MEC&F Expert Engineers : REQUEST FOR CORRECTION OF EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL ERRORS OF THE OFFICE OF FORECLOSURE. ISSUANCE OF EX-PARTE WRITS AND EX-PARTE JUDGMENTS IN VIOLATION OF STATE STATUTES AND CASE LAW. CASE NUMBER: F-9241-09

Monday, December 10, 2018

REQUEST FOR CORRECTION OF EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL ERRORS OF THE OFFICE OF FORECLOSURE. ISSUANCE OF EX-PARTE WRITS AND EX-PARTE JUDGMENTS IN VIOLATION OF STATE STATUTES AND CASE LAW. CASE NUMBER: F-9241-09


____________________________________________________________
December 10, 2018

Hon. Paul Innes
Presiding Judge
Civil Courthouse
175 South Broad Street
3rd Floor
Trenton, NJ 08650
Phone: 609-571-4200, ext 74204
Fax: (609) 571-4233

Clerk of Superior Court
Michelle M. Smith
R.J. Hughes Justice Complex
Superior Court Clerk's Office
P.O. Box 971
Trenton, NJ 08625-0971


Hon. Mary C. Jacobson
Assignment Judge
New Criminal Courthouse
400 S. Warren Street, 4th Floor
Trenton, NJ 08650
Phone: (609) 571-4200, ext. 74499
Fax: 609-571-4463

Thomas J. LaConte
Chancery Court  Presiding Judge.
Superior Court of New Jersey
Paterson Courthouse
71 Hamilton Street, 1st Floor
Paterson, New Jersey 07505
Phone: (973) 247-8168
FAX: (973) 247-8172


RE:     REQUEST FOR CORRECTION OF EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL ERRORS OF THE OFFICE OF FORECLOSURE.  ISSUANCE OF EX-PARTE WRITS AND EX-PARTE JUDGMENTS IN VIOLATION OF STATE STATUTES AND CASE LAW. CASE NUMBER: F-9241-09
Dear Judge Innes, Judge Jacobson, Judge LaConte and Clerk of the Superior Court:

I am writing to request that you correct the unlawful entry of judgments and/or writs that were entered by the Clerk of the Superior Court in violation of state law.  Apparently, the Clerk entered judgments and writs on an ex-parte basis, despite the fact that Stephanatos and thousands of homeowners becaome tenants-at-sufferance whose rights are protected by either the Summary Dispossess act, N.J.S. 2A:18-53 et seq.  or the anti-eviction act, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 et seq.
Pursuant to the authority of HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF WILDWOOD v. Hayward, et al., 406 A.2d 1318, 81 N.J. 311 (1979), Basilis N. Stephanatos, PhD, JD, files this instant request to officially enter a record of void writ of possession and void judgment of possession that was wrongly and unlawfully entered by the former Clerk of the Superior Court on May 13, 2011 in the case F-9241-09.  See Exhibit A.

BACKGROUND
My residence was foreclosed on May 13, 2011 because I was refusing to pay an unlawful over-assessment of my property: I purchased the property in 1993 for $240K, but it was assessed at $475K – this almost 100% overassessment violates the Uniformity Clause of the State Constitution.  Further proof that the property was impermissibly over assessed was the fact that the antitrust conspirators American Tax Funding, LLC and ATF Real Property, LLC sold my residence for $330K in January 2012, while the assessment was still at $475K, a 40 percent overassessment.  As a matter of state case law, the assessment was void.  The alleged tax I was refusing to pay were approximately $20K.
Even if we assume that the judgment of foreclosure was valid, at the time of entering that judgment, I became a tenant at sufferance.  I had two small businesses in my property that were also tenants – yet, with the writ that was issued without jurisdiction by the Clerk on May 13, 2011, they were both removed and permanently destroyed. Here is the case law of this state:
Under New Jersey law, "[a] purchaser at a mortgage foreclosure sale obtains the legal right to possession of land purchased as soon as he obtains a deed from the selling officer." 30 New Jersey Practice, Law of Mortgages § 373. The mortgagor's continued possession of the property after such time is that of a tenant at sufferance. See Caruso v. Hunt, 69 N.J.Super. 447, 452, 174 A.2d 381 (Ch.Div. 1961) (quoting 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 105, page 659) ("The owner's continued possession after sale of the property at execution, judicial, or like sale is that of a tenant at sufferance of the purchaser”). In Re St. Clair, 251 B.R. 660 (D.N.J. 2000).

