Tuesday, February 17, 2015

FLORIDA SECOND DISTRICT REVERSES SUMMARY JUDGMENT THAT HAD BEEN ISSUED BY THE LOWER COURT IN FAVOR OF THE INSURER

In Mora v. Tower Hill Prime Ins. Co., 2015 Fla. App. LEXIS 812 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2d Dist. Jan. 23, 2015), the Second District reversed a Hillsborough County trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurer. The summary judgment was predicated upon an alleged misrepresentation in the insurance application with regard to the condition of the Moras’ home. In 2010, nearly five years after purchasing the home, the Moras filed a sinkhole claim with their insurer, Tower Hill. After investigating the claim, which confirmed sinkhole activity, Tower Hill extended coverage. A disagreement arose with regard to the extent of the damage, and the Moras filed suit in 2011.

During discovery, Tower Hill obtained a real estate inspection form and a homeowner orientation report that were prepared when the Moras purchased the home. These documents contained notations that cracking existed throughout the home and handwritten notes regarding repair of the cracks. 

However, the documents were not addressed during the Moras’ depositions.
Tower Hill moved for summary judgment arguing that the reference to cracks on the documents showed that the Moras made a misrepresentation on their insurance application when they answered that they were not aware of any “prior repairs made to the structure on the insured location for cracking damage.” In support of its motion, Tower Hill filed an affidavit from an employee of the builder that authenticated the real estate inspection form and the homeowner orientation report. It also submitted an affidavit from an assistant vice president of underwriting stating “[h]ad Tower Hill known of the existing cracking damage to the property . . . it would not have issued the [policy].”


The Second District analyzed the issue within the framework of Florida Statute Section 627.409, which allows a policy to be forfeited in at least two circumstances: when an insured makes a misrepresentation that amounts to actual fraud or a misrepresentation that is material to the acceptance of the risk. When an insurer seeks to rescind a policy based on a misrepresentation that falls short of fraud, as Tower Hill did, the insurer must prove that the insured’s statement is a misrepresentation, that it is material, and that the insurer detrimentally relied on it.

The Second District found Tower Hill fell short of this burden in two respects. First, Tower Hill equated “cracking damage” in its application with “cracks” and “repairs” on the inspection documents. The Court concluded that an insured might consider repair of common drywall or stucco cracks as normal maintenance and that the word “damage” was added to the application question to limit the inquiry to more significant events than common “cracking.” If Tower Hill intended “cracking damage” to include all “cracking,” the Court reasoned, the question could be ambiguous. An insurer may not deny coverage under the statute if the misrepresentation was in response to an ambiguous question.

Second, the Second District took issue with Tower Hill’s position that it would not have issued the policy had it known of the drywall and stucco cracks. The Court stated that the record showed nothing more than the fact that the house had drywall, stucco, and other cracks, and “[i]t is a simple fact of life that most new Florida homes develop nonstructural cracks in drywall, stucco, and other areas.” 

The Court also noted that the affidavit of the underwriter did not explain why the “true facts” in the inspection documents would have caused Tower Hill not to issue the policy because “Tower Hill cannot seriously contend that it refuses to insure all homes in Florida that have a history of minor maintenance to drywall and stucco at the time of application.” Based on these deficiencies, the Court reversed summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings.