This blog presents Metropolitan Engineering Consulting & Forensics (MEC&F) claim management and claim investigation analyses of some of the typical claims we handle
A Navy F/A-18C refueling aboard the USS Harry S. Truman caught fire late Tuesday, injuring the pilot and a sailor on deck, the Navy said Wednesday.
The fire was quickly extinguished; the pilot ejected and landed on
the flight deck. He was treated and taken to New Hanover Regional
Medical Center, Wilmington, N.C., with non-life threatening injuries,
the Navy said. A sailor on deck was also injured and sent to New Hanover
with non-life threatening injuries.
Naval Air Force Atlantic spokesman Cmdr. Mike Kafka said the cause of
the fire and the pilot's decision to eject will be part of the Navy's
investigation. The pilot was taking part in night flying training operations with
Strike Fighter Squadron (VFA) 106 when the incident occurred around
midnight Tuesday. The Truman, operating off the coast of Virginia in the
Atlantic Ocean, temporarily suspended training operations after the
incident.
It's the third mishap this week for military aviation. An Army UH-60
Black Hawk made a hard landing onto the USNS Red Cloud off Okinawa on
Wednesday, injuring seven servicemembers.
On Monday, an Air Force F-16
assigned to Spangdahlem Air Base crashed near Bayreuth, Germany. The
pilot safely ejected in that crash and was treated for minor injuries.
Underwater seagrass beds are a vital habitat for juvenile fish, shrimp and crabs in Alabama's coastal waters. (Courtesy Dauphin Island Sea Lab) Dennis Pillion | dpillion@al.com on August 13, 2015 at 11:44 AM
The Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council released a draft Funded Priorities List (FPL) Thursday for public comment. This FPL details active restoration projects total $139.6 million, and recommends setting aside approximately $43.6 million for future projects.
According to a summary posted by the Council, the proposed projects on the list would "provide substantial near-term ecological benefits and would help set the stage for future success with large-scale, comprehensive Gulf restoration."
In addition to the Alabama projects, the FPL includes projects to fill in abandoned oil and gas canals and wells, work with land owners to prevent approximately 16,000 pounds of fertilizers per year from entering the Gulf, preserve 9,400 acres of "high value coastal habitat," and invest in Gulf-wide science, coordination and planning programs.
A group of local and national conservation organizations including National Audubon Society, the National Wildlife Federation, Environmental Defense Fund and the Nature Conservancy released a joint statement:
"While we haven't yet engaged on the details of the list, we are encouraged to see this first Funded Priorities List moving forward into the public comment period, and we congratulate the RESTORE Council and staff for their efforts to reach this point. The RESTORE Act is focused on comprehensive restoration for the Gulf of Mexico, and our organizations are eager to see strong projects progress to actual construction and implementation.
"With a final BP settlement on the horizon, the RESTORE Council and the Gulf states have a tremendous opportunity ahead to plan for and achieve meaningful restoration and lasting resilience for the essential ecosystems of the Gulf. Our organizations look forward to reviewing and providing comments on this first project list over the coming weeks and working with the Council on the next, more comprehensive FPL process."
Bethany Carl Kraft, director of Ocean Conservancy's Gulf Restoration Program said that the FPL marked an important step in the process of choosing which projects to fund through the RESTORE Act.
"While we are still reviewing the details of the draft list, we are encouraged by the approach they seem to be taking, including foundational investments in science and a commitment to funding projects that will begin to address the stressors that prevent our environment from functioning at its full potential," Kraft said in a news release. "The Council appears to have put politics aside, choosing to focus on prioritizing projects by watershed rather than by political boundary, but have unfortunately left out any consideration of the offshore waters of the Gulf of Mexico.
"The success of coastal restoration is intrinsically linked to a healthy marine ecosystem. We encourage the Council to extend their comprehensive approach beyond the salt line."
As established by the RESTORE Act, the Gulf Coast Ecosystem Restoration Council will handle one portion of the Clean Water Act fine money paid by BP and other companies responsible for the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill. In Alabama, it is often referred to as the federal council to differentiate it from the state RESTORE council, which will administer Alabama's portion of the Clean Water Act fine money.
Government officials recently announced a settlement agreement with BP that set the final Clean Water Act fine amount at $5.5 billion, to be paid out in increments over 18 years. If that settlement is finalized as is, the federal council would receive approximately $1.32 billion in total to be put toward comprehensive ecosystem restoration projects, as laid out in the legislation.
Public comments on this draft FPL can be lodged online, or by mailing or emailing the Restoration Council. The deadline for making comments is Sept. 28. There will also be a series of public meetings to discuss the FPL across the Gulf Coast, including one at Mobile's Battle House Renaissance hotel on Sept. 1 at 6 p.m.
A member of a Shelby County regional hazmat unit works at the Norcold plant in Sidney on Wednesday night, Aug. 12, 2015, where a chemical spill occurred. (Jim Noelker/Staff)
Breaking News Staff
SIDNEY, AU —
UPDATE @ 2:25 a.m. Aug. 13: A shelter-in-place order has been lifted following a chemical spill Wednesday night at Norcold Inc., Sidney police dispatch confirmed.
There were no injuries reported, and residents and businesses in the area can resume normal activities.
UPDATE @ 10:30 p.m.: The chemical spill at Norcold Inc. has triggered a shelter-in-place order until further notice for residents living within a mile radius south of the facility, Sidney Fire Chief Brad Jones said.
The spill of the liquid form of isocyanate, used for expanded foam insulation inside air conditioning units, prompted the order because of the wind direction, Jones said.
Crews aren’t sure of the size of the spill, he said, and there have been no reported injuries, but the spill was large enough to trigger the order that residents close all windows and doors and have no open flames in their homes until further notice.
According to the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health, isocyanates are a family of highly reactive, low molecular weight chemicals. They are widely used in the manufacture of flexible and rigid foams, fibers, coatings such as paints and varnishes, and elastomers, and are increasingly used in the automobile industry, autobody repair, and building insulation materials.
Isocyanates are powerful irritants to the mucous membranes of the eyes and gastrointestinal and respiratory tracts, according to NIOSH. Direct skin contact can also cause marked inflammation. Isocyanates can also sensitize workers, making them subject to severe asthma attacks if they are exposed again.
Death from severe asthma in some sensitized subjects has been reported.
NIOSH advises that workers potentially exposed to isocyanates who experience persistent or recurring eye irritation, nasal congestion, dry or sore throat, cold-like symptoms, cough, shortness of breath, wheezing, or chest tightness should see a physician knowledgeable in work-related health problems.
Chief Jones said the call reporting the spill inside the facility came in at 7:43 p.m., and first-arriving crews helped plant officials in isolating the spill. A regional hazmat unit and fire crews from Anna, Lockington and Port Jefferson were dispatched to assist the Sidney crews.
“We’re evaluating the situation,” Jones said. “We’re in the process of making it safe for the citizens of Shelby County and the city of Sidney. Once we have it secured and safe, we’ll hand it back over to the business owner.”
FIRST REPORT
Fire crews and a hazmat unit are at a chemical spill at Norcold Inc., a maker of RV gas/electric absorption refrigerators.
Crews were dispatched to the facility, 600 S. Kuther Road. sometime before 8 p.m.
Sidney Fire Chief Brad Jones said the building has been evacuated, mutual aid fire/rescue units are on scene as is the Shelby County Hazardous Materials Team.
“We’ve identified the chemical,” Jones said, declining to go into any detail.
There are no reports of any injuries.
Norcold is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Thetford Corporation. Headquartered in Ann Arbor, Mich., Thetford is the world’s leading supplier of sanitation and refrigeration products for the RV, marine and heavy-duty truck industries.
