STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Plaintiff,
v.
BASILIS N. STEPHANATOS,
Defendant
|
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
LAW
DIVISION - PASSAIC COUNTY
Indictment
No. 11-09-00810-I
Criminal Action
RESPONSE
TO THE STATE’S OPPOSITION TO THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND TO OTHER OMNIBUS
MOTIONS
|
TO: Passaic
County Prosecutor’s Office
401 Grand Street
Paterson, New Jersey 07505
Attn: Assistant Prosecutor Peter M.
Roby
FACTUAL DEFENSES
SHOULD HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO THE GRAND JURY AS THEY WERE REFUTING THE
TESTIMONY OF THE STATE’S WITNESSES AND DISPROVING NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF THE
ALLEGED OFFENSES
The State is confusing the “factual defenses” (or failure of proof
defenses) with the affirmative defenses.
The existence of the emails and phone records are failure of proof
defenses because they refute the statements of Lucas and D’Agostino that at
8:50 am they saw the Defendant pointing a gun at them behind a storm door: the email records show that at 8:50 am the
Defendant sent an email to this client; the previous e-mail strings also show
that the Defendant was at his computer for several hours prior to 8:50 am. These email records are extremely reliable
and prove conclusively that the Defendant was not pointing a gun at the two
sheriff employees at 8:50 am. Thus, the
email records have disproved a necessary element of the alleged assault offense
(the pointing of a gun). Hence, the
assault charges must be dismissed with prejudice.
It is important to note that the State has just admitted that it was in
receipt of the email and phone logs of the Defendant and that it failed to provide
them to the Grand Jury or inform the grand jury of the existence of that
factual information. The record of the
emails and the phone calls indicate that at 8:50 am, when the Sheriff’s Process
Service Unit arrived at the property, the Defendant was at his home office at
the back of the property, about 50 feet away from the door. This evidence directly refutes the charges of
assault at 8:50 am and raises a reasonable doubt that the Defendant acted the
way Lucas and D’Agostino claim. If reliable,
conclusive factual evidence refutes an element of the alleged charge, then that
evidence must be presented to the Grand Jury, as the petit jury will dismiss
the charges upon consideration of that evidence. It is that plain and simple.
In fact, the DVD of Sheriff transmissions provided in Exhibit C of the
State’s response brief corroborates the Defendant’s timeline facts, as it shows
that calls were made by the Sheriff employees after 8:55 am. If anything had happened at 8:50 am, then
there would have been records of phone calls of these sheriff employees at 8:51
or earlier. This information (that was
available to the State), directly refutes the assertion of the State witnesses
(who have obviously lied) and the Grand Jury would have investigated these
factual conflicts and perhaps subpoena the Defendant to testify. A simple examination of the scene of the
house would not have corroborated the testimony of the sheriff employees and
would have revealed that the Sheriff employees lied and that their testimony is
simply not believable, raising a reasonable doubt that the events occurred the
way these sheriff employees claimed they did.
Roby has concealed important evidence from this Court
The prosecutor, Roby, also continues to lie and mislead and hide
important evidence from this Court, the same way Walter Dewey, Jr. did before
the Grand Jury: these two “exemplary” and “ethical” prosecutors, are refusing to
present to this Court the written investigation reports prepared by Lucas,
D’Agostino, and others. The reason is
very simple: the written reports contradict the oral testimony of these two
sheriff employees.
Although requested by the Defendant, Roby is trying to conceal from this
Court the photographic and video and reporting evidence collected by the
sheriff at 687 Indian Road, Wayne, NJ property.
Furthermore, Defendant has stated that his doors were all locked and
closed. This directly refutes the
assertion of the State witnesses that Defendant’s door was wide open. It is more likely than not that a reasonable
juror would have believed that the doors were all locked, as this is what
people do to avoid intruders inside their home or when people are planning to
come and throw them out of their homes and business while legal proceedings
still pending: people simply keep their
doors closed and locked, the same way the Defendant did. These factual assertions of the Defendant are
not “affirmative defenses”, they are “factual defenses”; they create reasonable doubt that the events
took place in the manner the State’s witnesses claim they occurred and are a
failure of proof of elements of the offenses.
The prosecution should have let the Grand Jury know of the existence of
the emails and phone records. The
prosecution should also have advised the Grand Jury that the Defendant was
willing to testify at the proceedings as he had discussed with Mr. Carl Herman
and had also let Mr. Walter Dewy know to that effect. The Grand Jury then would have considered if
it needs some additional information or if it needs to subpoena the Defendant
to testify and so on. The State had
already into its possession the letters sent by the Defendant to Judge Reddin
complaining about the failure of Mr. Herman to secure his testimony at the
Grand Jury. (See Opposition to the
Motion to Revoke Bail, dated March 1, 2012).
Here is what the defendant included in that letter:
Mr. Herman:
·
Failed to submit my certification/affidavit to the
grand jury;
·
Failed to secure my presence to the grand jury;
·
He never found out as to the why the state refused
to allow me to testify at the grand jury;
Obviously I have
been very dissatisfied with the services of Mr. Herman since he failed to
secure my grand jury testimony or at least the submission of a certification or
affidavit or the alibi (the electronic records proving beyond any doubt that I
was located 30 feet away from the location of the alleged offense and at the
time of the alleged offense) or other constitutional and statutory
defenses/privileges/justifications/immunities.
We had agreed for me to testify.
That was the prime reason I hired him and paid him $3,500 upfront. But he failed completely in his duties
and this resulted in a fatal breach of trust and confidence on my part.
All this factual information proves beyond any doubt that the Defendant
had agreed with Mr. Herman to testify at the Grand Jury proceedings. It is also a fact that the Defendant has
written and verbally stated many times that these two sheriff employees lied
about the events and that the charges are fraudulent and not believable if they
are subjected to slight scrutiny or pitted against the email and phone records
of the Defendant and the physical setting of the residence.
It is
important to note here that the defendant’s home is in a wooded, remote and
isolated area of Wayne, New Jersey.
There are no homes neighboring to the north. There is only one home neighboring to the
east (about 50 feet away) where there was only one woman present. There is another home to the west (about 100
feet away) where the owners were at work.
Thus, the N.J.S. 2C:29-3b(2) charge is also fraudulent, as less than
five people and less than five habitations were within 100 feet from
defendant’s home. Defendant would have
testified to all these facts and would have caused the grand jury to return a
no bill for charge N.J.S. 2C:29-3b(2).
This factual evidence also proves that the sheriff employees lied when
they filed these charges against the Defendant.
The two
sheriff employees did not wear the dark blue or black law enforcement uniforms
and according to their testimony, they did not identify themselves as law
enforcement. In fact, they never claimed
that they ever announced themselves, such as knocking at the door or ringing
the doorbell, as per their testimony.
They in fact testified that they were sheriff employees, not police
officers performing a criminal investigation.
Their duties during that day were not law enforcement duties, because
this was a civil matter. Defendant’s
testimony would have also returned a no bill, as he was not aware that the
sheriff employees were police officers;
because they are not police officers.
The prosecutor is again fraudulently writing in his response letter that
the sheriff employees are in fact police officers, a very pathetic, fraudulent,
misleading and ludicrous assertion. In
Exhibit A, we attach copies of the original complaints filed by Lucas and
D’Agostino. It can be seen that these
two individuals filed charges under section 2C:12-1B(4), as they were not
police officers. This factual evidence
produced by the State’s witnesses conclusively proves that even the sheriff
employees did not know that they were in fact police officers; but, instead
they were sheriff employees.
As further
proof that the 2C:12-1B(4) statutes intended to protect law enforcement
officers is an examination of the statute 2C:12-1b(5). This is the statute that addresses the
assault on law enforcement officer or public employee, such a sheriff. Under this statute, the assault upon a law
enforcement officer is included under 2C:12-1b(5)(a): Any law enforcement officer acting in the performance of his duties
while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of his authority or because of his
status as a law enforcement officer.
By contrast
the assault on a sheriff officer is included under section 2C:12-1b(5)(h): Any … sheriff, undersheriff, or sheriff’s
officer acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or exhibiting
evidence of his authority.
Thus, the
legislature has clearly distinguished between a law enforcement officer and a
sheriff officer. These two groups of
employees were not meant to be considered one and the same.
I believe
that this analysis conclusively proves that the statute 2C:12-1b(9) does not
include sheriff employees, but it was intended to protect police officers in
their law enforcement duties. Lucas and
D’Agostino were sheriff’s officers wearing sheriff officer uniforms and not
police officers. The state legislature
would have most likely included the sheriff employees in the 2C:12-1b(9)
statute (the same way it did in 2C:12-1b(5)) and not simply leave it open to
interpretation or ambiguity.
The phone
records also prove that it was the Defendant who called Judge McVeigh at 8:56
am, to ask for the status of an application of a stay, as is allowed by all
eviction statutes. It was the Defendant
who initiated that phone as this factual evidence proves, and not the judge or
anyone else as the prosecutor fraudulently asserts in his letter to this Court. This significant evidence proves beyond any doubt
that the only thing the Defendant wanted was a 6-month stay that is freely
granted under all circumstances and it is in fact codified under the
statutes: see NJSA §
2A:42-10.6.
It was that
simple: a statute-based stay would have
solved every issue, but the reckless judge Margaret McVeigh and the convicted
conspirators did not do it for whatever reason.
Perhaps this judge was incompetent, reckless, ruthless, biased, usurped
her authority, or whatever else. It
would have been up to the Grand Jurors to determine the role of the State and County
employees and the conspirators and determine whether they acted prudently or
whether they caused the escalation of the situation through their negligent,
reckless or even criminal conduct, (improperly evicting a person is a criminal
act in the State of New Jersey).
Another crucial and clearly exculpatory evidence was that Metropolitan
Environmental Services, was not part of the fraudulently-obtained Writ of
Possession; and that the Sheriff was not authorized to remove Defendant’s
business from the premises; but the Sheriff did it anyway; the evidence presented to the Court (the
communications between Metropolitan Environmental Services and the Sheriff)
shows that the Sheriff was aware that a tenant was present and that no Writ had
been issued for that tenant. This
evidence was never presented to the Grand Jurors.
This crucial evidence also indicates that, since no judgment of
possession and writ or warrant of possession or removal had been obtained for
Metropolitan Environmental Services, Defendant had the right to defend his
business and business property from intruders or attackers; no such instructions were provided to the
Grand Jurors, as the State intentionally refused to provide that evidence to
the jury. The Defendant had valid
factual defenses (not merely affirmative defenses) that were never presented
and thus, the prosecutor interfered with the investigation of the Grand Jury
and changed the outcome of the Grand Jury proceedings.
The Defendant never threatened anyone few days prior to the eviction, as
the prosecutor has fraudulently asserted in his response brief; the Court should order the State to provide
proof of these fraudulent assertions, as these lies were also made to the Grand
Jurors and painted the Defendant as a violent person and affected the jury’s
decision to indict; the Defendant
vehemently denies that few days prior to the eviction he had threatened the
convicted criminal conspirators. I
hereby demand proof of such statements made by the Defendant few days prior to
the eviction.
THE CHANCERY COURT HAD NO SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER LAND
POSSESSION ISSUES AND ANY JUDGMENTS OR ORDERS ISSUED BY CHANCERY COURT WERE VOID
AB INITIO, A LEGAL NULLITY
The
fraudulently issued “final judgment” in May 2011, never adjudicated the subject
matter of land possession, as the Chancery courts have no jurisdiction over
land possession issues. Thus, the
judgment was void regarding the alleged adjudication of the possession of the
Defendant’s property. A judgment is void
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court has no authority to
adjudicate the controversy. See Bank v.
Kim, 361 N.J. Super. 331, 339 (App. Div. 2003) (mortgage foreclosure
judgment void in violation of bankruptcy automatic stay).
Subject matter
jurisdiction can neither be conferred by agreement of the parties nor waived as
a defense, and a court must dismiss the matter if it determines that it lacks
subject matter jurisdiction. Macysyn v. Hensler, 329 N.J. Super. 476, 481 (App.
Div. 2000) (indicating that such a motion can be made "at any time");
see also R. 4:6-7; Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 1
on R. 4:6-7 (2015).