THE ANTITRUST CONSPIRACY OF AMERICAN TAX FUNDING, LLC AND ROBERT DEL VECCHIO, ESQ. ET AL
The antitrust conspirators willfully and corruptly intended to enter into a criminal and fraudulent transaction through the anti-trust conspiracy.  Its existence against Stephanatos and thousands of New Jersey homeowners was determined and confirmed by the federal judge Michael A. Shipp in the federal antitrust case IN RE NEW JERSEY TAX SALES CERTIFICATES ANTITRUST LITIGATION, Master Docket No. 3:12-CV-01893-MAS-TJB  (see http://www.njtaxliensettlements.com/
 and by the conviction of at least 15 individuals and entities in New Jersey, including Passaic County, by the U.S. Attorney’s Office (See https://www.fbi.gov/newark/press-releases/2014/former-new-york-tax-liens-investment-company-executive-pleads-guilty-to-role-in-bid-rigging-scheme-at-municipal-tax-lien-auctions
Both the Robert U. Del Vecchio, Sr. (now deceased) and Robert A. Del Vecchio, Jr. are accused of being participants in the antitrust conspiracy.  They are both active in the tax lien business, they are both lawyers, they are related by blood (father and son), and they both share common place of business and place of residence in Hawthorn, Passaic County, New Jersey.  The Del Vecchios also established similar “pension plans” to hide their ill-gotten gains, such as the Robert Del Vecchio Pension Plan, LLC.  The Pension plans will be added as Defendants in this action to recover the millions in damages caused by the Del Vecchios.  Robert Del Vecchio, Sr. has pleaded guilty to a felony charge in Federal Court in Newark on September 30, 2013.
According to the court documents, Del Vecchio, Sr. and Michael Mastellone, of Cedar Knolls, New Jersey were involved in the conspiracy with others not to bid against one another at municipal tax lien auctions in New Jersey or to do mock biddings on select liens that were of small amounts and would refrain from bidding on the premium phase of the bidding. Since the conspiracy permitted the conspirators to purchase tax liens with limited competition, each conspirator was able to obtain liens that earned a higher interest rate or lower paid premium to the municipality or through the monopoly would obtain rights for charging the highest possible interest rate (18 percent) for all subsequent liens without any bidding on the subsequent liens. Property owners were therefore made to pay higher interest on their tax debts than they would have paid had their liens been purchased in open and honest competition, the department said.
Robert A. Del Vecchio, Esq. an attorney at law of Hawthorn, New Jersey provided false certifications to the Office of Foreclosure that this was an uncontested case, despite the fact that Stephanatos had fully contested this case; this way, Del Vecchio managed to circumvent the Anti-Eviction Act, the Summary Dispossess Act of New Jersey, N.J.S. 2A:18-53 et seq. and fooled the Acting Law Clerk, Jennifer Perez, and the Office of Foreclosure into issuance of an ex-parte writ of possession.  Del Vecchio also made false representations to this Court that Stephanatos had no possessory interests and that there are no tenants or residents on the property that must be protected by the Anti-Eviction Act and/or the Summary Dispossess Act, N.J.S. 2A:18-53 et seq., when in fact Metropolitan Environmental Services, a business owned by Stephanatos, was a tenant in the premises.  Del Vecchio also fraudulently certified to the Court that Stephanatos had not paid any taxes since 1993, an entirely fraudulently assertion.  Del Vecchio also fraudulently certified to the Passaic County Court and to the Sheriff of that County that Stephanatos had threatened him with violence, an entirely fraudulent assertion.  Del Vecchio also fraudulently certified to this Court that this was a mortgage foreclosure case, when in fact Stephanatos had no mortgage (he fully owned the property) and this was a tax sale foreclosure case.  Del Vecchio fraudulently submitted forms and papers to the Office of Foreclosure that pertain to mortgage foreclosures, although he knew that this was a tax sale foreclosure.  Del Vecchio fraudulently presented and certified to the state Court mortgage foreclosure cases as the basis of his certifications to the Court, although he knew that this was not a mortgage foreclosure case.  Del Vecchio also fraudulently represented to the state court the amount allegedly owed by Stephanatos in the form of taxes, when he knew that no taxes were due because of the impermissible over-assessment of Stephanatos’ residence by more than 40 percent (properties proven fair market value was $330,000 but it had impermissibly over-assessed at $475,000, making all taxes void ab initio). 
The New Jersey Court In Village of Ridgefield Park et al., v. Bergen County Board of Taxation et al., 62 N.J.Super. 133, 162 A.2d 132 said that any assessment levied in violation of the constitutional mandate of uniformity is absolutely void Ab initio.  Thus, the taxes were void, as a matter of New Jersey law.  Therefore, all subsequent acts of the municipal, antitrust and county personnel were illegal, as a matter of law.
Del Vecchio fraudulently certified to the Chancery Court that ATF had lawfully obtained the tax sale certificate at zero percent (0%) interest rate, when ATF colluded with Del Vecchio and others to rig the bids.  ATF in fact charged at least eighteen percent (18%) interest for all years but the first year. Del Vecchio and Bonchi also fraudulent failed to notify this Court that the writ was void because it was issued by the Clerk in Mercer County in violation of state statutes. N.J.S.A. 2A:18-57 provides that in summary dispossess proceedings "[n]o warrant of removal shall issue until the expiration of 3 days after entry of judgment for possession."

THE FRAUDULENT CERTIFICATION OF ROBERT DEL VECCHIO, ESQ THAT DR. STEPHANATOS HAD NO POSSESSORY RIGHTS PROTECTED BY STATE LAW
On or about April 18, 2011, one of the antitrust conspirators, Robert Del Vecchio, Esq., applied for an ex-parte judgment for possession and an ex-parte writ of possession from the Office of Foreclosure, certifying (i.e., swearing under oath) that Stephanatos had no possessory rights.  Specifically, Del Vecchio certified that Stephanatos was not protected by the Anti-Eviction Act, while he fardulently concealed from the Clerk that Stephanatos was a tenant-at-sufferance protected by the Summary Dispossess Act, N.J.S. 2A:18-53 et seq. 
No demand to quit or any other notice was provided prior to entering the judgment for possession or the writ of possession.  Such notices and demands are required by state law.  To make matters worse, the Clerk of the Superior Court entered the writ the same day as the final judgment on May 13, 2011, an act that is prohibited by state law, as well.
No motion and notice was provided to Stephanatos for substituting the foreclosing plaintiff ATF, LLC to ATFH Real Property, LLC.  As a result, ATFH Real Property, LLC lacked the standing to apply for final judgment and to apply for a writ of possession from the office of foreclosure. 
Furthermore, as the New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled, in HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF WILDWOOD v. Hayward, et al., 406 A.2d 1318, 81 N.J. 311 (1979).  Even if the judgment had been entered lawfully (we hold it was not), the clerk had no *316 jurisdiction to issue the warrant of removal the same day the judgment was entered. N.J.S.A. 2A:18-57 provides that in summary dispossess proceedings "[n]o warrant of removal shall issue until the expiration of 3 days after entry of judgment for possession."
To make matters even worse, state law says that an LLC cannot occupy a residential property.  Here is the case law:

Residential properties in New Jersey cannot be occupied by LLCs. 

In Law, the plaintiff LLC served its tenant with a notice to quit based on N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(l)(3) which permits a landlord to remove a tenant if the owner of the property seeks to personally occupy a unit. Id. at 425. The plaintiff argued that it was entitled to avail itself of that provision because its sole member intended to reside in the leased unit. Ibid.
We disagreed and, in an opinion authored by our former colleague Judge Dorothea Wefing, we examined the purpose of the anti-eviction statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(l)(3)), which we found was "to protect residential tenants from the effects of what the Legislature has recognized to be a severe shortage of rental housing in this state." Id. at 425 (citing Franklin Tower One, L.L.C. v. N.M., 157 N.J. 602, 614 (1999)). Under those circumstances, we concluded that an LLC could not personally occupy a residential property within the intendment of the statute
It is in accord with the appellate court's reasoning in [Law], supra, that the court finds that an LLC is not eligible as an owner-occupant of residential property.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY, APPELLATE DIVISION, DOCKET NO. A-0
MARIA PADILLA and 32 4TH STREET, LLC,  v. CITY OF ELIZABETH, December 13, 2016.

Despite this law, the Clerk erroneously entered a judgment for possession for an LLC in a residential property without any hearing and without any notice and entered a writ the same day as the judgment for possession.  All these acts of the Clerk were is violation of state law.
Eviction Actions After Foreclosure in New York State
When the original owner continues to live in the property after a lender has obtained title by a Referee’s Deed in foreclosure, the new owner must take legal action to evict the occupant. In New York State, such evictions can be accomplished under New York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law § 713. This section provides grounds for eviction “where no landlord-tenant relationship exists.” Subsection 5 provides that if the property has been sold in foreclosure, then a certified copy of the deed in foreclosure must be exhibited to the persons to be evicted from the premises.
If such an action is brought, it must be brought as a separate action from the original foreclosure, in a Court with appropriate jurisdiction. Even though no landlord-tenant relationship may exist, the procedures for such an action are similar to those in an ordinary landlord-tenant proceeding, with the end result being a warrant of eviction, assuming the necessary procedural requirements have been met.
Summary proceedings are a statutory creation, first enacted by the New York State legislature in 1820. Laws of 1820, Ch. 194.
That goal was, and remains, to provide a “simple, expeditious and inexpensive means of regaining possession of premises,” 201 NY at 454. while providing necessary and appropriate defenses to protect occupants’ rights.

New York Consolidated Laws, Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law - RPA § 713. Grounds where no landlord-tenant relationship exists

A special proceeding may be maintained under this article after a ten-day notice to quit has been served upon the respondent in the manner prescribed in section 735 , upon the following grounds:
1. The property has been sold by virtue of an execution against him or a person under whom he claims and a title under the sale has been perfected.
2. He occupies or holds the property under an agreement with the owner to occupy and cultivate it upon shares or for a share of the crops and the time fixed in the agreement for his occupancy has expired.
3. He or the person to whom he has succeeded has intruded into or squatted upon the property without the permission of the person entitled to possession and the occupancy has continued without permission or permission has been revoked and notice of the revocation given to the person to be removed.
4. The property has been sold for unpaid taxes and a tax deed has been executed and delivered to the purchaser and he or any subsequent grantee, distributee or devisee claiming title through such purchaser has complied with all provisions of law precedent to the right to possession and the time of redemption by the former owner or occupant has expired.

In addition to the New Jersey and other state law that Stephanatos has cited, we also cite the law of the State of Virginia. 

Evictions and Unlawful Detainers

House Bill 311 codifies certain roles and procedures during unlawful detainer matters:
  1. A former owner of a single-family residential dwelling unit who remains in the property after foreclosure is now defined as a tenant at sufferance.
  2. A successor owner has the right to file an unlawful detainer action three days after giving the tenant written termination notice.
The Virginia law is identical to the one New Jersey has.  The antitrust conspirators failed to use the applicable New Jersey statutes because they certified that Stephanatos had no possessory rights (i.e., that he was not a tenant at sufferance).
Furthermore, New Hampshire law considers a homeowner who remains in a home lost to foreclosure to be a tenant at sufferance, and the New Hampshire Supreme Court has held that “a purchaser at a foreclosure sale may not use self-help to evict a tenant at sufferance.” Evans v. J Four Realty, LLC, 164 N.H. 570, 574, 576 (2013); see also Greelish v. Wood, 154 N.H. 521, 527 (2006). Instead, a foreclosure sale purchaser must employ the summary procedure prescribed by chapter 540 of the New Hampshire Revised Statutes to evict a tenant at sufferance from foreclosed property. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 540:12 (providing for “purchaser [of property] at a mortgage foreclosure sale” to “recover possession” of property held by tenant at sufferance); Evans, 164 N.H. at 756-77.
It is also true that under Georgia law, “[w]here former owners of real property remain in possession after a foreclosure sale, they become tenants at sufferance.” Steed v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Corp., 689 S.E.2d 843, 848 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). When this occurs, a landlord-tenant relationship exists between the legal title holder and a tenant at sufferance, and dispossessory procedures set forth in O.C.G.A. § 44-7-50 provide the exclusive method by which a landlord may evict the tenant. Steed, 689 S.E.2d at 848.  It is also very significant here that Stephanatos never relinquished possession of his residential property and thus he never ceased being a tenant at sufferance, along with his business properties (Metropolitan Engineering Services, PC and Metropolitan Environmental Services).
Therefore, numerous states, including New Jersey provide for a summary dispossess proceeding prior to issuance of a judgment for possession and a writ.  Here, the Clerk entered these documents without having the requisite jurisdiction and a result they were void ab initio.  Although the damage has already done, it is the right thing for the Clerk to officially void these documents to correct these errors.  Mr. Sven Pfahlert clearly provides below further proof of the above violations because he states that if the anti-eviction act does not apply, then the tenant-at-sufferance is not protected by state laws.  This is wrong.  Considering the dramatic impact on people’s possessory interest that there negligent and/or reckless decisions have made, I have notified the state legislature of what is going on.