It is a privately-held company with seven manufacturing facilities in four nations.
We will stay on the scene and update this report as information becomes available. - See more at: http://www.whio.com/news/news/local/chemical-spill-reported-at-norcold-in-sidney/nnJWS/#sthash.liaP0w9K.dpuf
An oil pipeline leak sparked a fire in the Moscow River.
According to reports, pillars of smoke could be seen up to 10 miles
away. There were no deaths, but three people, including one child,
are being treated for respiratory tract issues. The pipeline is owned by
the Transneft oil pipeline company.
Authorities are still investigating the cause of the fire. Rescue
workers say the flames were sparked after a nearby grass fire reached
the spill.
Gazprom Neft, Moscow’s state-run oil refinery, says its operations have been unaffected by the fire.
Sea Shepherd crews were arrested for interfering with the
slaughter of pilot whales on the Faroe Islands known as the
“grindadráp.” Yesterday’s slaughter at Sandavágur is the fifth of the
year in the Faroe Islands and a total of 490 pilot whales have been
killed in the archipelago since June.
The practice of killing of pilot whales is protected by Denmark,
which allows the practice of “grindadráp.” The images of the July 23
slaughter and arrests Sea Shepherd crews for trying to stop the killing
got worldwide attention.
About 12 Sea Shepherd volunteers have been
arrested in the Faroe Islands. Sea Shepherd has been leading opposition to the grindadráp since the 1980s. Operation Sleppid Grindini is the organization’s sixth pilot whale defense campaign in the Faroe Islands.
On August 12, a Sea Shepherd boat arrived on the scene as the pod of
whales was being driven to the killing beach on the island of Vágar. The
boat disrupted the hunt, maneuvering between the flotilla of boats that
had surrounded the whale pod. The Sea Shepherd boat managed to
re-direct the pod, causing great confusion to the hunt.
Meanwhile, on the beach, five more Sea Shepherd volunteers ran into
the water in order to position themselves between the whales and the
awaiting hunters. All five were tackled by police and dragged back to
the sand where they were handcuffed.
Initial reports said the pod as large as 200, but about 61 pilot
whales were dragged onto the beach and eventually slaughtered. The
frenzied killing of the whale pod took two hours. The Faroe Islands
tourist industry is linked to the latest slaughter as it sells Atlantic
Airways helicopter services to transport people that want to participate
in the killings from the islands in the archipelago.
The location was reported by local authorities who gave the green light for the hunt to proceed.
Last week, two major German cruise-liner companies, AIDA and
Hapag-Lloyd, announced that they would be cancelling upcoming trips to
the Faroe Islands because of the impact of the grindadráp, and the law
that protects the slaughter, on its customers. Already, this backlash
from the tourism industry is estimated to have caused a loss of 6,000
tourists to the archipelago.
The August 12 slaughter at Sandavágur is the fifth of the year in the
Faroe Islands. A total of 490 pilot whales have been killed in the
archipelago since June.
On July 23, more than 250 pilot whales were slaughtered on the
killing beaches of Bøur and Tórshavn in two separate grindadráps. Five
Sea Shepherd volunteers were arrested that day for standing up in the
defense of the whales. All five, four of whom are citizens of the
European Union, have since been charged with breaching the Pilot Whaling
Act and with public disturbance.
The only way to stop the killing of the mammals is by boycotting all Danish products. It works every time.
Release Date: 08/13/2015 Contact Information: Brenda Reyes, (787) 977-5869, reyes.brenda@epa.gov
(New York, N.Y.) The U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency has proposed a plan to address contaminated soil and
groundwater at the San German Groundwater Contamination Superfund Site
in San German, P.R. Sampling at the site showed that public water
supply wells, soil and groundwater were contaminated with volatile
organic compounds, including PCE, a widely used solvent in industrial
processes. Exposure to PCE can have serious health impacts, including
liver damage and increased risk of cancer. After discovering the contamination, the
Puerto Rico Department of Health ordered the wells closed in 2006. Area
residents are connected to safe sources of drinking water from other
municipal water supplies in the area. The EPA will hold a public meeting to explain
the proposed plan on August 19, 2015 at 6:00 p.m. at Santa Marta
Basketball Court, Parque de Santa Marta, Carr. 102 Km 32.9 Interior,
Urbanizacion Santa Marta San German, PR. Written comments will be
accepted until September 11, 2015. The San German Groundwater Contamination
Superfund Site includes the Retiro Industrial Park, and adjacent areas.
Over 44 nearby industrial sites were part of the EPA’s investigation.
The cleanup of the site has been divided into two phases. The first
phase addresses contaminated soil and shallow, highly contaminated
groundwater because they act as an ongoing source of contamination for a
broader area of groundwater. The second phase deals with contamination
of groundwater throughout the site. The proposed plan addresses the areas that are
the potential source of PCE contamination in the soil and the
groundwater. The EPA is proposing a combination of systems that use
pumps and other methods to remove pollutants from the most contaminated
areas of soil and groundwater. Prior to installing these systems, the
EPA will conduct a study to determine exactly how the system should be
designed. The EPA will also determine if the site needs
to install caps on portions of the land to limit the ability of
rainwater to soak into the ground. Throughout the process, the EPA will
monitor the groundwater and soil to ensure the effectiveness of the
cleanup plan. In addition, the EPA is investigating whether
vapors from the groundwater and soil may have gotten into buildings on
and near the site. This investigation is ongoing and the EPA will
install ventilation systems in buildings where needed. Written comments on the EPA’s proposed plan
may be mailed or emailed to: Adalberto Bosque, PhD, MBA, Remedial
Project Manager, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, City View Plaza
II - Suite 7000, 48 RD, 165 Km. 1.2, Guaynabo, PR 00968-8069, telephone:
787-977-5825, email: bosque.adalberto@epa.gov.
The Nitrogen oxide and nitrogen dioxide has dissipated around Copper Cliff after a leak at Vale’s Acid Plant early this morning.
The mining company enacted a Level 3 Emergency and sounded the air horns just after 6am to notify nearby residents.
That was downgraded to a Level 1 just before 8:30 as the wind speed and weather prevented the chemicals from traveling outside the town boundaries.
No one was injured since Vale was on a planned maintenance period and there were few staff around.
Anyone exposed to nitrogen oxide could experience nose, throat, eye, skin or respiratory irritation.
A news conference is scheduled for 1pm at the Lionel E Lalonde Centre in Azilda to provide local media with more information.
///------------------///
Vale says emergency at Copper Cliff smelter over 4
Thursday, August 13, 2015 10:51:27 EDT AM
MR 55 was closed heading to Copper Cliff because of leak at Vale. John Lappa/The Sudbury Star/Postmedia Network
UPDATE: Vale, police, health unit and city staff have scheduled a media briefing for 1 p.m. Watch this site and Friday's Sudbury Star for full coverage.
....
Vale has given the all clear following a dangerous leak at its Copper Cliff operations early Thursday.
“During the planned maintenance period of the Vale Acid Plant in Copper Cliff, there was a release of nitrogen oxide and nitrogen dioxide (NOx) mist,” the company said in a release.
“Emergency measures were activated and as a precaution, a Level 3 emergency was called. The emergency air horn was sounded at approximately 6 a.m.to notify residents in the nearby area.
“Emergency and Vale personnel are now satisfied that the NOx mist has dissipated given the wind speed and weather conditions and there is no risk of additional substance traveling beyond company boundaries. Therefore, there is no risk to the community. The Level 3 emergency therefore was declared ‘all clear’ at 8:26 a.m.
“There are no reported injuries as a result of this incident.”
Vale said if a person is exposed to a NOx, symptoms can include nose, throat, eye, skin and respiratory irritation.
“If these symptoms should occur, a person should find fresh air and flush any irritated area with water,” the company said. “If symptoms persist, a person should seek medical attention.”
In a Level 3 emergency, “all residents are asked to remain indoors, close all doors and windows and turn off all furnaces, air conditioners and any other air intakes. Residents must remain inside until an ‘all clear message’ is broadcast and the air horn has stopped."
Roads around Copper Cliff had initially been closed, but are now open.
"Nitrogen dioxide affects the respiratory system and can be fatal in large doses,” Greater Sudbury Police said in a release.
A spokesman for Vale told Reuters the incident would not have an impact production as the leak occurred just as Vale was beginning a scheduled maintenance shutdown at the nickel smelter.
"It looks at this point in time like it may be related to some of the shutdown work that was being done," said Cory McPhee a spokesman for Vale in Canada. "Until we're able to investigate further, I can't say with any degree of certainty."
Vale initially declared a Level 3 emergency at the site, but it has now downgraded that to Level 2, meaning that it now only affects the plant, and it is safe for residents in the area to go outside, said McPhee.
Broadcaster CBC earlier reported a yellow plume was visible above the Vale complex - and that cars were being directed away from the smelter.
"The cloud is dissipating. The levels that we registered throughout the event were very low," said McPhee, adding that Vale has not received reports of any adverse effects outside the plant.
A Texas family is suing several companies involved in fracking after their water well exploded, injuring all four of them.
In August 2014, Cody Murray and his father, Jim, went to inspect the family’s pump house after seeing pressurized water spraying from it. Upon entering the building and turning on a switch, a fireball erupted from inside the well. Cody sustained serious burns on his arms, upper back, neck, forehead and nose after pulling his father away from the explosion, which caused serious injuries to Jim, Cody’s wife and his 4-year-old daughter.
Cody says he is unable to work and may never be able to do so again.
Their attorneys say the explosion was caused by methane gas that leaked into the well from nearby fracking operations run by the defendants, EOG Resources, Fairway Resources LLC and three Fairway subsidiaries. Fairway Resources GP, LLC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Goldman Sachs, according to Courthouse News Service.
“This is a tragic case arising from the flash explosion of a private water well that had been contaminated with methane as a result of the defendants’ drilling and extraction activities,” the complaint states.
The Murrays, who live in Perrin, 35 miles west of Fort Worth, are seeking actual and punitive damages for negligence, trespass, nuisance, lost wages, physical impairment, pain and suffering, continuing medical care, disfigurement and loss of consortium.
“Rigorous scientific testing, including isotope testing, has conclusively demonstrated that the high-level methane contamination of the Murrays’ water well resulted from natural gas drilling and extraction activities,” the complaint states. “The high levels of methane in the Murrays’ well were not ‘naturally occurring.’”
Bristow Helicopters (Nigeria) Limited today confirmed that six people have been killed in an offshore helicopter accident in Nigeria.
Bristow Helicopters said that the aircraft, that was involved in an
accident in Lagos, Nigeria, on August 12, 2015, carried 10 passengers
and a crew of two. The company now confirmed that there were six
survivors and six fatalities.
According to Bristow Helicopters, the Bristow flight crew was among
the fatalities, comprised of Captain Joseph “Jay” Wyatt of Oklahoma,
U.S., and First Officer Peter Bello, of Nigeria.
The company said that Captain Wyatt joined Bristow in 2006 and has
spent his entire career flying with Bristow Helicopters out of Africa.
First Officer Peter Bello joined Bristow in 2014 after graduating from
Bristow Academy’s helicopter flight school. Bristow noted that both
crewmen were experienced and qualified.
“We are shaken and deeply saddened by this tragic accident,” said Bristow’s Regional Director Africa, Duncan Moore. “Our thoughts and prayers go out to the families, friends and loved ones of all those on board.”
According to its press statement, Bristow has mobilized the full
resources of its response team and is working closely with authorities
on the investigation, including at the accident site to recover the
aircraft. Medical treatment is being provided to those who are injured
and trained coordinators have been assigned to the families of the crew
members and passengers to support them with their every need and ensure
that they receive the most current information and assistance.
“Bristow Nigeria would like to express its appreciation for the
help and support it has received from the NCAA, the NAIB, NEMA and other
industry stakeholders. The company would also like to thank the Lagos
State Government and the traditional ruler and people of the community
where the accident took place,” the company noted in the statement.
Smoke rises over the site of the explosions at the Binhai new district in Tianjin August 13, 2015. REUTERS/Jason Lee
Tianjin Port Blast Disrupts Oil Tankers, Iron Ore
By Bloomberg News
(Bloomberg) — Shipments of oil and iron ore were disrupted at the
northern Chinese port of Tianjin after a blast killed at least 44 people
and injured hundreds.
Oil tankers and vessels carrying “hazardous products” are barred from
calling at the port after multiple explosions rocked the city on
Wednesday, according to a post from the official microblog of the
Tianjin Maritime Safety Administration at 11:22 a.m. local time
Thursday. BHP Billiton Ltd. and Rio Tinto Group said iron ore shipments
were disrupted, while another vessel was prevented from loading steel.
Tianjin Explosion Coverage
Tianjin
is the 10th-busiest container port globally and has become a northern
gateway for shipments of ore, coal, automobiles and oil into China, the
world’s biggest user of energy, metals and grains. About 17 percent of
the nation’s ethylene imports, 15 percent of its wheat deliveries and 30
percent of steel exports in the first half of 2015 were transported via
the Tianjin customs area, government data show.
“The blast will have some direct impact to port operators and
commodities importers and exporters in the near term,” said Helen Lau,
an analyst at Argonaut Securities (Asia) Ltd. in Hong Kong. “It will
have little impact to commodities prices and imports as other ports
across China’s eastern coastline, especially those ports in nearby
Shandong and Hebei provinces, could easily digest the capacity Tianjin
may not be able to handle.” BHP Shipments
Total throughput at Tianjin rose 10 percent in 2014 to 445.8 million
metric tons, according to Hong Kong-listed Tianjin Port Development
Holdings Ltd. It handled 110.5 million tons of metal ore, 88.9 million
tons of coal and 18.7 million tons of crude oil, the equivalent of
375,000 barrels a day. China National Offshore Oil Corp.’s Tianjin FLNG,
the nation’s first floating liquefied natural gas terminal, is nearby.
BHP Billiton, the world’s biggest miner, is working with customers to
minimize the potential impact from the disruptions to its iron ore
shipments, the company said in an e-mailed statement. There was no
damage to its discharging berths at the port, it said.
Rio Tinto said its five vessels anchored in the harbor were
unaffected by the blast. The company said five fully-laden bulk carriers
are being re-routed, without specifying where to or what would happen
to future shipments. Material damage to the port could result in meaningful short-term
disruptions to iron ore deliveries as well as lost or damaged
stockpiles, according to Clarksons Platou Securities, an investment bank
that focuses on the energy, shipping and oil- service industries.
Chinese Refineries
China Petroleum & Chemical Corp.’s Tianjin and Yanshan refineries
may be affected if the outage lasts, according to Amy Sun, an analyst
with Shanghai-based commodities researcher ICIS China.
A spokesman for the company, known as Sinopec, said its refinery near
Tianjin was operating normally and that it didn’t see any immediate
impact to plant logistics. The refinery has capacity of 251,000 barrels a
day, according to data compiled by Bloomberg.
The port area is also home to manufacturing facilities, including
construction-equipment makers Deere & Co. and Caterpillar Inc.