Here, the
Chancery court had no subject matter jurisdiction over the property possession
issue and thus any judgment or order issued by that court was void, a legal
nullity. Therefore, the sheriff was
enforcing a void (and fraudulent as well) court order.
We have uncovered some new HORRIFIC AND TERRIFYING
ACCUSATIONS AGAINST the Chancery Judge McVeigh. She apparently allowed the issuance of a
"Final Judgment" where the following language was inserted by the
Plaintiffs (convicted felon Robert Del Vecchio, American Tax Funding, and
others):
“AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the plaintiff
dully recover against the said defendant …possession of the premises… and that
a Writ of Possession issue thereon”.
Of course, she had no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of land possession. Why did she insert or allowed that language to be
inserted into that "final judgment"?
The HORRIFIC AND TERRIFYING ACCUSATIONS AGAINST Chancery
Judge McVeigh is that she never even held any hearing over the land possession
issue. She just merely allowed that language to be inserted into the
text, so that the convicted felon Robert Del Vecchio immediately seizes the
property of Defendant without any due process and in violation of several New
Jersey statutes. So, this corrupt
“Judge” not only she did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the land
possession issue, but she then secretly and fraudulently allowed the above
language to be inserted in the so-called “final judgment”. As a result, they did not follow the Wrongful
Entry and Detainer Act and the Anti-Eviction Act, or the Summary Dispossess
Act. The consequences of these
criminal acts was that they caused millions of dollars in damages by forcibly
removing tenants or land possessors without due process. These are the true criminals, and not the
Defendant.
As it was stated earlier, it was the Defendant who called Judge McVeigh at
8:56 am to ask for a stay or check on the status of a stay he had applied few
weeks ago, pursuant to with
NJSA § 2A:42-10.6 that allows up to a
six month stay; the Sheriff SWAT team
had sharpshooters and snipers pointing at Defendant’s chest and head while he
was talking to judge McVeigh and the Defendant was fearful of his life and that
is why he told the Judge that there will be blood shed unless there is a
stay; a simple stay (allowed by the New
Jersey statutes and routinely granted by all courts) would have prevented this
incident; but the reckless State and
County employees caused the Defendant to be under stress and duress by trying
to remove his business without having a Writ for removal of Metropolitan
Environmental Services.
More lies and fabrications by Roby
The current prosecutor, P. Roby, is
fraudulently attempting to mislead and lie to this Court by stating that the
Sheriff was there to evict the Defendant from his “business/home”. However, the fraudulent Writ makes no mention
of Defendant’s business, a legal tenant at the property for many years. Now, this obviously lying and corrupt
prosecutor is claiming or appears to be claiming that the Writ covered both the
Defendant and his business. But it did
not – there is no evidence to support this reckless assertion and we are asking
the Court to strike these responses of the state and sanction the prosecutor.
In fact, there is no record that any
Judgment of Possession was adjudicated by any Law Division court. Judgments of Possession and other eviction
issues are in the jurisdiction of the Law Division. See Exhibit B for the legal forms used by the
Passaic County courts to adjudicate the issue of possession. These proceedings require a notice, and
reason for the eviction, and an answer, and a court order signed by a Law
Division judge, and so on. We demand
that the State provides a copy of the judicial record showing that there was a
trial or a factual hearing where the issue of possession was adjudicated. If the State fails to provide evidence of
such record, then this Court must rule in favor of the Defendant on the issue
of the adjudication of the Judgment of Possession and the subsequent Writ of
Possession. No court ever adjudicated the possession of the property by using the
long-established procedures listed above; NONE.
Please note
that under the “Writ of Possession” form in Exhibit B, it states the following:
“WHEREAS, on
________ by a certain judgment of the Law Division Special Civil Part, PASSAIC
in a cause therein pending, ….”
Clearly, the
conspirators were required to file a suit in the Law Division, but they never
did. This is the crux of the matter. They in fact defrauded and
lied to the various courts and court clerks. Most likely, a conspiracy
between the State, County and the convicted criminals had been formed, to force
out of their homes people who were disputing their tax bills.
There is no
record of any ejectment or eviction proceeding ever held before any court that
had jurisdiction over such proceedings and over Defendant’s property and person. The state has failed to provide any record
that such proceedings were ever held and is lying to this Court by claiming
that “a Court-ordered Writ of Possession” was issued. No court that had jurisdiction over the
property ever adjudicated a judgment of possession and therefore a Writ could
not have been possibly been issued.
Certainly, no
such hearings were ever held for the legal tenant Metropolitan Environmental
Services. The sheriff however, did evict
this tenant from the premises in a total disregard of the law of possession and
the law of tenancy. Recklessness beyond
belief. The Grand Jurors were never
informed of such illegal acts by the sheriff.
This fraudulent scheme was invented by
Robert Del Vecchio, American Tax Funding, and the other convicted
conspirators. Perhaps additional
conspirators include the County and Municipality and Judicial employees as they
have violated the legal rights of thousands of homeowners by using these
fraudulent (and criminal) ex-parte proceedings, without any hearing, without
any findings of fact, without application of facts to the law, by violating the
constitutional rights of the homeowners, and issuing judgments and orders
without subject matter jurisdiction and so on.
Absolute disgrace. This potential
conspiracy between the County, State and the convicted conspirators is the
prime reason we do not believe that fair trial and fair proceedings will be had
in this County. We hereby renew our
Motion to Change Venue, based on the detailed discussion of some of the factual
evidence that was intentionally and willfully not presented to the Grand
Jurors.
Hogan requires both exculpatory and
inculpatory statements to be presented to the grand jury, and so must this Court.
Defendant had the right to have the
grand jurors hear both the incriminating and the exculpatory evidence, rather
than have certain information withheld by the Assistant Prosecutor. When a witness presents a number of versions
of his story, and when the Defendant presents facts or testimony that is
refuting the factual allegations of the state witnesses, all the statements
must be presented to the grand jury in order for the grand jury to properly carry
out its investigative function with the level of fairness to which defendant is
entitled. The grand jury "was
deprived of its right to investigate and its ultimate task of determining
whether the State did in fact present a prima facie case." Hogan,
, 281 N.J. Super. at 299, 657 A.2d 462.
State v. Epps, 284 N.J. Super. 373 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1995
(dismissing the indictment for failure to provide both exculpatory and
inculpatory statements to the Grand Jury).
In Hogan, the Assistant Prosecutor argued in the
trial court that it was in her discretion to present the evidence to the grand
jury. Because she personally did not believe the recantation, and believed it
was coerced, and therefore not credible, she argued she did not have to present
the evidence to the grand jury. Id. at 296, 657 A.2d 462. The
court stated:
The
prosecutor contends that her duty to disclose only arises if the statement is
exculpatory and if the prosecutor believes it to be truthful. This cannot possibly
be the determinative basis for the decision whether to disclose evidence to the
grand jury. The standard for prosecutorial conduct may not rest on a
prosecutor's belief. The decision whether to indict is solely entrusted to the
grand jury, which must decide "whether a prima facie case has been made out."
*379379
[ Ibid. (citing Trap Rock Industries v. Kohl,
59 N.J. 471, 487, 284 A.2d 161 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1065, 92 S.Ct. 1500, 31 L.Ed.2d 796 (1972)).]
Similarly here, the prosecutor argues that he believes that the
Defendant’s emails and phone records are incriminatory and that they would not
have made any difference in the Grand Jury’s decision whether a prima facie
case has been made out. However, what
the prosecutor thinks of the evidence or the testimony of the witness is
irrelevant. The email records and the
phone call record of the sheriff and the Defendant show that the Defendant was
not pointing a gun at both Lucas and D’Agostino at 8:50 am as he was 50 feet
away behind his business computer. Basically,
the State’s witnesses’ testimony is fully contradicted by reliable electronic
and physical evidence. Although the
Grand Jury proceedings are not supposed to be adversarial ones, the prosecutor
must present evidence that will tend to disprove the elements of the state’s
charges or that would shed reasonable doubt that elements of the alleged
offenses ever took place. The bottom
line is that the prosecutor decided to withhold from the Grand Jury reliable
electronic evidence and eye-witnesses and the grand jury "was deprived of its right to investigate
and its ultimate task of determining whether the State did in fact present a prima
facie case." Hogan, supra, 281 N.J. Super. at 299, 657 A.2d 462.
Because a target has neither a right
to testify before the grand jury nor to have the grand jury hear any particular
evidence, the target is completely dependent on the prosecutor to inform the
grand jury of exculpatory evidence.
Although a prosecutor is not required to present “all possibly
exculpatory evidence” to a grand jury, he or she must alert the grand jurors to
the existence of “important exculpatory evidence.” In that category, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts includes “exculpatory evidence that
would greatly undermine the credibility of an important witness, [other]
evidence likely to affect the grand jury’s decision,” as well as evidence the
withholding of which would cause the presentation to be seriously tainted. The evidence proffered by the Defendant
demonstrates that the withheld evidence would have distorted or “greatly
undermined” the credibility of the evidence presented to the Grand Jury.
The evidence standard before the Grand Jury is whether there
is “evidence, which if uncontradicted and unexplained, would carry the case to
a jury and justify the conviction of the accused.” Trap
Rock Industries. Inc., v. Kohl, 59 N.J. 471 (1971). While this evidential burden may seem low, it
provides an important protection to citizens by preventing the State from
abusing its power and bringing criminal charges that lack any basis in the
evidence or they are contradicted by other evidence or witness testimony. Sufficiency of the evidence is not the
decision point; the evidence presented
must be uncontradicted and unexplained – this is the key decision point. Here, all the evidence presented to the Grand
Jury has been contradicted and fully explained by the Defendant’s proffered
evidence. Protecting our citizens
against the possibility of unfounded criminal charges is the most important
function of the grand jury.
Here, all the statements presented to the jurors were also false or
fraudulent and the Defendant was prepared to testify and provide evidence that
would have refuted necessary elements of each offense that he was charged with
and would have contradicted and explained testimony presented by the State. The Defendant would have testified, among
other important facts, that
·
that no court had adjudicated a Judgment of Possession through an
eviction hearing or a summary dispossess hearing;
·
that the Chancery Court had no subject matter jurisdiction over a land
possession issue, as such issues are the jurisdiction of the Law Division; and
therefore, all possession orders issued by Chancery Court were void ab initio,
with no legal effect, a complete nullity;
·
that no court had ordered a writ of possession to be issued, following an
eviction hearing (a property possession hearing); it was the conspirator Robert
Del Vecchio who falsified forms presented to a judge in Mercer County (Judge
Jacobson) and put language to indicate that the possession issue had been
adjudged – but it had not been adjudicated by any court – THIS IS AN EXTRAORDINARY
IMPORTANT POINT FOR THE COURT TO UNDERSTAND;
·
that he did not know that Sheriff employees were “police officers” as the
State fraudulently states in its brief;
·
that the Sheriff employees were not wearing the dark “police officer”
uniforms, but they were wearing Sheriff civil division uniforms;
·
that the individuals peering through Defendant’s side windows never announced
that they were “police officers” or sheriff officers;
·
that a young (neither bold and no facial hair) Sheriff employee was
illegally peering through Defendant’s side window; and that he slipped and fell
as he was standing at the very edge of the porch and was illegally trying to
look inside Defendant’s home at about 8:53 am, about 3 minutes after he arrived
at the porch at 8:50 am;
·
that Lucas (he may have been the sworn law enforcement officer on duty
that day) was not the one peering through that side window and that he was
located at least 50 feet away near his sheriff vehicle;
·
that Lucas formed a conspiracy with the other Sheriff employees to
testify that he was the one sitting on the porch of the Defendant’s home; the reason is that none of the other sheriff
employees were sworn law enforcement officers;
·
that Lucas has testified that it was hard to see inside the home because
of the sun reflection, further corroborating Defendant’s facts presented in the
Motion to Dismiss;
·
that a Writ of Possession does not allow the Sheriff to peer through
inaccessible windows or perform illegal search especially if the Plaintiff (the
conspirators, Robert Del Vecchio, ATF, et al.) has not arrived at the property;
·
that a Warrant for Removal issued by a Law Division Judge was required to
remove the Plaintiff from his home or business and that the Sheriff did not
have a Warrant and that no such Warrant for Removal was ever obtained from a
Law Division court;
·
that the Plaintiff representative (the conspirators Robert Del Vecchio,
ATF, et al) were not present during the Sheriff illegal peering through the
window(s) of Defendant’s home;
·
that the County, the Chancery Court and the conspirators also
violated the New Jersey Constitution, Article I, paragraph 20 that states that Private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.
