Earthquake rattles parts of Kansas, Oklahoma and Arkansas, in the heart of the hydraulic fracturing boom. Still no connection between hydraulic fracturing and earthquakes?

Earthquake rattles parts of Kansas, Oklahoma and Arkansas, in the heart of the hydraulic fracturing boom.  Still no connection between hydraulic fracturing and earthquakes?

An earthquake with a preliminary magnitude of 4.8 shook parts of Kansas and Oklahoma on Wednesday, the largest since a series of temblors began rattling Kansas a little more than a year ago. 

The quake's epicenter was near the town of Conway Springs, about 25 miles southwest of Wichita, according to the U.S. Geological Survey said. It came at 3:40 p.m., less than a day after a magnitude 2.6 earthquake was recorded near the southern Kansas town of Anthony.

Kansas Emergency Management spokeswoman Sharon Watson said the only reported damage was from an uprooted tree that cracked a home's foundation. No damage was reported in Oklahoma, said Keli Cain, a spokeswoman at the state's Department of Emergency Services.

The region is at the heart of the state's mini oil-and-gas boom involving hydraulic fracturing, or fracking. State and federal agencies are trying to determine whether the controversial technique is responsible for a significant increase in earthquakes over the past two years, the story said. Energy companies deny the connection, saying the state has always had earthquakes. 

 The Oklahoma University Geological Survey issued a report that indicated that the jury is still out regarding the cause of the quakes and whether hydraulic fracturing has contributed to the tremors.  It is safe to say that hydraulic fracturing is not helping.  Only time will tell us what the connection is.  We have the feeling and the expertise to say that hydraulic fracturing is most certainly a contributing factor to the quakes.

THE COLUMBIA GAS TRANSMISSION CORPORATION NATURAL GAS PIPELINE RUPTURE AND FIRE WAS CAUSED BY CORROSION AND LACK OF RECENT INSPECTIONS, NTSB DETERMINES

the columbia gas TRANSMIssION corporation Natural gas pipeline rupture and fire was caused by corrosion and lack of recent inspections, NTSB determines

The 2012 rupture of a Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation natural gas pipeline in West Virginia was caused by external corrosion that could have been discovered by the pipeline operator, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) said in a report released in February 2014.

On December 11, 2012, a 20-inch high-pressure natural gas pipeline running through Sissonville, W.V., ruptured with so much force that a 20-foot-long segment of pipe was thrown more than 40 feet from where it had been buried. The released natural gas ignited and burned so hot that it heavily damaged the asphalt road surface on an interstate highway, destroyed three homes, and melted the siding on houses hundreds of feet from the rupture site.

It took the pipeline controller more than 10 minutes to recognize that a rupture had occurred despite the series of alerts he was receiving that indicated that the pressure in the pipeline had begun to decay. The shutdown was only initiated after a controller from another pipeline company reported a possible rupture to the CGTC control center.

Following the rupture, more than an hour passed before the pipeline operator's field personnel were able to shut down the supply of natural gas to the broken pipe.  More than 76 million cubic feet of natural gas was released and burned, which exacerbated the property damage caused by the accident.  The NTSB said that had the pipeline been equipped with automatic shutoff valves, they would have shortened the duration of the gas-fed fire.

A 30-square-foot area of the ruptured pipeline was found to have suffered from severe external corrosion that reduced the thickness of the pipeline wall to only about 30 percent of what the pipe originally had when it was installed in 1967.

The ruptured pipe was the smallest diameter of a group of three CGTC pipelines, all of similar age, which traversed the immediate area. The two larger pipelines were in a "high consequence area," which required more stringent inspections.  Both of those pipes were periodically examined with an inline inspection tool.  The accident pipeline, however, had not been inspected or tested since 1988.  The NTSB said that if it had been inspected with an inline tool, the rupture would likely have been prevented.

"Remarkably, no lives were lost in this accident but the potential for tragedy was clearly there," said NTSB Chairman Deborah A.P. Hersman. "Inspection and testing improve the chances of locating defects early, and reduce the probability of a catastrophic failure which can have devastating results."

As a result of this accident investigation, the NTSB issued three safety recommendations to the Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation and one to the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration.

