SHAMELESS
ILLEGAL, UNETHICAL AND OUTRAGEOUS: THE NEW JERSEY
JUDICIARY INTENTIONALLY VIOLATE INNOCENT MAN’S SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS FOR 7.5
YEARS AND COUNTING!!
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THE
NEW JERSEY JUDICIARY INTENTIONALLY VIOLATE INNOCENT MAN’S SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS
FOR 7.5 YEARS AND COUNTING!!
DEAR
LEGISLATORS:
I AM
WRITING TO REPORT AN EXTRAORDINARY CASE WHERE THE JEW JERSEY JUDICIARY HAVE
INTENTIONALLY VIOLATED DR. STEPHANATOS' SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS FOR MORE THAN 7 AND
HALF YEARS. THEY ALSO VIOLATED SEVERAL OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND
THEY ARE TRYING TO COVER UP THEIR WRONG DOING.
I URGE
YOU TO INVESTIGATE. THIS CASE WILL SHOCK YOUR CONSCIENCE.
SINCERELY
MARY
CLINTON
=====================================================
ILLEGAL, UNETHICAL AND OUTRAGEOUS: THE NEW JERSEY
JUDICIARY INTENTIONALLY VIOLATE INNOCENT MAN’S SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS FOR 7.5
YEARS AND COUNTING!!
PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
This
is the oldest case in the state of New Jersey and originated with a tax sale
certificate for about $800 purchased by American Tax Funding, LLC in
2005.
and
entities (such as American Tax Funding, LLC) who lied to the Mercer County and
Passaic County and court law clerks (e.g., lied to Acting Law Clerk Jennifer M.
Perez) and hired the sheriff’s officers to illegally seize Defendant’s
home/business in violation of state and federal laws; the conspiracy was
uncovered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with assistance from the
Defendant (See
its existence against the Defendant and thousands of New Jersey homeowners was
determined and confirmed by the federal judge Michael A. Shipp in the federal
antitrust case IN RE NEW JERSEY TAX SALES CERTIFICATES ANTITRUST LITIGATION,
Master Docket No. 3:12-CV-01893-MAS-TJB (see
Contrary
to what the trial court said, the Antitrust violations were not part of any
civil court proceeding and the Third Circuit Judge Hochberg never addressed
such claims. The trial court confused the “conspiracy under section 1983” claim
that was part of the 2012 lawsuit considered by Judge Hochberg, with the
current claim of Antitrust Conspiracy under the Sherman Act. These are
two separate claims and have nothing to do with each other. Judge Shipp
never decided the Antitrust claims against ATF, LLC and others until October
2014, so these antitrust conspiracy claims were not part of the Defendant’s
2012 lawsuit. Even more crucial, the federal judge did not address the
Uniformity Clause violation claims, because they were not part of that lawsuit
and even if they were, judge Hochberg could not have addressed state claims
because the judge found no federal civil right violations.
Defendant’s
property was located at 687 Indian Road, Wayne, New Jersey and was purchased by
the Defendant in 1994 for $240,000. The assessed value (AV) was $237,000,
using a 0.5 ratio; this means that the fair market value (FMV) assigned by
Wayne Tax Assessor was $475,000, more than 40 percent greater than the 1994
purchase value. Thus, Wayne Township Tax Assessor knew as early as 1995
of the true fair market value of Dr. Stephanatos and that the taxes levied onto
his property were illegal because they exceeded the 15 percent range allowed
under the Uniformity Clause provision of the state constitution (Article VIII,
Section 1, paragraph 1(a)).
N.J.S.A.
54:4-1 states
the requirement that property be assessed and taxed annually at its
"taxable value." N.J.S.A. 54:4-2.25 states that the
"true value" standard is to be used in the assessment of taxable
property. N.J.S.A. 54:4-23 specifically directs the assessor
annually to determine the "full and fair value" of real property by
making an informed estimate of the price at which a particular parcel would
sell for at a "fair and bona fide sale." That phrase, "full and
bona fide sale," is commonly understood as "market value."
Wayne Township failed to follow the above statutes and therefore the assessment
was invalid.
The
property was damaged by flooding starting in about 2000 and later years due to
the flooding at Ramapo River that reduced significantly the property
value. Defendant proceeded on a prose basis to attempt to reduce the
taxes charged by the Wayne Township by using a variety of arguments, including
Equal Protection, the Taking Clause, etc. The Uniformity Clause provision
of the New Jersey Constitution was not used as argument because at the time,
Defendant was not aware that Wayne Township was using a 0.5 ratio between
assessed value and true fair market value. Almost all municipalities use
a 1.0 ratio between assessed value and true fair market value.
Defendant
filed legal actions challenging the constitutionality of the taxes using equal
protection arguments. He never challenged at the time the illegal
overassessment because he was not aware of the use of the 0.5 ratio between AV
and FMV. Defendant paid all taxes assessed from 1994 through 2004.
In 2004, the tax collector did not properly credit the $800 state refund to the
2004 taxes, but instead credited them to the 2005 taxes due.
Faced
with continued dispute with Wayne, Plaintiff paid about 50 percent or so of the
taxes starting with 2005 tax year. The issue of overassessment of his
property was never addressed by any court, as Defendant was not aware of the
0.5 ratio. It is crucial to Defendant’s case to be allowed to explain to
the jury the background leading to the illegal eviction.
A
complaint to foreclose tax sale certificate number 2310 was filed on February
18, 2009. The tax sale certificate was sold by Wayne township to American Tax
Funding, LLC on September 27, 2005 for delinquent property taxes on property
located at 687 Indian Road. Defendant filed a contesting answer on April
1, 2009. On June 12, 2009 a motion for summary judgment was denied by Judge
McVeigh and the foreclosure matter stayed for four months to allow Defendant to
file a complaint in lieu of prerogative writs in the law division by June 19,
2009. This complaint was filed on June 16, 2009 and ultimately dismissed on
February 19, 2010 by Judge Riva. Judge Riva dismissed the case after an
unnoticed motion by Wayne Township. No hearing ever took place and no
fact finding was ever conducted by Judge Riva. He never issued an
application of the law to the facts in violation of Rule 1:7-4(a). R. 4:64-6 states that in foreclosure
of tax sale certificates, if
the defendant's answer sets up the defense of the invalidity of the tax or
other lien, or the invalidity of the proceedings to sell, or the invalidity of
the sale, those questions shall be tried in the action. However, here
there is neither fact finding nor a trial on any of the issues raised by Dr.
Stephanatos.
Defendant
was not aware that Judge Riva dismissed the action while still in
discovery. It was during the discovery period when the Defendant found
out about the 0.5 ratio between AV and FMV used by the Wayne Assessor. The issue
of overassessment of the property was never submitted to Judge Riva because he
retired shortly after.
On
April 27, 2010 and order was entered by Judge McVeigh striking the answer and
returning the matter to the Office of Foreclosure because she considered the
matter uncontested. She never issued an application of the law to the
facts in violation of Rule 1:7-4(a). However, Defendant continued to
contest the validity of the tax and the tax sale certificate and also indicated
that ATF and Robert Del Vecchio were lying to the court(s). A case is
considered contested when the Defendant contests the validity of the underlying
lien or debt, which he did. R. 4:64-6 states
that in foreclosure of tax sale certificates, if the defendant's answer sets up the defense of the
invalidity of the tax or other lien, or the invalidity of the proceedings to
sell, or the invalidity of the sale, those questions shall be tried in the
action. However, here there is neither fact finding nor a trial on any of
the issues raised by Dr. Stephanatos.
Despite
having no jurisdiction for contested cases, the Office of Foreclosure entered
an order setting amount, time and place of redemption on January 14, 2011,
fixing a redemption date of March 2, 2011. This is the time that Defendant became
aware of what was going on. He immediately filed a motion to vacate the
redemption order and asked for re-instatement of the claims against Wayne
Township.
On
March 21, 2011 an order was entered by Judge McVeigh denying Defendant’s motion
to vacate the redemption order and further denying Defendant’s request to stay
the matter permitting reinstatement of claims against Wayne Township. She
never issued an application of the law to the facts in violation of Rule
1:7-4(a). In fact, all other New Jersey court cases cited by the state were
decided by motion, without any hearing and without an application of the
law to the facts in violation of Rules 1:7-4(a) and R. 4:64-6. Dr.
Stephanatos has evidence that he was in fact a target of state and local government
employees because of his lawsuits against Wayne Township asking for Equal
Protection.