Individuals or private corporations shall not be authorized to take
private property for public use without just compensation first made to the
owners. And that under no
circumstances private property can be taken by private entities and that no
court can issue orders to that effect, taking private property fully owned by
the Defendant and delivering it to a third, private party;
·
That no property possession hearings
(eviction hearings) or summary dispossess proceedings were ever held before any
court of proper jurisdiction, in violation of New Jersey law – the State has not and cannot provide
evidence to this Court that a Property Possession hearing (an eviction hearing)
ever took place; the conspirators simply
fooled a Court Clerk in Mercer County into believing that the property
possession had been adjudicated;
·
no bench or other trial was ever held by
McVeigh on any issue before her;
·
no fact-findings and application of the law
to the facts consistent with Court Rule 1:7-4(a) were ever held; and that the
Court of Appeals would have vacated every order that had been issued;
·
no pre-eviction notices were ever provided to
the Defendant, as is required by New Jersey Law;
·
no stay of the proceedings for up to six
months were ever held authorized under NJSA § 2A:42-10.6 and no notices were provided by the
conspirators advising the Defendant to apply for a stay;
·
that during the execution of a Writ of Possession, the Sheriff is not
allowed to brake the door or enter the premises without the owner being present;
and that the Sheriff in this case did just that or attempted to do that without
the conspirators being present;
·
that Defendant’s business, Metropolitan Environmental Services, was not
part of the Writ of Possession; and that the Sheriff was not authorized to
remove Defendant’s business from the premises; but the Sheriff did it anyway;
·
that Defendant never threatened anyone few days prior to the eviction, as
the prosecutor has fraudulently asserted in his response brief; the Court should order the State to provide
proof of these fraudulent assertions, as these lies were also made to the Grand
Jurors and painted the Defendant as a violent person and affected the jury’s
decision to indict;
·
that it was the Defendant who called Judge McVeigh to ask for a stay or
check on the status of a stay he had applied few weeks ago, pursuant to with
NJSA § 2A:42-10.6 that
allows up to a six month stay;
·
that the Sheriff SWAT team had sharpshooters and
snipers pointing at Defendant’s chest and head while he was talking to judge
McVeigh and the Defendant was fearful of his life and that is why he told the
Judge that there will be blood shed unless there is a stay; a simple stay (allowed by the New Jersey
statutes (and granted by all courts) would have prevented this incident);
·
that several appeals were pending, including a Suit to Vacate the Tax
Deed; and that THE Sheriff employees now
claim that they did not know that appeals and suits were pending;
·
that the Defendant was forced out of his home by the threats made by Sheriff
officer Celix that the SWAT team will break into his home if he does not get
out; Defendant hereby requests that the phone conversations between Celix and
him become available to the Defendant;
·
that at 1:30 pm, the SWAT team got the go-ahead to use excessive and
unnecessary force and break into Defendant’s home without having a Warrant;
·
that at no time did anyone told the Defendant that he was under arrest;
·
that at no time did anyone told the Defendant that he had committed any
offense;
·
that at no time did anyone told the Defendant that an arrest warrant had
been issued for his arrest;
·
that at no time did the Defendant barricaded the door or windows or the
property;
·
that the Defendant only wanted (and had the right) to protect his
business and business property that was not part of the fraudulent Writ of
Possession, pursuant to NJSA 2C:3-6 (defense of premises NJSA 2C:3-6(a) and (b)
and defense of personal property (NJSA 2C:3-6(c) and (d));
·
that Defendant’s property was sold for $330,000, representing the fair
market value of the property; while the
Wayne Township has over assessed the property at almost $500,000; this is more
than the 15% allowance on over-assessments and that as result no taxes were due
to the Township, as a matter of law;
·
that the Tax Assessor of Wayne Township sent a letter to the Defendant
stating that no assessments had been performed since 1995;
·
that flooding in Passaic County had reduced the property values,
including the Defendant’s and had communicated so with the Assessor.
·
that the former home of the Defendant was located in an isolated and
wooded area of Wayne where less than 5 people and less than 5 habitations were
located within 100 feet from the property;
·
that Lucas was not the person illegally peering through Defendant’s side
window, as the Defendant has recently obtained a photo of Lucas and he is not
the person that he saw having stuck his face onto the side window; Defendant remembers a young person peering
through his side window; that person had full set of hair and no facial hair,
while Lucas is in his 50s and has facial hair and he is very-very bold. The young sheriff employee was in his late
20s to early 30s and had full set of hair and also had very sharp eyes illegally
searching inside the residence as the Defendant did not answer the door at 8:50
am. Defendant hereby requests a list of the
names of all Sheriff employees who were originally dispatched at the 687 Indian
Road property at 8:50 am. This is
obviously a bomb-shell, as it will expose the conspiracy among these Sheriff
employees to frame the Defendant.
·
I am attaching the original charge filed by
Lucas on 6/28/2011 under Section NJS 2C:17-2C.
As you see, he wrote the reason for the charge is “PLACING SLIVER[sic]
METAL CONTAINER ON HIS FRONT STEPS CAUSING THE EVACUATION OF NEIGHBORS”. As you know by now, this was a BLACK PLASTIC
SAFETY CONTAINER FOR MY BUSINESS INSTRUMENT placed there to be picked up by the
vendor, Pines Environmental. Note that Lucas
writes: “SLIVER [sic]” (he meant silver). However, this was a black plastic instrument
case. This is another clue telling me that Lucas was not there to
eye-witness the instrument.
MORE FRAUDULENT STATEMENTS MADE BEFORE THE GRAND JURY TO PORTRAY MR. STEPHANATOS AS A VIOLENT PERSON
In 2008, Robert Del Vecchio put a
lien onto Basilis Stephanatos' residential property for unpaid taxes that
Stephanatos was disputing due to alleged over assessment of his residence (in
fact, after the seizure of the Stephanatos' propety, Del Vecchio sold it for
$330,000 which is the fair market value of the property. However, the
property was assessed by Wayne Township at $475,000. This is about 40 percent
greater over-assessment and thus no taxes were legally owed by Basilis
Stephanatos- tragic, tragic, tragic situation).
In any event, around December 2008,
Robert Del Vecchio, Jr. (he was a lawyer for American Tax Funding, Inc.) sent a
letter to Basilis Stephanatos , notifying him that a lien has been placed onto
his property. Then on December 26, 2008, Basilis Stephanatos sent a letter
to Robert Del Vecchio demanding that the lien be removed. Basilis
Stephanatos wrote that he is filing a criminal complaint and other reporting to
the media. He basically threatened Robert Del Vecchio with legal action
and not physical violent threats.
This is what Basilis Stephanatos
wrote to Robert Del Vecchio in the December 28, 2008 letter:
26
December 2008
Robert
A. Del Vecchio, Esq.
405
Lafayette Avenue
P.O.
Box 561
Hawthorne,
New Jersey 07507
Phone: (973) 423-9035
Fax: (973) 423-9036
RE: Tax Sale Certificate #02310
Block/Lot 4503. 21
ATF, Inc.
Wayne Township, New Jersey
TO WHOM IT MAY
CONCERN:
This is a follow-up letter to the one we sent
you on 24 December 2008. We demand that
you immediately remove the lien you have placed on our property. I am filing criminal complaint against you,
ATF, Inc., Wayne Township Tax Collector and Wayne Township for violation of a
number of federal civil rights. I am
also sending the file information to the newspapers.
This is not a threat – it is real. After you see what we have in store for your
client, you will beg to be instead fucked in the ass by a 5-ft long rhinoceros
dick for the rest of your life.
Mary Christmas and Happy the New Year.
Very Truly Yours,
Basilis N. Stephanatos
Block/Lot 4503. 21.
"This
is not a threat – it is real. After you see what we have in store for
your client, you will beg to be instead fucked in the ass by a 5-ft long rhinoceros
dick for the rest of your life.
Mary
Christmas and Happy the New Year."
So, Stephanatos
never threatened Del Vecchio with violence and certainly this was 2.5 years
prior to the June 28, 2011 incident. However, Robert Del Vecchio, perhaps in a conspiracy with Judge Margaret McVeigh, stated that Mr. Stephanatos had threatened Del Vecchio few days prior to the June 28, 2011 eviction with violence and that Stephanatos told him that " I will fuck in the ass by a 5-ft long rhinoceros
dick". As the Court can see, this was a fraudulent statement Del Vecchio made in order to seize Mr. Stephanatos' property without following the Summary Dispossess Act, as is required under New Jersey Law. Then, the state prosecutors also used this same fraudulent statement before the Grand Jury to depict Mr. Stephanatos as a violent person. Fraudulent statements like that essentially sealed the fate of Mr. Stephanatos before the Grand Jury.
THIS IS VERY SERIOUS ALLEGATION AND THIS COURT MUST PERFORM AN URGENT
INVESTIGATION.
The above is just a summary of the factual
contentions of the Defendant. These
factual contentions, along with physical corroborating evidence, refute the
allegations of the State witnesses and refute elements of the alleged offenses
by facts and testimony and other physical and printed corroborating evidence
that clearly exculpate the Defendant or at least place reasonable doubt upon
necessary elements of the charged offenses.
A Defendant’s statement denying involvement in an alleged
offense, although such a statement directly negates guilt, ordinarily would not
be sufficiently credible to be ‘clearly exculpatory,’ and need not be revealed
to the grand jury.
[Hogan, Id. at 237–38.
However, in this case the eye-witness testimony of the
Defendant would have provided not just a mere statement of not-guilty, but
consists of numerous eyewitness observations, and corroborating emails and
phone records, and written material and photographs and detailed description of
the physical setting and the surroundings that would have greatly assisted the
Grand Jury in its investigation. In this
particular case, it is important to note that the State has not provided not a
single physical corroborating evidence to the Grand Jury and also has not
provided any corroborating witness to the Lucas and D’Agostino testimony.
The Appellate
Division, in John Hogan, supra, correctly observed that a
prosecutor’s obligation to instruct the grand jury on possible defenses is a
corollary to his responsibility to present exculpatory evidence. 336 N.J. Super. at 341. Since Defendant’s home and Defendant’s
business and personal property was involved, the State should have presented
the defenses of one’s person, the defense of his dwelling, the defense of his
business and the defense of his property (both business and personal). In Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, as well as
in this reply brief, the Defendant has presented numerous facts that clearly
warranted an instruction of the Defense of Home, Defense of Property, Duress,
Entrapment and Self-Defense.
New Jersey
self-defense law permits citizens to use force against unlawful intrusion into
their homes, curtilage, or occupied motor vehicles by any person, including
public servants. This law altered the
landscape of the Castle Doctrine by extending legal protection to those who
would use force against the police.
In the Preamble to the New Jersey
Self-Defense Act, an act concerning
the protection of persons and property, amending N.J.S.2C:3-4 and N.J.S.2C:3-6,
introduced in the assembly and the senate for the 2010 session, the [New Jersey] Legislature finds and
declares that:
a. It is proper for law-abiding people
to protect themselves, their families and others from intruders and attackers
without fear of prosecution or civil action for acting in defense of their own
well-being and the well-being of others.
b. The "Castle Doctrine" is
a long-standing American legal concept
arising from English Common Law that provides that one's abode is a special area in which one enjoys
certain protections and immunities, that
one is not obligated to retreat before defending oneself against attack, and that one may do
so without fear of prosecution.
c. Article I of the New Jersey
Constitution guarantees the citizens of this State the rights "of enjoying
and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness."
d. The Second Amendment to the United
States Constitution affords the people of this nation the right to keep and
bear arms.
e. All who reside in and all who visit
this State have a right to expect to be unmolested and safe within their homes,
residences and vehicles.
f. No person should be required, as a
point of law, to surrender their personal safety or well-being to the unlawful
actions of a criminal, nor to needlessly retreat in the face of intrusion or
attack.
g. It is, therefore, altogether
fitting and proper, and within the public interest, to ensure that law-abiding
people are justified in protecting themselves, their families and others from
intruders and attackers, and that they may do so without fear of prosecution or
civil action.