EMAIL FROM SVEN PFAHLERT, OFFICE OF FORECLOSURE
Last Friday, after many letters and requests from the Office of Foreclosure to explain the violations of state laws and due process as has been provided by the state legislature, I received an email from one Sven E. Pfahlert, Esq., Administrative Office of the Courts, Superior Court Clerk’s Office, 25 Market Street, Trenton, New Jersey.  Mr. Pfahlert wrote the following (see Exhibit A):

The New Jersey Anti-Eviction Act applies to tenants, not prior property owners. N.J.S.A. 2A:18-51 et seq and cited case law refer to landlord/tenant proceedings. The Office of Foreclosure will take no action in this matter absent a judge’s order. Please be guided accordingly.

However, as I explained to Mr. Pfahlert, the State’s own law revision commission states the following:
Since enactment of the Anti-Eviction Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 et seq., the Summary Dispossess Act, N.J.S. 2A:18-53 et seq.  has been understood to cover the eviction of nonresidential tenants and residential tenants not covered by the Anti-Eviction Act.  Source: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, NEW JERSEY LAW REVISION COMMISSION, Final Report Relating to Landlord and Tenant Law, February 10, 2012.

In other words, even if the Anti-Eviction Act does not apply, then the Summary Dispossess Act, N.J.S. 2A:18-53 et seq. applies for all other tenants, including tenants at sufferance.
This tenancy at sufferance is included in the definition of tenant in the New Jersey statutes: "Tenant" includes, but is not limited to, a lessee or tenant at will or at sufferance or for any duration, or any subtenants, assigns, or legal repre of the lessee or tenant. Title 46A – Landlord and tenant law. Article 5, eviction, chapter 14, eviction generally.  46A:14-1: Tenant, landlord, residential rental premises; what is included.
Here is some of the case law of New Jersey:
Under New Jersey law, "[a] purchaser at a mortgage foreclosure sale obtains the legal right to possession of land purchased as soon as he obtains a deed from the selling officer." 30 New Jersey Practice, Law of Mortgages § 373. The mortgagor's continued possession of the property after such time is that of a tenant at sufferance. See Caruso v. Hunt, 69 N.J.Super. 447, 452, 174 A.2d 381 (Ch.Div. 1961) (quoting 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 105, page 659) ("The owner's continued possession after sale of the property at execution, judicial, or like sale is that of a tenant at sufferance of the purchaser”). In Re St. Clair, 251 B.R. 660 (D.N.J. 2000).
As defined by the New Jersey Supreme Court in James v. Francesco, 61 N.J. 480, 485 (1972),
"a judgment is void if there has been a failure to comply with a requirement which is a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the court."

Here, there have been multiple failures to comply with state-mandated requirements prior to entering a judgment for possession or writ.  I am urging you to do the right thing and officially void the judgment for possession and/or the writ.

THE WRIT OF POSSESSION WAS VOID AB INITIO BECAUSE THE CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO ISSUE THE EX-PARTE WRIT OF POSSESSION THE SAME DATE THE JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED.  HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF WILDWOOD v. Hayward, et al., 406 A.2d 1318, 81 N.J. 311 (1979)
ATF Defendants engaged in "knowing concealment, suppression and omission of material facts," and made a false representation of fact and law which the Chancery Court and the Mercer County Clerk relied upon.  Former Judge Hochberg also coerced by the fraudulent certifications of the Defendants into dismissing the timely filed Section 1983 suit in 2012.
Plaintiff has demonstrated that he had several cognizable equitable (Stephanatos fully owned the property valued at $475K, while the alleged unlawful tax lien was less than $20K) and property interests (i.e., the tenancy at sufferance and the presence of two businesses in the premises) under New Jersey law of which he could not have been deprived without due process.
It is well-established that where former owners of real property remain in possession after a foreclosure sale, they become tenants at sufferance. See In re Atlantic Business & Community Corporation 901 F.2d at 328 (3rd Cir. 1990) where the Third Circuit stated that a tenancy at sufferance creates a property interest that is protected by federal and state laws and the U.S. Constitution.
See the definition of tenant in the New Jersey statutes: "Tenant" includes, but is not limited to, a lessee or tenant at will or at sufferance or for any duration, or any subtenants, assigns, or legal representatives of the lessee or tenant. Title 46A – Landlord and tenant law. Article 5, eviction, chapter 14, eviction generally.  46A:14-1: Tenant, landlord, residential rental premises; what is included.  New Jersey law considers a homeowner who remains in a home lost to foreclosure to be a tenant at sufferance.  We have found that a tenant at sufferance is "'one who comes into possession of land by lawful title, usually by virtue of a lease for a definite period, and after the expiration of the period of the lease holds over without any fresh leave from the owner.'" Xerox Corp. v. Listmark Computer Sys., 142 N.J. Super. 232, 240 (App. Div. 1976) (citing Standard Realty Co. v. Gates, 99 N.J. Eq. 271, 275 (Ch. 1926)).  WA GOLF COMPANY, LLC v. ARMORED, INC, Appellate Division, August 6, 2014.
The ATF Defendants fraudulently certified to state and federal courts that Stephanatos had no possessory rights.
No motion and notice was provided to Stephanatos for substituting the foreclosing plaintiff ATF, LLC to ATFH Real Property, LLC.  As a result, ATFH Real Property, LLC lacked the standing to apply for final judgment and to apply for a writ of possession from the office of foreclosure. 
Furthermore, as the New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled, in HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF WILDWOOD v. Hayward, et al., 406 A.2d 1318, 81 N.J. 311 (1979).  Even if the judgment had been entered lawfully (we hold it was not), the clerk had no *316 jurisdiction to issue the warrant of removal the same day the judgment was entered. N.J.S.A. 2A:18-57 provides that in summary dispossess proceedings "[n]o warrant of removal shall issue until the expiration of 3 days after entry of judgment for possession."

