant case has been confirmed by the Third Circuit decisions in Kaymark v. Bank of Am., N.A., 783 F.3d 168, 179 (3d Cir. 2015) and Piper v. Portnoff Law Assocs., Ltd., 396 F.3d 227, 235 (3d. Cir. 2005).  See also Wilson, 443 F.3d at 378-379[6].
The FDCPA broadly defines a debt collector as "any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. §1692a. The FDCPA generally applies only to third party debt collectors, like Defendant Del Vecchio, where he attempted to collect the money allegedly owed ATF, LLC and the secured party, BMO Capital Markets Corp.
The plaintiff alleges that the ATF Defendants and the Wayne Township Defendants have not complied with their obligations under these laws as they obtained fraudulent and/or illegal or void ex-parte judgment of possession and void ex-parte writ of possession and that he was being charged excessive or unlawful collection fees and costs and interest and penalties by the ATF and Wayne Township Defendants in their attempt to collect an unlawful tax bill.  Robert Del Vecchio also charged Stephanatos with his legal fees and costs and he was attempting to collect on those legal fees.
Specifically, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants violated the FDCPA by charging "an amount (including any interest, fee, penalty, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation)," that was not expressly authorized by the debt agreement or permitted by the tax sale law or the tax laws of the State of New Jersey. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692f(1).  Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that the ATF and municipal Defendants failed to validate the alleged debt and committed false and misleading representations, harassment and abuse in attempting to force Stephanatos to pay personally their unlawful and/or excessive fees and interest and penalties. In addition, the plaintiff claims that the defendants' letters did not inform the recipient that they were from a debt collector as required by 15 U.S.C. § 16926(H), nor did the letters include validation notices pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692(g).  Sixth Circuit Holds State Law Violations May Constitute FDCPA Violations under 1692f and 1692e(5) Currier v. First Resolution Investment Corp., 2014 WL 3882745 (6th Cir. Aug. 8, 2014).
In Kaymark, supra, the defendant law firm brought a judicial foreclosure action under Pennsylvania law. See 783 F.3d at 172-173. It sought not only to liquidate the underlying property, but also to collect fees for legal services not yet performed on behalf of the creditor—a patent effort to obtain money from the debtor in the context of a judicial foreclosure proceeding. See ibid. Given those facts, the Third Circuit easily deemed the law firm a “debt collector” under the FDCPA; it declined to “immuniz[e]” the firm’s efforts to collect money simply because they occurred in the context of a foreclosure “litigation.” Id. At 176-177, 179. Kaymark is thus consistent with the decision below, which “left for another day” whether additional activity that amounted to an “attempt to induce [Stephanatos] to pay money” would have rendered Robert Del Vecchio a debt collector.
The other Third Circuit decision the Plaintiff cites, Piper, is even closer on point. The defendant law firm in that case was retained by a municipality to collect payment for overdue water and sewage obligations. See 396 F.3d at 229. The law firm sent letters urging the debtors to make payment directly to it and threatening to file a lien against the debtors’ property (just like Del Vecchio did here in the Stephanatos case). See id. at 229-230. It then acted on that threat and continued to “demand[] payment” in letters and phone calls, using the lien as leverage (similar to what Del Vecchio did). Id. at 230. The law firm’s communications sought “personal payment of money,” and the law firm readily admitted it was “not looking to liquidate the real property” but rather to cause the debtors to “pay the money.” Id. at 233 (citation omitted). In light of those facts, it is unsurprising that the Third Circuit deemed the law firm a “debt collector,” reasoning that enforcing the security did not “immun[ize]” the defendant where its “activities fit the statutory definition of a ‘debt collector.’ ” Id. at 234, 236. 
In identical fashion to Piper and Kaymark, supra, Defendant Robert Del Vecchio did attempt to collect money from Stephanatos, including unlawful and/or excessive interest, fee, penalty, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation;  as a result, he did qualify as a “debt collector” under the FDCPA’s general definition.
Del Vecchio also committed a number of other serious offences as are detailed in Plaintiff’s briefs in association with the unlawful debt collection through the use of the U.S. mail and wire systems (mail and wire fraud) and Plaintiff alleges that his actions were part of racketeering and antitrust activities by the ATF Defendants.