DEFENSE
OF PREMISES (N.J.S.A. 2C:3-6(a) and (b))
The State
failed or refused to charge the Grand Jury with the ordinary defense of the
Defense of Premises N.J.S.A.
2C:3-6(a) and (b). The burden of
proof is upon the State to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the use of force by the Defendant was not
justified. Here is what the Model Jury
instructions provide for this defense:
A section of our criminal law provides
that ......... the use of force upon or toward the person of another is
justifiable when the actor is in possession or control of premises or is
licensed or privileged to be thereon and he reasonably believes such force
necessary to prevent or terminate what he reasonably believes to be the
commission or attempted commission of a criminal trespass by such other person
in or upon such premises.
A reasonable
belief is one that is not recklessly or negligently held;
it is a belief that would be held by a person of ordinary prudence and
intelligence situated as defendant was.
As the statute indicates, the defense of property exonerates a person
who uses force in the reasonable belief that such action was necessary to
prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission of a criminal
trespass, even though his/her belief was later proven mistaken. Accordingly, the law requires only a
reasonable, not necessarily a correct, judgment.
A person commits a criminal trespass
if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or
surreptitiously remains in any research facility, structure, or separately
secured or occupied portion thereof.
BURDEN OF PROOF [ALL
CASES]
The
burden of proof is upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
use of force by the defendant was not justified. Thus, if you find that the State has proven
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
_________________________ [the crime[s] charged in the indictment] and has also
proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not justified in using
force, then your verdict must be guilty.
But if you have a reasonable doubt whether his/her use of force was
justified, then your verdict must be not guilty.
The State has
falsely stated that this is an affirmative defense. In an affirmative defense, the defendant has
the burden to prove the defense by a preponderance of evidence. However, the above Model Jury instructions
clearly state that the burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the use of force by the defendant was not justified. Thus this is not an affirmative defense and
it should have been charged to the Grand Jury.
Defendant provided affidavits or
certifications to Mr. Herman for submittal to the grand jury, but Mr. Herman
failed to do so. Defendant had evidence
provided to Mr. Herman proving that at the time the complainants claim he was
standing at his front door, he was in fact sitting in front of his computer,
sending emails to his clients. These
proofs would have established that defendant could not have acted the way the
complainants allege. Also, the record
reveals that counsel advised defendant of his right to testify before the grand
jury and defendant eagerly decided to do so. Defendant was eager, willing
and ready to testify and took the liberty to contact Mr. Dewey multiple
times to ask as to when he can testify in the grand jury proceedings.
However,
defendant did not testify to the grand jury due to omissions by Mr. Herman
and the acts of the prosecutors and no exculpatory or
defenses/justifications/privileges/immunities were ever presented to the grand
jurors. Defendant did not testify
regarding the elements of knowledge, purpose, or intent or scienter of the
individual offenses. Should defendant
have testified to the grand jury on his alibi and his defenses/justifications,
he would have been exonerated of all charges.
POST SALE
PROCEDURE FOR MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE CASES
The
applicable statutes here are the so called Summary Dispossess Act statutes. The
Summary Dispossess Act, N.J.S. 2A:18-53 et seq. was enacted in 1951 and
amended in 1983 and 1991. Since enactment
of the Anti-Eviction Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 et seq., the Summary Dispossess
Act has been understood to cover the eviction of nonresidential tenants and
residential tenants not covered by the Anti-Eviction Act. This is a very critical issue for the Court
to note. Source: STATE OF NEW
JERSEY, NEW JERSEY LAW REVISION COMMISSION, Final Report Relating to Landlord
and Tenant Law, February 10, 2012.
This Court
should also compare the law of the state of New York, where similar process
must be followed, i.e., the issue of actual possession must be decided by a Law
Division Judge, after a new owner (a tax sale purchaser) has met the conditions
for taking possession. The court should
note here that ATF and Robert Del Vechhio did not take possession of the property; they only wanted to remove Dr. Stephanatos
from the property. They immediately sold
the property for $330,000 to a third party.
The Court should note that the conspirators could have sold the property
without violently removing Dr. Stephanatos from his home and place of business.
Based on New
Jersey and New York law, including the law of all other states, to remove a
person in actual possession, the owner must occupy the premises himself (this
was not the case here as ATF did not take actual possession of the premises and
only took constructive possession) or no rent was being paid or for breach of
the peace. In other words, only after
they met few exceptions (such as not paying rent, etc.) and through an Order
from a Law Division Judge could have allowed these defendants to enter Dr.
Stephanatos’ property and to remove him from his dwelling in tax lien cases.
The
defendants intentionally did not follow the Anti-Eviction Act, N.J.S.A.
2A:18-61.1 et seq., and the Summary Dispossess Act, N.J.S. 2A:18-53 et
seq. and refused to follow the Unlawful and Forceful Entry and Detainer
statutes of the state of New Jersey, and they willfully lied to the Mercer
County Clerk in May 2011 that there were no persons in the premises (see
Exhibit C for the willful misrepresentation by Robert Del Vecchio that no
persons with possessory interests were present at the residence of Dr.
Stephanatos) protected by either the Anti-Eviction Act N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1
et seq., or the Summary Dispossess Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53 et seq.
These
criminals[5]
(especially Robert Del Vecchio, Jr., Esq and Robert Del Vecchio, Sr., Esq who
are both lawyers in New Jersey) knew that this was a residential property and
this was not a mortgage foreclosure case and they knew that they had to comply
with the Unlawful Entry and Wrongful Entry statutes – but they knowingly
decided not to comply with the state law.
This way they managed to fool the sheriff (there is significant evidence,
however, that Del Vecchio, D’Agostino and Lucas formed a conspiracy to violate
the legal rights of the Plaintiff) to perform an unlawful search and unlawful
entry and to forcefully remove Dr. Stephanatos from his lawfully-occupied
residence on June 28, 2011.
State statute
N.J.S.A. 2A:18-57 requires that a judgment of possession must be issued
by a Law Division judge, followed by a warrant for removal. Specifically, state law requires that a
Warrant for Removal must be obtained by a Law Division judge (see N.J.S.A.
2A:18-57 for non-leaseholders and N.J.S.A. 2A:42-10.1 for
leaseholders)).
2009 New Jersey Code
TITLE 2A - ADMINISTRATION OF CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Section 2A:18
2A:18-57. Judgment for
possession; warrant for removal; issuance
If no sufficient
cause is shown to the contrary when the action comes on for trial, the
court shall issue its warrant to any officer of the court, commanding him to
remove all persons from the premises, and to put the claimant into full
possession thereof, and to levy and make the costs out of the goods and
chattels of the person in possession.
No warrant of
removal shall issue until the expiration of 3 days after entry of
judgment for possession, except as provided for in chapter 42 of this
Title.
L.1951 (1st SS), c.344; amended by L.1979,
c. 392, s. 1, eff. Feb. 6, 1980.
Furthermore,
Section 2 of P.L.1974, c.47 (C.2A:42-10.16) reads as follows:
2. In any
proceeding for the summary dispossession of a tenant, warrant for possession
issued by a court of appropriate jurisdiction: a. Shall
include a notice to the tenant of any right to apply to the court for a stay of
execution of the warrant, together with a notice advising that the tenant may
be eligible for temporary housing assistance or other social services and that
the tenant should contact the appropriate county welfare …
No such
notice was provided in the Writ of Possession issued by a Clerk of Mercer
County (again, that Mercer County court had no jurisdiction over property that
is located in other counties).
The
defendants fraudulently and willfully refused to obtain such judgment of
possession from a Law Division judge and a warrant for removal and instead
provided a certification to a Clerk of the Mercer County that no persons with
possessory interests were present, when in fact Plaintiff was in actual
peaceful possession continuously since 1995.
We are providing below a summary from a document entitled Practical
Guide to Foreclosures and Foreclosure Alternatives, by Ralph F. Casale, Esq.,
2008, 290 Route 46 West, Denville, New Jersey 07834 to show to this Court that in order
for a person to be evicted the new owner must initiate a legal process and is
required to obtain a Judgment of Possession, followed by a Writ of
Possession.
The procedure
listed below is for mortgage foreclosures and subsequent evictions. The present case is a so-called tax-lien
foreclosure. In the present case, the
conspirators were mandated to initiate eviction proceedings and obtain a
Judgment for Possession followed by a Warrant for Possession or Warrant for
Removal, but they never did. There is
not record that an eviction proceeding ever took place and the State has not
(and cannot) provide with any proof that a Judgment for Possession legal
proceeding ever took place. As we have
explained to this Court, the circumvention of the New Jersey legal procedures
was part of the conspiracy scheme to defraud homeowners of their properties.
In a mortgage foreclosure case, if the lender is the successful bidder, the sheriff will provide a deed in due course which is then recorded.
The lender then is burdened
with selling the premises
which obviously incurs more time and costs. The premises must be brought to saleable condition, there are the usual realtor
commissions, transfer taxes and if not current, past due real estate taxes and possibly
condominium association fees.
More
often than not the former borrowers still occupy the premises.
In order to sell and close the property must be vacant. The lender can try to persuade the borrowers to vacate the premises
voluntarily. Many lenders
try to provide “cash for keys”. Sometimes the
incentive of a cash payment from the lender is enough to convince
the borrowers to vacate. Most often however,
the lender must evict the occupant of the premises. If the occupants
are the former borrowers, the process is accomplished through a Judgment of Possession, followed by a Writ of Possession
and affected through the sheriff
of the county. The process usually takes an additional
three to six months. The lender can expect the borrower to apply to the court
for the extension of the eviction
for a variety of reason and the courts are generally very liberal in extending the date. Once the final eviction date is established, the lender must provide
a representative at the designate
time at the property
along with a locksmith and mover. The sheriff only attends the eviction to insure and peaceful turnover
of the property. The sheriff is
not supposed to do anything and must wait for the arrival of the owner or its
representative.
If the premises are occupied by persons other than the borrowers
or their relatives, the eviction process is subject to applicable tenancy
laws. This is also crucial for this Court to note,
as a tenant, Metropolitan Environmental Services, was present at the
premises. New Jersey
has what is generally
referred to as an anti-eviction statute. The statute’s effect is that as long as a (tenant(
pays the rent, the
landlord cannot evict the tenant. There
must be a reason for the tenant to be evicted.
There are several steps the lender and its attorney must follow to eventually effect an eviction. Suffice
it to say that the process is much slower than the eviction of the former borrowers. Several legal issues arise. Are the premises
properly registered with the municipality; what can the lender/landlord reasonably demand as monthly rent; should the lender offer a lease and if
so, on what terms; if
the property
is a multi-family, is it in compliance with applicable state regulations effecting multi-family dwellings; what if the property is a FHA Section 8 premises?
Clearly the lender must be in close communication with its attorney
who hopefully is well versed in this area of the law. Without going into all the intricacies of the process,
assuming the tenant does not pay the rent, a tenancy
action is instituted which will eventually result in a Warrant
for Removal which is effected
by a constable along with a
representative of the lender/landlord, locksmith
and mover.
Source:
Practical Guide to Foreclosures and Foreclosure Alternatives, by Ralph F.
Casale, Esq., 2008, 290 Route 46 West, Denville, New Jersey 07834.
Similar
procedure is followed in tax lien foreclosure case, with the significant
difference that in residential properties (such as the one at hand) instead of
a Writ of Possession, the Sheriff must obtain a Warrant. Here, the Sheriff failed to obtain a Warrant.
The
application of the New Jersey land possession statutes is explained in detail
in Gary LEVIN and Donna Levin, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Adrian LYNN, et al.,
310 N.J. Super. 177, decided April 1998, Appellate Division A-1537-96T2.
“The references therein, to N.J.S.A.
2A:18-53 et seq. and N.J.S.A. 2A:39-2 et seq., are to the statutory provisions
concerning, respectively, summary dispossess proceedings instituted in the
Special Civil Part, and Superior Court actions to establish either title or the
right to possession of real property, and the intent of those amendments is
clearly to prohibit a landlord or anyone else from taking possession of
residential premises without following judicial procedures. In the case of a
summary dispossess proceeding (which is the method employed by the Millers to
obtain a judgment of possession against plaintiffs here) that procedure
includes the landlord's obtaining of a warrant for possession. N.J.S.A.