THE EX-PARTE JUDGMENT FOR POSSESSION WAS ALSO ENTERED UNLAWFULLY BECAUSE NO NOTICE TO QUIT WAS PROVIDED TO STEPHANATOS PRIOR TO ENTERING THAT LANGUAGE INTO THE FINAL JUDGMENT ON MAY 13, 2011
The following language was entered into that judgment by the conspirator Robert Del Vecchio:
“AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the plaintiff dully recover against the said defendant …possession of the premises… and that a Writ of Possession issue thereon”. 
There was no hearing on property possession.  Possession is the subject matter of the Law Division.  This case was not a mortgage foreclosure.  It was a tax lien foreclosure.    Furthermore, my small business, Metropolitan Environmental Services was located in the premises, a legal tenant.  The order you signed did not call for the removal of my business from the property.  Why did you do it?
The question to you is: why was that language was entered by the Office of Foreclosure that has no jurisdiction over contested cases?  Why there was no compliance with 2A:18-56. Proof of notice to quit prerequisite to judgment, the Summary Dispossess Act, N.J.S. 2A:18-53 (for me/family) and no compliance with the Anti-Eviction Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 et seq. that was applicable to the legal tenant of the premises, Metropolitan Environmental Services.
State law requires that prior to the issuance of a judgment for possession, the owner must provide proof of notice to quit, followed by an eviction proceeding before a judge who has jurisdiction over the property and the person.  Here are the state statutes:
2A:18-56. Proof of notice to quit prerequisite to judgment
No judgment for possession in cases specified in paragraph "a." of section 2A:18-53 of this Title shall be ordered unless:
  1. The tenancy, if a tenancy at will or from year to year, has been terminated by the giving of 3 months' notice to quit, which notice shall be deemed to be sufficient; or
  2. The tenancy, if a tenancy from month to month, has been terminated by the giving of 1 month's notice to quit, which notice shall be deemed to be sufficient; or
  3. The tenancy, if for a term other than at will, from year to year, or from month to month, has been terminated by the giving of one term's notice to quit, which notice shall be deemed to be sufficient; and
  4. It shall be shown to the satisfaction of the court by due proof that the notice herein required has been given.
Note: Unlike residential tenants, who are mostly protected by the Anti-Eviction Act, commercial tenants (like Metropolitan Engineering Services, PC and Metropolitan Environmental Services) may be evicted at the end of their lease terms. However, a Notice to Quit is still required before the eviction action may be filed.  No such notice was ever provided.  That the eviction of Stephanatos’ businesses from the property was unlawful.
The landlord-tenant law also requires the same notice for removal of residential tenants (like Dr. Stephanatos):

2A:18-61.2 Removal of residential tenants; required notice; contents; service.
No judgment of possession shall be entered for any premises covered by section 2 of this act, except in the nonpayment of rent under subsection a. or f. of section 2, unless the landlord has made written demand and given written notice for delivery of possession of the premises.