UNDER NEW JERSEY LAW, A PROPERTY TAX IS NOT A PERSONAL DEBT OF THE OWNER.  TAX LIENS CAN BE FORECLOSED BY MUNICIPALITIES UNDER THE IN REM TAX FORECLOSURE ACT CODIFIED IN N.J.S.A. 54:5-104.29 ET SEQ.  A PRIVATE PARTY CANNOT PERFORM AN IN REM FORECLOSURE (LIKE IN THE STEPHANATOS CASE) FOR RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES
Normally, an in personam foreclosure is a strict foreclosure. This means that there is no judicial sale.
Dr. Stephanatos was not personally liable for the property taxes and no personal judgment could have been issued against him.  This New Jersey law has been clearly established for many years: "A tax against real estate is not a debt of the owner; it is not founded on a contract express or implied but is an imposition against the property and no personal liability attaches." (emphasis added) Francis Realty Co. v. Newark, 16 N.J. Misc. 328, 330 (Essex Co. Cir. Ct. 1938).  Staub v.Harris, 626 F.2d 275, 278 (3d Cir. 1980).
See also decisions from the Second Circuit: “There is no dispute that property owners are not personally liable to pay the real property tax liens at issue in the foreclosure actions because the personal liability of the property owners was extinguished by the purchase of the tax liens”. City of Buffalo v.Cargill, Inc., 55 A.D.2d 61, 65, 389 N.Y.S.2d 932, 936 (4th Dep’t 1976), aff’d 44 N.Y.2d 7,403 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1978).
Thus, although the foreclosure actions name the property owners as the primary defendants, the actions are in rem in that they are brought against the real property for which the plaintiffs have not paid property taxes”.  Bunting, et al v. Phillips Lytle LLP, et al, Case No. 5:11-CV-123, USDC, Northern District of New York, 2011.
Based on the above case law, Dr. Stephanatos was not personally liable for the property taxes and no personal judgment could have been issued against him.  However, the result here was to force Stephanatos to lose between $190K and $475K in equity, i.e., the judgment end up costing him his own personal savings and resulting in a massive windfall to the conspirators, a windfall that the legislature did not intend..  This was illegal and implicates procedural and substantive due process.  The ATF Defendants could have instituted a tax collection action to collect on the tax liens on Stephanatos’ personal accounts, as is authorized by the Tax Sale Law. In other words, the ATF and Municipal Defendants did not have to take Plaintiff’s home to collect an unlawful debt.  The ATF Defendants have not presented any evidentiary support that they searched for any personal assets that Stephanatos had prior to beginning the in personam strict foreclosure (no judicial sale) tax lien foreclosure proceedings against the Stephanatos’ residence.  The only reason they did that because of greed and because they wanted to relatiate against Stephanatos for filing his tax refund suits..
But the ATF Defendants are not authorized to bring in rem tax foreclosures for occupied residential procedures.  Only recently (in 2015) did the state legislature allowed private parties to conduct in rem foreclosures for UNOCCUPIED properties.  But, still, no state law allows a private party to conduct an in rem tax foreclosure.
Only an in rem proceeding could have been legally instituted to take title from him and to force him out of his residence.  However, according to New Jersey law only the municipality can institute an “in rem” proceeding.  The municipally held liens can be foreclosed by municipalities under the In Rem Tax Foreclosure Act codified in N.J.S.A. 54:5-104.29 et seq.  However, a private entity, such as ATF and Del Vecchio, is not allowed by New Jersey law to perform in rem foreclosures for occupied residential properties.  Only in 2015 did the state legislature authorize the in rem foreclosure by private entities of properties that are unoccupied.  Residential properties in New Jersey cannot be occupied by LLCs. 
In Law, the plaintiff LLC served its tenant with a notice to quit based on N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(l)(3) which permits a landlord to remove a tenant if the owner of the property seeks to personally occupy a unit. Id. at 425. The plaintiff argued that it was entitled to avail itself of that provision because its sole member intended to reside in the leased unit. Ibid.