Deere’s east campus at Tianjin had broken windows, according to an
e-mail from spokesman Ken Golden. Lisa Miller, a Caterpillar spokeswoman
in Peoria, Illinois, said the company had no updates on the situation
in Tianjin.
Operations at PetroChina Co.’s Dagang refinery that’s in the southern
part of Tianjin municipality aren’t affected, according to a spokesman.
He declined to comment further.
The late-night blasts Wednesday, which may have been the result of a
fire, spewed toxic material into the air and shattered windows in
buildings for kilometers around. China’s earthquake center said the
biggest explosion was equivalent to a 2.9-magnitude temblor.
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) investigated this
occurrence for the purpose of advancing transportation safety. It is not
the function of the Board to assign fault or determine civil or
criminal liability.
Collision with wires
Héli-Boréal inc.
Eurocopter AS 350 BA (Helicopter), C-FHPC
Sept-Îles, Quebec, 35 nm N
Summary
On 13 May 2014, the Héli-Boréal inc. Eurocopter AS 350 BA helicopter
(registration C-FHPC, serial number 2395) was on a flight to inspect
power-line vegetation encroachment with a pilot and an observer on
board. The flight surveyed a 25-kilovolt power distribution line, which
ran adjacent to a service road leading to Hydro-Québec’s
Sainte-Marguerite power dam. While completing a right turn in a valley,
the pilot noticed a 315-kilovolt power transmission line crossing
perpendicular to the direction of flight. The right turn was increased
to avoid the transmission line, but one of the helicopter’s main rotor
blades struck the lower wire. The resulting damage to the rotor blade
caused severe vibrations, which made it difficult to control the
helicopter. While on approach to land in a small clearing under the
315-kilovolt transmission line, the helicopter’s skid gear contacted
trees. The helicopter rolled to the left and fell approximately 50 feet
through the trees, coming to rest on its left side in the snow. Both
occupants sustained serious injuries, yet were able to exit the
aircraft. The helicopter was substantially damaged. The 406-megahertz
emergency locator transmitter activated on impact. The Cospas-Sarsat
International Satellite System for Search and Rescue did not receive a
signal until 25 minutes after the accident. There was no post-impact
fire. The accident occurred in daylight hours at 1020 Eastern Daylight
Time. Le présent rapport est également disponible en français.
1.0 Factual information
1.1 History of the flight
On 13 May 2014, Héli-Boréal inc. (Héli-Boréal) operated a charter
flight for Hydro-Québec using an AS 350 BA helicopter. The objective of
the flight was to survey for encroachment of vegetation along a
25-kilovolt (kV) power distribution line in the area of Hydro-Québec's
Sainte‑Marguerite (SM3) power plant. At 0955,Footnote 1
the pilot and an Hydro-Québec employee (observer) departed SM3 to begin
the distribution line survey flight. The survey was conducted at an
altitude of about 50 feet above ground level along the right side of the
road that was adjacent to the distribution line (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Survey route showing location of wire strike (Source: Google Earth, with TSB annotations)
While following the distribution line around a hill (arrow, Figure 1), the observer noticed the 315 kV power transmission lineFootnote 2
wires that crossed over and above the distribution line ahead. The
observer indicated to the pilot that the survey was complete for that
section. At that moment, the pilot noticed the transmission line
straight ahead, running perpendicular to their flight path (Figure 2).
The pilot immediately initiated a right turn to avoid a collision; but
1 main rotor blade hit one of the lower wires of the transmission line,
was damaged, and this caused subsequent vibrations in the helicopter.
The area under the transmission line was covered with mature trees, with
a small cleared path approximately 6 metres wide directly below and
parallel to the line. The pilot had limited control of the helicopter
and attempted to slow the helicopter for a forced landing along the
path. The helicopter's skid impacted the trees just short of the path,
and the helicopter rolled to the left, descended into the trees, and
came to rest on its left side. The cockpit was destroyed, and the pilot
was suspended in the seat above the observer, who was in his seat
against the snow-covered ground. The pilot quickly shut down the engine.
Figure 2. Intersection of distribution and transmission lines
Having been able to release both their seat belts, the pilot assisted
the observer out of the wreckage. After locating the satellite phone,
the pilot moved away from the helicopter to get a satellite signal and
contacted Héli-Boréal's base at approximately 1030. The pilot used a
thermal blanket located in the helicopter to keep the observer warm.
Fifteen minutes later, the pilot proceeded toward the road where an
Hydro-Québec vehicle was seen driving by about 150 metres away. The
pilot managed to reach the road and met an Hydro-Québec employee who was
working nearby. In the meantime, Hydro-Québec rescuers from the SM3
power plant were dispatched to the accident site, where they met the
pilot at approximately 1050. Both the pilot and the observer were
transported to hospital with serious injuries.
1.2 Injuries to persons
Table 1. Injuries to persons
Crew
Passengers
Others
Total
Fatal
0
0
0
0
Serious
1
1
0
2
Minor/None
0
0
0
0
Total
1
1
0
2
1.3 Damage to aircraft
One of the main rotor blades was significantly damaged when it struck the transmission wire. The cockpit, instrument panel, radio console, and cabin roof were
destroyed during the helicopter's descent through the trees and impact
with the ground. All of the rotor blades separated at the main rotor
head during the impact with terrain. The pilot seat back separated, but kept supporting the pilot by the
seat belt. The passenger seat broke from the floor seat track
attachments. The helicopter was destroyed in the sequence of impact (Photo 1).
Photo 1. Impact site (Source: Héli-Boréal)
1.4 Other damage
Approximately 220 litres of Jet A-1 fuel spilled and were absorbed into the ground around the helicopter. The lower wire of the transmission line was severed by one of the
main rotor blades and fell on the distribution line, which caused a
power loss in the electrical distribution system.
1.5 Personnel information
Table 2. Pilot information
Pilot-in-command
Licence
Commercial helicopter pilot
Medical expiry date
01 June 2015
Total flying hours (rotary-wing aircraft)
5847
Hours in the last last 90 days
72
Hours on type
4454
Hours on duty prior to accident
2.5
Hours off duty prior to work period
15
The pilot had been Héli-Boréal's chief training pilot since 2010.Footnote 3
Records indicate that the pilot was certified and qualified for the
flight in accordance with existing regulations. There was no indication
that fatigue, incapacitation, or physiological factors affected the
pilot's performance.
1.6 Aircraft information
1.6.1 General
The Eurocopter AS 350 BA is a single-engine, single-pilot, Turbomeca
turbine-powered helicopter with 6 seats and a maximum gross weight of
4630 pounds. It has 1 main rotor with 3 blades made of composite
material. Records indicate that the helicopter was certified, equipped, and
maintained in accordance with existing regulations and approved
procedures, and that there were no known deficiencies before the
occurrence flight. The investigation determined that the helicopter's weight and centre of gravity were within the prescribed limits.
1.6.2 Emergency locator transmitter
The helicopter was equipped with a Kannad model AF-COMPACT,
406-megahertz (MHz) emergency locator transmitter (ELT). The ELT was
installed in the right rear baggage compartment, and its antenna was
located on top of the main rotor transmission deck. When activated, a 406 MHz ELT will transmit for a quarter of a second
immediately, and then transmit a digital burst once every 50 seconds.
The quality and strength of the signal can be affected by objects and
antenna position. The Cospas-Sarsat International Satellite System for
Search and Rescue (Cospas-Sarsat) Programme is a satellite-based search
and rescue distress alert detection and information distribution system.
According to its website:Footnote 4
To reach the Cospas-Sarsat satellites the beacon must have a
relatively unobstructed view of the sky. A submerged beacon, or one
with its antenna blocked by the body of an aircraft or vessel, is
unlikely to be received by the satellites. Similarly, it may take longer
to detect a beacon activated, for example, in a canyon as there may be a
delay before a satellite passes within view overhead.
