MEC&F Expert Engineers : THE DEADLY CELL TOWERS – WHEN FAILURE TO PROPERLY TRAIN, EQUIP OR SUPERVISE WORKERS HAS DEADLY CONSEQUENCES

Tuesday, October 28, 2014

THE DEADLY CELL TOWERS – WHEN FAILURE TO PROPERLY TRAIN, EQUIP OR SUPERVISE WORKERS HAS DEADLY CONSEQUENCES



THE DEADLY CELL TOWERS – WHEN FAILURE TO PROPERLY TRAIN, EQUIP OR SUPERVISE WORKERS HAS DEADLY CONSEQUENCES


OSHA issues new directive to keep communication tower workers safe
WASHINGTON - The Occupational Safety and Health Administration has updated its Communications Tower directive regarding the use of hoist systems used to move workers to and from workstations on communication towers. This follows an alarming increase in preventable injuries and fatalities at communication tower work sites.
More fatalities occurred in this industry in 2013 than in the previous two years combined. This disturbing trend appears to be continuing, with nine worker deaths occurring so far in 2014.
"This directive ensures that communication tower workers are protected regardless of the type of the work they are doing on communication towers," said Dr. David Michaels, assistant secretary of labor for occupational safety and health. "Employers and cell tower owners and operators must make sure workers are properly trained and protected."
The directive outlines the proper use of hoist and other fall arrest systems and includes detailed information on how to hoist people safely. The directive updates a 2002 enforcement policy, which only covered the hoisting of workers to workstations during new tower erection activities. The updated policy covers any work on a communication tower - including both maintenance and new construction - that involves the use of a hoist to lift workers from one elevated workstation to another.
The release of the new directive is the latest in a series of actions OSHA has taken to improve cell tower safety. The agency is collaborating with the National Association of Tower Erectors and other industry stakeholders to ensure that every communication tower employer understands how to protect workers performing this high-hazard work.
OSHA sent a letter to communication tower employers urging compliance and strict adherence to safety standards and common-sense practices. OSHA has also created a new Web page targeting the issues surrounding communication tower work. This outreach follows a November 2013 memo to OSHA's compliance officers and regional administrators mandating increased attention, education and data collection on the industry. OSHA continues to investigate past incidents and will issue the results as they become available. Communication towers are on the agency's regulatory agenda and OSHA expects to issue a Request for Information later this year.
Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, employers are responsible for providing safe and healthful workplaces for their employees. OSHA's role is to ensure these conditions for America's working men and women by setting and enforcing standards, and providing training, education and assistance. For more information, visit www.osha.gov.

Prior to the 1980s, communication and broadcast tower erection, servicing and maintenance was a very small and highly specialized industry. Over the past 30 years, the growing demand for wireless and broadcast communications has spurred a dramatic increase in communication tower construction and maintenance.
In order to erect or maintain communication towers, employees regularly climb towers, using fixed ladders, support structures or step bolts, from 100 feet to heights in excess of 1000 or 2000 feet. Employees climb towers throughout the year, including during inclement weather conditions.
Some of the more frequently encountered hazards include:
  • Falls from great heights
  • Electrical hazards
  • Hazards associated with hoisting personnel and equipment with base-mounted drum hoists
  • Inclement weather
  • Falling object hazards
  • Equipment failure
  • Structural collapse of towers
In 2013, OSHA recorded a total number of 13 communication tower-related fatalities. In the first half of 2014, there have already been nine fatalities at communication tower worksites. This represents a significant increase in fatalities and injuries from previous years, and OSHA is concerned at this trend. OSHA is working with industry stakeholders to identify the causes of these injuries and fatalities, and to reduce the risks faced by employees in the communication tower industry.
Compliance Assistance


Standards
Construction Industry (29 CFR 1926)



Resources


Training
  • New FCC and DOL announce wireless apprenticeship program. The Wireless Infrastructure Association is orchestrating the Telecommunications Industry Registered Apprenticeship Program (TIRAP).
Recent Citations


Incident Investigations
Communications Tower
The following communications tower incidents have been investigated by OSHA. Most of them were reported to OSHA, or OSHA learned about them from news reports, etc. There have been tower incidents that OSHA did not investigate because they were not reported to OSHA as required.


Construction Incidents Investigation Engineering Reports


Additional Information
  • NIOSH FACE reports

Wireless Horizon tower collapse results in deaths of 2 cell tower workers
OSHA finds 2 willful, 4 serious safety violations at Blaine, Kansas, work site
OSHA's inspection found that the equipment the company provided the workers was in poor repair. The company did not use proper engineering plans to ensure the workers were protected against this type of collapse
BLAINE, Kan. – Following the death of two workers from the collapse of a cell tower they were dismantling March 25, the U.S. Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration has cited Wireless Horizon Inc. for two willful and four serious safety violations. OSHA placed the company in the Severe Violator Enforcement Program* following the incident. So far in 2014, 11 workers have lost their lives nationwide in the communication tower industry; and 13 deaths occurred in 2013.
"Two families have lost their loved ones in a preventable tragedy. No one should ever have to endure that loss. Inspecting and ensuring equipment is in good working order is a common-sense safety procedure that stop injuries and fatalities," said Dr. David Michaels, assistant secretary of labor for occupational safety and health. "OSHA expects tower owners and operators, such as Wireless Horizon, to protect their workers on job sites in this hazardous industry by increasing training and implementing all known safety precautions. Our nation's growing need for telecommunications should not cost workers their lives."
The tower technicians, ages 25 and 38, were using a load-lifting gin pole attached to the side of the tower with a wire rope sling. The sling failed, causing the gin pole to fall and bring the tower down with it. One of the employees was above the gin pole near the top of the tower, and the second employee was approximately 20 feet below the pole. Both workers fell to the ground during the collapse. As the tower fell, it also struck an adjacent tower, causing it to crumble as well. One of the employees had been with the company two months, while the other employee had only been working there for five months when the incident occurred. OSHA's inspection found that the equipment the company provided the workers was in poor repair. The company did not use proper engineering plans to ensure the workers were protected against this type of collapse.
OSHA's investigation found that Wireless Horizon failed to inspect the wire rope slings prior to use and provide protection to the slings when rigged over sharp objects. These failures resulted in the issuance of two willful violations. A willful violation is one committed with intentional, knowing or voluntary disregard for the law's requirements, or with plain indifference to worker safety and health.
Wireless Horizon also failed to conduct an engineering survey and develop a rigging plan prior to beginning the demolition process. Additionally, the company did not provide the technicians a load chart for the gin pole in use or operator manuals. OSHA issued four serious citations for these violations. A serious violation occurs when there is substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from a hazard about which the employer knew or should have known.
OSHA has proposed penalties of $134,400 for the company, based in St. Peters, Missouri. Wireless Horizon employs approximately 60 workers, including four that were present at the Blaine job site on the date of this fatal incident.
To view current citations, visit http://www.osha.gov/ooc/citations/WirelessHorizonInc_964654_0919_14.pdf*.
This company has been inspected by OSHA on two previous occasions since 2005, and OSHA issued multiple serious violations both times.
OSHA is collaborating with the National Association of Tower Erectors and other industry stakeholders to ensure that every communication tower employer understands their responsibility to protect workers performing this very dangerous work. OSHA has created a Web page targeting the issues surrounding communication tower work to help employees and employers better understand the risks of tower work and how to prevent injuries and fatalities in this industry.
Wireless Horizon has 15 business days from receipt of the citations to comply; request an informal conference with OSHA's area director in Wichita, Kansas, or contest the findings before the independent Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission.
To ask questions; obtain compliance assistance; file a complaint or report workplace hospitalizations, fatalities or situations posing imminent danger to workers, the public should call OSHA's toll-free hotline at 800-321-OSHA (6742).
Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, employers are responsible for providing safe and healthful workplaces for their employees. OSHA's role is to ensure these conditions for America's working men and women by setting and enforcing standards, and providing training, education and assistance. For more information, visit http://www.osha.gov.
# # #
Region 3 News Release: 14-1421-PHI (osha 14-068)
July 31, 2014
Contact: Leni Fortson      Joanna Hawkins
Phone: 215-861-5102      215-861-5101
Email: uddyback-fortson.lenore@dol.gov      hawkins.joanna@dol.gov
Cell tower company cited by OSHA for safety hazards following fatality in
Clarksburg, West Virginia, tower collapse in February 2014
New US Department of Labor OSHA directive seeks to protect communication tower workers
CLARKSBURG, W.Va. – Following the collapse of a Clarksburg communication tower in February 2014 that seriously injured two and claimed the lives of two employees and a volunteer firefighter, S and S Communication Specialists Inc. has been cited for two serious workplace safety violations. The citations issued to the Hulbert, Oklahoma-based company follow an investigation by the U.S. Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration.
S and S Communication Specialists was contracted to perform structural modifications to an existing cellular communication tower. The modifications included replacing diagonal bracing and installing leg stiffeners and new guy wires on the structure. The tower collapsed while the employees were removing diagonal bracing.
"These deaths are a painful reminder of the dangers associated with communication towers, and are at the root of OSHA's directive on communication tower construction activities," said Prentice Cline, OSHA area director for Charleston. "OSHA is concerned about the alarming increase in preventable injuries and fatalities at communication tower work sites. The agency is collaborating with the National Association of Tower Erectors and other industry stakeholders to ensure that every communication tower employer understands how to protect workers performing this high-hazard work."
Thirteen workers lost their lives in the communication tower industry in 2013, more than the previous two years combined. This year, nine worker deaths have occurred in this industry to date.
OSHA inspectors cited the company for violating section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act for directing employees to remove diagonal structural members on communication towers without using temporary braces or supports, and for allowing employees to be tied off to bracing that was not capable of supporting at least 5,000 pounds. A serious violation occurs when there is substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from a hazard about which the employer knew or should have known.
The company was assessed a $7,000 penalty for each of the two violations, which is the maximum amount allowed by law for a serious violation, and has 15 business days from receipt of its citations and proposed penalties to comply, meet informally with OSHA's area director, or contest the findings before the independent Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission.
To ask questions, obtain compliance assistance, file a complaint or report workplace hospitalizations, fatalities or situations posing imminent danger to workers, the public should call OSHA's toll-free hotline at 800-321-OSHA (6742) or the Charleston Area Office at 304-347-5937.
Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, employers are responsible for providing safe and healthful workplaces for their employees. OSHA's role is to ensure these conditions for America's working men and women by setting and enforcing standards, and providing training, education and assistance. For more information, visit http://www.osha.gov.


US DOL – FCC joint Event on communication tower safety and apprenticeship.
Several articles were compiled on the joint FCC and OSHA effort to protect cell tower workers including the following:
  • Perez: The Cell Phones in our Pockets Shouldn't Come at the Expense of Workers' Lives. EHS Today, (2014, October 20).
  • New rules would protect cell tower workers. The Hill, (2014, October 14).
  • FCC, Labor team to save tower workers' lives. Broadcasting & Cable, (2014, October 14).
  • Department of Labor, FCC announce wireless apprenticeship program. RCR Wireless News, (2014, October 14).

On July 18, 2008, a 55-year-old male communications tower worker died after falling 60 feet from a self-supported tower to the ground. On the day of the incident, the decedent and three other workers were performing structural upgrades to a 280-foot-tall communications tower in southern New Jersey. Two workers, including the victim, were stationed on the southeast face of the structure at a height of 60 feet. While the victim was preparing to ready his position to finish working, he fell backwards from the tower to the ground, and died instantly. NJ FACE investigators recommend that these safety guidelines be followed to prevent similar incidents:
  • Tower workers should utilize a separate fall protection system when employing vertical lifelines or controlled descent devices.
  • Communication tower employees should be trained on the proper use of tower climbing and fall protection equipment.
  • A safety and health plan based on a job hazard analysis should be developed by the employer and followed for each tower climb where workers are assigned tasks.

Introduction

On July 18, 2008, a Federal OSHA compliance officer notified NJ FACE staff of the death of a 55-year-old worker who was killed after falling 60 feet from a communications tower. A NJ FACE investigator contacted the employer and arranged to conduct an investigation, which took place on August 25, 2008. During the visit, the NJ FACE investigator interviewed the immediate supervisor and colleagues of the decedent. Additional information was obtained from the medical examiner’s report, OSHA communication tower experts, and the OSHA compliance officer’s final report.
Of the three workers on the tower the day of the incident, the victim had the most experience (>5 years) as a communications tower worker; one had been at the company for about five years and the other was relatively new. Employee health and safety training, as well as job training, was conducted on site by the employer.

Investigation

The incident occurred on a hot, humid, July day with low wind. The self-supported communications tower was situated in an off-road wooded area that had been cleared for the tower and its equipment. Three workers were assigned to change out steel diagonal structural members on the tower in preparation for new communications equipment that was to be installed. Stronger grade steel was to be installed in place of the existing diagonals at the 20-60 foot elevation and the 120-160 foot elevation of the 280-foot tower. The crew arrived on site at approximately 8:30 am. By 9:10 am, they had begun changing out the steel diagonals at the 20- and 40-foot elevations on the northeast face of the tower (the tower is pyramidal in shape; see Figure 1), which was completed at 10:25 am. The work ropes, which ran through pulleys to raise and lower loads and lifelines, were being relocated to the southeast tower face (seen in Figure 1). At about 10:45 am, the decedent (Worker #1) and a second crew member (Worker #2) were working at a height of approximately 60 feet on the southeast face of the tower. Each of the workers was attaching a 0.5 inch line, which was fed thorough a controlled descent device called a “Fisk,” in order to begin work on that face. These lines, which also functioned as lifelines, were attached to the tower via an anchor strap that was fastened to a horizontal member (see Figure 1). The lifeline was fed through the metal ring on the anchor strap. The workers also each had a harness strap, which was connected to the anchor strap. None of the workers had a separate fall protection system.
The two workers attached and tested the lines. Worker #1 began to lower into a working position and suddenly fell to the ground. A coworker called 911, and police and rescue workers arrived at the scene. The responders did not find any vital signs, and the victim was pronounced dead at the scene via telemetry.
As noted above, the anchor strap was affixed to one of the horizontal beams of the tower, and was used as the connection point of the lifeline and harness strap. The victim had on a harness with various pieces of equipment attached; a lifeline was connected that also contained an in-line Fisk (the controlled descent device; see Figure 2). One end of the lifeline had a loop knot which is connected directly via carabiner to the anchor strap. The other end of the lifeline has a slip knot which was also connected via carabiner to the anchor strap. The line was fed through the worker’s harness and through the Fisk, which he used to control his descent. When ready to descend, a worker would unhook the slip knot to allow the line to move through the Fisk, providing the ability to lower to the working elevation.
According to Worker #2, as the victim was preparing to lower himself into position, he unhooked the harness strap carabiner from the anchor strap instead of the slip knot carabiner. Then when he sat into position, the weight pulled his lifeline free from the anchor strap, and he fell backwards 60 feet to his death.
A separate fall arrest system (e.g., a separate lifeline with rope grab) could have prevented this incident. As per OSHA 29 CFR 1926.502(d), Fall protection systems criteria and practices, personal fall arrest systems, employers are required that, “…where vertical lifelines are used, each employee shall be attached to a separate lifeline.”
Figure 1: Work site on tower. Note the anchor strap and work ropes at the 60 foot elevation point where the deceased was working.


Figure 2: Lifeline: Controlled descent device or Fisk, along with slip knot and loop knot at each end of the lifeline.

Recommendations/Discussion

Recommendation #1: Tower workers should utilize a separate fall protection system when employing vertical lifelines or controlled descent devices.
Discussion: In this incident, the controlled descent device (Fisk) was being used as fall protection. Fisk descenders were developed by rock climbers for intermittent rappelling, or episodes of free falling followed by brief periods of control. This is not recommended for safe working conditions on a communications tower. If a proper fall arrest system is appropriately rigged, a worker cannot fall more than 6 feet before the system activates. Fisks are sometimes used because they are easier to master than other descent tools. The preferred method of descent device, however, is the rope grab or rope brake, which enable the automatic repositioning of the connection to the separate fall protection system. These devices lock onto a line under stress, are generally attached to a static lifeline, and have either shock absorbers or the ability to stretch. In this case, a Fisk was used in place of a rope grab because the rope grab was considered by workers to be an encumbrance, and “where wind would blow, it would hit us in the head.” If a manual descending system such as a Fisk is used, a separate fall protection system must be in place. The OSHA Fall Protection Standard, 29 CFR 1926.502(d)10i, requires that, “…where vertical lifelines are used, each employee shall be attached to a separate lifeline.” Proper fall arrest systems should also conform to ANSI/ASSE Z359.1-2007, Safety Requirements for Personal Fall Arrest Systems, Subsystems and Components, which, “Establishes requirements for the performance, design, marking, qualification, instruction, training, inspection, use, maintenance and removal from service of connectors, full-body harnesses, lanyards, energy absorbers, anchorage connectors, fall arresters, vertical lifelines and self-retracting lanyards comprising personal fall arrest systems for users within the capacity range of 130 to 310 lb (59 to 140 kg).”
Recommendation #2: Communication tower employees should be trained on the proper use of tower climbing and fall protection equipment.
Discussion: The OSHA Fall Protection Standard, 29 CFR 1926.503(a), requires that, “…a training program for each employee who might be exposed to fall hazards must be provided.” The program trains employees to recognize the hazards of falling and the procedures to be followed in order to minimize these hazards. According to OSHA 1926, Subpart M, Appendix C, section e (full reference in Appendix), this should include, “…proper hook-up, anchoring and tie-off techniques, including the proper dee ring (carabiner or other attachment point to use on the body belt and harness for fall arrest).” Part of any training program should also include access to the NIOSH Alert, Preventing Injuries and Deaths from Falls during Construction and Maintenance of Telecommunication Towers, which is available online at: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2001-156/). This publication provides useful information to both employers and employers, and includes five FACE fatality narratives that all involve fatal falls during construction or maintenance of communication towers.
Recommendation #3: A safety and health plan based on a job hazard analysis should be developed by the employer and followed for each communications tower where workers are assigned tasks.
Discussion: Employers should conduct a job hazard analysis, with the participation of employees, of all work areas and job tasks. A job hazard analysis should begin by reviewing the work activities for which the employee is responsible, and the equipment that is needed. Each task is further examined for mechanical, electrical, chemical, or any other hazard the worker may encounter. A source of information on conducting a job hazard analysis is included in the Appendix.

Appendix

Recommended Resources
It is extremely important that employers obtain accurate information on health, safety, and applicable OSHA standards. NJ FACE recommends the following sources of information which should help both employers and employees:
U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA)
Federal OSHA will provide information on safety and health standards on request. OSHA has four area offices in New Jersey that cover the following counties:
Hunterdon, Middlesex, Somerset, Union, and Warren counties
Telephone: (732) 750-3270
Essex, Hudson, Morris, and Sussex counties
Telephone: (973) 263-1003
Bergen and Passaic counties
Telephone: (201) 288-1700
Atlantic, Burlington, Cape May, Camden, Cumberland, Gloucester, Mercer, Monmouth, Ocean, and Salem counties
Telephone: (856) 757-5181
Federal OSHA
Web site: https://www.osha.gov/

New Jersey Public Employees Occupational Safety and Health (PEOSH) Program
The PEOSH Act covers all NJ state, county, and municipal employees. Two state departments administer the act; the NJ Department of Labor and Workforce Development (NJDLWD), which investigates safety hazards, and the NJ Department of Health and Senior Services (NJDHSS), which investigates health hazards. PEOSH has information available that may also benefit private employers.
NJDLWD, Office of Public Employees Safety
Telephone: (609) 633-3896
Web site: http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/lsse/employer/Public_Employees_OSH.html
NJDHSS, Public Employees Occupational Safety & Health Program
Telephone: (609) 984-1863
Web site: http://www.state.nj.us/health/eoh/peoshweb/
On-site Consultation for Public Employers
Telephone: (609) 984-1863 or (609) 633-2587
Web site: www.state.nj.us/health/eoh/peoshweb/peoshcon.htm

New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Occupational Safety and Health On-Site Consultation Program
This program provides free advice to private businesses on improving safety and health in the workplace and complying with OSHA standards.
Telephone: (609) 984-0785
Web site: http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/lsse/employer/peosh_consultation.html (Link updated 3/26/2013)

New Jersey State Safety Council
The NJ State Safety Council provides a variety of courses on work-related safety. There is a charge for the seminars.
Telephone: (908) 272-7712.
Web site: http://www.njsafety.org

Internet Resources
Other useful internet sites for occupational safety and health information:


Reference

Job Hazard Analysis. US Department of Labor Publication # OSHA-3071, 1998 (revised). USDOL, OSHA Publications, PO Box 37535, Washington DC 20013-7535.
29 CFR Ch. XVII, Section 1926.502 (d)10i: Fall Protection systems criteria and practices.
Appendix C to Subpart M of Part 1926—Personal Fall Arrest Systems; Non-mandatory guidelines for Complying with 1926.502(d).
ANSI/ASSE Z359.1-2007: Safety Requirements for Personal Fall Arrest Systems, Subsystems and Components

New Jersey FACE Program

Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) Project
Investigation #08-NJ-003
Staff members of the New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Services, Occupational Health Service, perform FACE investigations when there is a report of a targeted work-related fatal injury. The goal of FACE is to prevent fatal work injuries by studying the work environment, the worker, the task and tools the worker was using, the energy exchange resulting in the fatal injury, and the role of management in controlling how these factors interact. FACE gathers information from multiple sources that may include interviews of employers, workers, and other investigators; examination of the fatality site and related equipment; and reviewing OSHA, police, and medical examiner reports, employer safety procedures, and training plans. The FACE program does not determine fault or place blame on employers or individual workers. Findings are summarized in narrative investigation reports that include recommendations for preventing similar events. All names and other identifiers are removed from FACE reports and other data to protect the confidentiality of those who participate in the program.
NIOSH-funded state-based FACE Programs include: California, Iowa, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, and Washington. Please visit the NJ FACE website at www.state.nj.us/health/eoh/survweb/face.htm or the CDC/NIOSH FACE website at www.cdc.gov/niosh/face for more information.
The NJ FACE Project is supported by Cooperative Agreement #1 U60 OH0345-01 from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The contents of this report are solely the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official views of the CDC.
To contact New Jersey State FACE program personnel regarding State-based FACE reports, please use information listed on the Contact Sheet on the NIOSH FACE web site. Please contact In-house FACE program personnel regarding In-house FACE reports and to gain assistance when State-FACE program personnel cannot be reached.

Tower Construction Worker Dies Following 40-Foot Fall From Cellular Tower in Missouri

MO FACE Investigation #99MO138
Date: May 22, 2001
SUMMARY
On November 26, 1999, a 38-year-old tower construction worker fell approximately 40 feet from a cellular tower. The victim and co-workers were in the process of constructing a 180-foot monopole tower. The victim was working outside of the tower at the 40-foot level where he was bolting together two tower sections. The tower design allowed the workers to reach through access ports from the outside, place the bolt through the section flange and tighten the nut to specifications. There were several bolts that could not be reached from the outside of the tower. The co-worker climbed down to the ground and climbed up the inside of the tower. The co-worker then could slide the bolt through the flange and the victim could tighten the nut to specifications. At the time of the incident the victim was wearing a saddle style-positioning belt. Attached to his positioning D-rings was a spreader bar, with a large hook. Apparently, the victim unhooked from the tower and was moving to the next bolt location when he fell. The victim was taken by ambulance to a local hospital and then life-flighted to a trauma center where he died the morning of November 27, 1999.
The MO FACE investigator concluded that in order to prevent similar occurrences all employers should:
  • provide employees with a 100% fall protection system compatible with the work being performed, instruct employees in the proper use of the system and equipment, and ensure their use;
  • employers should ensure that proper personal protective equipment is available and instruct workers in the proper use and limitations of the system, and ensure its use;
  • develop, implement, and enforce a comprehensive written safety program which includes a commitment to 100% tie off and written procedures to implement 100% fall protection
Additionally, manufactures of tower components and tower owners should:
  • consider installing fall-protection fixtures on tower components during fabrication or erection that would facilitate the use of fall protection.

INTRODUCTION
The MO FACE investigator was notified of an occupational fatality at a tower construction site in Missouri at approximately 11:00 a.m., November 27, 1999, by the county sheriff's office. The investigator responded to the incident site on Monday November 29, 1999. Upon arrival the investigator found that the company had returned home to be with their families and the family of the victim. Employees of the cellular service company who owned tower were present and were also there at the time of the incident. The company returned to the site on Thursday, December 2, 1999. On-site at this time were the company owners, the president of the tower manufacturing company and a compliance officer for the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).
The employer is a tower erection company who has been in business for approximately five years and, at the time of the incident, employed one employee. The company did not have written safety rules and procedures in place for the tasks performed by the workers. According to the employer, the victim was experienced in tower construction and had received training that specifically addressed the hazards associated with the fatality. The victim was a temporary employee for this company, employed just for the construction of this tower. This was his second day on this job and was the first fatality the company had experienced.

INVESTIGATION
The tower construction company contracted with the cellular service company to erect a 180-foot monopole cellular telephone tower. The company had been on-site for three days when the incident occurred. The victim had arrived at the site working for his regular employer three days before the incident. His regular job was to deliver and install the prefabricated electronics building which was located next to the base of the tower. The victim had prearranged with the tower contractor to stay on-site after he had completed the installation of the electronics building and work for them in the construction of the tower.
On the day of the incident the workers began setting tower sections with the assistance of a crane service company. They had set and bolted the 20-foot base section to the concrete foundation and slab. Section two had been set and bolted to the base section. The tower had been completed to the height of 40-feet. The next 20-foot section was set in place by the crane. The victim and one co-worker were on the tower at the 40-foot height. They were bolting the flanges of the two sections together using a total of 48 bolts. Most of the bolts and corresponding nuts could be placed by reaching through access ports, placing the bolt up through the flange and tightening the nut down from the outside. There were several bolts that could not be reached from the outside and the co-worker climbed down from the outside of the tower and climbed up the inside to the 40-foot level. From inside the tower the co-worker could place the bolts up through the flange and victim could tighten the on the bolt. As the victim was repositioning himself on the tower he unhooked his positioning belt. At this time he lost his grip and fell 40-feet. The workers onsite immediately came to the victim's aid. A worker with the cellular company called 911 from their cell phone and helped direct the ambulance to the site. The victim was taken by ambulance to a local hospital then life-flighted to a trauma center where he did not survive the injuries and died the next morning.

CAUSE OF DEATH
Severe Brain Injury, Multiple Trauma.

RECOMMENDATIONS/DISCUSSION
Recommendation #1: Employers should provide employees with a 100% fall protection system compatible with the work being performed, instruct employees in the proper use of the system and equipment, and ensure their use.
Discussion: In this incident, the employee was using a positioning safety belt sometimes described as a tree-trimmers belt, but no other fall-protection system was in place to protect him as he moved on the tower. OSHA Compliance Directive, CPL 2-1.29 - Interim Inspection Procedures During Communication Tower Construction Activities describes measures to be taken during the construction of telecommunication towers:
When climbing the tower during construction activities, employees must be protected from falls using a fall arrest system meeting the criteria of 29CFR1926.502 or a ladder assist safety device meeting the requirements of 29CFR1926.1053(a). These are acceptable methods of accessing tower workstations regardless of height. All employees climbing or otherwise accessing towers must be trained in the recognition and avoidance of fall hazards and in the use of the fall protection systems to be used, pursuant to 1926.21 or where applicable, 1926.1060.
Some industry representatives have joined with OSHA in recommending that each employee six feet or more above a lower level should be protected from falling by a guardrail system, safety net system, ladder safety device, fall arrest system or positioning device system. However, current OSHA standards only require fall protection at heights of more than 25 feet.
Fall-protection is defined as follows: Employees at risk of falling from work levels more than six feet above the ground or working surface should be protected by some conventional means of fall protection, which may include an integral fall-arrest system. This applies to ascending, descending, moving point-to-point, or any other tower construction or alteration-work activity conducted at an elevated workplace. Employers should also require a minimum of three-point contact (two hands and one foot or two feet and one hand) at all times when employees are moving on the tower.
Fall protection for tower work is more easily provided when the employee is stationary and can tie-off at one location on the structure. When employees are required to move about on the tower, other means of fall protection are recommended, which can include, but are not limited to, a Y-style lanyard with connectors at each end that:


  1. can attach to anchorage points incorporated into the design of the tower;
  2. are large enough to completely encircle tower members to which they are to be attached (these large connectors may require a special order from a fall-protection equipment manufacturer as the throat opening must be large enough to encircle the member); or
  3. a Y-style lanyard made of reinforced fabric. The reinforced lanyards can be looped around the tower member and attached back to themselves.
These lanyards attach to the D-ring at the center back (dorsal position) of the employee's full-body harness. A fall-arrestor should also be incorporated into the lanyard. Using this system allows the worker to move about the structured alternating the use of each leg of the Y lanyard providing 100 percent fall protection. This may be the most feasible method for fall protection when moving horizontally on the tower.
When there is an anchor point above the worker's head a properly installed and used retractable lifeline or retractable lanyard may be considered. These fall limiting devices are a preferred method of fall protection due to they engage almost immediately minimizing the fall distance and significantly reducing the impact on the worker. Other means of providing vertical fall protection is incorporating lifeline and rope-grab system. Lifelines can be attached to the tower sections on the ground before they are raised into position. After the higher tower section is set and bolted in place and the worker is securely attached to the tower with his positioning lanyards he can easily switch the rope grab from the lower lifeline and upper lifeline and then continue to ascend vertically. These lifelines need to remain in place for descending tower as well.
The first person going up the tower is at greatest risk if there has been no vertical lifeline established. To ensure 100 percent fall protection during the initial ascent, an anchor hook can be used to establish temporary anchor points. The anchor hook is attached to a telescoping pole to which a lifeline or retractable lanyard is attached. The retractable lanyard extends between the D-ring in the middle of the harness back and the anchor hook. If a lifeline is used, a rope grab travels on the rope and is attached to the center D-ring on the harness back. The other end attaches to the anchor hook. When the employee moves the hook, he must always be attached to the structure using his positioning system. Once he reaches the top of the structure he secures the lifeline to an anchor point and can then use the lifeline and rope grab for future climbs. Tie-off adapters should be issued to each employee to allow them to establish an anchorage on the tower.
Once the tower is fully constructed a permanent system should be in place to protect the worker while climbing the tower using permanently installed climbing pegs or ladder. One such system includes the use of a safety-climb device/system. This system incorporates a metal cable stretched the entire length of the tower and equipped with a cable-grab device. The worker attaches the front (sternal) D-ring on his harness to the cable-grab using a connector or short lanyard. The cable grab ascends with the worker. If the worker slips or falls from the climbing pegs or ladder the cable grab immediately engages limiting the fall distance.

For more information regarding these and other available methods to achieve 100% fall protection, employers should consult with safety professionals and fall-protection-equipment sales representatives to learn more about systems available that meet their particular needs. Employers should keep in mind that when there are no specific OSHA regulations governing the safety of workers performing these tasks, and the OSHA general duty clause (Public Law 91-596, Section 5 (a) (1)) may apply.

Recommendation #2: Employers should ensure that required personal protective equipment is available and instruct workers in the proper use and limitations of the system, and ensure its use.
Discussion: In this incident, the employee was not equipped with proper personal protective equipment. The system the victim was using to tie off to the tower was a tree-trimmers belt. The belt consisted of a safety belt with two positioning D-Rings and a sling across the back to which the worker would place across his buttocks and sit into. This did not provide sufficient protection from falls and does not comply with OSHA Compliance Directive CPL2-129 and 29CFR1926.502(d), which requires the use of a full body harness as a personal fall arrest system.1, 2
Recommendation #3: Employers should develop, implement, and enforce a comprehensive written safety program which includes a commitment to 100% tie off and written procedures to implement 100% fall protection.

Discussion: The evaluation of tasks to be performed at the work-site forms the basis for development, implementation, and enforcement of a safety program. Key elements of such a program should include, at minimum, frequent and regular inspection of the work-site and should include provisions for training employees in hazard identification, avoidance and abatement. The comprehensive safety program should include a clear statement indicating the employer's commitment to providing 100% fall protection, to preventing worker death and minimizing injury due to falls, and a commitment to meeting OSHA safety requirements, including the general-duty requirements. The fall protection plan should include, but may not be limited to:
  • identification of work-site activities that require fall protection;
  • any methods to be used to eliminate the fall hazard;
  • all protective systems and PPE to be used for worker protection;
  • training for workers;
  • minimum standards for protection systems and their use;
  • ongoing evaluation to correct any deficiencies in the system or in the use of the system by workers,
  • a plan for worker involvement in identifying fall hazards;
  • a plan for systematic review of the plan.

Recommendation #4: Manufacturers of tower components and tower owners should consider installing fall-protection fixtures on tower components during fabrication or erection that would facilitate the use of fall protection.
There are fall protection fixtures that can be engineered into the tower design and added during component fabrication or erection that would facilitate the use of fall protection systems. For example, the installation of safety-climb devices/systems on all tower legs, the installation of permanent horizontal and vertical lifelines, and the installation of anchorage points. These and other methods should be researched and evaluated keeping in mind that employees will need to perform work on existing towers whenever services are to be changed or maintained.
The manufacturer of this tower did incorporate fall protection into the tower design. Anchorage points were welded onto the outside and the inside at all strategic points where workers would be located during tower construction.

REFERENCES
  1. OSHA Compliance Directive, CPL 2-1.29 - Interim Inspection Procedures During Communication Tower Construction [1999]. United States Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Washington, D.C.
  2. Code of Federal Regulations 29 CFR 1926.502, U.S. Government Printing Office, Office of the Federal Register, Washington, DC.

The Missouri Department of Health, in co-operation with the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), is conducting a research project on work-related fatalities in Missouri. The goal of this project, known as the Missouri Occupational Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Program (MO FACE) is to show a measurable reduction in traumatic occupational fatalities in the state of Missouri. This goal is being met by identifying causal and risk factors that contribute to work-related fatalities. Identifying these factors will enable more effective intervention strategies to be developed and implemented by employers and employees. This project does not determine fault or legal liability associated with a fatal incident or with current regulations. All MO FACE data will be reported to NIOSH for trend analysis on a national basis. This will help NIOSH provide employers with effective recommendations for injury prevention. All personal and company identifiers are removed from all reports sent to NIOSH to protect the confidentiality of those who voluntarily participate with the program.

Three Tower Painters Die After Falling 1,200 Feet When Riding the Hoist Line - North Carolina

NIOSH In-house FACE Report 2000-07
SUMMARY
A 40-year-old tower-painting-company owner, his 16-year-old stepson, and a 19-year-old employee died after falling 1,200 feet when the hoist line on a portable capstan hoist used to raise them up the side of a 1,500-foot-high radio tower began slipping around the capstan, causing the hoist operator to lose control of the hoist line. The company had been at the site for 2 weeks to repair the beacon light at the top of the tower, paint the tower, and install rest platforms on the tower. On the day of the incident, the owner was going to work on the beacon light at the top of the tower while the two other workers were going to continue painting the tower. A 3,000-foot length of ¾-inch nylon rope and a 1,000- pound-capacity portable electric capstan hoist was used to raise the male workers up the outside of the tower. Three loops, which the workers utilized to assist them in riding the hoist line, were tied into the hoist line approximately 6 feet apart. The stepson was first on the line, then the 19-year-old, then the company owner. Using a length of woven rope, the male workers had attached one of the rest platforms to the end of the nylon rope 62 inches below the last loop. The company owner's wife was operating the capstan hoist using a foot pedal located on the ground. As the wife was operating the hoist and hoisting the men up the side of the tower, the hoist line began to slip around the capstan. The wife tried to hold the rope, but could not and the men fell to the ground. The wife went to the tower's service building and called the radio station that owned the tower, who in turn told her to call 911. The owner of the company that maintained the county equipment attached to the tower was in his truck and heard via radio that the county emergency medical service had been dispatched to the scene. He proceeded to the scene and was the first responder to arrive. The county fire rescue squad arrived next, then the county emergency medical service. Due to the extent of the victims' injuries, no first aid was initiated. After the county sheriff's personnel secured the scene, the victims were taken to the local hospital, where they were officially pronounced dead.
NIOSH investigators concluded that to help prevent similar incidents, employers should:
  • ensure that hoisting equipment used to lift personnel is designed to prevent uncontrolled descent and is properly rated for the intended use
  • comply with OSHA Compliance Directive CPL 2-1.29 "Interim Inspection Procedures During Communication Tower Construction Activities" during maintenance and construction activities on towers
  • ensure that workers inspect equipment on a daily basis to identify any damage or deficiencies
  • ensure that required personal protective equipment is available and properly used
  • know and comply with child labor laws which include prohibitions against work by youth less than 18 years of age in occupations which are declared by the Secretary of Labor to be particularly hazardous (Hazardous Orders).
Additionally: Tower owners should ensure that workers adhere to OSHA Compliance Directive CPL 2-1.29 while performing maintenance or construction activities on their towers.
Incident Site

Introduction

On December 3, 1999, a 40-year-old tower-painting-company owner, his 16-year-old stepson, and a 19-year-old employee died after falling 1,200 feet when the hoist line on a portable capstan hoist used to raise them up the side of a 1,500-foot-high radio tower began slipping around the capstan, causing the hoist operator to lose control of the hoist line. On December 7, 1999, officials of the North Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Administration (NCOSHA) notified the Division of Safety Research of this multiple fatality. On December 21 through 23, 1999, a DSR occupational health and safety specialist conducted an investigation of the incident. The incident was reviewed with the NCOSHA compliance officers assigned to the case, the tower owner's engineering services representative, the owner of the company that maintained the county's hardware on the tower, the owner of the company that installed the new coaxial cable, the county coroner, and the county sheriff's office. The site was photographed and photographs and video footage taken immediately after the incident were reviewed. The county coroner and sheriff's reports were reviewed during the investigation, as well as site drawings and sheriff's department photographs taken immediately after the incident. An engineer and the manager of the proprietary properties department for the hoist manufacturer were consulted on questions pertaining to the operation of the hoist, and manufacturer's literature and catalogues pertaining to the hoist were reviewed. Correspondence prepared by a manufacturer's engineer to answer the NIOSH investigator's questions was provided by the manager of proprietary properties.
The company was a family-owned tower painting and maintenance service. The owner's brother stated during OSHA interviews that the owner had over 20 years experience painting and performing maintenance on towers. At the time of the incident the company owner had three employees - his wife, his 16-year-old stepson, and a 19-year-old male employee. The company had no written safety policy or safety program. Any training was performed on the job. Although the owner's wife stated that she, her son and their employee had worked with her husband on numerous occasions, the amount of tower-related work experience could not be determined at the time of the investigation.

Investigation

The company had been contacted by a radio station to install a new coaxial cable for the radio broadcast antenna on the station's 1,500-foot-high, three-sided telecommunication tower, and to replace the beacon light at the top of the tower's antenna. After the cable installation was complete, the company was to paint the tower and install rest platforms at designated intervals up the tower. The company owner, his 16-year-old stepson, and a 19-year-old male employee were performing the work.
The owner had recently purchased six, 500-foot lengths of ¾-inch diameter nylon rope that he spliced together to use as the hoist rope on this job. He had also rented an 8,000-pound capacity powered cable puller to raise the coaxial cable up the tower. After setting up the cable puller and replacing the beacon light at the top of the antenna, the male workers attached the coaxial cable to the hoist line and began raising the cable up the inside of the tower structure. The cable had been raised approximately 300 feet when the director of engineering services for the radio station arrived at the site and instructed the owner to lower the cable back down the tower. It was determined that the company did not have sufficient equipment or manpower to install the cable but would still paint the tower and install the rest platforms. A second contractor was then contracted to install the coaxial cable.
When the cable had been installed by the second contractor, the company began to paint the tower. The owner attached a portable electric capstan hoist to the tower approximately 6 feet above ground level (Figure 1). An extension cord was plugged into a 115-volt outlet in the tower's adjacent service building to power the hoist. Power to the hoist was controlled by a foot switch that was activated by stepping on the switch. The portable electric capstan hoist had a lifting capacity of 1,000 pounds and was not manufactured or rated for lifting people.
Figure 1. Incident Site
For safe operation and positive control of the load being lifted the capstan is designed to turn in only one direction. The proper method of wrapping the hoist rope around the capstan will place the "load wrap" (the end of the rope attached to the load) on the inboard end of the capstan where the diameter is the smallest (Figure 2).1 This allows the rope to feed smoothly over the capstan without jumping or changing position. The number of rope wraps around the capstan is determined by many variables including the load to be lifted. The final determination is made by "feel." "Feel" is defined by the manufacturer as the amount of force required to keep the rope just tight enough around the capstan to raise or lower a load. With the proper number of wraps, an approximate 20-pound pull should raise or lower a load. Adding wraps of rope around the capstan decreases the amount of pull required to control the load. Removing wraps increases the amount of pull required.1
Figure 2. Proper method for wrapping the hoist rope
around the capstan for optimum rope action
The workers painted for several days and used the hoist line to assist them in climbing inside the tower. To prevent the rest platforms from striking the tower while being raised, the owner climbed the tower and rigged the hoist line so that the load line would be on the outside of the tower structure on Thursday, December 2, 1999. The owner had been notified earlier that day by the radio station that owned the tower that the beacon light at the top of the tower was again not working.
The three workers arrived at the site the following morning, along with the owner's wife. It was decided that the two younger workers would continue painting while the owner worked on the malfunctioning beacon light and installed one of the rest platforms. The male workers intended to ride the hoist line to their work stations. The two painters would be raised to approximately the 1,200-foot level where they would step onto the tower, while the owner would ride the line to the top of the tower.
The male workers tied one end of a length of ½ inch woven rope to one of the rest platforms, then tied the other end to the end of the hoist's load line. The rest platforms were approximately 2½- feet square and weighed approximately 175 pounds. Three loops were tied into the hoist load line approximately 60 inches apart to assist the workers in riding the line. The three workers then used a stepladder to climb to the first crossbar on the tower, and the wife was instructed to begin raising the hoist line and rest platform. Evidence suggests that as the loops reached the workers, the workers stepped into them. The owner's stepson was first on the line, then the 19-year-old employee, then the owner. As the male workers were raised, the owner's wife kept pressure on the hoist line by pulling the rope (fall line) from the capstan hoist, allowing it to fall to the ground.
The male workers were raised without incident until they reached approximately the 1,200-foot level. At that time, the rope began to slip around the capstan and the wife lost control of the hoist line. She tried to hold the line but could not. She looked up to see the three male workers falling. They fell to the ground, landing approximately 60 feet from the tower (Figure 3). The wife ran to the tower's service building and called the radio station that owned the tower. The station personnel instructed her to call 911, which she did. The owner of the company that serviced the county's hardware on the same tower heard the Emergency Medical Service (EMS) dispatched to the tower over the radio in his truck and proceeded to the tower. The fire rescue squad and EMS were next on the scene and checked the victims for vital signs, but found none. The owner's wife was transported to the hospital where she was treated for shock and rope burns to her hands. When the scene had been secured by sheriff's department personnel, the victims were transported to the hospital where they were officially pronounced dead.
Figure 3. Overhead view of the incident site
As previously mentioned, the hoist was not rated for lifting personnel. It is also possible that the hoist was being used in an overload condition. The weights of the 3 victims, as obtained from the county coroner were 190, 200, and 210 pounds. The weight of the rest platform was 175 pounds. The hoist manufacturer's braided rope, similar to that used in this incident, weighs 14 pounds per 100 feet in length.2 The weight of at least 2,000 feet of rope was against the hoist at the beginning of the lift. This would have added an additional weight of 280 pounds (2,000 X .14lb/ft =280 lb). The total of these weights would be 1,055 pounds. An additional load on the hoist would have been the friction added by the pulley at the top of the tower. A manufacturer's engineer stated that it is usual to add a minimum of 10% (105 lbs) additional load for this friction. It is possible that the capstan could have seen a total load of 1160 pounds, exceeding its 1,000 pound capacity.2
It could not be determined why the rope began to slip around the capstan. The fact that it slipped indicates that not enough force was being applied to keep the rope tight around the capstan. The owner's wife stated that she had operated the hoist a few times in the past but never with men on the line. She also said she thought the capstan was full of rope wraps. The hoist manufacturer's literature indicated that, under tension, 8 complete wraps of ¾-inch braided rope could be placed on the hoist drum and would completely fill the drum.2 As a general rule, 3 or 4 wraps would allow an operator to lift the rated load of 1,000 pounds with 20 to 40 pounds of pull on the fall line. Figure 4 contains the manufacturer's chart used to calculate the required fall line pull for a load with 1 to 5 wraps of rope on the hoist drum.3 Following the line to the right of the number 4 (number of wraps located on the left side of the chart) to the intersection of the curve, then down to the bottom shows that 4 wraps yield an approximate 44:1 mechanical advantage. In this case, a 44:1 advantage is 1,160 lb/44 = 26.26 pounds of pull required on the fall line to lift the load. Using the same procedure, it can be seen that 5 wraps yield an approximate 115:1 mechanical advantage. In this case, a 115:1 advantage is 1,160 lb/115 = 10.08 pounds of pull required on the fall line. If the hoist drum was full of 8 rope wraps, the pull required would be less.
Figure 4. Mechanical Advantage of Series 90 Hoists
The ¾-inch nylon rope used was the maximum diameter suggested by the manufacturer for use on the portable capstan hoist. As previously mentioned, the six 500-foot sections of rope were spliced together. The diameter of one of the spliced areas was approximately 1 3/8 inch. It is not known if the difference in diameter of the rope wraps on the capstan could have been a factor in the incident. Correspondence with one of the hoist manufacturer's engineers indicates that most splices, although larger in diameter than the rope, will move across the capstan smoothly. However, unusually large splices may tend to "over wrap" the rope already on the capstan. This "over wrapping" would require the hoist operator to momentarily reduce the pull on the fall line rope to allow the splice to seat on the capstan.2

Cause of Death

The county coroner listed the cause of death for all three workers as massive trauma.

Recommendations and Discussion

Recommendation #1: Employers should ensure that hoisting equipment used to lift personnel is designed to prevent uncontrolled descent and is properly rated for the intended use.
Discussion: The hoist used in this incident was not rated for the transport of personnel, and warning labels on the hoist stated that the hoist was not intended for use in the lifting or moving of persons. Equipment should only be used as rated by the manufacturer. OSHA Compliance Directive CPL 2-1.29, Interim Inspection Procedures During Communication Tower Construction Activities, requires that hoists used to lift personnel must be designed to use power lowering;4 the hoist in this incident was not. Additionally, CPL 2-1.29 requires that hoists used to lift personnel be equipped with a primary brake connected directly to the drive train of the hoisting machine and a secondary automatic emergency-type brake that, if actuated, would be able to hold the rated load within a vertical distance of 24 inches.4 The hoist involved in this incident was not equipped with a braking system.
Recommendation #2: Employers should comply with OSHA Compliance Directive CPL 2-1.29 during maintenance and construction activities on telecommunication towers.
Discussion: OSHA Compliance Directive CPL 2-1.29 describes measures to be taken during the construction of telecommunication towers.4 To ensure the safety of workers, these measures should also be applied to maintenance activities. The directive outlines measures including, but not limited to, access of towers using hoists, requirements for hoists, 100% fall protection, the training of hoist operators, and the inspection of equipment components. The Compliance Directive outlines the proper methods for riding the line and transitioning from the hoist line to the tower. Had these measures been followed in this incident, these fatalities may have been prevented.

Recommendation #3: Employers should ensure that required personal protective equipment is available and properly used.
Discussion: OSHA Compliance Directive CPL 2-1.29 and 29 CFR 1926.502(d) require the use of a body harness as a personal fall arrest system.4, 5 In this instance, two of the victims were wearing body harnesses but the leg straps were not fastened. The owner was wearing only a safety belt. Personal protective equipment (PPE) was not a factor in this incident; however, to provide the safest possible work environment, employers should ensure that the proper PPE is available and utilized in the correct manner.

Recommendation #4: Employers should ensure that workers inspect equipment on a daily basis to identify any damage or deficiencies.
Discussion: All equipment shall be visually inspected by a qualified person,A as defined by the OSHA Compliance Directive CPL 2-1.29, on a daily basis before work begins.4 In this instance the lanyards used by the workers were worn and frayed and the hoist rope was spliced in several places and was very worn and abraded, with several areas repaired with plastic tape. Both the workers' lanyards and the hoist rope should have been removed from service. Although the condition of this equipment was not a factor in this incident, equipment should be inspected on a daily basis to identify damaged or deficient equipment. Once this equipment is identified, it should be removed from service, thus eliminating the exposure of workers to hazards.

Recommendation #5: Employers should know and comply with child labor laws which include prohibitions against work by youths less than 18 years of age in occupations which are declared by the Secretary of Labor to be particularly hazardous (Hazardous Orders).
Discussion: The Fair Labor Standards Act provides a minimum age of 18 years for work which the Secretary of Labor declares to be particularly hazardous (Hazardous Orders). One of the 17 Hazardous Orders prohibits minors from work in all occupations involved in the operation of power-driven hoisting apparatus, including riding on a manlift (Hazardous Order No. 7).6 The term "manlift" is defined as "a device intended for the conveyance of persons which consists of platforms or brackets mounted on, or attached to, an endless belt, cable, chain, or similar method of suspension; such belt, cable, or chain operating in a substantially vertical direction and being supported by and driven through pulleys, sheaves or sprockets at the top and bottom."

Additionally: Tower owners should ensure that workers adhere to OSHA Compliance Directive CPL 2-1.29 while performing maintenance or construction activities on their towers.
Discussion: The widespread use of wireless communication services has fueled the demand for construction, and subsequent maintenance, of towers to hold transmitting devices for radio and television broadcast antennas, personal communication services and cellular phones. Recent NIOSH FACE investigations indicate that many employers, supervisors, and workers may not be fully aware of the serious fall hazards associated with tower work. Problems identified include, but are not limited to, lack of employer safety programs, use of improper PPE, improper use of PPE, lack of worker training, and improper use of hoists to transport personnel up and down the tower. Because construction and maintenance operations may be accomplished in brief time periods, it is virtually impossible for OSHA to monitor the safety and health practices of the employers involved. For this reason, tower owners should become familiar with OSHA Compliance Directive CPL 2-1.29 which outlines safety measures to be taken during tower construction.4 These measures should also be adopted for maintenance activities. The tower owners should establish safety parameters as guided by CPL 2-1.29 to be followed for each job and monitor the work being performed on their towers. Tower owners may want to enlist the aid of professional engineers to establish the safety parameters. Scheduled and unscheduled safety inspections should be conducted at the tower sites by designated persons, which would demonstrate the tower owners' commitment to safety and health and their desire to control the risk of occupational injury.

A Qualified person: One who, by possession of a recognized degree, certificate or professional standing, or who by extensive knowledge, training or experience, has successfully demonstrated the ability to solve or resolve problems relating tot he subject matter, the work or the project.

References
Bulletin 20-9301CH, Chance tips of the trade-Capstan Hoists. Chance tips Vol. 53 No. 3, October 1992; and Vol. 54 No. 1, January 1993.

   Hubbell Power Systems - intra-company correspondence received by NIOSH from Hubbell Power Systems Proprietary Properties Department.
 
Hubbell/Chance - Centralia, Missouri. Catalogue Section 1150 - powered hoists.

   CPL 2-1.29, Compliance Directive: Interim Inspection Procedures During Communication Tower Construction Activities [1999]. United States Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration, Washington, D.C.
 
Code of Federal Regulations 29 CFR 1926.502(d), 1999 edition. U.S. Government Printing Office, Office of the Federal Register, Washington, D.C.

   DOL (1990). Child labor requirements in nonagricultural occupations under the Fair Labor Standards Act. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Standards Administration, Wage and Hour Division, WH 1330.

Investigator Information

This incident was investigated by Virgil J. Casini, Safety and Occupational Health Specialist, NIOSH, Division of Safety Research, Surveillance and Field Investigations Branch. Mr. Casini is with the NIOSH Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation Program located in Morgantown, West Virginia.






Man jumps to his death from a tower on which a tech had jumped off in April



 

 

October 21, 2014 – With a suicide note left in his car, a Manchester, N.J. man jumped from a Long Branch 400-foot self-supporting tower in the city’s downtown on Monday and died after crashing through an abandoned building at the Y107 tower site. In April, a tower technician also ended his life in the same manner.

Authorities said that Christopher Zweidinger, 38, was pronounced dead at the scene after he jumped from the tower

Police responded around 2:40 p.m. after receiving a call that someone was climbing the tower. The man, who was later identified as Zweidinger, was at about the 200-foot level when they tried to make contact with him using a loudspeaker.
He then removed his jacked and jumped and died on impact, according to authorities.

Zweidinger was the second person to leap from the tower this year. On April 21, 2014, a 60-year-old tower technician jumped to his death from the top of the tower and fell through the roof of the same vacant building where Zweidinger was found.

At that time the tech had attached his lanyard to the tower and remained there for a while, swinging from side to side as authorities tried to coax him down.

He then stared at the crowd which had gathered on the sidewalk outside a ring of emergency vehicles, unhooked his harness and threw himself off of the tower with his feet pointed at the ground and his hands raised in the air.  

New Jersey tower tech takes his life by jumping off a 400-foot tower he had previously serviced





April 23, 2014 – It may never be known why a 60-year-old tower technician committed suicide Monday evening by jumping off of a tower he had previously worked on performing a Verizon project a week before in Long Branch, N.J.
According to authorities, Pedro Macias from Elizabeth was on the tower for approximately an hour before he jumped. He worked for National Microwave Contractors, Inc. of Rockaway.

As seen in a video taken by a bystander, Macias climbed the tower with his personal fall protection equipment on, stopping briefly for a cigarette break, and then proceeded to climb to the top mast which supported  Y107’s antenna and an incandescent beacon on the 400-foot self-supporting tower.

He hooked up his lanyard and remained there for a while, swinging from side to side. He then stared at the crowd which had gathered on the sidewalk outside a ring of emergency vehicles, unhooked his harness and threw himself off of the tower with his feet pointed at the ground and his hands raised in the air.

He went through the roof of a vacant building, dying upon impact. Police and firemen could not immediately enter the building as it was deemed unsafe. After a hole was cut in the side of the structure he was lowered to the ground.

Macias had been a tower technician for more than 15 years and was originally from Cuba. He had either climbed the tower compound’s fence or may have had a key to access the gate as there were no signs of a break-in.

Long Branch Director of Public Safety Jason Roebuck said that he had been in touch with National Microwave and they had stated that they had no record of Macias doing any maintenance on the tower on Monday.

The tower is located at Memorial Pkwy. and Belmont Ave.




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