We disagreed and, in an opinion authored by our former colleague Judge Dorothea Wefing, we examined the purpose of the anti-eviction statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(l)(3)), which we found was "to protect residential tenants from the effects of what the Legislature has recognized to be a severe shortage of rental housing in this state." Id. at 425 (citing Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. N.M., 157 N.J. 602, 614 (1999)). Under those circumstances, we concluded that an LLC could not personally occupy a residential property within the intendment of the statute
It is in accord with the appellate court's reasoning in [Law], supra, that the court finds that an LLC is not eligible as an owner-occupant of residential property.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE DIVISION, DOCKET NO. A-0
MARIA PADILLA and 32 4TH STREET, LLC,  v. CITY OF ELIZABETH, December 13, 2016.
Therefore, what Robert Del Vecchio, ATF, LLC and their agent, the Passaic County Sheriff did was to terminate the Defendant’s residential tenancy without having the right to do so.  They also committed a criminal offence, in violation of NJ Rev Stat § 2C:33-11.1 for failing to lawfully execute a warrant for possession for residential properties.  To make matters worse, they used a void ab initio writ to do their wrongful acts.  Again, all these illegalities raise substantive and procedural due process issues.
What these defendants did, then, was to treat the real estate taxes as a personal debt and they used the “in personam” foreclosure proceedings that are applicable to debtor-creditor residential mortgage proceedings or in situations where a person is personally liable for a debt; only here they threatened to “either pay the unlawful tax or we take your property”.  They used the so called “strict foreclosure”, that does not involve a judicial sale of the property and distribution of the sale assets.  This was clear unconstitutional taking.  As Plaintiff has alleged, the Defendants intentionally did that to remove Stephanatos from Wayne Township because he had filed the tax refund suits and they refused to properly assess his property and used the excessive and unlawful taxes and the 25-26 percent in interest and penalties per annum to promote their scheme against Stephanatos.
However, according to New Jersey law "A tax against real estate is not a debt of the owner; it is not founded on a contract express or implied but is an imposition against the property and no personal liability attaches." (emphasis added) Francis Realty Co. v. Newark, 16 N.J. Misc. 328, 330 (Essex Co. Cir. Ct. 1938).  This position is supported by Rothman v. River Edge, 149 N.J.Super. 435, 374 A.2d 36 (App.Div. 1977), certif. den., 75 N.J. 19, 379 A.2d 250 (1977) in that court's statement that the unpaid taxes could not result in a judgment against the taxpayers but shall be a lien against the premises. [149 N.J. Super. at 442, 374 A.2d 36].  However, as Exhibit A of the November 11, 2018 brief to the Court shows, a final judgment was issued against Stephanatos resulting in the loss of several hundred thousand dollars in equity.  This was illegal, it was a robbery, as the legislative intend was and still is that the tax lien purchasers shall not receive a windfall like in this case.  Therefore, it was a private taking and an unreasonable seizure and unjust enrichment to take the hundreds of thousands of equity that Stephanatos had in his property.  This was not just unconscionable, but it was unconstitutional, as well, as private takings are prohibited under the federal and state laws without compensation first provided to the owner.
Thus, because the real estate taxes were not a personal debt of the Plaintiff and no personal liability attaches, these defendants could not have used the residential mortgage foreclosure proceedings or the “in personam” tax lien foreclosure proceedings to determine ownership and possession of the land and actual possession of the land.  This could only have happened through an “in rem” proceeding and that proceeding could have only been conducted by municipalities under the In Rem Tax Foreclosure Act codified in N.J.S.A. 54:5-104.29 et seq.  Thus, the actions of the defendants are thoroughly unlawful under state law and also is prohibited by the Public Use Clause of the Federal and State Constitutions.  These irregularities also raise issues of Taking of Private Property without Due Process of Law, i.e., a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process violation.