Examination of the helicopter revealed that the ELT was selected to
the ARM position. No damage was noted on the ELT, the antenna, or the
connecting wire. The helicopter came to rest with the antenna in the
horizontal position. The antenna was shielded by the cowlings and trees.
Cospas-Sarsat satellites received an ELT signal 25 minutes after the
impact.
1.6.3 Fuel
When the helicopter took off from the Sept-Îles, Quebec, base, it was
fuelled to its full capacity of 540 litres. At the time of the
accident, there was about 70% (or 370 litres) of fuel left on board,
enough for about 2 hours of flying time.
1.7 Meteorological information
The 1000 aviation routine weather report (METAR) for Sept-Îles, about
35 nautical miles (nm) southeast of the accident site, recorded the
weather as surface wind 360° True, variable 290° to 030° at 8 knots, and
surface visibility 30 statute miles (sm) in clear sky conditions.
According to the graphic forecast area, the weather was forecast to be
clear sky in the area. The weather was not considered a factor in this
occurrence.
1.8 Aids to navigation
The Héli-Boréal company operations manual (COM) requires that
pertinent charts be on board. The company used visual flight rules (VFR)
navigational charts (VNC). The current VNC applicable for the area was
the AIR 5010 Chicoutimi, Edition 14, issued October 2010. The VNC for
Chicoutimi was not carried on board during the accident flight, as the
pilot was very familiar with the area, nor was it required by
regulations. NAV CANADA publishes the VNCs for Canadian airspace in accordance
with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standard Annex 4.Footnote 5, Footnote 6 ICAO Annex 4, Section 17.7.4, states, “Natural and cultural
landmarks, such as bridges, prominent transmission lines […] when
considered to be of importance for visual air navigation, should be
shown.”Footnote 7 Section 17.9.3.2 states “When considered of importance to visual
flight, prominent transmission lines, […] which are obstacles, shall be
shown.”Footnote 8 NAV CANADA updates aeronautical information products such as the VNCs
using a combination of federal, provincial, private, and commercial
data. In 2009, NAV CANADA started digitalizing this informationFootnote 9
to enable the use of digital cartography to maintain charts.
Cartography is a human process which involves making decisions on the
portrayal of information; on occasion, certain features may not be
included. This process is governed largely by the purpose of the
products being generated. According to ICAO, all structures over
300 feet high are considered obstacles and must be shown on a VNC.
NAV CANADA considers that reference to a man-made feature below that
limit is for navigation purposes rather than obstacle avoidance. Not all
obstacles will be shown, as it is impracticable to guarantee all
obstacles have been included, and not all geographical or aeronautical
features can be shown. The VNC AIR 5010 Chicoutimi chart did not show the 315 kV
transmission line, even though the transmission line had been in place
for more than 15 years. The 315 kV transmission line was less than
300 feet high. NAV CANADA is the official provider of Canadian VNC data to numerous electronic digital navigation system manufacturers. NAV CANADA receives obstacle information on a voluntary basis, as it
does not have the legal authority to mandate individual parties to
provide that information. According to the Canadian Aviation Regulations
(CARs) Standard 621, Chapter 1.2, “Any person planning to erect an
obstruction should also provide information to Nav Canada, using the
‘Land Use Proposal Submission Form' […].”Footnote 10 Furthermore, any individual who notices a discrepancy in the charts
can inform NAV CANADA so that it may be addressed. The investigation
noted discrepancies in other VNCs, which were brought to the attention
of NAV CANADA and addressed. Another way that NAV CANADA gathers information is to request data
from individual parties, such as Hydro-Québec. The investigation
revealed that NAV CANADA had made a few requests to Hydro-Québec for
information on transmission lines within the last 3 years with mixed
results. As the exchange of information is voluntary, NAV CANADA is
limited to making the request. During the occurrence flight, the observer used a global positioning
system (GPS) to record areas where vegetation encroached along power
lines. The observer also carried detailed geographical charts that
identified Hydro-Québec's infrastructure, including transmission lines
and towers. These charts were carried in case of GPS failure. Although
aware of these charts, the pilot did not use them for navigation.
1.9 Communications
N/A
1.10 Aerodrome information
N/A
1.11 Flight recorders
The helicopter was not equipped with a flight data recorder or a cockpit voice recorder, nor was either required by regulations.
1.12 Wreckage and impact information
The airframe wreckage was examined, and no indication was found of
any pre-accident anomaly or malfunction with the flight controls, the
drive train, or other aircraft system that could have contributed to the
accident. The cockpit canopy, doors, instrument panel, instrument console, and
windshield were ripped off the cabin and found under the cabin floor.
1.13 Medical and pathological information
N/A
1.14 Fire
There was no post-impact fire.
1.15 Survival aspects
1.15.1 General
The helicopter's cabin roof was ripped off the cabin aft wall and
floor structures during the fall. The helicopter was on its left side on
the snow-covered ground. Both the pilot and the passenger front seats
failed by lateral loads at impact and held occupants in their position. After falling about 50 feet, the helicopter impacted the frozen
ground, with both the pilot and the observer held in their seats by the
4-point safety belt system. The pilot's seat back fractured and
separated near the seat base. The observer's seat broke free of the
cabin floor in a lateral direction to the left (Photo 2).
Photo 2. C-FHPC cabin floor (Source: Héli-Boréal)
The injuries sustained by both occupants were caused by the breakup
of the cockpit and cabin roof during the fall through the trees.
1.15.2 Flight helmets
The pilot was wearing a flight helmet, but it came off the pilot's head during the impact. Examination of the helmet revealed several impact marks visible on
the left side and at the top of the helmet. The sun-visor part of the
helmet showed 2 severe scratches starting from the left cheek and temple
and going toward the left eye and the nose. Photo 3 and Photo 4
show the helmet condition after impact damage. The visor was cracked
and scratched by impact loads on its surface. Examination of the helmet
chin strap webbing material adjacent to the visor showed severe rubbing
marks. However, it could not be determined how the helmet had come off
the pilot's head.
Photo 3. Pilot's helmet impact damage to left side visor (Source: Héli-Boréal)
Photo 4. Pilot's helmet close-up view of the left side visor with impact damage (Source: Héli-Boréal)
The second most-frequently injured area of the body in survivable helicopter crashes is the head.Footnote 11
According to United States military research, the risk of fatal head
injuries can be as much as 6 times greater for helicopter occupants not
wearing head protection.Footnote 12
The effects of non–fatal head injuries range from momentary confusion
and inability to concentrate, to full loss of consciousness.Footnote 13
Incapacitation can compromise a pilot's ability to escape quickly from a
helicopter and assist passengers in an emergency evacuation or survival
situation. In 1988, the United States National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) reviewed 59 emergency medical services (EMS) aviation accidents
that occurred between 11 May 1978 and 03 December 1986. This study
resulted in NTSB's recommendations A-88-009 to the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and A-88-014 to the American Society of Hospital
Based Emergency Aeromedical Service asking them to require that flight
crew and medical personnel wear protective helmets, and encourage them
to do so, to reduce the chance of injury and death. Transport Canada recognized the safety benefits of using head
protection in its 1998 Safety of Air Taxi Operations Task Force (SATOPS)
report, in which it committed to implementing the following
recommendations:
Recommend Transport Canada continue to promote in the Aviation Safety VortexFootnote 14
newsletter the safety benefits of helicopter pilots wearing helmets,
especially in aerial work operations, and promote flight training units
to encourage student pilots to wear helmets.Footnote 15
In addition, SATOPS directed the following recommendation to air operators:
Recommend that helicopter air operators, especially aerial
work operators, encourage their pilots to wear helmets, that commercial
helicopter pilots wear helmets and that flight training units encourage
student helicopter pilots to wear helmets.Footnote 16
The TSB has documented a number of occurrencesFootnote 17
where the use of head protection likely would have reduced or prevented
the injuries sustained by the pilot. There is no regulation requiring
helicopter pilots to wear head protection. TSB Aviation Investigation Report A09A0016 found that despite the
well-documented safety benefits and the challenging nature of helicopter
flying, the majority of helicopter pilots continue to fly without head
protection. Likewise, the investigation found that most Canadian
helicopter operators do not actively promote or require the use of head
protection by company pilots. On 27 June 2011, in recognition of the benefits of head protection, a
resolution passed by the Helicopter Association of Canada (HAC) Board
of Directors stated that:
HAC strongly recommends to its Operator-Members that they
should promote the use of helmets for helicopter flight crew members
under all operational circumstances which permit their use. HAC also
points out, however, that certain pilot/aircraft type configurations may
preclude safe helmet use.
