In Mora v. Tower Hill Prime Ins. Co., 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 812
 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. Jan. 23, 2015), the Second District 
reversed a Hillsborough County trial court’s grant of summary judgment 
in favor of the insurer. The summary judgment was predicated upon an 
alleged misrepresentation in the insurance application with regard to 
the condition of the Moras’ home. In 2010, nearly five years after 
purchasing the home, the Moras filed a sinkhole claim with their 
insurer, Tower Hill. After investigating the claim, which confirmed 
sinkhole activity, Tower Hill extended coverage. A disagreement arose 
with regard to the extent of the damage, and the Moras filed suit in 
2011.
 During discovery, Tower Hill obtained a real estate inspection form and
 a homeowner orientation report that were prepared when the Moras 
purchased the home. These documents contained notations that cracking 
existed throughout the home and handwritten notes regarding repair of 
the cracks. 
However, the documents were not addressed during the Moras’ 
depositions.
 Tower Hill moved for summary judgment arguing that the reference to 
cracks on the documents showed that the Moras made a misrepresentation 
on their insurance application when they answered that they were not 
aware of any “prior repairs made to the structure on the insured 
location for cracking damage.” In support of its motion, Tower Hill 
filed an affidavit from an employee of the builder that authenticated 
the real estate inspection form and the homeowner orientation report. It
 also submitted an affidavit from an assistant vice president of 
underwriting stating “[h]ad Tower Hill known of the existing cracking 
damage to the property . . . it would not have issued the [policy].”
 The Second District analyzed the issue within the framework of Florida 
Statute Section 627.409, which allows a policy to be forfeited in at 
least two circumstances: when an insured makes a misrepresentation that 
amounts to actual fraud or a misrepresentation that is material to the 
acceptance of the risk. When an insurer seeks to rescind a policy based 
on a misrepresentation that falls short of fraud, as Tower Hill did, the
 insurer must prove that the insured’s statement is a misrepresentation,
 that it is material, and that the insurer detrimentally relied on it.
 The Second District found Tower Hill fell short of this burden in two 
respects. First, Tower Hill equated “cracking damage” in its application
 with “cracks” and “repairs” on the inspection documents. The Court 
concluded that an insured might consider repair of common drywall or 
stucco cracks as normal maintenance and that the word “damage” was added
 to the application question to limit the inquiry to more significant 
events than common “cracking.” If Tower Hill intended “cracking damage” 
to include all “cracking,” the Court reasoned, the question could be 
ambiguous. An insurer may not deny coverage under the statute if the 
misrepresentation was in response to an ambiguous question.
 Second, the Second District took issue with Tower Hill’s position that 
it would not have issued the policy had it known of the drywall and 
stucco cracks. The Court stated that the record showed nothing more than
 the fact that the house had drywall, stucco, and other cracks, and 
“[i]t is a simple fact of life that most new Florida homes develop 
nonstructural cracks in drywall, stucco, and other areas.” 
The Court 
also noted that the affidavit of the underwriter did not explain why the
 “true facts” in the inspection documents would have caused Tower Hill 
not to issue the policy because “Tower Hill cannot seriously contend 
that it refuses to insure all homes in Florida that have a history of 
minor maintenance to drywall and stucco at the time of application.” 
Based on these deficiencies, the Court reversed summary judgment and 
remanded for further proceedings.