Former
Judge McVeighs orders were frivolous because equity cannot "create a
remedy that is in violation of [the] law." IMO Estate of Shinn, 394
N.J. Super. 55, 67 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 192 N.J. 595 (2007).
Rather, a decision is incorrect when the court overlooks "the maxim that
'equity follows the law.'" Id. at 67. See also M&D Assocs. v.
Mandara, 366 N.J. Super. 341 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 180 N.J. 151 (2004)
for its rationale that chancery courts "in such foreclosure cases
should be alerted . . . that a significant windfall might result if adequate
scrutiny . . . is not undertaken[,]"
“We
are of the view that particularly in situations like the one involved in this
case, where there is substituted service, as well as a tremendous disparity
between the amount due on the tax certificates and the value of the property
subject to foreclosure (here approximately $4,500 versus potentially $100,000
to $200,000 for the property), careful scrutiny of the affidavit of inquiry
requires the Chancery Judge to demand more than cursory inquiries or recitals
not only as a matter of due process, but also of fundamental fairness. See Bron
v. Weintraub, supra (42 N.J. at 93-96). The Chancery Judge in such foreclosure
cases should be alerted when the face of the documentation indicates that a
significant windfall might result if adequate scrutiny of the affidavit of
inquiry is not undertaken. In view of our decision, the operation of the tax
sale law requires that the entire judgment must be vacated as void based upon
equitable considerations.”
The
order granted Defendant an additional thirty days to redeem the tax sale
certificate. The outstanding taxes were not redeemed because Defendant knew
that the property was impermissibly over assessed in violation of the
Uniformity Clause provision. An ex-parte Final Judgment was entered on
May 13, 2011. An ex-parte Writ of Possession was entered on May 13, 2011,
although such writs must be entered 3 days after the entering of final
judgments. Eviction took place on June 28, 2011. An order was entered by Judge
McVeigh on June 30, 2011 denying Defendant’s motion to stay the writ and
further denying a stay pending appeal. Defendant filed an appeal that was never
adjudicated because the Passaic County sheriff took possession of Defendant’s
dwelling on June 28, 2011.
Here,
ATF, LLC/Wayne Township knowingly charged excessive taxes and 24 percent
interest and penalties and fees on top of these excessive and illegal
taxes. Thus, a tax dispute of less than $20K (the overassessment amount)
became $60K. Dr. Stephanatos offered to pay the $20K overassessment
amount, but refused to pay the $60K amount. Then the antitrust conspirators
confiscated his residential real estate property, along with his business,
Metropolitan Environmental Services, PC. ATF, LLC received a property
valued at $475,000 for a small tax debt, while at the same time permanently
damaging Dr. Stephanatos business located in the premises.
That
Passaic County Chancery Court failed to address the legal issues presented to
it, and through the fraud and lies perpetrated by Robert A. Del Vecchio and ATF
and others, certified that all issues in this contested matter were addressed,
when in fact none had been addressed, especially the 40% overassessment of
Defendant’s property. Defendant asserts that Judge McVeigh was poisoned
by Robert Del Vecchio, Jr who told her that Defendant had not paid taxes since
1993 (a false allegation) and that Defendant had threatened him with physical
violence (also a patently false allegation). Defendant’s fate was sealed
due to these people who committed fraud on the court. It is Defendant’s
position that Due to the Fraud on the Court, no judge had jurisdiction over the
F-9241-09 case and all orders, judgments, writs were VOID AB INITIO. It
is also clear and well-settled New Jersey law that any attempt to commit “fraud
upon the court” vitiates the entire proceeding. See, e.g., Shammas
v. Shammas, 9 N.J. 321, 330 (1952). Gilgallon v. Bond, 279 N.J.
Super. 265, 267 (App. Div. 1995).
The
antitrust conspirators (Robert Del Vecchio, Esq.) falsely told the Passaic
County sheriff that Dr. Stephanatos had threatened him with violence, which was
a lie. That way, at least four sheriff officers came to Dr. Stephanatos’
residence armed with MI-16 assault rifles. Two sheriff employees, Lucas
and D’Agostino, claimed that they were assaulted by the Defendant on June 28,
2011. Dr. Stephanatos vehemently denied the accusations and provided
numerous proofs that the charges were fabricated in order to remove him out of
his home. Defendant was indicted in September 2011. The prosecutor
refused to inform the grand jury that Dr. Stephanatos wanted to testify as a
witness and dispute the allegations of the two sheriff employees.
Defendant
hired Carl Herman for the grand jury and after that Miles Feinstein who has
been on the case until his departure due to illness in February 2018. In
2012, Mr. Feinstein and John Saycanick, Esq. filed a Motion to Change Venue due
to conflicts of interest with the state witnesses. The assigned Judge De
la Carrera never addressed the Motion to Change Venue until late 2015. Due to
the case delays, the assignment Judge Ernest Caposela removed Judge De la
Carrera from the case in May 2016. After that, Judge Marilyn C. Clerk
took over the case, but determined that the case was improperly kept in the
Passaic Vicinage and should have been transferred to another county due to the
conflicts of interest and the appearance of improprieties. The case was
transferred to Judge James Guida in Bergen County for adjudication in January
2018.
Between
November 2015 and May 9, 2018, Dr. Stephanatos submitted 33 Omnibus Motions to
Dismiss, including supporting brief and attachments. He alleged perjury
on the part of the sheriff employees and prosecutorial misconduct during the
grand jury, among other motions. Defendant provided clear proofs of
perjury and misconduct and requested a hearing pursuant to State v. Atwood,
161 A.3d 763, 229 N.J. 255 (2017). Defendant also requested that the
indictment be dismissed because the seven (7) year, 2,450-day case delay
deprived the defendant of his constitutionally-guaranteed right to a speedy
trial.
In
May 24, 2018, erroneously relying on a civil court case that was decided by
motion, without any hearings, Judge Guida denied all the Omnibus Motions.
He denied all defenses, including the claim of illegal overassessment of
Defendant’s property, unconstitutional taking of private property, duress,
outrageous government conduct, Castle Doctrine Defense (N.J.S. 2C:3-4 and
N.J.S. 2C:3-6), due process clause violations under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The Court also did not dismiss the
indictment under the doctrine of cumulative errors; State v. Orecchio, 16
N.J. 125, 129 (1954). Very significant, the judge said that the
Defendant will not be allowed to bring the claim of illegal overassessment of
his residential property during the trial that has been scheduled for August 6,
2018. This is extraordinarily damaging to the Defendant, as he will not
be able to present the “totality of the circumstances” to the jury that lead to
the events of June 28, 2011, including the fraud-on-the-court claim.
Defendant submits that the exception to the collateral bar applies, because the
Final Judgment was transparently invalid, void, or frivolous order and/or
required the "irretrievable surrender" of constitutional rights or no
“adequate and effective” opportunity for appellate review exists, because the
judgment issued by the Mercer Court was ex-parte, without any hearing or
notice.
On
June 4, 2018, on a Motion for Reconsideration, Judge Guida admitted that Mr.
Feinstein only asked for 31 adjournments out of 75+ total. He had initially
stated on May 24, 2018, that Feinstein had asked for 80 out of 100+
adjournments.
The
Defendant asks this Court to reverse the trial court’s decision denying his
defenses and claims, including the violation of his fundamental speedy trial
right. The Court should also allow the Defendant to present the property
overassessment claims, outrageous government conduct, duress, due process
violations, Article I, par. 20, N.J. Const. violations and other
defenses to the jury.
LEGAL ARGUMENTS
I. THE COURT ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT AND ERRED BY FAILING TO
FIND THAT THE SEVEN (7) YEAR, 2,450-DAY CASE DELAY DEPRIVED THE DEFENDANT OF
HIS CONSTITUTIONALLY-GUARANTEED RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL
A
defendant has a fundamental constitutional right to a speedy trial. U.S.
Const., amend.VI; N.J. Const. Art. I, par. 10. New Jersey
has adopted the four-prong test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514
(1972), to determine whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has
been violated. See State v. Szima, 70 N.J. 196, 200-01 (1976).
The
United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct.
2182, 2192, 33 L. Ed. 101, 117 (1972), and the New Jersey Supreme
Court in State v. Cahill, 213 N.J. 253 (2013), examined the
constitutional right to a speedy trial in the context of a criminal charge and
a DWI charge, respectively. The New Jersey Supreme Court instructed, “[p]rompt
disposition of criminal or quasi-criminal charges addresses the interest of the
accused to be treated fairly …and prevents prejudice to the accused.” Id. at
276.