Here, no notice to quit and no eviction hearing ever took place.  What the conspirator Robert Del Vecchio did was to include language in the judgment for foreclosure order that also included a judgment for possession, without any notice for such possession hearing ever provided to Stephanatos, as is required by state law: 2A:18-56. Proof of notice to quit prerequisite to judgment.  HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF WILDWOOD v. Hayward, et al., 406 A.2d 1318, 81 N.J. 311 (1979).  Here, the antitrust conspirator Robert Del Vecchio, failed to provide the requisite notice to quit and the Clerk, pursuant to NJSA 2A:18-56 and 2A:18-61.2 had no jurisdiction to enter the language of the judgment for possession into the final foreclosure judgment.
Thus, this negligent or intentional violation of state law represents a violation of Stephanatos’ procedural due process rights for both the judgment for possession and the writ of possession.
WHEREFORE, Basilis N. Stephanatos requests this Court and/or the Clerk of the Superior Court to officially void the illegal writ of possession entered on May 13, 2011 in violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-57 that provides that in summary dispossess proceedings "[n]o warrant of removal shall issue until the expiration of 3 days after entry of judgment for possession." HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF WILDWOOD v. Hayward, et al., 406 A.2d 1318, 81 N.J. 311 (1979).  Even if the judgment had been entered lawfully (we hold it was not), the clerk had no *316 jurisdiction to issue the warrant of removal the same day the judgment was entered.
Basilis N. Stephanatos also requests this Court to void the judgment for possession language entered on May 13, 2011, because it was in violation of 2A:18-56. Proof of notice to quit prerequisite to judgment and/or 2A:18-61.2 Removal of residential tenants; required notice; contents; service.
No judgment of possession shall be entered for any premises covered by section 2 of this act, except in the nonpayment of rent under subsection a. or f. of section 2, unless the landlord has made written demand and given written notice for delivery of possession of the premises.

Thank you in advance for your consideration.
Respectfully Submitted,
Very Truly Yours,


 



Basilis (Bill) N. Stephanatos, PhD, JD



CERTIFICATION OF BASILIS N. STEPHANATOS
I hereby certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing statements made by me are true and correct.  I am aware that if any of the foregoing statements made by me are willfully false, I am subject to punishment. NJ Court Rule R. 1:4-4(b); 28 U.S.C. §1746.

DATE:  December 10, 2018

Respectfully Submitted,



___________________________________
Basilis N. Stephanatos, PhD, PE, JD


EXHIBIT A
CORRESPONDENCE WITH SVEN PFAHLERT, ESQ
OFFICE OF FORECLOSURE


TO: MICHELLE SMITH, CLERK OF THE OFFICE OF FORECLOSURE:

Dear Ms. Smith:

Based on the email from Mr. Pfahlert, it is obvious he is the one who advised the former Clerk and now you to enter an ex-parte judgment of possession and a subsequent ex-parte writ of possession in the above-referenced case.  The facts are undisputed that it was the Office of Foreclosure that entered these two ex-parte judgments, based on the incorrect advice of Mr. Phahlert that the former owner was not protected by the Summary Dispossess Act, N.J.S. 2A:18-53 et seq.  Mr. Pfahlert is dead wrong because the law of this state says that  "The owner's continued possession after sale of the property at execution, judicial, or like sale is that of a tenant at sufferance of the purchaser”.  See Caruso v. Hunt, 69 N.J.Super. 447, 452, 174 A.2d 381 (Ch.Div. 1961).  To remove a tenant (including a tenant at sufferance), the summary dispossess act, N.J.S. 2A:18-53 et seq. must be followed.  Based on the attached email by Mr. Pfahlert, he advised you that a former owner is not protected by the tenancy laws of this state – which is a very wrong and very illegal advice.

The State’s own law revision commission states the following:

Since enactment of the Anti-Eviction Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 et seq., the Summary Dispossess Act, N.J.S. 2A:18-53 et seq. has been understood to cover the eviction of nonresidential tenants and residential tenants not covered by the Anti-Eviction Act.  Source: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, NEW JERSEY LAW REVISION COMMISSION, Final Report Relating to Landlord and Tenant Law, February 10, 2012.
This tenancy at sufferance is included in the definition of tenant in the New Jersey statutes: "Tenant" includes, but is not limited to, a lessee or tenant at will or at sufferance or for any duration, or any subtenants, assigns, or legal representatives of the lessee or tenant. Title 46A – Landlord and tenant law. Article 5, eviction, chapter 14, eviction generally.  46A:14-1: Tenant, landlord, residential rental premises; what is included.