The “private taking” that was conducted (i.e., the stolen equity of Stephanatos that was into the hundreds of thousands of dollars) by the defendants is prohibited by the federal constitution as the Court has already been extensively briefed. The Public Use Clause provides that “one person's property may not be taken for the benefit of another private person without a justifying public purpose, even though compensation is paid.Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (quoting Thompson v. Consol. Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937)). Because a private taking cannot be constitutional even if compensated, “[a] plaintiff that proves that a government entity has taken its property for a private, not a public, use is entitled to an injunction against the unconstitutional taking, not simply compensation.” Carole Media LLC v. N.J. Transit Corp., 550 F.3d 302, 308 (3d Cir. 2008).   Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiff’s property was taken for a private purpose and it is undisputed that no compensation was ever provided.
The defendants knew that the above law and other state statutes protect Plaintiff’s right to remain in actual possession of his residence.  Specifically, N.J.S.A. 2A:39-7 says that title shall not be an issue since Plaintiff was in continuous possession of his residence for 16 years.  N.J.S.A. 2A:39-7 Title not inquired into; defense of 3 years possession.  Title shall not be an issue in any action commenced under this chapter. 3 years peaceable possession by the defendant shall be a defense to the action.

JURISDICTION
There are two sources of subject matter jurisdiction in this Court:
·                     A substantial part of this action arises under the Constitution and the laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §1331 and §1337.
·                     The parties’ citizenship is completely diverse and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.  28 U.S.C. §1332.
VENUE
There is one source of venue in this Court:
·                     A substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the action occurred in this district.  28 U.S.C. §1391(a)(2).

A WELL-PLEAD COMPLAINT IS ATTACHED
Plaintiff is providing this instant amended complaint that properly alleges the elements of fraud, fraudulent concealment, fraud-on-the-court, civil RICO conspiracy, civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment, anti-trust, and several other claims due to the actions of all the Defendants that have resulted in injuries to Stephanatos’ person and property.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to grant this Motion for Relief from the Court’s October 16, 2018 Order pursuant to Fed.R.C.P. 60(b) (2), (3), (5), and (6), allowing him to file an amended complaint alleging violation of the federal constitution (First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments) and federal laws (Sherman Act violations, civil RICO, conspiracy to violate RICO, Fraudulent Conveyance, FDCPA and others).



Respectfully submitted,
________________________________                        Dated December 5, 2018
Basilis N. Stephanatos, PhD, JD


  1. [1] In re Philadelphia Entm’t & Dev. Partners, 17-1954, 2018 WL 358216 (3d Cir. Jan. 11, 2018). Depending on the context, reference to PEDP may refer to either the Third Circuit opinion or the debtor-entity itself.
  1. [2]The Rooker-Feldman doctrine derives its name from two U.S. Supreme Court cases, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
  1. [3] Id. at *3.
  1. [4] In re Philadelphia Entm't & Dev. Partners, 17-1954, 2018 WL 358216, at *5 (3d Cir. Jan. 11, 2018) citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1521, 161 L. Ed. 2d 454 (2005).
  1. [5] In re Philadelphia Entm't & Dev. Partners, 17-1954, 2018 WL 358216, at *6 (3d Cir. Jan. 11, 2018).

[6] In Wilson, the defendant law firm sent the debtor a letter that “contained a specific request for money to ‘reinstate the [mortgage] account.’ ” 443 F.3d at 376. The same letter “instructed” the borrower to pay her debt, along with foreclosure fees, “by cashiers check made payable to the [creditor] and to send it to [the defendant].” Id. at 377. The Fourth Circuit explained that the FDCPA “does not exclude those who enforce security interests but who also fall under the general definition of ‘debt collector.’ ” Id. at 378. Similarly, in McCray, 839 F.3d at 357, the Fourth Circuit addressed defendants retained by the creditor to “collect” on the defaulted amount where the record demonstrated that the defendants “were seeking repayment” of the debt. 839 F.3d at 360-361. Indeed, the defendants expressly threatened foreclosure in an “attempt[] to collect on a debt” by stating, inter alia, that “a foreclosure action may be filed in court” if “[the borrower] did not bring the loan current.” Id. at 361 (internal quotation marks omitted). Both cases thus involved demands for payment from the debtor, just like here, where Defendant Del Vecchio demanded money from Stephanatos and included unlawful and/or excessive interest, fee, penalty, charge, or expense incidental to the principal obligation.