2A:18-57. And, it should be noted that in any action seeking possession of a
residential property, the issuance of that warrant can be delayed, for good
cause, for as long as six months:
[I]n any action brought by a landlord
against a tenant to recover possession of premises or unit used for dwelling
purposes, to which this act is applicable, whether by summary dispossess
proceedings, civil action for the possession of land, or otherwise, the judge
of the court having jurisdiction shall use sound discretion in the issuance of
a warrant or writ for removal or writ of possession, and if it shall appear
that by the issuance of the warrant or writ the tenant will suffer hardship
because of the unavailability of other dwelling accommodations the judge may
stay the issuance of the warrant or writ and cause the same to issue at such
time as he shall deem proper under the circumstances, but in no case shall such
judge stay the issuance of any such warrant or writ for possession for a longer
period than 6 months after the date of entry of judgment of possession․
[N.J.S.A. 2A:42-10.6.]”
These
practices by these convicted criminals have been criticized by the state of New
Jersey and the Public Advocate Division. See for example the following
excerpt from the “Toolkit for Tenants Living in Foreclosed Properties”,
published by the Department of the Public Advocate, Trenton, NJ 08625, dated
March 2010:
Courts and Sheriffs In addition to owners and those who
work for them, the courts and sheriff officers sometimes mistakenly target
protected tenants during the foreclosure process. The writs of execution and
final foreclosure judgments are drafted by the attorneys for the lenders. The
attorneys sometimes use language in court papers that cause problems because it
seems to cover tenants (for example, “and any and all persons occupying said
premises”). Other times attorneys specifically name tenants and certify (swear
to the court) that those tenants are not covered by the Anti-Eviction Act. This is especially problematic because
tenants often do not have the opportunity to demonstrate that they are in fact
legitimate tenants until after the removal has already been ordered by the
court and scheduled by the sheriff. If a court order specifically names a
tenant to be removed, the sheriff must evict that person. Sometimes, however,
sheriffs read the language in the order and believe that they must evict
everyone. Also, some notices that sheriffs create and post on property include
language, such as “occupants” instead of “owners,” that appears to include
tenants. The Attorney General
distributed a memo to sheriffs regarding the rights of tenants living in
foreclosed properties.
Thus, the judges and the sheriff knew of the
practices of Del Vecchio and ATF; yet, the sheriff employees acted as agents
for Del Vecchio and intentionally violated Dr. Stephanatos’ possessory rights,
including a host of other offenses. Dr.
Stephanatos had informed the two judges and the sheriff of these practices by
Del Vecchio and ATF and had alerted the authorities (the sheriff, the governor,
the local senator O’Toole, etc.) that these individuals are breaking a host of
state and federal laws. Dr. Stephanatos
also filed appeals and suits to vacate the tax deed.
Dr.
Stephanatos also had significant possessory interest, including the filing of a
Suit to Vacate the Tax Deed, the filing of two appeals, the possession of a
business in the premises, and the right to buy back the rights to the property.
See N.J.S.A. 54:5-104.100. This state law is consistent with the
legislative findings in N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1a.
See also Royal Tax Lien
Services, LLC v Morodan, Appellate Division, Docket No. A-1211-14T3, July
20, 2015 wherein the court stated:
On the other hand, the tax sale laws and our court rules are designed to allow owners to redeem their properties where possible, and to receive relief from inequitable judgments. The analysis
found in I.E. clearly favors defendants, and although not binding upon us, it clearly and convincingly outlines the equitable weight
that should be accorded to a defendant’s concerns in this scenario, the
consequences of which are draconian.
The
equities at stake can vary when the redemption value is disproportionately low
relative to the owner's equity in the property. As the court stated in I.E.'s,
LLC v. Simmons, 392 N.J. Super. 520, 536 (Law Div. 2006), the law results in a
"harshness of the tax sale certificate proceedings in this State, where
people with substantial equity in a property, for whatever reason, fail to pay
property taxes and thereafter default in the tax sale certificate foreclosure
proceedings."
In that case, the
redemption amount was $22,837.50 and the property's value was $275,000. Ibid.
That disparity is similar in magnitude to the disparity in this case. That
opinion also stated:
Until the Legislature
devises a better system, courts of equity must do their best to balance the
equities, taking into account the necessity of allowing the transfer of clear
title and the need to compel the payment of property taxes against the
necessity of ameliorating, in appropriate circumstances, the onerous impact of
the procedure in circumstances where the party has remained in possession of
the property and has substantial equity in it.
[Id.
at 537.]
This Court
should also compare the law of the state of New York, where similar process
must be followed, i.e., the issue of possession must be decided by a Law
Division judge:
NEW YORK STATE REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW(RPAPL)
ARTICLE 7
SUMMARY PROCEEDING TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF REAL PROPERTY
Sec. 713. GROUNDS WHERE NO
LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP EXISTS.
A special proceeding may be maintained under this article after a ten-day
notice to quit has been served upon the respondent in the manner prescribed in
section 735, upon the following grounds:
1. The property has been
sold by virtue of an execution against him or a person under whom he claims and
a title under the sale has been perfected.
2. He occupies or holds
the property under an agreement with the owner to occupy and cultivate it upon
shares or for a share of the crops and the time fixed in the agreement for his
occupancy has expired.
3. He or the person to
whom he has succeeded has intruded into or squatted upon the property without
the permission of the person entitled to possession and the occupancy has
continued without permission or permission has been revoked and notice of
the revocation given to the person to be removed.
4. The property has
been sold for unpaid taxes and a tax deed has been executed and delivered
to the purchaser and he or any subsequent grantee, distributee or devisee
claiming title through such purchaser has complied with all
provisions of law precedent to the right to possession and the time of
redemption by the former owner or occupant has expired.
5. The property has been
sold in foreclosure and either the deed delivered pursuant to such sale, or a
copy of such deed, certified as provided in the civil practice law
and rules, has been exhibited to him.
Based on New
Jersey and New York law, including the law of all other states, to remove a
person in possession, the owner must occupy the premises himself (this was not
the case here) or no rent was being paid or for breach of the peace. In
other words, only after they met few exceptions (such as not paying rent, etc.)
and through an Order from a Law Division Judge could have allowed these
defendants to enter Dr. Stephanatos’ property and to remove him from his
dwelling. They did not follow the Wrongful Entry and Detainer Act and the
Anti-Eviction Act, or the Summary Dispossess Act and they willfully lied to the
Mercer County Clerk in May 2011 that there were no tenants in the premises (see
Exhibit B in Attachment 7 for the willful misrepresentation by Robert Del
Vecchio that no tenants were present at the residence of Dr. Stephanatos and
that Dr. Stephanatos had no possessory interests in his home).
The
defendants also knew that the Wrongful or Unlawful Entry statutes protect
Plaintiff’s right to remain in possession of his residence. Specifically,
N.J.S.A. 2A:39-7 says that title shall not be an issue since
Plaintiff was in continuous possession of his residence for 16 years.
N.J.S.A. 2A:39-7 Title not inquired
into; defense of 3 years possession
Title shall not be an issue in any
action commenced under this chapter. 3 years peaceable possession by the
defendant shall be a defense to the action.
Defendants
Del Vecchio and ATF failed to disclose these statutes to the sheriff that
prevent the sheriff from evicting a person from a residential property without
a Warrant for Removal. This way they managed
to fool the sheriff to perform an unlawful search and unlawful entry and to
forcefully remove Dr. Stephanatos from his lawfully-occupied residence on June
28, 2011. The New Jersey Law clearly says that these individuals can be
charged with criminal trespass, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3, including
many other criminal charges, such as Theft by Unlawful Taking, Robbery,
Burglary, etc.
Dr.
Stephanatos’ possessory interest in his home could not have been violated by
the defendants without the very specific legal process of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53
et seq. However, the
defendants willfully violated Dr. Stephanatos’ legal rights
It is very
crucial for this Court to understand that the conspirators never instituted
such land possession proceedings before any court of competent jurisdiction. It is mandatory that summary dispossess
proceedings, civil action for the possession of land, or otherwise be held by
the conspirators, in accordance with New Jersey law, but the conspirators
intentionally did not do that. These
convicted criminals simply drafted the document entitled “Final Judgment” and
they gave it to a Judge in Mercer County (Judge Jacobson) to sign the two
pages. This was part of the conspiratory
scheme of these criminals, i.e., to file false certifications with the courts,
to mislead the courts in signing judgements of possession without holding any
hearing or any New Jersey law-mandated legal process. The
State has not and cannot provide ANY legal proceedings to this Court where the
Judgment of Possession was adjudicated.
And certainly cannot provide any evidence regarding such proceedings
against Metropolitan Environmental Services, a proper and legal tenant of the
687 Indian Road premises.
Importantly,
the New Jersey law allows for extension of the eviction time, even in case
where a valid Writ was issued. See N.J.S.A. 2A:42-10.6. Here, the Defendant called and wrote and pled
with the conspirators and Judge McVeigh to stop the illegal onslaught and to
stay the illegal eviction, but to no avail.
Judge McVeigh sure should have known that no eviction hearings (Judgment
of Possession) were ever held. She
should have known that what the conspirators were doing was illegal; she could not have been that incompetent of a
judge. Perhaps she is an incompetent
judge, as she also failed to consider defendant’s full equity in his home (as
is mandated by New Jersey case law (see Royal
Tax Lien Services, LLC v Morodan, Appellate Division, Docket No.
A-6030-12T1, July 3, 2014)) and she never conducted a bench trial to
determine the facts consistent with Rule 1:7-4(a).
Judge
Jacobson in Mercer County simply issued a judgment against defendant based on
the statements of the conspirators Robert Del Vecchio and American Tax Funding
(ATF). The entire panorama of
circumstances indicate that defendant was denied due process. There are issues and defenses of entrapment,
duress and improper government conduct.
It is the
Defendant’s position that New Jersey’s Anti-Eviction Act (N.J.S.A.
2A:18-61.1 et seq.) and New Jersey’s Foreclosure Fairness Act (N.J.S.A.
2A:50-69 thru 72) were violated by the State’s and conspirators’ actions in
this case as they evicted a legal tenant of the premises, Metropolitan
Environmental Services. The fraudulently
obtained Writ of Possession cited by the State, does not include Metropolitan
Environmental Services and the Defendant had the right to defend his business
from illegal eviction. Even more
importantly, State Law requires a Warrant for eviction of a residential tenant.
A JUDGMENT RENDERED WITHOUT PROPER
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION IS VOID.
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION CANNOT BE WAIVED BY THE PARTIES OR OTHERWISE
AVOIDED
JURISDICTION
OF THE NEW JERSEY COURTS
To further prove that a
Chancery Court has no subject matter jurisdiction over land possession issues, here
is the jurisdiction of the New Jersey courts, as is provided at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/civil/.
As you can see, the Chancery Court has no Jurisdiction over property possession
issues. On the other hand, the Law Division handles either the
Landlord-Tenant issues (to summary dispossession actions) or
actions for possession of real estate (unlawful detainer/writ of
possession). This is very critical information, as you can imagine.
Superior Court, Law
Division, Special Civil Part
The
Special Civil Part handles claims for monetary damages of $15,000 or less
(unless the overage is waived) and unlawful detainer actions. Case types
typically filed in the Special Civil Part are damage claims arising from
contract, consumer debt, auto negligence property damage, and statutory penalty
enforcement, and non-monetary matters such as writs of replevins and actions
for possession of real estate (unlawful detainer/writ of possession). Judges
without a jury typically adjudicate Special Civil Part cases. There are
approximately 406,000 cases filed in the Special Civil Part each year.
The
Special Civil Part, Small Claims Section handles cases in which the demand is
$3,000 or less and actions for the return of all or part of a security deposit
when the amount does not exceed $5000. Annually, approximately 35,000 cases are
filed with the Small Claims section.
The
Special Civil Part, Landlord - Tenant Section has limited, special
jurisdiction. It is limited to summary dispossession actions in which the
dispute arise out of a landlord - tenant relationship. The only relief
available is whether possession is returned to the landlord with the tenant’s
summary removal from the property. Annually, approximately 170,000 cases are
filed with the Landlord-Tenant section.
For
more information on Special Civil Part click here.
