The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention came under
fire last year after a series of safety lapses at CDC facilities involving
Ebola, anthrax, and bird flu. A report detailing inadequate lab safety
procedures has prompted improvements at CDC.
MARCH 20, 2015
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the federal
agency dealing with Ebola, anthrax, measles, avian flu, and other issues
involving public health, has come under fire for what a panel of experts says
are inadequate lab safety practices and procedures.
The independent panel was named last year after a series of
safety lapses at CDC facilities, including the accidental exposure of 80
unprotected workers to pathogenic anthrax at CDC's Bioterrorism Rapid Response
and Advanced Technology lab in June.
"Leadership commitment toward safety has been
inconsistent and insufficient at multiple levels," the report states.
"Safety, including lab safety, is viewed by many as something separate
from and outside the primary missions of public health and research. Safety is
not integrated into strategic planning and is not currently part of the CDC
culture, enterprise-wide.”
“Individual
divisions, teams and lab groups have taken it upon themselves to implement
safety programs, but this is not done in a consistent manner, nor is it done
across the CDC,” the report charges. “A clearly articulated CDC safety mission,
vision or direction is lacking.”
The report is dated Jan. 13, but the CDC only just released
the findings this week.
In response to the report, the agency said on its website:
“CDC concurs with these recommendations, has made progress towards implementing
them, and will soon report on that progress. CDC's aim is to improve the
culture of laboratory safety across the agency and minimize the risks associated
with laboratory work.”
CDC Director Tom Frieden, a medical doctor, convened the
panel last year after several incidents involving failures in safety
procedures. In December, specimens of the Ebola virus were mixed up and a lab
worker was potentially exposed. In another incident, a biological specimen that
had been cross-contaminated with a more pernicious strain of bird flu was sent
to a US Department of Agriculture facility.
In congressional testimony last July, Rutgers University's
Richard Ebright, a professor of chemistry and chemical biology, noted reports
of “biosafety and biosecurity engineering flaws and equipment failures at CDC
select-agent laboratories, including inadequate provisions for emergency backup
power (essential to maintain safety and security containment in the event of a
power outage), failure to maintain negative-pressure airflow in biocontainment
areas (essential to ensure safety and security containment at all times),
non-functioning doors between biocontainment areas and corridors,
non-functioning door seals between biocontainment areas and corridors, and
jury-rigged repairs to door seals with duct tape.”
The “laboratory safety workgroup” convened by Dr. Frieden
included experts in biosafety, laboratory science, and research. The group
reviewed CDC incident reports and safety policies, visited CDC labs, conducted
a lab safety culture survey, and met with internal staff and
leadership. The 11-member panel was co-chaired by Joseph Kanabrocki,
associate vice president for research safety at the University of Chicago, and
University of Florida emeritus professor Kenneth Berns.
“Interviews and surveys demonstrated that many employees
neither understand the agency’s response to accidents nor how that information
is communicated to the larger agency community outside immediately affected
labs,” the group reported. “Disturbingly, the negative responses peak among
those individuals who work at BSL3 and 4, especially among those holding a
master’s degree.”
Biosafety Level 3 and Biosafety Level 4 labs (BSL3 and 4)
deal with the most dangerous bacteria, viruses, and toxins.
The report makes many recommendations. These include:
·
Establishing a standardized lab safety training
curriculum, as well as standardized methods for competency skills mapping and
refresher training.
·
Establishing an external review and
accreditation process for all CDC labs.
·
Hiring a director to oversee lab safety.
·
Rewarding researchers who run safe labs.
·
Documenting the risks and benefits of proposed
experimental work before the work is begun
“Efforts to establish a culture of responsible science and
accountability are of critical importance,” the report emphasizes. “This
culture of responsible science will require prompt and accurate reporting of
incidents or breaches in standard protocol without fear of reprimand or
punishment.”
Responding to the report and its recommendations, CDC Chief
Operating Officer Sherri Berger said in a statement, “It's critical that we
continue to solicit feedback on how we can improve our operations, especially
functions as critical as lab safety. We brought this group of external experts
together over the summer to assist us with identifying and implementing
solutions, of which many are already underway.”
Source:csmonitor.com