To the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration:

Revise Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Section 903, Subpart O, Gas Transmission Pipeline Integrity Management, to add principal arterial roadways including interstates, other freeways and expressways, and other principal arterial roadways as defined in the Federal Highway Administration’s Highway Functional Classification Concepts, Criteria and Procedures to the list of “identified sites” that establish a high consequence area.

To Columbia Gas Transmission Corporation:

• Implement a process for selecting alert set points, and provide guidance to pipeline controllers on the expected alert response time, ways to evaluate the significance of alerts, and actions the controller must take in response to those alerts.

• Modify your supervisory control and data acquisition system to (1) provide the controller with operating parameter trend data that can be used to evaluate the significance of a system change and (2) assign an alarm function to trends that are likely significant system malfunctions and therefore require immediate action by the controller.

• Establish a procedure to ensure that all integrity-related information gathered for pipelines located in high consequence areas is considered in the risk assessments and integrity management of other pipelines not located in high consequence areas.

The full 38-page accident report, including a one-page executive summary of investigation, is available at http://go.usa.gov/KDKx.

Office of Public Affairs
490 L'Enfant Plaza, SW
Washington, DC 20594
(202) 314-6100
Peter Knudson
peter.knudson@ntsb.gov

BEST PRACTICES FOR THE STORAGE OF AMMONIUM NITRATE

 BEST PRACTICES FOR THE STORAGE OF AMMONIUM NITRATE

  

References Related to Best Practices – Storage of Ammonium Nitrate

Please check with your local jurisdiction having authority to determine if there is a local fire code or other regulatory code that must be utilized related to storage of ammonium nitrate. 

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)

OSHA Standard 1910.109(i)(4) also defines additional requirements for storage of ammonium nitrate. The following are some, but not all the requirements: 

1910.109(i)(5)(i)(a): “Ammonium nitrate shall be in a separate building or shall be separated by approved type firewalls of not less than 1-hour fire-resistance rating from storage of organic chemicals, acids, or other corrosive materials…”.

1910.109(i)(5)(i)(b): “In lieu of separation walls, ammonium nitrate may be separated from the materials referred to in paragraph (a) of this section by a space of at least 30 feet”. 

1910.109(i)(6)(i): “Electrical installations shall conform to the requirements of subpart S of this part, for ordinary locations. They shall be designed to minimize damage from corrosion”. 

1910.109(i)(7)(ii)(a): “Water supplies and fire hydrants shall be available in accordance with recognized good practices”. 

The U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works held a hearing on June 27th in Washington, D.C., and various experts from the Chemical Safety Board, Department of Homeland Security, Texas A&M University, and others all agreed with Chairperson Boxer that fire must be prevented from reaching bulk storage of ammonium nitrate. Some recommendations included: 

• Storage of ammonium nitrate in non-combustible storage facilities or at least have a one-hour fire barrier separating a storage bin of ammonium nitrate from other adjacent products

• Fire sprinklers suitable for a corrosive atmosphere

• Third party inspection of these facilities should be in place (i.e. insurance companies insuring these facilities, safety institutes, etc.)

NFPA 400 Hazardous Materials Code, 2013 Edition, Chapter 11 (Please refer to the entire standard. Below are some highlights from this NFPA standard and not inclusive of everything in this document). 

Ammonium nitrate is rated as a Class 2 Oxidizer and a Class 3 Unstable Reactive requiring automatic fire sprinklers per 6.2.1.1

Portable extinguishers shall be provided throughout

the storage area and in the loading and unloading areas in

accordance with the fire prevention code adopted by the jurisdiction

and NFPA 10, Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers. 

Separation.

Ammonium nitrate shall be separated by fire barrier

walls of not less than 1-hour fire resistance or located in a

separate building from the storage of any of the following: 

(1) Organic chemicals, acids, or other corrosive materials

(2) Compressed flammable gases

(3) Flammable and combustible materials, solids or liquids

(4) Other contaminating substances, including the following:

(a) Wood chips

(b) Organic materials

(c) Chlorides

(d) Phosphorus

(e) Finely divided metals

(f) Charcoals

(g) Diesel fuels and oils

Walls referred to in 11.2.12.1.1 shall extend from

the floor to the underside of the roof above.