Courts
should assess “four non-exclusive factors” to determine if a defendant’s
constitutional speedy trial guarantees have been violated: “length of the
delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right by a defendant, and
prejudice to the defendant” Id. at 264.; see also State v. Farrell, 320
N.J. Super. 425 (App. Div. 1999); State v. Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. 1 (App.
Div. 2009). United States v. Velazquez, 749 F.3d 161, 174 (3d
Cir. 2014). The four factors in Barker are identical to the ones in Farell,
supra: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the
defendant’s assertion of his or her right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant.
See Cahill, supra, 213 N.J. at 270. Due to the lack of a specified time
period, courts must engage in a balancing process, subject to the specific
facts and circumstances of each case. A determination by a trial judge on
whether defendant was deprived of right to speedy trial should not be
overturned unless "clearly erroneous." State v. Merlino, 153 N.J.
Super. 12, 17 (App. Div. 1977).
The
Length of the Delay
The
threshold question under Barker is whether the length of delay was
sufficient to trigger analysis of the remaining factors. This involves “a
double enquiry.” Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 652
(1992). “In other words, a court first decides whether the delay is long
enough that it should trigger analysis of the other Barker factors. . .
. If it is, the length of the delay is also separately weighed in the court’s
analysis of the remaining factors.” Velazquez, 749 F.3d at 174
(citations omitted). The length of delay is measured “from the date of arrest
or indictment, whichever is earlier, until the start of trial.” United
States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Hakeem v.
Beyer, 990 F.2d 750, 764 (3d Cir. 1993) at 760). “We have previously held
that a delay of even fourteen months is sufficient to trigger review of the remaining
Barker factors. Id. (citing Hakeem, 990 F.2d at 760).
Stephanatos
has endured what is
undeniably an “extraordinary delay” in awaiting trial. Seven years have
elapsed since he was detained by the government on June 28, 2011, and he still
has not had his trial day in court. Courts assessing Sixth Amendment
speedy trial claims have consistently branded as “extraordinary,” “excessive,”
“substantial” and “disturbing” multi-year delays between indictment and trial,
weighing such delays heavily in the defendant’s favor in the Barker balancing
analysis. See, e.g., Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652, 655, 112 S. Ct. at
2691, 2693 (dismissing with prejudice, after finding an eight-and-one-half
year delay between indictment and trial “extraordinary” and “excessive”); Barker,
407 U.S. at 533, 534, 92 S. Ct. at 2193-94 (dismissing with prejudice after
finding “clear[ly] . . . extraordinary” an over five-year pre-trial delay);
United States v. Carini, 562 F.2d at 148 (dismissing with prejudice
after deeming a 34-month pre-trial delay “disturbing”); United States v. New
Buffalo Amusement Corp., 600 F.2d 368, 377 (2d Cir. 1979) (dismissing
with prejudice after ruling that a pre-trial delay of “four and one-half years
is unquestionably substantial”); United States v. Bergfeld, 280 F.3d
486, 490 (5th Cir. 2002) (dismissing with prejudice after quoting trial
court finding that “[f]ive years well exceeds a length of time that might be
held to be presumptively excessive”). Indeed, under the Barker analysis,
delays of just one year are “presumptively prejudicial.” Doggett at 505
U.S. at 652 n.1, 112 S. Ct. at 2690 n.1.
“There
is no set length of time that fixes the point at which delay is excessive.” State
v. Tsetsekas, 411 N.. Super. at 12. In Cahill, the Court
instructed that a gauge to a “presumptively prejudicial” delay is “the amount
of time customarily required to dispose of similar charges.” State v.
Cahill, 213 N.J. at 265. Here, this is an assault case that involves
only one defendant. It is not a complicated case and the state is not
performing further investigation into the facts of case. In fact, the
state had finished its investigation in 2011. It should have taken no
more than 2 years for the adjudication this case. In State v. Tsetsekas,
the Court found that 344 days, “more than five times the stated [Supreme Court]
objective” … weighted heavily for the defense. State v. Tsetsekas, 411 N.J.
Super. at 11. See also United States v. Valentine, 783 F.2d 1413, 1417
(9th Cir.1986) (six-month delay is a “borderline case”). See
also United States v. Velazquez, 749 F.3d 161, 174 (3d Cir.
2014): “In weighing all the factors, we concluded that the [6.5 year]
delay violated Velazquez’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, and that
dismissal of the indictment was required”. Id. at 186.
Here,
there is a more than 2,450-day (81-month) delay since the indictment in
September 2011 and most of the delays have been caused by the failure of the
judge(s) to timely rule on motions to change venue (it took 3 years to rule on
that motion and only after continued inquiries by the Defendant) and by at
least 2 or 3 changes in the Passaic County prosecutors on the case (this caused
an additional 2 years in delays attributed solely to the state). Thus,
the case must be dismissed with prejudice. These enormous delays are
presumptively prejudicial, considering that the defendant is a licensed expert
witness whose reputation has been tarnished by the charges and cannot earn a
living. Even worse, the physical setting of the property where the
alleged offense occurred has been drastically changed by the new owner of the
property and the jurors will not be able to assess the truthfulness of what the
sheriff employees claim. Judge Guida in his oral opinion referred to this
torturous delay as “almost unconscionable”. This factor weights
very heavily in favor of the Defendant.
Assertion
of Right
The
Defendant first asserted his right to speedy trial before Judge Filko and Judge
Reddin in 2012. He also continued to assert his speedy trial rights
throughout the proceedings. In addition, a defendant does not have an
obligation to assert his right to a speedy trial because he is under no
obligation to bring himself to trial. Cahill, at 266. Court delays are
charged to the State, not to the Defendant. State v. Farrell, 320 N.J.
Super. at 450-451. This factor weights in favor of the Defendant.
Reason
for the Delay
The
government bears the burden of justifying the delay in bringing a defendant to
trial. Battis, 589 F.3d at 680 (citing Hakeem, 990 F.2d at 770).
“In evaluating this factor, we subtract the amount of delay caused by the
defendant from the delay caused by the Government.” Id. (citing United
States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 184-85 (3d Cir. 1998)). In Battis, we
set forth the three categories of delay and the resulting weight each carries
against the government: (1) “A deliberate effort by the Government to delay the
trial in order to hamper the defense weighs heavily against the government;”
(2) “A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts also weighs
against the Government, though less heavily;” and (3) “a valid reason, such as
a missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay.” Id. at
679 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “By contrast, delay
caused by the defense weighs against the defendant.” Id. at 680
(internal quotation marks omitted).
This
case has a very detailed record that explains that most of the delays have been
caused by the government, and particularly the courts in delaying the
adjudication of the Motion to Change Venue. It took 6.5 years for the
courts to correctly decide on that motion to change venue filed in early 2013.
There
have been several judges assigned to this case since 2011:
·
Judge Reddin (from October 2011 to November 2011)
·
Judge Filko (from November 2011 to March 2012)
·
Judge Yablonsky (from March 2012 to May 2012)
·
Judge de la Carrera (from mid-2012 to May 2016);
·
Judge Caposela (from May 2016 to September 2018, after removing Judge de la
Carrera from the case for failing to timely rule on motions);
·
Judge Clark (from September 2017 to December 2017)
·
Judge Guida (from February 2018 to present)
Judge
De la Carrera never addressed the 2013 Motion to Change Venue until late 2015.
It took the judge three years to decide a motion that only should take few
minutes to few days to decide. Due to the case delays caused by the
judge, the assignment Judge Ernest Caposela removed Judge De la Carrera from
the case in May 2016. Therefore, these 3 years of delays are attributed
to the state and not the Defendant.
After
that, Judge Marilyn C. Clark took over the case, but determined that the case
was improperly kept in the Passaic Vicinage and should have been transferred to
another county due to the conflicts of interest and to avoid the appearance of
improprieties. The case was transferred to Judge James Guida in Bergen County
for adjudication in January 2018. So, we have an additional 2 years of
delays from the firing of Judge De la Carrera to the transfer of the case to
Judge Guida. The Defendant has nothing to do with these delays.
These additional 2 years of delays are squarely the fault of the court(s).