Superior Court,
Chancery Division, General Equity
Chancery
Division, General Equity handle claims for non-monetary relief, such as
restrictive covenant enforcement, labor injunctions, foreclosures, and
corporation or partnership governance disputes. A judge without a jury tries
General Equity cases. There are approximately 8,900 cases filed in General
Equity each year.
The above
prove beyond any doubt that the Chancery Judge had no jurisdiction over the
possession issue and any orders issued by a court devoid of subject matter
jurisdiction are void and cannot be enforced.
The worst part here is that this “adjudged” possession judgment was
never adjudicated, as there was never a hearing or trial ever took place. The convicted conspirators simply wrote that
language into a “final judgment” issued in May 2011 and gave it to a Chancery
judge in another county, Mercer County, to sign it. Then they obtained an ex-parte Writ of
Possession from a Clerk of Mercer County (note that the subject property was
located in Passaic County, and the Mercer County Clerk had no jurisdiction over
the Defendant’s property located in Passaic County).
Subject
matter jurisdiction can neither be conferred by agreement of the parties nor
waived as a defense, and a court must dismiss the matter if it determines that
it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Macysyn v. Hensler, 329 N.J. Super. 476,
481 (App. Div. 2000) (indicating that such a motion can be made "at any
time"); see also R. 4:6-7; Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court
Rules, comment 1 on R. 4:6-7 (2015).
As defined by
our Supreme Court in James v. Francesco, 61 N.J. 480, 485 (1972), "a judgment
is void if there has been a failure to comply with a requirement which is a
condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the court." A void
judgment is one rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction with regard to the
party against whom it is rendered or lacking jurisdiction of the subject matter
of the action, Restatement, Judgments (2d) Section 1 pp 30-33 (1982), and it
may be set aside without the need of showing a meritorious defense. See Jameson
v. Great Atlantic, 363 N.J. Super. 419, 425 (App. Div. 2003). New
Century Financial Services, Inc. v. Suk Cha Carrero, Appellate Division,
Superior Court, February 2007, Docket No. A-3926-05T23926-05T2.
Thus, the
“final judgment cited by the State was void, not voidable. It had no legal effect whatsoever. Thus, any Writ issued pursuant to such void
judgment was also void, of no legal effect.
A judgment is
void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court has no authority to
adjudicate the controversy. See Bank v.
Kim, 361 N.J. Super. 331, 339 (App. Div. 2003) (mortgage foreclosure
judgment void in violation of bankruptcy automatic stay). Here,
the Chancery court had no subject matter jurisdiction over the property
possession issue and thus any order issued by that court was void, a legal
nullity.
New Jersey
Court Rule 1:13 Miscellaneous Rules as to Procedure
1:13-4.
Transfer of Actions
·
(a) On Motion.
Subject to the right to be prosecuted by indictment, if any court is without
jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action or issue therein or if there
has been an inability to serve a party without whom the action cannot proceed
as provided by R. 4:28-1, it shall, on motion or on its own initiative, order
the action, with the record and all papers on file, transferred to the proper
court or administrative agency, if any, in the State. The action shall then be
proceeded upon as if it had been originally commenced in that court or agency.
4:6-2. How Presented
Every defense, legal or
equitable, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any complaint,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party complaint shall be asserted in the
answer thereto, except that the following defenses, unless otherwise provided
by R. 4:6-3, may at the option of the pleader be made by motion, with briefs:
(a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (b) lack of jurisdiction over
the person, (c) insufficiency of process, (d) insufficiency of service of
process, (e) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (f)
failure to join a party without whom the action cannot proceed, as provided by
R. 4:28-1. If a motion is made raising any of these defenses, it shall be made
before pleading if a further pleading is to be made. No defense or objection is
waived by being joined with one or more other defenses in an answer or motion.
Special appearances are superseded. If, on a motion to dismiss based on the
defense numbered (e), matters outside the pleading are presented to and not
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment
and disposed of as provided by R. 4:46, and all parties shall be given
reasonable opportunity to present all material pertinent to such a motion.
4:6-7. Waiver or
Preservation of Defenses
Defenses (b) (c) and (d) in
R. 4:6-2 are waived if not raised by motion pursuant to R. 4:6-3 or if omitted
from a previously made motion to which R. 4:6-6 is applicable. Defenses (e) and
(f) and an objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may be made
in any pleading permitted or ordered, or by motion for summary judgment or at
the trial on the merits. Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court
shall dismiss the matter except as otherwise provided by R. 1:13-4.
Based on
these above Court Rules, the Chancery Judge should have transferred the land
possession issue to the Law Division.
But she failed to do so and she in fact did not even hold a hearing to
adjudicate the possession. What a rotten
and corrupt to the bone “judge”.
HOW THE
CONSPIRATORS MANAGED TO FOOL (OR CONSPIRED WITH) THE COURTS
Despite the
luck of any fact finding by Judge McVeigh (Judge McVeigh never conducted a
bench trial to determine the facts consistent with Rule 1:7-4(a)), on May 13,
2011, the Mercer County Honorable Mary C. Jacobson, P.J.Ch., entered a “final
judgment” against defendant in favor of American Tax Funding, LLC (“ATFH”).
(Final Judgment annexed at Da44-46) upon the presentation to that court of a
form that had been prepared by the conspirator Robert Del Vecchio.
That form
includes language “AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the plaintiff
dully recover against the said defendant …possession of the premises… and that
a Writ of Possession issue thereon”.
Contrary to
what the conspirators wrote in this form and presented to a Mercer County Court
for signing, there was never an
adjudication of the possession of the premises. There
is no judicial record that the State can provide that indicates that such
possession litigation ever took place.
As was stated in the previous section, the Chancery Court had no subject
matter jurisdiction over the property possession issue and it could not have
been adjudicated by that court. This
fact alone provides clear and convincing evidence of a conspiracy between
McVeigh and the convicted criminals (Robert Del Vecchio, ATF, and others) to
defraud the Defendant of his property and business.
Basically the
conspirators presented to the Mercer County court a form that has adjudicated
both the ownership issue and the possession issue. The conspirators managed to fool the Mercer
County court clerk by providing this fraudulently prepared form that states
that the possession issue has been adjudged by the Passaic County Chancery
Court. Basically, the conspirators took
advantage of the dysfunctional legal system of New Jersey where one court does
the fact finding and another court signs the orders (and in this instant case,
Judge McVeigh of Passaic County Chancery Court, never held any fact finding and
application of the facts to the law session in violation of Rule 1:7-4(a). The conspirator Robert Del Vecchio took full
advantage of this confusion and managed to full the court system.
This final
judgment also contains the language “This judgment shall not affect the rights
of any person protected by the New Jersey Tenant Anti-Eviction Act (N.J.S.A,
2A:18-61.1 et seq.)” (Da45). The
significance of this clause is discussed in the Motion to Change Venue brief
and it is applicable here as Defendant’s businesses (Metropolitan Environmental
Services and Metropolitan Environmental Services, PC) were tenants at that
property and could not have been evicted without legal process. The Writ of Possession fraudulently obtained
by the conspirator Robert Del Vecchio did not include Metropolitan
Environmental Services. However, the
Passaic County Sheriff did evict these business tenants without having a Writ
of Removal or a Warrant for Removal.
This is an undeniable fact and proves beyond any doubt that the sheriff
employees did violate the Defendant’s possessory rights and caused massive
economic and non-economic injuries in the process.
THE
PROSECUTOR CONTINUES TO LIE AND MISLEAD THIS HONORABLE COURT BY STATING THAT
LUCAS AND D’AGOSTINO WERE POLICE OFFICERS WHEN IN FACT THEY WERE SHERIFF
OFFICERS
The
prosecutor continues to refer to the sheriff officers as police officers, in a
willful attempt to mislead this Court the same way the prosecutor mislead the
Grand Jury. The New Jersey Criminal Code
clearly distinguishes between a police officer and a sheriff officer. As proof that the 2C:12-1b(9) statutes intended to protect law enforcement
officers in the performance of the police duties and not to protect sheriff
officers, the Court should take a look at the statute 2C:12-1b(5). This is the statute that addresses the
assault on law enforcement officer or public employee, such a sheriff.
Under this
statute, the assault upon a law enforcement officer is included under
2C:12-1b(5)(a): Any law enforcement
officer acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or exhibiting
evidence of his authority or because of his status as a law enforcement
officer.
By contrast
the assault on a sheriff officer is included under section 2C:12-1b(5)(h): Any … sheriff, undersheriff, or sheriff’s
officer acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or exhibiting
evidence of his authority.
Thus, the
legislature has clearly distinguished between a law enforcement officer and a
sheriff officer. These two groups of
employees were not meant to be considered one and the same. This is the reason that sheriff officers who
perform civil process, wear different colored uniforms than the law enforcement
officers. Even within the Sheriff’s
department, there are different groups of sheriff’s employees identified as law
enforcement group, civil service group, K-9 group, etc. and they in fact wear
different color uniforms to make that distinction as a law enforcement versus
non-law enforcement. Based on their
testimony, Lucas and D’Agostino were employees working in the civil process
division and wearing light blue uniforms and not the dark blue uniforms.
We believe
that this analysis conclusively proves that the statute 2C:12-1b(9) does not
include sheriff employees, but it was intended to protect police officers in
their law enforcement duties. The state
legislature would have most likely included the sheriff employees in this
statute and not simply leave it open to interpretation or ambiguity.
The
prosecutor, fully aware that the above statute is meant to protect police
officers and not sheriff officers, has fraudulently represented throughout his
response brief that the sheriff’s process servers were in fact police
officers. The same fraudulent
presentation was made to the Grand Jury and mislead the jurors and tainted the
proceedings.
These charges
under 2C:12-1b(9) must be
dismissed with prejudice for the reasons stated above as Lucas and D’Agostino
were not police officers but sheriff officers.
THE
PROSECUTOR CONTINUES TO LIE AND MISLEAD THIS HONORABLE COURT BY STATING THAT
LUCAS AND D’AGOSTINO HAD THE AUTHORITY TO EVICT BOTH THE DEFENDANT AND THE BUSINESS
TENANT
The
Prosecutor is lying to the Court by stating in his response brief that the
sheriff officers had a Writ of Possession that included the Defendant’s
business. However, the Writ of
Possession makes no reference to Defendant’s business, Metropolitan
Environmental Services, that was a legal tenant of the premises.
It is the
Defendant’s position that New Jersey’s Anti-Eviction Act (N.J.S.A.
2A:18-61.1 et seq.) and New Jersey’s Foreclosure Fairness Act (N.J.S.A.
2A:50-69 thru 72) were violated by the Sheriff’s and conspirators’ actions in
this case as they evicted a legal tenant of the premises, Metropolitan
Environmental Services. The alleged Writ
of Possession cited by the State, does not include Metropolitan Environmental
Services and the Defendant had the right to defend his business from illegal
eviction.
NO JUDGMENT OF POSSESSION OR EVICTION
PROCEEDINGS WERE EVER HELD IN FRONT OF A LAW DIVISION COURT AS IS REQUIRED BY
NEW JERSEY LAW.
The State
continues to make fraudulent representations to this Court that somehow a
“court-ordered Writ of Possession” was issued by a court of competent
jurisdiction, when in fact no Judgement of Possession was ever adjudicated and
so such writ was ever issued by a competent court as there was never an eviction action
instituted against the Defendant by the conspirators. This is extremely crucial for this Court to
understand.
In is
response, the State has failed to
provide to this Court ANY transcripts of any legal process relating to the
issue of the adjudication of the eviction of the Defendant from his fully-owned
property (the Defendant had 100 percent equity in his home). Absolutely no evidence of any eviction
process exists, as no such action was brought by the conspirators before a
court of competent jurisdiction and no hearing or legal process ever took place
in direct violation of State Constitutional and Statutory Laws. We explain below.
As we wrote
in our Omnibus Motions Brief, the conspirators Robert Del Vecchio, American Tax
Funding, et al. never applied to the Chancery Court or a Law Division Court for
an eviction judgement (also called Judgement for Possession). This is critical for this Court to
understand. After the Defendant refused to
redeem the illegal tax sale certificate obtained by the conspirators, the
Chancery Court transferred the title of his 687 Indian Road property (fully
owned by the Defendant) to the conspirators via a so-called Tax Deed. This occurred prior to May 13, 2011. No further hearings or legal process occurred
regarding the possession of the property that was the home and the place
of business of the Defendant. The Court
must note that New Jersey Law prohibits the self-eviction from residential
properties and provides that no eviction process will be adjudicated unless the
owner follows notice and other requirements found in the New Jersey’s
Anti-Eviction Act (N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 et seq.) and New Jersey’s Foreclosure
Fairness Act (N.J.S.A. 2A:50-69 thru 72.
The New
Jersey law that was intentionally violated by the State, the County and the
conspirators, provides as follows:
N.J.S.A. 2A:39-1. No
person shall enter upon or into any real property ․ and detain and hold the
same, except where entry is given by law, and then only in a peaceable manner.
With regard to any real property occupied solely as a residence by the party in
possession, such entry shall not be made in any manner without the consent of
the party in possession unless the entry and detention is made pursuant to
legal process as set out in N.J.S. 2A:18-53 et seq. or 2A:35-1 et seq.
Specifically, for removing a person
from a residential property, N.J.S.A.
2A:18-57 requires that a judgment of possession must be issued by a Law
Division Judge, followed by a Warrant for Removal. State law also mandates that a notice be
provided to the person in possession that s/he has the right to apply to the
court for a stay of execution of the warrant, along with other notifications.
The
application of these statutes is explained in detail in Gary LEVIN and Donna
Levin, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Adrian LYNN, et al., 310 N.J. Super. 177,
decided April 1998, Appellate Division A-1537-96T2.
“The references therein, to N.J.S.A.
2A:18-53 et seq. and N.J.S.A. 2A:39-2 et seq., are to the statutory provisions
concerning, respectively, summary dispossess proceedings instituted in the
Special Civil Part, and Superior Court actions to establish either title or the
right to possession of real property, and the intent of those amendments is
clearly to prohibit a landlord or anyone else from taking possession of
residential premises without following judicial procedures. In the case of a
summary dispossess proceeding (which is the method employed by the Millers to
obtain a judgment of possession against plaintiffs here) that procedure
includes the landlord's obtaining of a warrant for possession. N.J.S.A.
2A:18-57. And, it should be noted that in any action seeking possession of a
residential property, the issuance of that warrant can be delayed, for good
cause, for as long as six months:
[I]n any action brought by a landlord
against a tenant to recover possession of premises or unit used for dwelling
purposes, to which this act is applicable, whether by summary dispossess
proceedings, civil action for the possession of land, or otherwise, the judge
of the court having jurisdiction shall use sound discretion in the issuance of
a warrant or writ for removal or writ of possession, and if it shall appear
that by the issuance of the warrant or writ the tenant will suffer hardship
because of the unavailability of other dwelling accommodations the judge may
stay the issuance of the warrant or writ and cause the same to issue at such
time as he shall deem proper under the circumstances, but in no case shall such
judge stay the issuance of any such warrant or writ for possession for a longer
period than 6 months after the date of entry of judgment of possession․
[N.J.S.A. 2A:42-10.6.]”
At that time,
the Defendant filed two Appeals and a Suit to Vacate the Tax Deed based on the
illegal activities of the conspirators.
The State
continues to make fraudulent representations to this Court that somehow a
“court-ordered Writ of Possession” was issued by a court of competent
jurisdiction. Here is what the New
Jersey statutes say under Article 3, Actions for Possession:
§
2A:42-10.6. Judge to use sound discretion in issuing warrants or writs for
removal or writs of possession; stay of issuance;limitation
Notwithstanding
any other provisions of law, in any action brought by a landlord against a
tenant to recover possession of premises or unit used for dwelling purposes, to
which this act is applicable, whether by summary dispossess proceedings, civil
action for the possession of land, or otherwise, the judge of the court having
jurisdiction shall use sound discretion in the issuance of a warrant or writ
for removal or writ of possession, and if it shall appear that by the
issuance
of the warrant or writ the tenant will suffer hardship because of the
unavailability of other dwelling accommodations the judge may stay the issuance
of the warrant or writ and cause the same to issue at such time as he shall
deem proper under the circumstances, but in no case shall such judge stay the
issuance of any such warrant or writ for possession
for
a longer period than 6 months after the date of entry of the judgment of
possession;
Despite the
luck of any fact finding by Judge McVeigh (Judge McVeigh never conducted a
bench trial to determine the facts consistent with Rule 1:7-4(a)), on May 13,
2011, the Mercer County Honorable Mary C. Jacobson, P.J.Ch., entered a “final
judgment” against defendant in favor of American Tax Funding, LLC (“ATFH”).
(Final Judgment annexed at Da44-46) upon the presentation to that court of a
form that had been prepared by the conspirator Robert Del Vecchio. That form includes language “AND IT IS
FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the plaintiff dully recover against the said
defendant …possession of the premises… and that a Writ of Possession issue
thereon”. Contrary to what the
conspirators wrote in this form and presented to a Mercer County Court for
signing, there was never an adjudication
of the possession of the property.
There is no judicial record that the State can provide that indicates
that such possession litigation ever took place. Basically the conspirators presented to the
Mercer County court a standard form that has adjudicated both the
ownership issue and the possession issue and some blanks are filled out- these
forms are only applicable to mortgage foreclosure cases and not to a tax lien
case where Defendant had full ownership of the property and where the alleged
tax owed was a small fraction of the value of the property. The conspirators managed to fool the Mercer
County court clerk by providing this fraudulently prepared form that states
that the possession issue has been adjudged by the Passaic County Chancery
Court. Basically the conspirators took
advantage of the dysfunctional legal system of New Jersey where one court does
the fact finding and another court signs the orders. The conspirator Robert Del Vecchio took full
advantage of this confusion and managed to full the court system.
This final
judgment also contains the language “This judgment shall not affect the rights
of any person protected by the New Jersey Tenant Anti-Eviction Act (N.J.S.A,
2A:18-61.1 et seq.)” (Da45). The
significance of this clause is discussed in the Motion to Change Venue brief.
This Court
should understand that in every property, there are two titles: a possessory
title and a legal (ownership) title. The
above judgment (fraudulent or not), only covers the ownership and not
possession of a property. The possession
of a property must be decided under the provisions of the Unlawful Entry and
Detainer state law (see N.J.S.A. 2A:18-57, New Jersey’s Anti-Eviction
Act (N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 et seq.) and New Jersey’s Foreclosure Fairness Act
(N.J.S.A. 2A:50-69 thru 72). The new
owner must file an eviction suit against the defendant and must state the
reasons for the eviction and must comply with pre-eviction notices. An owner cannot simply self-evict a person by
providing self-certification; however, this is what these conspirators and the
state and county employees did here and violated the possessory rights of the
Defendant as are guaranteed by the State Constitution and by State Laws. This is very crucial for the Court to
understand.
Robert A. Del
Vecchio is the attorney for the conspirator ATFH, and he submitted a
self-Certification (on an ex-parte basis) (filed May 13, 2011), with the Clerk
of Mercer County, stating, in part, that:
The aforementioned person is not
protected by the provision of the Anti-Eviction Act (the “Act”), as enunciated
in the New Jersey Supreme Court Case of Chase Manhattan Bank v. Josephson,
since that Act applies to tenants and this defendant is the prior owner of the
property. His ownership rights were
foreclosed upon in the above-entitled action. (Da48). The
Court should note that this conspirator wrote that “”His ownership rights were
foreclosed”; however, the issue at hand
was the possession of the property and not the ownership.
This
self-certification was an illegal and fraudulent ex-parte certification by the
co-conspirator Robert Del Vecchio, on behalf of his client, ATF or ATFH, as
Defendant’s businesses were tenants at the property. This Court should also note that the Chase Manhattan
Bank v. Josephson case refers to mortgage foreclosures and not tax lien
foreclosures, as the Appellate Division in Royal
Tax Lien Services, LLC v Morodan has already ruled that homeowners who
hold significant equity into their properties should not lose their home:
Furthermore,
as we have indicated earlier, Defendant’s business was a tenant at the subject
property and was not subject of the Writ of Possession or any other legal
proceeding and could not have been evicted from the premises. This is crucial evidence before this Court
and indicates the magnitude of the conspiracy against the Defendant:
·
The State, the County, the Chancery Court and
the conspirators also violated the New Jersey Constitution, Article I,
paragraph 20 that states that Private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. Individuals or private corporations shall not
be authorized to take private property for public use without just compensation
first made to the owners.
·
no property possession hearings were ever
held;
·
no bench trial was ever held by McVeigh on
any issue before her;
·
no fact-findings and application of the law
to the facts consistent with Rule 1:7-4(a) were ever held;
·
no pre-eviction notices were ever provided to
the Defendant;
·
no stay of the proceedings were ever held
consistent with § 2A:42-10.6;
As
the Appellate Division in Royal Tax
Lien Services, LLC v Morodan has already ruled, homeowners who hold
significant equity into their properties should not lose their home:
Moreover, if the final judgment stands,
plaintiff will receive property that, according to defendants, is valued at
$650,000 for an approximate $65,000 investment. That is a factor that should
have been taken into account when balancing the equities. See I.E.'s, L.L.C.
v. Simmons, 392 N.J. Super. 520, 537 (Law Div. 2006) (tax sale certificate
foreclosure system can be "Dickensian" where owners hold substantial
equity in property. "Until the Legislature devises a better system, courts
of equity must do their best to balance the equities, taking into account the
necessity of allowing the transfer of clear title and the need to compel the
payment of property taxes against the necessity of ameliorating, in appropriate
circumstances, the onerous impact of the procedure"). Royal
Tax Lien Services, LLC v Morodan,
Appellate Division, Docket No. A-6030-12T1, July 3, 2014.
Here, the Chancery Judge McVeigh refused or failed to
obey the above State case law. Her
actions violated the rights of the Defendant.
Thus, we have just provided proof that the conspirators and the County
employees did in fact violated Defendant’s rights and broke State laws and the
State Constitution that expressly prohibits the taking of private property for
either private or public use without compensation is provided first. A fully-owned $500,000-valued property
suddenly became the property of a private entity in direct violation of Article
I, paragraph 20 of the New Jersey Constitution.
These are disgraceful, as well as illegal acts; the Grand Jury was never
informed, as the State and the County made sure that no such evidence was
presented to them and prevented the Defendant from testifying and presenting
this evidence and other testimony and physical corroborating evidence.
In summary, contrary to the fraudulent
assertions of the State and County employees, no court had ever issued a
Judgment for Possession as is required prior to obtaining a Writ of
Possession. And no compliance with the
eviction notice requirements ever took place.
And the Writ of Possession fraudulently obtained by the conspirator
Robert Del Vecchio did not include Metropolitan Environmental Services.
However, the Passaic County Sheriff did evict these business tenants
without having a Writ of Removal or a Warrant for Removal. The
State has failed to provide any legal documents that the Judgment of Possession
proceedings ever took place. This proves
beyond any doubt that Defendant’s possessory rights were violated by the
Sheriff and the conspirators.
THE INDICTMENT MUST BE DISMISSED WITH
PREJUDICE BECAUSE THE FOUR (4) PLUS YEAR CASE DELAY DEPRIVED THE DEFENDANT OF
HIS CONSTITUTIONALLY-GUARANTEED RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL CAUSING HIM SEVERE
ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC HARDSHIP, LOSS OF EMPLOYMENT AND PROFESSIONAL
LICENSES, AND OTHER HARDSHIPS. BARKER
V. WINGO, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. CT. 2182, 2192, 33 L. ED. 101, 117
(1972), STATE V. CAHILL, 213 N.J. 253 (2013), STATE V. JONATHAN E.
DOWNS, DOCKET NO. A-0, N.J. SUPERIOR COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FEBRUARY 14,
2014
A defendant
has a right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const., amend.VI; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶
10. New Jersey has adopted the
four-prong test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), to determine
whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated. See State
v. Szima, 70 N.J. 196, 200-01 (1976).
Courts should
assess “four non-exclusive factors” to determine if a defendant’s
constitutional speedy trial guarantees have been violated: “length of the delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right by a defendant,
and prejudice to the defendant” Id.
at 264.; see also State v. Farrell, 320 N.J. Super. 425 (App. Div.
1999); State v. Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2009). The four factors in Barker are (1) the length
of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of
his or her right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. See Cahill, supra, 213
N.J. at 270. Due to the lack of a specified time period, courts must engage in
a balancing process, subject to the specific facts and circumstances of each
case.
“There is no
set length of time that fixes the point at which delay is excessive.” State
v. Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. at 12.
In Cahill, the Court instructed that a gauge to a “presumptively
prejudicial” delay is “the amount of time customarily required to dispose of
similar charges.” State v. Cahill,
213 N.J. at 265.
The
Cahill Court referred to New Jersey Supreme Court Chief Justice Wilentz’s July
26, 1984 Directive #1-84 instructing that DWI charges be disposed of in 60
days. Id. at 269. The Court called the 60-day period a goal, not a “bright line
rule.” Id. at 270. However, the Court
said, “90 to 120 days should be the norm for disposing of [DWI] cases.” Id. at
274. The Court further noted that a case that “approaches one year” is
“presumptively prejudicial.” Id. at 265.
In Cahill, the Court called the 16-month delay “too long.” Id. at
277. Likewise, in State v. Tsetsekas, the Court found that 344 days,
“more than five times the stated [Supreme Court] objective” … weighted heavily
for the defense. State v. Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. at 11.
In 2014, the
New Jersey Joint Committee on Criminal Justice recommended that the Legislature
enact a speedy trial act that sets forth time frames in which defendants must
be indicted and brought to trial. If the defendant has been released pretrial,
the complaint against that person would be dismissed without prejudice to it
being refiled at a later time. After indictment, if a case is not tried within
180 days, an incarcerated defendant would be released. The indictment would be dismissed with prejudice after 365 days if the
defendant is not in custody. Source: Report of the Joint Committee on Criminal
Justice, March 10, 2014. Here, there is
a more than 1,500 days delay since the indictment in September 2011. Thus, the case must be dismissed with
prejudice.
The Defendant
first asserted his right to speedy trial before Judge Filko and Judge Reddin in
2012. At the time, the defense lawyers
indicated to the courts that they should not enforce the Defendant’s right to
speedy trial. In any event, a defendant
does not have an obligation to assert his right to a speedy trial because he is
under no obligation to bring himself to trial. Id. at 266. Court delays are charged to the State, not to
the Defendant. State v. Farrell, 320 N.J. Super. at 450-451.
A
mere presence of court backlog or overcrowded case load is insufficient to
justify delay by prosecution. United States v. Goeltz, 513 F. 2d 193,
197, (10th cir. 1975). Here, this Court
took almost 3 years to decide a Motion to Change Venue, instead of deciding it
within 30 days or less. These delays cannot
possibly be attributed to the Defendant.
To the extent that the Defendant's counsel waived time or requested
continuances, this would not be attributed to Defendant, due to counsel's
actions contradicting the best interest of Defendant. Regardless of Defendant being bound by
counsel's actions, defense continuances don't excuse lengthy delays in the
disposition of a case. United States v. Lam, 251 F. 3d 852 (9th Cir.
2001).
The court
instructed in State v. Farrell, “prejudice to a defendant resulting from
delay is no longer confined to inability to defend on the merits. Prejudice can
also be found from employment interruptions, public obloquy, anxieties
concerning the continued and unresolved prosecution and the like.” State v.
Farrell, 320 N.J. Super. at 452.
Likewise, the
Court in Tsetsakas recognized that “significant prejudice may also arise
when the delay causes the loss of employment or other opportunities,
humiliation, the anxiety in awaiting disposition of the pending charges, the
drain in finances incurred for payment of counsel or expert witness fees and
the other costs and inconveniences far in excess of what would have been
reasonable under more acceptable circumstances. State v. Tsetsekas, 411
N.J. Super. at 13.
Here,
defendant has suffered very significant losses of employment, as employers performed
background checks and refused to hire defendant, even after they made
employment offers. In addition,
defendant lost several professional licenses due to the outstanding charges,
leading to further economic losses.
Defendant also has not been able to obtain state licenses (including the
Licensed Site Remediation Professional license) to do professional work because
of the pending, unresolved charges.
Several New Jersey licensing boards even denied defendant the
application to sit for exams, causing defendant to lose very significant
business and/or employment opportunities.
The net result of these prolonged delays is potentially multi-million
dollars in economic damages.
As a
professional expert engineer, defendant has also suffered irreparable
reputation loss that essentially destroyed his career that he worked many
decades to build.
DEFENDANT HAS DISCOVERED SOME NEW
EXPLOSIVE INFORMATION.
Corporal
Ronald Lucas was not the officer looking through my side window on June 28,
2011. That man was a young officer without facial hair.
Now I have
obtained the picture of Ronald Lucas (see attached) and it shows an old man in
his 50s. That man has a shoulder brace, after his shoulder injury that he
claims he suffered when he jumped from the porch.
As
part of an investigation I have been performing for the last few months, I
discovered that Ronald A. Lucas, a former Passaic County sheriff officer with
the Civil Division lied about his on-the-job shoulder injury. He claimed
that he fell on the job on June 28, 2011 at 687 Indian Road, Wayne, NJ.
He then filed a disability claim with the New Jersey Division of Pensions and
Benefits (Police and Firemen Retirement System). He was granted
disability for one year with subsequent review. After he retired with
claimed disability, he obtained a job as part-time security guard at the
Pequannock High School.
We
discovered that Mr. Lucas suffered shoulder injuries while playing football and
lifting weights over his lifetime. He was a linebacker with the Pompton
Lakes Cardinals. He also trained his two sons (Dean Lucas and Ronnie
Lucas) into playing TE and DE positions also with the Cardinals football team.
We
discovered that Mr. Lucas has been complaining about his shoulder for several
years prior to the June 28, 2011 incident. Several Passaic County Sheriff
employees can attest to that.
We
also discovered that based on what he said regarding the subject incident, he
must have fallen (if true) onto his right shoulder. However, the shoulder
that Mr. Lucas claimed he injured was his left shoulder. We have obtained
photos where he wears a shoulder support in his left shoulder.
We
have obtained photos showing Mr. Lucas lifting weights, after his alleged
job-ending disability. See for example the attached image that is dated
December 2013.
This twist of
events explain as to why Lucas could not get his story straight and why he made
so many revisions.
We need to
find out the name of the young officer who rode with Victor D’Agostino that
day. Obviously this young officer decided not to lie and Ron Lucas
took his place instead.
We need to
find out as to where Lucas actually fell. There must be some testimony or
some eye witness testimony that we can figure this out. This man (Lucas)
played football during high school (and afterwards) and I would not be
surprised if he had injured his shoulder from sports.
These are all
bombshells!!!
LETTER FROM
JUDGE MCGEADY, DATED JANUARY 17, 2014
The
prosecutor commented on the lack of probable cause found by Judge
McGeady. This was misleading for the Court (De la Carrera), as McGeady
later suggested that I write to the prosecutors to appeal the probable cause
determination. Please see his letter dated January 2014.
When I filed
criminal charges against these individuals, there was not criminal proceeding
against them. That is perhaps the reason McGeady did not find probable cause
at the time. When I submitted new evidence at a later time, he sent me
the attached letter suggesting to resubmit the case.
RULE 3:12. Defendant's Obligation To
Provide Notice
The Defendant hereby serves written
notice on the prosecutor that he intends to rely on the following defenses:
Ignorance or Mistake, 2C:2-4(c);
Duress, 2C:2-9(a);
Entrapment, 2C:2-12(b);
General Principles of Justification,
2C:3-1 to 2C:3-11;
3:12-1. Notice Under Specific Criminal
Code Provisions
A defendant shall serve written notice
on the prosecutor if the defendant intends to rely on any of the following
sections of the Code of Criminal Justice: Ignorance or Mistake, 2C:2-4(c);
Accomplice: Renunciation Terminating Complicity, 2C:2-6(e)(3); Intoxication,
2C:2-8(d); Duress, 2C:2-9(a); Entrapment, 2C:2-12(b); General Principles of
Justification, 2C:3-1 to 2C:3-11; Insanity, 2C:4-1; Lack of Requisite State of
Mind, 2C:4-2; Criminal Attempt (renunciation of criminal purpose), 2C:5-1(d);
Conspiracy (renunciation of criminal purpose), 2C:5-2(e); Murder (affirmative
defense, felony murder), 2C:11-3(a)(3); Criminal Restraint, 2C:13-2(b); Theft
by Extortion, 2C:20-5; Perjury (retraction), 2C:28-1(d); False Swearing
(retraction), 2C:28-2(b); Controlled Dangerous Substances Near or On School
Property, 2C:35-7; and Distributing, Dispensing or Possessing Controlled
Substances Within 500 Feet of Public Housing Facilities, Parks or Buildings,
2C:35-7.1.
No later than seven days before the
arraignment/status conference the defendant shall serve on the prosecutor a
notice of intention to claim any of the defenses listed herein; and if the
defendant requests or has received discovery pursuant to R. 3:13-3(b)(1),
the defendant shall, pursuant to R. 3:13-3(b)(2) , furnish the prosecutor with
discovery pertaining to such defenses at the time the notice is served. If,
however, the arraignment/status conference was held within 28 days of
indictment pursuant to R. 3:9-1(c), the defendant shall serve such notice on
the prosecutor, along with the pertinent discovery, by a date to be determined
by the trial judge, except in no event later than 14 days after the date of the
arraignment/status conference. The prosecutor shall, within 14 days after
receipt of such discovery, comply with R. 3:13-3(b)(1) and (f) with respect to
any defense for which the prosecutor has received notice.
For good cause shown the court may
extend the time of service of any of the foregoing, or make such other orders
as the interest of justice requires. If a party fails to comply with this Rule,
the court may take such action as the interest of justice requires. The action
taken may include refusing to allow the party in default to present witnesses
in support or in opposition of that defense at the trial or to allow the
granting of an adjournment or delay during trial as the interest of justice
demands.
CONCLUSION
For the
foregoing reasons and authorities cited, the defendant Basilis N. Stephanatos
respectfully submits that the indictment must be dismissed with prejudice. Defendant also requests the specific relief
delineated in the Omnibus Motions, including the cross examination of Officers
Lucas and D’Agostino at a hearing to prove that their testimony before the
grand jury was false, fraudulent and intentionally misleading. The purpose of those hearings would also be
to establish damages incurred to the Defendant as a result of the criminal acts
of these sheriff employees.
Additionally, there must be a hearing on the motion to suppress. Defendant will testify that his doors were
all closed and locked with a deadbolt and that the two officers performed an
unlawful search inside his dwelling in violation of his constitutionally
guaranteed rights and in violation of state law prohibiting peering inside
residences. See Exhibit D for a similar
situation in West Milford, to see how the sheriff employees behave in these
matters.
The state has
admitted in proceedings before Judge Filko that the sheriff’s officers did not
have a Warrant from a Law Division Judge.
They only had an ex-parte Writ issued pursuant to a void possession
judgment issued by a Mercer County Chancery judge who had no subject matter
jurisdiction over land possession matters.
Thus, they were illegally attempting to remove defendant from his
dwelling while working as agents for convicted criminals Robert Del Vecchio,
ATF, et. al. Defendant incorporates
herein his prior submissions to this Court.
Respectfully
submitted,
___________________________________
Miles Feinstein, Esq.
Attorney for defendant
Basilis N. Stephanatos
Dated:
March 1, 2016
ORDER TO
DISMISS
Having found that the State failed to
bring the instant case to conclusion of trial within the time allowed by law
and Judicial Rules, this Court acknowledges that the State denied Defendant's
right to a speedy trial. This Court therefore now orders the immediate
dismissal with prejudice of all charges in the instant case against the
Defendant, the immediate discharge and liberation of the Defendant from bail,
the return of all of Defendant's property, the immediate repair at State’s
expense of all damage done to Defendant and Defendant's property during or
consequent to the arrest and incarceration, immediate payment by the Plaintiff
of all storage, impound, and other fees for Defendant's business instruments
and other property encumbered as a consequence of Defendant's arrest, the
transportation of Defendant by Defendant's choice of public or private
automobile, or other public conveyance to Defendant's dwelling place at State’s
sole expense, the immediate writing and hand delivery to Defendant of a
formal apology by the prosecutor in the instant case for violating Defendant's
Constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy trial, for which let execution
issue forthwith.
_______________________________________
____________
Judge Miguel De la
Carrera Date
Ordered