At Héli-Boréal, although there is no written company policy for the
use of a helmet, approximately 80% of the pilots own and wear them.
1.16 Tests and research
The TSB laboratory was provided with the observer's handheld GPS,
which was used to document the region covered. The TSB laboratory
downloaded the GPS data for the accident flight, and investigated the
time delay between the GPS time of the accident and the time the ELT
signal was received at the Canadian Mission Control Centre (CMCC). The GPS data download indicated the flight track and the position of
the accident under the 315 kV transmission power line at 1020:51. The
CMCC occurrence ELT case report showed an initial satellite reception at
1045:38, which corresponds to a delay of about 25 minutes with the GPS
time. The TSB laboratory concluded that a combination of ELT signal
attenuation due to the helicopter location under the forest canopy and
data signal degradation due to the antenna being in the horizontal
position and shielded under the helicopter cowlings may have resulted in
the time delay in decoding the ELT signal by the satellite system.
1.16.1 TSB laboratory reports
The TSB completed the following laboratory report in support of this investigation:
Héli-Boréal operates 7 helicopters (6 Eurocopter AS 350 and 1 EC120)
and 2 fixed-wing aircraft (Beech King Air 90 and Cessna 206U), and holds
a valid Air Operator Certificate. Its base is located about 7 nm
northwest of Sept-Îles. The helicopters are operated under Canadian Aviation Regulations (CARs) Subpart 703 - Air Taxi Operations.
The majority of the flights that Héli-Boréal performs are for
Hydro-Québec, and are for construction, inspection, and maintenance
projects. Although not yet required by regulations, Héli-Boréal has adopted an
in-house safety management system (SMS), in which the president of the
company is the accountable executive. Since Héli-Boréal is a small
organization, all employees are involved in the discussions of reported
unsafe conditions and take action through an informal process. The SMS
management team, which consists of the president, chief pilot, director
of operations, and director of maintenance, meet formally and informally
to address safety issues as topics arise. In April 2014, a Héli-Boréal helicopter collided with a communication
tower guy wire. The company immediately initiated an SMS investigation
and implemented corrective action, including additional training on the
dangers of low-altitude flying. This training presentation, developed by
the chief training pilot (13 May 2014 occurrence pilot), covered the
identification of visual cues and markings near power lines and towers,
the dangers associated with different phases of flight, the methods to
approach power lines, and the importance of remaining vigilant to
hazards inherent to low-altitude operations. This presentation was given
to all company pilots, and indicated that the occurrence pilot was well
informed and trained in the dangers of low-level flying.
1.17.2 Regulatory oversight
Transport Canada (TC) develops and administers policies and
regulations for the civil aviation system. Its aviation safety program
aims to control the risks at acceptable levels through a systemic
approach. The introduction of SMS in the aviation industry is
fundamentally changing the way TC approaches its oversight
responsibilities. Traditional surveillance methods have been replaced with assessments and program validation inspections (PVI)Footnote 18
as the primary surveillance tools. Assessments and PVIs are used to
measure operational effectiveness and CARs compliance, but the PVI is a
routine surveillance method.Footnote 19
TC conducts additional inspections and interventions as needed and
based on available resources, including occasional field audits of the
operator's aircraft present at the base. Implemented properly, an SMS allows aviation companies to identify
hazards, manage risks, and develop and follow effective safety
processes. Canada's large commercial air carriers operating under
Subpart 705 of the CARs have been required to have an SMS since 2005.
However, for smaller air carriers, such as those that provide aerial
work under Subpart 702 of the CARs, provide air taxi services under
Subpart 703 of the CARs, or provide commuter services under Subpart 704
of the CARs, SMS implementation has been delayed to provide additional
time to refine procedures, guidance material, and training. Yet this
group accounted for 92% of commercial aircraft accidents and 95% of
commercial aviation fatalities from 2004 to 2013. In its 2014 Watchlist, the TSB called for TC to implement regulations
requiring all operators in the air industry to have formal safety
management processes, and for TC to oversee these processes. Héli-Boréal has an SMS. However, because the SMS is not required by the CARs, its effectiveness has not been verified by TC. TC performed a PVI of Héli-Boréal in October 2009 to determine the
effectiveness of the company's quality assurance system. The PVI was
conducted in accordance with TC Staff Instruction SUR-001, Safety
Management System Assessment and Program Validation Procedures. The
outcome of the PVI revealed no non-compliance with any operational
control aspects as all the measurement criteria were met. In December
2010, TC conducted another PVI of Héli-Boréal to determine that the
company had a COM, that the COM complied with the regulations, that
personnel followed the COM directives, and that the company had a
control system process for the COM. The PVI had only 1 finding,
concerning the operation and resetting of electric circuit breakers.
1.17.3 Surveillance by frequent users of helicopter services
In general, clients who use commercial helicopter services rely on
the operator and on the pilot to ensure flight safety. However, the
employer is responsible for the health and safety of its employees and
must take reasonable precautions to ensure the workplace is safe.
Consequently, some frequent users of helicopter services, including
Hydro-Québec, have chosen to implement their own surveillance measures
and criteria over and above CARs standards.
1.17.4 Hydro-Québec
Hydro-Québec's Air Transport Unit uses the services of several
operators in Quebec to perform aerial work by helicopter. Hydro-Québec
has approximately 35 000 kilometres of electrical distribution power
lines across Quebec. The annual flight time averages between 11 000 and
15 000 hours, of which approximately 5000 hours are for power line
inspections and maintenance. Hydro-Québec is the helicopter services
industry's biggest customer in Quebec. In 1992, following a series of
accidents, Hydro-Québec set up a qualification and technical audit
program to evaluate the helicopter companies it uses and to ensure these
companies maintain their aircraft and operations in accordance with the
CARs. In 2005, Hydro-Québec developed a technical assessment method to
evaluate its carriers. This method was implemented in collaboration with
the École nationale d'aérotechnique (ÉNA), which conducts a quality
audit every 18 months on average and produces a report. Hydro-Québec
then completes an assessment based on the carrier's past performance and
compliance with contractual requirements. The result is expressed as a
percentage, which is then used to assign a qualification level to the
carrier.Footnote 20 Hydro-Québec indicates the minimum qualification level in calls for tender for helicopter services. Héli-Boréal underwent a qualification audit on 30 April 2013,
obtaining an R1 rating (highest level) with a 100% score. It was the
first time in Hydro-Québec's audit of helicopter operators that a
perfect grade was given.