In
February 2018, Judge Guida stated in his Chambers to Mr. Feinstein that all the
delays are attributed to the court(s) and not to the defense. Judge Guida
also repeated this statement in open court that same day. In a stunning
reversal of that statement, Judge Guida stated on May 24, 2018 that the case
delays are attributed to the Defendant, when in fact Defendant has been asking
for a speedy trial since the hearing before Judge Filko in 2011 and was sent to
jail for 64 days between March and May 2016, because he asked too many times
for the judge(s) to expedite the case. On June 4, 2018, the trial court
corrected the record to state that Mr. Feinstein that only asked for 31 adjournments
and not the 80 adjournments assigned to him on May 24, 2018. Therefore,
the majority (44+) adjournments were caused by the courts and not the
defendant.
The
government's negligence or recklessness, which is the reason for the delay,
weighs in Stephanatos’ favor. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182
(the government's negligence should weigh less heavily in defendant's favor
than does a deliberate delay, but “nevertheless should be considered since
the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the
government rather than with the defendant”).
A
mere presence of court backlog or overcrowded case load is insufficient to
justify delay by prosecution. United States v. Goeltz, 513 F. 2d 193,
197, (10th cir. 1975). Here, Judge De la Carrera took almost 3
years to decide a Motion to Change Venue, instead of deciding it within 30 days
or less- that is clear negligence or recklessness in performing his judicial
duties. He was in fact removed from the case by the Assignment Judge Ernest
Caposela due to such recklessness. And even worse, he decided the
motion to change the venue incorrectly, due to the significant conflicts of
interest and the appearance of impropriety by having sheriff employees and a
judge or two still working at the Courthouse in Passaic County and being also
witness for the state- this is also evidence of negligence. These delays
and squarely wrong decisions on the Motion to Change Venue, cannot possibly be
attributed to the Defendant; yet Judge Guida indicated that all the delays are
attributed to the defendant! This is a 180-degree reversal of what Judge
Guida said in the February 8, 2018 hearing when he stated that “the delays
are not attributed to the defense or the prosecution, but they are attributed
to us [the judiciary]”.
To
the extent that the Defendant's counsel waived time or requested continuances,
this would not be attributed to Defendant, due to counsel's actions
contradicting the best interest of Defendant. Regardless of Defendant
being bound by counsel's actions, defense continuances don't excuse lengthy
delays in the disposition of a case. United States v. Lam, 251 F. 3d 852
(9th Cir. 2001).
Defense
attorneys cannot unilaterally continue cases. Continuances can only be
accomplished with the agreement of the prosecution or the court.
Even
more important, the defense continuances that Judge Guida cited were in fact
approved by the prosecutor(s) and the court. If the prosecutors or
the court had any problem with the continuances, they should have objected; but
they did not – they went along with them. Judge Guida made a huge,
enormous, gigantically enormous crucial error in assigning the delay caused by
continuances to the Defendant. It was all on the Judge(s) and the
prosecutor who agreed to those continuances. There is no record that
shows that Defendant signed off on any continuance.
It
is important to note that on May 24, 2018, Judge Guida claimed that Miles
Feinstein applied for 80 continuances out of a total of more than 100.
However, upon reconsideration, the trial court admitted that Mr. Feinstein only
applied for 31 continuances, out of a total of 75. Yet, Judge Guida
failed to reverse his order denying the dismissal of the indictment; this a
clear abuse of discretion. The judge claimed that he had a special order
from the Chief Justice to bring the case to trial. Defendant is
speechless, as the Chief Justice cannot possibly ordered Judge Guida to violate
the speedy trial rights of the Defendant.
Defense
attorneys and Defendant have no power. Defense counsel can only react to
the system that the courts and the prosecution have consciously devised or that
has evolved over the decades. It was squarely the responsibility of the
judge and the prosecutor to prevent the 7-year delay in the case and not that
of Miles Feinstein or the Defendant.
The
record shows that the Defendant continued to send letters to Judge De la
Carrera and, when he was removed from the case, to Judge Ernest Caposela,
asking for his speedy trial rights. After De la Carrera was removed from
the case in May 2016 by Judge Caposela (I was told that this was a truly
remarkable and unprecedented event in the history of the Passaic County court),
it has taken another two (2) years to reach the point we are now. And only
because Defendant continued to inquire with Judge Caposela regarding the
adjudication of the case on a speedy basis.
In
addition to that correspondence, the defendant has been asking his former
lawyer Mr. Miles Feinstein, Esq. on a weekly basis to move forward with the
case on a speedy basis and to inform the Court that the defendant wanted to
exercise his speedy trial rights. Therefore, this balancing factor weighs
in defendant’s favor, because Defendant was not the reason for the delays.
The
trial court also conveniently ignored the crucial fact that the former
prosecutor on the case, Peter Roby was removed from the case in June 2016 and a
new prosecutor was assigned (Mr. Nubar Kasaryan). After one to two years,
a new prosecutor was assigned to the case (Mr. Stephen Bollenbach). Thus,
the trial court’s statement that the state prosecutors did not cause any delays
and was always ready to proceed with the trial, is clearly erroneous.
Equally important, the state has not complied with the discovery requests of
the Defendant.
On
November 6, 2017, after having been assigned the case from Judge Caposela,
Judge Marilyn C. Clark indicated that the case will be transferred to Bergen
County Courthouse for adjudication due to the conflicts of interest that were
described in Defendant’s 2012 Motion to Change Venue. Judge Clark and
Judge Caposela were dumbfounded as to why the case was not transferred at the
time (2012) to another county due to the significant conflicts of interest,
involving at least 5 or so sheriff employees still working at the Passaic
County Courthouse who would be witnesses for the state; and the former Chancery
Court Judge McVeigh would also be a witness for the state. Then, in late
December 2017, after another request by the Defendant to expedite the case, the
presiding Judge Marilyn Clark transferred the case to Bergen County (the case
transfer order was signed by Judge Caposela).
Based
on these facts, the Defendant has done everything humanely possible to expedite
the adjudication of the case. All these case transfer delays were caused
by the state judiciary in wrongly deciding the Motion to Change Venue and are
squarely attributed to the State. Court delays are charged to the
State, not to the Defendant. State v. Farrell, 320 N.J. Super. at
450-451. Yet, Judge Guida attributed the delays to the
Defendant! This is an extraordinary error committed by the trial court,
requiring reversal.
I
report below a state case where the charges were dismissed because the state
failed to provide discovery to the defendant for 531 days (about 1.45
years). Here, we did not have complete discovery despite the passing of
seven years since the events of June 28, 2011. The Appeals court reasoned that
the defendant's speedy trial rights were violated even though the defense
attorney wasn't "energetic in his demands" for discovery. State
V. Downs, Docket No. A-0, N.J. Superior Court, Appellate Div., February 14,
2014.
See
also the April 2014 letter to Judge De la Carrera where he stated:
Thus,
my concern is that if it takes more than a year to rule on a motion to change
venue, how long will it take to adjudicate the 25+ motions we have put
together for dismissal of the tainted and/or fraudulently procured indictment?
I have suffered significant economic and non-economic damages and I continue to
suffer significant economic and non-economic damages every day this case is
delayed. I am urging this Court to read these documents into
the record, including my concerns with all the delays in proceeding with the
motions.
Source:
Letter from the Defendant to Judge De la Carrera, dated April 21, 2014.
This
Court also stated that the Defendant should have fired his lawyer. But
Defendant did just that many times, as is evidenced in the October 12, 2015
letter to Judge de la Carrera, entitled, “The Decision to Remove Mr. Feinstein
from the Case”.. Here is an excerpt from that letter:
For
the last 4 years Mr. Feinstein has been giving me one excuse after the other,
delaying the adjudication of the case. Upon my numerous inquiries and
complaints about these unacceptable delays, he did blame this court for the
case delays; he suggested that we file a complaint or ask for the
disqualification of this court for failing to rule on a simple motion to change
venue over a period of 3 years.
Source:
Defendant’s letter to Judge De la Carrera, dated October 12, 2015.
Therefore,
the Appellate Court must realize the superhuman efforts of the Defendant to
assert his speedy trial rights. Despite this significant effort, Judge
Guida claimed that the overwhelming delays in this case were caused by the
Defendant! This is very significant and highly prejudicial reversible
error committed by Judge Guida, requiring reversal of that decision. The
trial court abused its discretion by refusing to dismiss the indictment.
In
State v. Merlino, 153 N.J. Super. 12, 17 (App. Div. 1977) the
Appellate Division ruled that A determination by a trial judge on whether
defendant was deprived of right to speedy trial should not be overturned unless
"clearly erroneous." Here, the factual determinations by
the trial court are clearly erroneous, necessitating an overturning of that
determination.
Prejudice
In
Cahill, the Court explained that the “minimization of anxiety
attributable to unresolved charges” is one of the interests the speedy
trial right is designed to protect. Id. at 266. “A speedy trial
violation can be established without evidence of prejudice.” Id. at 274
(citing State v. Farrell, supra., 320 N.J. Super. at 446. The Cahill
Court explained, “every unresolved case carries with it some measure of
anxiety.” Id. “This is particularly true when one of the sanctions [for
DWI is] a license suspension.” Id.
The
court instructed in State v. Farrell, “prejudice to a defendant
resulting from delay is no longer confined to inability to defend on the
merits. Prejudice can also be found from employment interruptions, public
obloquy, anxieties concerning the continued and unresolved prosecution and the
like.” State v. Farrell, 320 N.J. Super. at 452. Likewise, the
Court in Tsetsekas recognized that “significant prejudice may also arise
when the delay causes the loss of employment or other opportunities,
humiliation, the anxiety in awaiting disposition of the pending charges, the
drain in finances incurred for payment of counsel or expert witness fees and
the other costs and inconveniences far in excess of what would have been
reasonable under more acceptable circumstances. State v. Tsetsekas, 411 N.J.
Super. at 13.
The
fourth factor, prejudice, is presumed since the seven-year delay from arrest to
trial is wholly chargeable to the government. See, e.g., United States v.
Ingram, 446 F.3d 1332, 1340 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding in a case of a
two-year post-indictment delay that the defendant “need not demonstrate actual
prejudice resulting from the delay” because “[t]he first three Barker factors
all weigh heavily against the Government.”).
Here,
the Defendant has suffered a very significant prejudice because his lawyer on
the case, Mr. Miles Feinstein, Esq. became severely ill and dropped out of the
case on February 8, 2018. The Defendant has suffered a massive blow to
his ability to defend the case, because Mr. Feinstein is a great trial lawyer
and was intimately involved with the case since 2012. This prejudice to
the Defendant has been caused solely by the extraordinary 81-month delay in the
case.
Furthermore,
Defendant has suffered very significant losses of employment, as employers
performed background checks and refused to hire defendant, even after they made
employment offers. In addition, defendant lost several professional
licenses due to the outstanding charges, leading to further economic losses.
Defendant also has not been able to obtain state licenses (including the New
Jersey Licensed Site Remediation Professional license) to do professional work
because of the pending, unresolved charges. Even worse, Defendant
was scheduled to sit for the California Bar exam in July 2011. Defendant
lost also this ability to sit for the bar exam due to the events of June 28,
2011. Several New Jersey licensing boards even denied defendant the
application to sit for exams, causing defendant to lose very significant business
and/or employment opportunities. The net result of these prolonged delays
is potentially multi-million dollars in economic damages, anxiety and enormous
stress in both the financial and personal life of the Defendant.
As
a professional expert engineer, defendant has also suffered irreparable
reputation loss that essentially destroyed his career that he worked many
decades to build. These unresolved (not to mention fraudulent)
charges have destroyed the Defendant economically and reputationaly. Due
to these losses and the continued and unresolved prosecution Defendant suffers
from anxiety, humiliation and withdrawal from social events. Both his
personal and professional life is essentially destroyed by the failed
resolution of the pending wrongful charges.
As
was also explained under the section “The Reason for the Delay”, the
long delay has already prejudiced the defendant because the landscaping at the
subject dwelling where Lucas was peering through the side window has been
changed through the removal of the yews and rhododendrons and the big planters
and the pet tower. Furthermore, defendant is prejudiced because he has
been concerned that along with the bushes, the sheriff may have destroyed
videotaped and audiotaped evidence that is exculpatory to the defendant.
Finally,
but not least, my lawyer of 6 years on this case, Mr. Miles Feinstein, became
very ill and had to drop out of the case in February 2018. This will most
likely affect the ability of the Defendant to defend these charges, as Mr.
Feinstein was a great trial lawyer. These are some very serious prejudices that
hamper the defendant’s defense and they are the sole creation of the state. Therefore,
this factor also weighs heavily in favor of the Defendant.
Conclusion
In
a 180-degree reversal of his February 8, 2018 statement in Chambers to Mr.
Miles Feinstein and in open court, Judge Guida erroneously attributed most of
the 2,500-day (81-month) delay in the case to the Defendant by falsifying the
continuance records; this is unfathomed and goes against the factual record
cited herein. When Judge Guida was confronted with the correct evidence
showing that Mr. Feinstein only adjourned the case 31 out of 75 times, then
Judge Guida changed his tune and said that he has a special order to bring the
case to trial. This is clearly erroneous. Later, on June 13, 2018
during a hearing after a Motion to Recuse based on Disqualification, Judge
Guida admitted that he had no special order from the Chief Justice to bring the
case to trial.
The
factual determinations made by Judge Guida were in clear error and highly
prejudicial, especially after he failed to state that there has been already a
change of several prosecutors on the case, causing delays. The failure to
dismiss the indictment is an abuse of discretion. The finding of no speedy
trial right violation was a clear error. All these errors and abuse of
discretion require reversal.
In
Carini, the Second Circuit charged to the government various delays for
reasons less egregious than here. The Court found that the great bulk of
a 34-month delay was attributable to a judge’s illnesses, “the court’s
summer recesses, unexplained inaction of the District Court, caused, no doubt,
by an overloaded docket,” and the disqualification and death of other
judges. Carini, 562 F.2d at 149. All of this delay was charged to
the government, although none of it was attributed to some improper government
intent. Id.; see also New Buffalo Amusement Corp., 600 F.2d at
377-80 (finding a four-and-one-half year delay -- attributable to
government inaction, over-crowded dockets, and “the trial court’s failure to
rule expeditiously on appellants’ motions[]” -- warranted dismissal with
prejudice).
See
also United States v. Pennick, 2nd Circuit, 16-3069-cr, Nov. 2017,
where the District Court and the Court of Appeals dismissed the indictment with
prejudice because 6.5 and almost 8 years had passed since they issued their
decisions. The Second Circuit said that “Although some delay can be
attributed to Pennick, such as delays arising from retaining four different
attorneys, some delay can also be attributed to the government, such as for
twice superseding the indictment, and much of the delay can be attributed to
the court, as it candidly acknowledged, such as the delay in deciding motions. ʺWhile
the government may have had little control over the ʹinstitutional
delaysʹ
more appropriately attributable to the court, ʹthe ultimate responsibility for
such circumstances must rest with the government rather than the defendant.ʹʺ
cf. United States v. Bert, 814 F.3d 70, 85 (2d Cir. 2016) (commending
the district courtʹs ʺhonest and unequivocal acceptance of responsibilityʺ
for a Speedy Trial Act violation, but noting that ʺthe
mere fact that a speedy trial violation is attributable to the court and not
the government does not expunge that violation, nor does it automatically
render the violation any less serious.ʺ).
Therefore,
based on the above factual and legal record, the Court has expressed its
decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis and against the
vast number of similar cases from all federal circuit courts and courts of this
state. It is obvious that the trial court either did not consider, or
failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.
Therefore, reversal of the trial court’s May 24, 2018 order is required to
correct these extraordinary factual and legal errors committed by Judge Guida,
necessitating the dismissal of the indictment.
On
Tuesday, September 25, 2018 11:19 AM, Mary Clinton
<maryclinton728@yahoo.com> wrote:
On
Tuesday, September 25, 2018 11:18 AM, Mary Clinton
<maryclinton728@yahoo.com> wrote:
On
Tuesday, September 25, 2018 11:16 AM, Mary Clinton
<maryclinton728@yahoo.com> wrote:
MASSIVE
CONSPIRACY AGAINST HOMEOWNER EXPOSED.
Dear
Legislators:
I
have been reading about abuse of laws and violation of citizens' constitutional
rights by municipal and superior court judges as a way of shaking them
up. In one case reported to the media, former Chancery judge
Margaret McVeigh in Passaic County stole homestead property valued at $475,000
for $20,000 in undue taxes in Wayne Township, New Jersey. Then, Passaic
County and state employees conspired to frame this homeowner whose property was
stolen under the gun point (the Passaic County Sheriff brought MI-16 rifles
with them to take his property by force), for assault. They then have
been delaying the adjudication of the fraudulent and fake charges for more than
seven and a half years.
It
is time that you intervene and put an end to this mockery of “justice”.
Sincerely,
Mary
Clinton
===================================
PROOFS
OF MASSIVE MATERIAL PERJURY BY RONALD A. LUCAS AND VICTOR D’AGOSTINO.
THIS PERJURY WAS KNOWN TO THE PASSAIC COUNTY PROSECUTOR PRIOR TO THE GRAND JURY
PROCEEDINGS.
MOTION
(32) – UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF CUMULATIVE ERRORS, A NEW GRAND JURY SHOULD BE
CONVENED PURSUANT TO STATE V. ORECCHIO, 16 N.J. 125, 129 (1954)
Taken
cumulatively, the legal errors and false testimonies in this case are of such a
magnitude that they undeniably prejudiced the defendant’s rights and, in their
aggregate, rendered the grand jury proceedings totally unfair.
Fundamental fairness and constitutional concepts dictate a dismissal. See
State v. Orrechio, 16 N.J. 125 (1954).
The
New Jersey Supreme Court first discussed the concept of cumulative errors in
the context of a criminal trial in State v. Orecchio, 16 N.J. 125, 129
(1954). When legal errors cumulatively render a grand jury proceeding
or trial unfair, the Constitution requires a new trial. "[W]here any one
of several errors assigned would not in itself be sufficient to warrant a
reversal, yet if all of them taken together justify the conclusion that
defendant was not accorded a fair trial, it becomes the duty of this court to
reverse." Id. at 134 (citations omitted).
The
testimonies’ cumulative effect was “clearly capable of producing an unjust
result,” R. 2:10-2, requiring a reversal of defendant’s convictions. See State v. Weaver, 219
N.J. 131, 155 (2014) (explaining a court should reverse a conviction
“[w]hen legal errors cumulatively render a trial unfair” (citing State v.
Orecchio, 16 N.J. 125, 129 (1954))).
It
is respectfully submitted that there are numerous serious legal issues raised
regarding the unfair grand jury presentation in the Stephanatos
matter.
·
In part, material false testimony presented to the grand jury by Lucas and
D’Agostino when in fact they were never assaulted by Dr. Stephanatos (and Dr.
Stephanatos has already provided irrefutable proof of the perjury committed by
Lucas who signed a document stating that it was Nick Mango and not himself at
the front door – See Defense Exhibit D-1, Supplemental Motions to Dismiss,
March 2018);
·
Numerous contradictory investigatory reports were not presented to the grand
jurors or were outright hidden from the grand jurors by the prosecutor;
·
In paragraph 2 of section 4 of the Warrant Affidavit, Lucas “relates” to
Detective Scala “that upon knocking on the front entrance door of the
residence”. See excerpt from the warrant affidavit, Defense Exhibit
D-11. This statement to Detective Scala fully corroborates Dr.
Stephanatos’ statements that his front door was closed – very closed – with a
lock and deadbolt closed.
·
However, in his June 28, 2011 report prepared by Cpl. Lucas, he writes the
following: “As we proceeded toward the front door I ascented[sic] the steps
and noticed the front wood door was open and a glass storm door made the
interior of the house visible to me”. “At that moment a man came
from the hallway with a long object in his left hand”.
·
So, based on these diametrically different statements by Lucas, the prosecutor
knew or should have known that Lucas lied. At the point at which the
prosecutor learned of the perjury before and during the grand jury, the
prosecutor was under a duty to notify the court and the grand jury, to correct
the cancer of justice that had become apparent to him. But he did
not. This is clear, unequivocal prosecutorial misconduct for
intentionally misleading the grand jury.
·
Furthermore, in his grand jury testimony, Officer Lucas identified the “Ruger
M77 Mark II, 270 caliber Winchester single bullet hunting rifle” as being the
weapon that the defendant pointed at him. (GJT27-8 to 13; Da15, Motion to
Change Venue). It is critical to note that the hunting rifle is a BROWN COLORED
GUN. However, in section 2 of paragraph 4 of the Warrant Affidavit, Lucas
“relates” to Detective Scala that he saw a “BLACK COLORED RIFLE”. So,
again the prosecutor knew or should have known that Lucas lied before the grand
jury when he selected a different color gun than the one he related to
Detective Scala.
·
“fake facts” (the pointing of a gun out a window) cooked up by the prosecutor
that were highly prejudicial to the Defendant;
·
Not mentioning that this was a residential property in a wooded area of Wayne
Township where less than 5 people and less than 5 dwellings were located
nearby;
·
not presenting to the Grand Jurors the record of the phone and emails of Dr.
Stephanatos PROVING BEYOND ANY DOUBT OF HIS WHEREABOUTS (and refuting
the state’s allegations that he was pointing guns at people and that he was
barricaded);
·
the impermissible mentioning of bombs and IEDs and ammunition boxes during the
grand jury proceeding when in fact the prosecutor and his witnesses knew that
these were false statements and no bombs or IED or ammunition boxes were ever
found or ever existed;
·
not mentioning that State Statutes Prohibit the Entering into Residential
Properties unless the entry and detention is made pursuant to legal
process as set out in N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53 et seq.; the
purpose of following such clearly established process for residential
properties is to avoid the breach of public peace;
·
not mentioning that no warrant for removal signed by a Law Division judge was
obtained by the sheriff employees prior to attempting to remove Dr. Stephanatos
from his residence;
·
not mentioning to the Grand Jurors that Victor A. D’Agostino’s duties were not
that of a sworn law enforcement officer;
·
failing to provide proofs that the Defendant knew that the sheriff employees
were in fact sworn law enforcement officers, as this was a civil matter and the
statutes under which the Defendant was charged pertain to police officers while
they perform criminal law enforcement duties.;
·
the intentional lying by Lucas that he injured his shoulder requiring 5 pins,
when he in fact injured his shoulder and elbow after playing competitive football
for many years and lifting heavy weights and doing body building;
·
Lt. Nick Mango wrote in his June 28, 2011 report that “nobody was hurt”.
Also, Lucas never wrote in his June 28, 2018 report that he was injured.
He specifically wrote : “As I entered the woods I stumbled”.
He never wrote that he was injured. However, during this grand jury
testimony, he provided a diametrically different picture:
·
Lucas claimed that he fell on his elbow and shoulder, but was able to regain
his balance, and he ran into a wooded area to seek cover behind a large
boulder. (GJT11-18 to 21; Da7, Motion to Change Venue). Lucas claimed
that he tore his biceps and had surgery on his shoulder, and “ended up having a
pretty severe injury” in his shoulder, requiring “five pins.” (GJT12-7 to 9;
Da8, Motion to Change Venue). Of course we now know that this guy was a
football player and body builder and suffered these injuries over his many
years of lifting heavy weights and hitting his opponents with his shoulder (he
was a linebacker with the Pompton Lakes Cardinals at #41). This guy then
defrauded the Police and Firemen Retirement Fund by claiming disability and
started the double dipping.
·
So, from flip-flopping regarding the color of the gun; to whether the door was
closed or open; to whether he knocked the door or not; to whether he suffered a
major injury or not, Lying Lucas has some serious credibility issues; and all
his lies were allowed to poison the grand jury deliberations.
·
the false (and highly prejudicial) allegations that Dr. Stephanatos had
threatened Robert Del Vecchio, Esq. with violence few days prior to the
“eviction”;
·
the false (and highly prejudicial) allegation that Dr. Stephanatos did not want
to pay taxes;
·
not presenting evidence that Dr. Stephanatos only wanted a simple stay of the
proceedings (as is allowed by state law) so that he can file and adjudicate his
appeals and to save his home and home-based business from an illegal eviction;
·
failing to mention that at no time did the sheriff employees told Dr.
Stephanatos that he was under arrest;
·
not presenting evidence of the illegal background leading up to the charges
perpetrated by the conspirators Robert Del Vecchio, ATF, and others;
·
not mentioning the fact that this was a civil matter based upon profit for the
same;
·
not mentioning that Dr. Stephanatos fully owned his real estate property and
was used as his home and small business and that his business (Metropolitan
Environmental Services) was not part of any eviction proceedings;
·
not mentioning that state case law allowed Dr. Stephanatos not to lose his
home;
·
not mentioning that no state or federal court has the authority to take private
homestead property and deliver it to a private entity as it is in violation of
the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Article I, par. 20 of the
state constitution;
·
not mentioning that Dr. Stephanatos’ property was over-assessed by more than 40
percent since 1995 and no taxes were legally due;
·
the failure to properly charge the grand jurors on several asserted defenses,
including the defense of self and defense of dwelling, the Castle Doctrine, the
defense of business, duress, outrageous government conduct, honestly-held
belief, etc.;
·
the intentional failure to inform or notify the grand jurors that Dr.
Stephanatos wanted to testify (based on the letter sent to the prosecutor by
Mr. Herman, Esq. prior to the grand jury deliberations); thus the prosecutor
interfered with the independence of the Grand Jury;
·
and no explanation was given to the grand jury of the specific violations of
the law(s) and Court Rules (Sherman Act violation, tax sale law violations, fraud-on-the
court, failure to provide notice, failure to adjudicate the issue of
possession, obtaining ex-parte writs of possession, etc.) by the conspirators
and what is required to be done if there was to be legality and legitimate
process, which brought Officers Lucas and D’Agostino to the defendant’s home on
the day in question.
·
Add to this the constitutional violations (subject to the motion to suppress);
the doctrine of “false in one, false in all” not explained to the grand jury;
the fact that the grand jury was not charged as to the rights of protection by
the homeowner where it involves his property (the defense of home or New
Jersey’s Castle Doctrine), the protection of his business, as well as the
unlawful entry by the officers on defendant’s property as they were relying on
void judgments and writs due to the fraud on the court committed by Robert Del
Vecchio, ATF and others. The law of duress and self-defense and
outrageous government conduct should have been charged to the grand jury by the
prosecutor.
Instead
of a fair presentation, there was a biased presentation in actuality depicting
the defendant as a “monster”. The perjured testimonies’ and “fake facts”
cumulative effect was “clearly capable of producing an unjust result,” R.
2:10-2, requiring a reversal of defendant’s indictment. State v.
Orecchio, 16 N.J. 125, 129 (1954).
The
Law on Perjury Before a Grand Jury
The
grand jury both “acts as a sword so that those who are suspected of wrongdoing
may be properly brought to trial, and as a shield to protect the people
from arbitrary prosecution.” State v. Smith, 269 N.J.Super. 86,
93, 634 A.2d 576 (App. Div. 1993). In State v. Murphy, 110 N.J.
20, 538 A.2d 1235 (1988) the New Jersey Supreme Court held that it is the
court’s obligation to exercise its supervisory authority over the grand jury
process to ensure that the selection of the grand jurors and the presentation
are fair and unbiased.
“Unless
the prosecutor’s misconduct is ‘extreme and clearly infringes upon the [grand]
jury’s decision-making function’ an otherwise valid indictment should not be
dismissed.” Id. citing State v. Buonadonna, 122 N.J. 22, 48-49, 583
A.2d 747 (1991). The dismissal of an indictment is appropriate
“if it is established that the violation substantially influenced the
grand jury’s decision to indict” or if there is ‘grave doubt’ that the
determination ultimately reached was arrived at fairly and impartially.
Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 256 quoting United
States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 78 (1986). “The grand jury
cannot be denied access to evidence that is credible, material and so clearly
exculpatory as to induce a rational grand juror to conclude that the State has
not made out a prima facie case against the accused.” State v. Hogan,
144 N.J. 216, 236, 676 A.2d 533 (1996).
PROOFS
OF MASSIVE MATERIAL PERJURY BY RONALD A. LUCAS AND VICTOR D’AGOSTINO.
THIS PERJURY WAS KNOWN TO THE PASSAIC COUNTY PROSECUTOR PRIOR TO THE GRAND JURY
PROCEEDINGS.
In
paragraph 2 of section 4 of the Warrant Affidavit, Lucas “relates” to
Detective Scala “that upon knocking on the front entrance door of the
residence”. See excerpt from the warrant affidavit, Defense Exhibit
D-11. This statement to Detective Scala fully corroborates Dr. Stephanatos’
statements that his front door was closed – very closed – with a lock and
deadbolt closed.
However,
in his June 28, 2011 report prepared by Cpl. Lucas, he writes the following: “As
we proceeded toward the front door I ascented[sic] the steps and noticed the
front wood door was open and a glass storm door made the interior of the house
visible to me”. “At that moment a man came from the hallway with a
long object in his left hand”.
The
statement by Lucas to Detective Scala is diametrically different than the
statements given by Lucas and D’Agostino at the grand jury proceedings and also
wrote in their reports: that they did not knock the door and they were
assaulted as they were coming up the front porch steps and they were able to
see everything so nicely and so clearly because the front door was magically
open (that stupid Dr. Stephanatos, he should have left his door closed!
(sarcasm here)).
So,
based on these diametrically different statements by Lucas, the prosecutor knew
or should have known that Lucas lied. At the point at which the
prosecutor learned of the perjury before and during the grand jury, the
prosecutor was under a duty to notify the court and the grand jury, to correct
the cancer of justice that had become apparent to him. But he did
not. Welcome to Passaic County!
Furthermore,
in his grand jury testimony, Officer Lucas identified the “Ruger M77 Mark II,
270 caliber Winchester single bullet hunting rifle” as being the weapon that
the defendant pointed at him. (GJT27-8 to 13; Da15, Motion to Change
Venue). It is critical to note that the hunting rifle is a BROWN COLORED
GUN. However, in section 2 of paragraph 4 of the Warrant Affidavit, Lucas
“relates” to Detective Scala that he saw a “BLACK COLORED RIFLE”. Therefore,
the affidavit paragraph 4, section 2 included a material false statement that
was included with reckless disregard for the truth. So, again the
prosecutor knew or should have known that Lucas lied before the grand jury when
he selected a different color gun than the one he related to Detective Scala.
I
respectfully submit to this Court that the statements made by Lucas in the
early moments of the June 28, 2011 events are closer to the truth (but not
quite the truth), than his fabrications that are start pouring in later in the
day and afterwards. For example, Lt. Nick Mango wrote in his report that
“nobody was hurt”. Also, Lucas never wrote in his report that he
was injured. He specifically wrote : “As I entered the woods I
stumbled”. However, during this grand jury testimony, he provided a
diametrically different picture:
Lucas
claimed that he fell on his elbow and shoulder, but was able to regain his
balance, and he ran into a wooded area to seek cover behind a large boulder.
(GJT11-18 to 21; Da7, Motion to Change Venue). Lucas claimed that he tore
his biceps and had surgery on his shoulder, and “ended up having a pretty
severe injury” in his shoulder, requiring “five pins.” (GJT12-7 to 9; Da8,
Motion to Change Venue). Of course we now know that this guy was a
football player and body builder and suffered these injuries over his many
years of lifting heavy weights and hitting his opponents with his shoulder (he
was a linebacker with the Pompton Lakes Cardinals). This guy then went on
to defraud the New Jersey Police and Firemen Insurance Fund by claiming
disability and retiring from the sheriff’s department. After that, he
started the double dipping.
THE
LIES, FABRICATIONS AND INTENTIONAL OMISSIONS OF WALTER DEWEY
After
the two sheriff employees served a bunch of lies to the grand jurors and the
prosecutor, after learning of the perjury failed to correct it, he decided to
add some more fake facts of his own creation; basically, adding salt to the
injury (the vultures were keep piling on the body of still-alive Dr.
Stephanatos). The prosecutor, Walter Dewey, also mislead the jurors and
fabricated “facts” by eliciting false testimony from Officer D’Agostino
regarding the pointing of a gun out of a “window”. The officers had
indicated that they saw me standing behind a glass storm door and that I never
opened the door. No “window” was ever mentioned by the two individuals,
as no window exists in the front porch of the dwelling. See attached
image of the front door of the dwelling, showing that no window is present.
(I
denied that I was standing behind the storm door: I have stated many
times that I was in my office doing my business, I have the computer records to
prove it, those records were submitted to the prosecutors, and I kept the doors
of the home locked with a deadbolt).
But
the prosecutor asked D’Agostino if I was pointing a gun “out the window”.
Then D’Agostino said “yes”. See Grand Jury Transcripts, Motion to Change
Venue.
This
Court should note that there is no opening window in the front porch- that was
another misleading and prejudicial question by the corrupt Passaic County
prosecutor. The prosecutors obviously wanted to mislead and lie to the
grand jury by stating that the defendant was pointing a weapon outside a
window, something that the two sheriff employees never wrote in their reports,
as no window was involved. In fact, Lucas never testified or wrote that
the defendant was pointing a weapon outside a window. The corrupt prosecutor
Walter Dewey elicited this statement from D’Agostino only. Certainly this
is a highly prejudicial, fraudulent and misleading question/statement,
necessitating a dismissal of the indictment.
So,
from flip-flopping regarding the color of the gun; to whether the door was
closed or open; to whether he knocked the door or not; to whether he suffered a
major injury or not, Lying Lucas has some serious credibility issues. And
Walter Dewey added salt to the injury by cooking up highly prejudicial fake
“facts” of his own creation (the pointing of a gun out a window). This
Court cannot possibly uphold an indictment based on these material fact
perjuries and based on all the false and highly prejudicial evidence presented
at the grand jury. This is not how things are done. They need to go
back and try to obtain a superseding indictment (using the truth please), after
this Court dismisses this patently flawed one.
DEFENDANT
SPECIFICALLY REQUESTS AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING PURSUANT TO NJ COURT RULE 3:5-7
(C) HEARING AND THE RECENT SUPREME COURT CASE STATE V. ATWOOD, A-42,
SEPTEMBER TERM 2016 (2018).
Because
Defendant has provided many proofs in his various submissions to this Court,
directly refuting the fake facts cooked up by the prosecutor and his witnesses,
Defendant specifically requests an evidentiary hearing pursuant to NJ Court Rule
3:5-7 (c) Hearing. If material facts are disputed, testimony
thereon shall be taken in open court. The evidentiary hearing is also
requested pursuant to the recent Supreme Court case State v. Atwood, A-42,
September Term 2016 (2018).
See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL.,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 14.3(a), at 321–22 (3d ed. 2007) (defendant arguably
should not be bound over for trial if evidence would not permit jury to convict).
I
am forwarding a copy of the material directly to the Passaic County prosecutor,
Stephen Bollenbach, as reflected by the enclosed certification of service.
I
hereby certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements made by
me are true and correct. I am aware that if any of the foregoing
statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment. NJ
Court Rule R. 1:4-4(b); 28 U.S.C. §1746.
Respectfully
Submitted,
___________________________________
Joshua
Epstein, Esq.
Encl.
cc:
Steven Bollenbach, Passaic Co.
=======================================================================
Dear
Legislators:
I
am a concerned citizen who has been reading about illegal and unethical
practices of New Jersey judges.
I
have been reading about abuse of laws and violation of citizens' constitutional
rights by municipal and superior court judges as a way of shaking them
up. In one case reported to the media, former Chancery judge
Margaret McVeigh in Passaic County stole homestead property valued at $475,000
for $20,000 in undue taxes in Wayne Township, New Jersey. Could you
please comment on this story?
Sincerely,
Mary
Clinton
========================================
JUDICIAL
CORRUPTION AND ABUSE OF LAWS IN NEW JERSEY
I
have been reading your stories regarding local courts that must stop shaking
N.J. residents down for cash.
I
must inform you that these practices are not limited to the municipal
courts. They are widespread in the superior courts, the Chancery (or
general equity) divisions that handle tax sale foreclosures. They
threaten people with forfeiting their homes and with eviction if they fail to
pay taxes that may not even owe.
In
my case, they stole my homestead property and place of business that was valued
at $475,000 for a property tax of $20,000. The property was over-assessed
by more than 40 percent in violation of N.J.S.A. 54:4-23 and the Uniformity
Clause of the NJ Constitution (Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 1(a)),
and they knew it, but they confiscated my home, anyway. Tragic, tragic,
situation.
The
corrupt former Chancery judge Margaret McVeigh never issued an application of
the law to the facts in violation of court Rule 1:7-4(a).
Furthermore, court rule R. 4:64-6 states that in foreclosure of tax sale
certificates, if the defendant's answer sets up the defense of the invalidity
of the tax or other lien, or the invalidity of the proceedings to sell, or the
invalidity of the sale, those questions shall be tried in the action.
However, here there is neither fact finding nor a trial on any of the issues
raised by Dr. Stephanatos. The corrupt former Chancery judge Margaret
McVeigh failed to consider the equities that were in favor of Dr. Stephanatos
or that a windfall will result. See M&D Assocs. v. Mandara, 366 N.J.
Super. 341 (App. Div.) certif. denied, 180 N.J. 151 (2004) for its
rationale that chancery courts "in such foreclosure cases should be
alerted . . . that a significant windfall might result if adequate scrutiny . .
. is not undertaken[,] In view of our decision, the operation of the tax sale
law requires that the entire judgment must be vacated as void based upon
equitable considerations.”
Dr.
Stephanatos was also targeted by the government due to the filing of several lawsuits,
both federal and state; he was penalized by the judges for that. What the
government did was unlawful, unfair and unreasonable.
The
Passaic County sheriff then filed criminal charges against me for refusing to
leave my home and they claimed they were assaulted. The criminal case is
pending for 7 years and 1 month now. It has not gone to trial because of
the massive corruption in the judicial system and because the sheriff employees
(Ronald A. Lucas and Vincent D'Agostino) committed perjury, i.e. they lied that
they were assaulted. Although an assault case must be brought to trial
within 1 to 2 years, it has been more than 7 years now. A defendant has a
fundamental constitutional right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const.,
amend.VI; N.J. Const. Art. I, ¶ 10. But the state judiciary
violated that right.
They
also violated my constitutional rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and
Article I, par. 20 of the state constitution that prohibit private
takings; no state court had jurisdiction or authority to take a $475,000
homestead property belonging in full to Dr. Stephanatos and deliver it to a
third party (American Tax Funding, LLC). But these corrupt judges did it
anyway.
What
has really shocked our conscience is that ATF, LLC/Wayne Township knowingly
charged unlawful and/excessive taxes in violation of the Uniformity Clause
(Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 1(a)). They also charged him 18
percent interest and 6 percent penalties on top of these excessive and illegal
taxes. Thus, a tax dispute of less than $20K (the overassessment amount)
became $60K. We found that Dr. Stephanatos offered to pay the $20K
overassessment amount, but refused to pay the $60K amount. Then the
antitrust conspirators (See the U.S. District Court in Newark Antitrust
Litigation that found that ATF, LLC conspired to defraud homeowners of their
properties and money) confiscated his residential real estate property, along
with his business, Metropolitan Environmental Services.
PRIVATE
TAKINGS ARE PROHIBITED BY BOTH FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS; AS A RESULT,
THE CHANCERY COURT EXCEEDED ITS CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY AND ITS JUDGMENT WAS
VOID AB INITIO
We
provide the following two precedential New Jersey cases where the courts have
ruled that an act of the legislature cannot confer any right upon an individual
to deprive persons of the ordinary enjoyment of their property without just
compensation. Here are the two seminal cases:
An
act of the legislature cannot confer any right upon an individual to deprive
persons of the ordinary enjoyment of their property without just compensation.
Oechsle v. Ruhl, 140 N.J. Eq. 355, 54 A.2d 462 (Ch.1947). Constitutional Law.
An
act of the legislature cannot confer upon individuals or private corporations,
acting primarily for their own profit, although for public benefit as well, any
right to deprive persons of the ordinary enjoyment of their property, except
upon condition that just compensation be first made to the owners. Pennsylvania R. Co. v.
Angel, 41 N.J. Eq. 316, 7 A. 432, 56 Am.Rep. 1 (1886).
See
also the following federal law, prohibiting private takings:
The
Public Use Clause provides that “one person's property may not be taken for the
benefit of another private person without a justifying public purpose, even though
compensation is paid.” Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241
(1984) (quoting Thompson v. Consol. Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937).
Because a private taking cannot be constitutional even if compensated, “[a]
plaintiff that proves that a government entity has taken its property for a
private, not a public, use is entitled to an injunction against the
unconstitutional taking, not simply compensation.” Carole Media LLC v.
N.J. Transit Corp., 550 F.3d 302, 308 (3d Cir. 2008).
UNREASONABLE
SEIZURES ARE PROHIBITED BY ARTICLE I, PAR. 7 OF THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION
They
also violated the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures (see also Article I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey
Constitution). They seized and confiscated a residential property valued
at $475,000 (plus his business as well) for a small amount of disputed
taxes. These are truly criminal acts.
If
you can listen and publish my story, you will be shocked of what these judges
have been doing to shake people up for money. They essentially
blackmailing them: you either pay, or you lose your home; you either pay
or we put you to jail; you either pay or we take your license away, and
so on.
Here
is a link, if you want to learn more about this case. You will be
really-really-really shocked regarding what they have done to me.
See
also the corruption tip regarding Ronald Lucas who defrauded the police and
firemen fund by claiming on the job disability.
We
have evidence that Dr. Stephanatos was targeted by the government employees
because he had filed lawsuits asking for equal protection regarding his
excessive property taxes. That is why they violated the constitution and
confiscated his property for taxes that he did not even owe. These are
absolutely unethical and even criminal acts. Please investigate.
United States of America) 
Who is Air America Flight Services? 