In lieu of fire barrier walls, ammonium nitrate

shall be permitted to be separated from the materials referred

to in 11.2.12.1.1 by a space of at least 30 ft (9.1 m) or more, as

required by the AHJ, and sills or curbs shall be provided to

prevent mixing during fire conditions. 

Incompatible Materials.

Flammable liquids, such as gasoline, kerosene,

solvents, and light fuel oils, shall not be stored on the premises,

unless the following criteria are met: 

(1) The storage conforms to NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible

Liquids Code.

(2) Walls and sills or curbs are provided in accordance with

11.2.12.1.1 through 11.2.12.1.3.

LP-Gas shall not be stored on the premises, unless

such storage conforms to NFPA58, Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code. 

Indoor Storage. 

Storage Conditions/Arrangement. Storage arrangement

shall be in accordance with 11.3.2.1 through 11.3.2.3. 

Containers. Bags and containers used for ammonium

nitrate shall comply with the specifications and standards established

by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). 

Piles of Bags, Drums, or Other Containers.

Containers of solid ammonium nitrate shall not be

placed into storage when the temperature of the ammonium

nitrate exceeds 130°F (54.4°C). 

Bags of ammonium nitrate shall not be stored

within 30 in. (762 mm) of the walls and partitions of the storage

building. 

Piles shall comply with the following dimensions: 

(1) The height of piles shall not exceed 20 ft (6.1 m).

(2) The width of piles shall not exceed 20 ft (6.1 m).

(3) The length of piles shall not exceed 50 ft (15.2 m), unless

otherwise permitted by 11.3.2.2.3(4).

(4) Where the building is of noncombustible construction, or

is protected by automatic sprinklers, the length of piles

shall not be limited. 

In no case shall the ammonium nitrate be stacked

closer than 3 ft (0.9 m) below the roof or its supporting overhead

structure. 

Aisles shall be provided to separate piles by a clear

space of not less than 3 ft (0.9 m) in width, with at least one

service or main aisle in the storage area not less than 4 ft (1.2 m)

in width. 

Piles of Bulk Solid Storage. 

Warehouses shall have ventilation, or be capable of

ventilation in case of fire, that will, in the event of a fire, prevent

the explosive decomposition of ammonium nitrate.

Buildings shall be ventilated so as to prevent confinement

of decomposition gases. 

Bulk storage structures shall not exceed a height of

40 ft (12.2 m). 

Where bulk storage structures are constructed of

noncombustible material and facilities for fighting a roof fire

are provided, the height of the storage building shall only be

limited by the building construction type as specified in the

building code adopted by the jurisdiction. 

Compartments. 

Bins shall be clean and free of materials that can

contaminate ammonium nitrate. 

Due to the corrosive and reactive properties of ammonium

nitrate, and to avoid contamination, galvanized iron,

copper, lead, and zinc shall not be used in bin construction, except

where such bins are protected against impregnation by ammonium

nitrate. 

Aluminum bins, and wooden bins protected

against impregnation by ammonium nitrate, shall be permitted.

The warehouse shall be permitted to be subdivided

into any desired number of ammonium nitrate storage

compartments or bins. 

The partitions dividing the ammonium nitrate storage

from the storage of other products that would contaminate

the ammonium nitrate shall be constructed to prevent

the ammonium nitrate from becoming contaminated.

The ammonium nitrate storage bins or piles shall

be clearly identified by signs reading AMMONIUM NITRATE

with letters at least 2 in. (50.8 mm) high. 

Piles or bins shall be sized and arranged so that

all material in the pile is able to be moved out in order to

minimize possible caking of the stored ammonium nitrate.

The height or depth of piles shall be limited by

the pressure-setting tendency of the product; however, in no

case shall the ammonium nitrate be piled higher at any point

than 3 ft (0.9 m) below the roof or its supporting and overhead

structure. 

Ammonium nitrate shall not be placed into storage

when the temperature of the product exceeds 130°F (54.4°C). 

Dynamite, other explosives, and blasting agents

shall not be used to break up or loosen caked ammonium nitrate.

Floors.

All flooring in storage and handling areas shall be

without open drains, traps, tunnels, pits, or pockets into which

any molten ammonium nitrate is able to flow and be confined

in the event of fire. 

Note: This is not an all inclusive list of best practices related to storage of ammonium nitrate, but is provided to provide highlights from three resources to facilitate further research by the property manager and/or owner.