1.17.4.1 Flight following
Since Hydro-Québec has a flight following department, Héli-Boréal
pilots contracted to fly for Hydro-Québec use that system for flight
following. At the time of the accident, the helicopter flight following
equipment was being serviced; therefore, the pilot had to call
Hydro-Québec flight dispatch once airborne, and then check in at least
every 60 minutes. If there was no contact with a helicopter,
Hydro-Québec would initiate its emergency procedures. The occurrence helicopter left the SM3 dam at 0955 and was only on
patrol for about 25 minutes prior to the accident. By the time
Hydro-Québec would have considered the helicopter overdue and started
its emergency procedures, the pilot had already contacted the company to
report the accident.
1.17.5 Power line markings
1.17.5.1 General
There is no federal regulatory requirementFootnote 21
to give indication of an upcoming power line crossover as may be
encountered during line inspections. However, Hydro-Québec TransÉnergieFootnote 22 has a document of standardsFootnote 23
containing a policy to identify the location of power lines and
obstacles which aims to optimize and standardize marking installation.
The purpose of the markings is to ensure flight safety and to provide
individuals performing inspections along the lines with standardized
warnings for obstacle avoidance. Markings are mainly installed on flight
paths located in rural and forested areas. According to the document, the crossing of power lines is to be identified by a yellow and black triangular markingFootnote 24
attached to the tower or poles preceding the intersection. Therefore,
every intersection is identified by 4 triangular markings, one from each
direction. Each triangular marking is positioned to be visible during
the flight and pointing in the direction (danger above or below) of the
power line that will be encountered. Triangular markings had not been
installed at the occurrence intersection. For aviation in Canada, the
recognized paint standardFootnote 25
colours are orange and white. Even if this standard is not applicable
to the identification of crossing power lines, it provides maximum
visibility of an obstruction by contrast colours. The Hydro-Québec TransÉnergie document mentions that Hydro-Québec
employees (observers) must be able to identify the various types of
markings in order to warn the pilot, by hand gestures or verbally, of
any approaching obstacle. In this occurrence, the observer was aware
that the crossing power line was coming up and indicated to the pilot
that the inspection was complete. This was communicated at the same time
as the pilot saw the wires, and did not provide sufficient warning. The investigation also revealed that power lines in other areas of
the network had some missing and non-compliant markings on approach of
crossing power lines.
1.17.5.2 Clearing of vegetation around power lines
Hydro-Québec TransÉnergie has a document identifying the standardsFootnote 26 for right-of-way (ROW)Footnote 27
clearings under power lines. It indicates the size of the area to be
cleared under power lines, taking into consideration various factors,
such as the environmental protection standard,Footnote 28
the reliability of the network, and the safety of the public and
workers (i.e. the people involved in maintaining and inspecting the
power lines). The usual ROW clearing covers the whole area under the transmission
lines. For areas that are only accessible by helicopter, an extra
26 metres is added to one side of the power line to allow for the safe
landing of an helicopter. The investigation revealed that only a 6-metre-wide area around the
short segment of the transmission line on the hillside where the
accident occurred was cleared of trees because of the Hydro‑Québec
TransÉnergie complementary environmental protection standard established
by the Programme de maîtrise intégrée de la végétation (integrated
vegetation control programme).
1.18 Additional information
Wire strike accidents are not normally related to a pilot's flying
experience. According to the FAA, the average age and experience of
pilots involved in such accidents is 43.5 years of age and 4000 flight
hours.Footnote 29 As well, the majority (86%)Footnote 30 of such accidents in the United States happened in daytime visual meteorological conditions (VMC). According to the FAA, the normal field of vision for each eye is
about 160° horizontally and 135° vertically. However, outside of a 10°
cone of the point of focus, visual acuity drops by 90%.Footnote 31 According to Flight Safety Australia, when discussing fields of
vision, “A pilot approaching wires between 2 visible poles would mostly
be too far away to discern the wires, or too close to see both the poles
at once. Clues within the field of vision would be outside the range of
vision and vice versa.”Footnote 32 During the occurrence flight, the helicopter was following a road to
the right of the distribution line being surveyed, around a hill. The
terrain was up-sloping to the right, with the right-hand tower of the
crossing transmission line at a higher altitude than the helicopter (Figure 3).
Figure 3. View from helicopter passenger seat approaching the transmission line (Source: Héli-Boréal, with TSB annotations)
In addition, many factors can increase the difficulty of seeing wires in the low-level environment:
A pilot's ability to see and avoid collision with wires is
complicated by the flood of visual cues seen from a different
perspective as low-level work is carried out; by vegetation, shadows and
landforms blocking the pilot's view of wires and wire support
structures; by cockpit ergonomics; and by seemingly minor things like
smudged handprints on the windscreen and insects that speckle the
windscreen.Footnote 33
Because of these limitations of human vision, it is important to have
other references and visual cues in order to avoid striking wires. It
is partly for these reasons that Hydro-Québec implemented standards for
markings to help helicopter pilots recognize upcoming obstacles.
Furthermore, the clearing of trees under power lines is done to help in
building the power lines and performing maintenance. As well, these
clearings are used as a visual reference for aircraft performing surveys
and patrols. The clearings also provide a safe place to land in case of
an emergency.
1.19 Useful or effective investigation techniques
N/A
2.0 Analysis
2.1 General
The examination of the wreckage and components of the aircraft
revealed no evidence of any structural failure, flight control
malfunction, or loss of power that could have caused the accident. The
examination of the maintenance records and maintenance program indicated
no issues with the aircraft maintenance that could have contributed to
the accident. The investigation of the company regulatory oversight and
the safety culture indicated no shortcomings. The company showed a
pro-active approach to safety management. The helicopter took off in good visual meteorological conditions
(VMC), and all operational requirements were met for the flight. The
analysis will therefore focus on the circumstances surrounding the
flight, the power line markings, the clearing under the power lines, the
emergency locator transmitter (ELT), the visual flight rules (VFR)
navigation chart (VNC) deficiencies, the survivability, and the use of a
helmet.
2.2 Power line markings
The pilot was flying low, following a 25- kilovolt power distribution
line at an altitude of approximately 50 feet above ground level, close
to the tree tops and in valleys. This task required deep concentration.
At the time of the occurrence, the flight was following the distribution
line around a hill to the right. The crossing 315 kV transmission line
came in sight at the end of the turn. In flight conditions such as
these, the pilot has narrower peripheral cues than when flying at a
higher altitude away from ground obstacles. At the time the observer
indicated that the survey was completed for the area, the towers of the
crossing power line were likely outside of the pilot's field of vision.
There was not enough time to react prior to hitting the wires. The cues from triangular markings allow pilots to be forewarned of
impending hazards. The distribution line being surveyed did not have the
standard markings to indicate the upcoming intersection with the
transmission line located above it. The investigation revealed that
other intersections of power lines throughout the Hydro-Québec network
were also lacking the triangular markings. Furthermore, on some of the
lines with markings, those markings did not meet Hydro-Québec
TransÉnergie's standard as to size and colour. Also, when in place, the
yellow and black markings reduce the chances of the markings being seen
in a timely manner, compared to markings painted orange and white, which
is the recognized paint colour standard in aviation. If power
distribution companies do not enforce their power line marking
standards, there is an increased risk of collision with wires from
low-level flying aircraft. Hydro-Québec TransÉnergie has established an industry standard to
ensure that all crew involved in power line inspection, maintenance, and
other work have safety knowledge of the work involved when flying
around power lines. An observer can be a great asset in the cockpit as
an extra set of eyes. Observers are taught to recognize the markings on
towers and poles indicating the impending crossing of power lines. If
hazards are not effectively communicated to the pilot in a timely
manner, there is an increased risk that a collision with an obstacle may
occur, which would jeopardize the safety of the flight.
2.3 Clearing of power lines
Hydro-Québec TransÉnergie has established a standard for clearing
trees under and around power lines to allow for their construction and
maintenance, and to maintain the reliability of the electrical power
distribution system. The clearing of trees is considered essential for
the safety of the helicopter flights that must be performed to support
the distribution system.
Due to environmental considerations, the short area on the hill under
the transmission line was only partially cleared. This condition reduced
the opportunity for the pilot to be warned of the presence of the
transmission line and it limited the space available to perform an
emergency landing. The helicopter pilot and observer did not receive any of the visual
cues normally offered by tree clearings. After impacting the wire, the
pilot aimed for the small path under the power line, but hit the
bordering trees. If vegetation under power lines is not cleared, there
is a risk that low-level survey helicopter flights may not have an
adequate landing area in an emergency.
2.4 Emergency locator transmitter
The helicopter came to rest on its left side in a forested area. In
order to make a satellite telephone call to the company, the pilot had
to move away from the helicopter into a cleared area so that a satellite
could receive the telephone's signal. Therefore, it is likely that the
emergency locator transmitter (ELT) signal was not immediately received
by the satellite because the signal was being shielded by the trees and
the helicopter cowlings. If the ELT signal is not received in a timely
manner, this could delay rescue operations which risks compromising
survivability.
2.5 Navigation charts
In many flight operations, whether in commercial or general aviation,
charts are relied upon to assist in identifying potential hazards and
navigating accurately. The accuracy of the information provided in the
VNC must allow a pilot to safely perform a flight. NAV CANADA is
responsible to provide accurate aeronautical data to the user or pilot.
Many electronic digital navigation system manufacturers use NAV CANADA's
information for their databases. Any erroneous or missing information
is therefore propagated throughout the aviation community. The existing
request process for obstacle data showed mixed results. If the data
collection process to update aeronautical information products does not
function effectively, there is a risk that these products may not
contain the information required to ensure the safety of flight. If
available navigation information is not used, there is a risk that a
collision with an obstacle may occur.
2.6 Helmets
The pilot's helmet came off during the impact sequence. The
helicopter canopy was no longer protecting the occupants during the
fall. The helmet provided sufficient protection to allow the pilot to
remain conscious after the impact, to shut down the engine, and to
provide help to the observer, who was seriously injured. Examination of
the helmet revealed it had sustained a significant impact that would
have caused severe injuries to the head and face had the pilot not been
wearing it. Not wearing helmets and visors places pilots at greater risk
of incapacitation due to head injuries following a ditching or crash.
This type of injury jeopardizes a pilot's ability to assist in the safe
evacuation and survival of the passengers. If helicopter pilots do not wear helmets, there is an increased risk
of severe injuries, which could affect not only their own survival, but
also their ability to assist passengers and to seek help.
3.0 Findings
3.1 Findings as to causes and contributing factors
The 25-kilovolt distribution line
being surveyed did not have the Hydro-Québec TransÉnergie standard
triangular markings, which failed to warn of the upcoming intersection
with a 315-kilovolt transmission line.
The helicopter was following the
distribution line around a hill and this reduced the opportunity for the
pilot to see the upcoming intersection with a 315-kilovolt transmission
line in sufficient time to avoid collision.
A main rotor blade hit a power line wire, which caused vibrations and required the initiation of an emergency landing.
The trees located under the power line were not cleared; the helicopter hit the trees and fell to the ground.
3.2 Findings as to risk
If the emergency locator
transmitter signal is not received in a timely manner, this could delay
rescue operations which risks compromising survivability.
If the data collection process to
update aeronautical information products does not function effectively,
there is a risk that these products may not contain the information
required to ensure the safety of flight.
If available navigation information is not used, there is a risk that a collision with an obstacle may occur.
If helicopter pilots do not wear
helmets, there is an increased risk of severe injuries, which could
affect not only their own survival, but also their ability to assist
passengers and to seek help.
If power distribution companies do
not enforce their power line marking standards, there is an increased
risk of collision with wires from low-level flying aircraft.
If hazards are not effectively
communicated to the pilot in a timely manner, there is an increased risk
that a collision with an obstacle may occur, which would jeopardize the
safety of the flight.
If vegetation under power lines is
not cleared, there is a risk that low-level survey helicopter flights
may not have an adequate landing area in an emergency.
3.3 Other findings
A combination of emergency locator
transmitter (ELT) signal attenuation due to the location of the
helicopter under the forest canopy and to data signal degradation caused
by the antenna being in the horizontal position and shielded under the
helicopter cowlings may have resulted in the time delay in decoding the
ELT signal by the satellite system.
4.0 Safety action
4.1 Safety action taken
4.1.1 NAV CANADA
NAV CANADA has published a formal fit-for-purpose document
(Aeronautical Information Circular 1/15, dated 08 January 2015). The
goal of this document is to provide clarity as to the intended use of
individual Aeronautical Information Publications (AIP). Use of
publications in a manner that does not align with their intended purpose
can significantly and negatively impact safety. This document is
available on the NAV CANADA website. NAV CANADA has reached an agreement with Hydro-Québec for the
exchange of power line data that may be used as navigational reference
on selected charts. In addition, in January 2015, Transport Canada and
NAV CANADA exchanged letters confirming nation-wide support for the data
acquisition program that will ensure accurate data from authoritative
sources.
4.1.2 Héli-Boréal inc.
Héli-Boréal inc. implemented a safety program to provide financial
compensation to its pilots for the purchase of flight helmets. Héli-Boréal inc.'s flight training program has been amended to
include flight training improvement techniques for power line inspection
flights. The training includes integration of recent study results for
visual scanning concepts, pre-flight review of the flight environment,
and other tasks in the cockpit that could generate possible
distractions. The training also includes flight training for obstacle
avoidance. This report concludes the Transportation Safety Board's
investigation into this occurrence. The Board authorized the release of
this report on 10 June 2015. It was officially released on
13 August 2015.
Footnotes
Footnote 1
All times are Eastern Daylight Time (Coordinated Universal Time minus 4 hours).
Cospas-Sarsat International Satellite System for Search and Rescue's
website, available at:
http://www.cospas-sarsat.int/en/beacon-ownership/what-happens-when-i-activate-my-beacon
(last accessed 10 August 2015)
The Aeronautical Chart (ANC) – ICAO 1:500 000 supplies more
detail and provides a suitable medium for pilot and navigation
training. This series is most suitable for use by low-speed, short- or
medium-range aircraft operating at low and intermediate altitudes
J.S. Crowley, “Should Helicopter Frequent Flyers Wear Head Protection? A Study of Helmet Effectiveness”, Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine, 33(7), 1991, pp. 766-769
A process comprising a documentation review and an on-site review of
1 or more components of a safety management system (SMS) or other
regulated areas of a certificate holder.
Aerial power line inspection is a specialized activity performed at
very low altitudes, in complex environments, and is outside the scope of
the CARs Standard 621.
The document (identification number TET-LIA-N-SUP0010), titled “Balisage des lignes aériennes de transport” (Marking of aerial transmission power lines), was developed in 1970, and the current version is dated 04 November 2005.
The document (identification TET-EMP-N-VEG0001) is titled “Programme
de maîtrise intégrée de la végétation dans les emprises de lignes
aériennes de transport”(integrated vegetation control programme in the
rights-of-way of aerial transmission lines).
Federal Aviation Administration, “Pilot Vision”, available at:
http://www.faa.gov/pilots/safety/pilotsafetybrochures/media/pilot_vision.pdf
(last accessed 10 August 2015)