Here is some of the case law of New Jersey:
Under New Jersey law, "[a] purchaser at a mortgage foreclosure sale obtains the legal right to possession of land purchased as soon as he obtains a deed from the selling officer." 30 New Jersey Practice, Law of Mortgages § 373. The mortgagor's continued possession of the property after such time is that of a tenant at sufferance. See Caruso v. Hunt, 69 N.J.Super. 447, 452, 174 A.2d 381 (Ch.Div. 1961) (quoting 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession § 105, page 659) ("The owner's continued possession after sale of the property at execution, judicial, or like sale is that of a tenant at sufferance of the purchaser”). In Re St. Clair, 251 B.R. 660 (D.N.J. 2000).

What your Office of Foreclosure did was to then believe Mr. Pfahlert’s incorrect and illegal advice and enter an ex-parte judgment for possession without the prerequisite notices.  You then entered the very same day an ex-parte writ for possession again in violation of the state statutes requiring notice to quit or vacate.  You also violated state law that says you cannot enter a writ the same day you entered a judgment.  To make matters worse, the judgment was entered by Judge Jacobson who had neither personal nor subject matter jurisdiction over Stephanatos or the property.

Furthermore, state case law clearly states that an LLC (here ATFH Real Property, LLC ) is not eligible to take possession of a residential property.

You have broken several state laws.  I am asking that you obtain an advice of somebody else other than Mr. Pfahlert because he has led you to a wrong path and you have caused damages not only to me, but to hundreds or even thousands of residential tenants (at sufferance or not).

DEAR LEGISLATORS:

Please see what these people at the Office of Foreclosure have done.  They have violated several state laws and are refusing to correct their wrongdoings.  I am asking for an official investigation to protect tenants at residential properties (including tenants at sufferance).

Very Truly Yours,

Basilis (Bill) N. Stephanatos, PhD, PE, JD
Tel.: (201) 366-4588
Tel.: (973) 897-8162
Fax: (973) 810-0440
E-MAIL CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE
The contents of this e-mail message and any attachments are intended solely for the addressee(s) and may contain confidential and/or legally privileged information.  If you are the intended recipient, be aware that your use of any confidential or personal information may be restricted by state and federal privacy laws.  If you are not the intended recipient of this message or if this message has been addressed to you in error, please immediately alert the sender by reply e-mail and then delete this message and any attachments from any computer.

From: Bill Stephanatos [mailto:bstephanatos@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, December 07, 2018 4:25 PM
To: 'Sven Pfahlert'; 'Michelle Smith';
mary.jacobson@njcourts.gov
Cc: 'Irene Komandis';
SenVanDrew@njleg.org; AsmAndrzejczak@njleg.org; AsmLand@njleg.org; SenBrown@njleg.org; AsmMazzeo@njleg.org; AsmArmato@njleg.org; SenSweeney@njleg.org; AsmBurzichelli@njleg.org; AsmTaliaferro@njleg.org; SenMadden@njleg.org; AsmMoriarty@njleg.org; AswMosquera@njleg.org; SenCruzPerez@njleg.org; AswEganJones@njleg.org; AsmSpearman@njleg.org; SenBeach@njleg.org; AsmGreenwald@njleg.org; AswLampitt@njleg.org; SenSingleton@njleg.org; AsmConaway@njleg.org; AswMurphy@njleg.org; SenAddiego@njleg.org; AsmHowarth@njleg.org; AsmPeters@njleg.org; SenConnors@njleg.org; AsmRumpf@njleg.org; AswGove@njleg.org; SenHolzapfel@njleg.org; AsmWolfe@njleg.org; AsmMcGuckin@njleg.org; SenGopal@njleg.org; AswDowney@njleg.org; AsmHoughtaling@njleg.org; SenThompson@njleg.org; AsmClifton@njleg.org; AsmDancer@njleg.org; SenOscanlon@njleg.org; AswHandlin@njleg.org; AswDiMaso@njleg.org; SenGreenstein@njleg.org; AsmDeAngelo@njleg.org; AsmBenson@njleg.org; SenTurner@njleg.org; AswReynoldsJackson@njleg.org; SenBateman@njleg.org; AsmFreiman@njleg.org; AsmZwicker@njleg.org; SenBSmith@njleg.org; AsmDanielsen@njleg.org; AsmEgan@njleg.org; SenDiegnan@njleg.org; AsmKarabinchak@njleg.org; AswPinkin@njleg.org; SenVitale@njleg.org; AsmCoughlin@njleg.org; AswLopez@njleg.org; SenCryan@njleg.org; AswQuijano@njleg.org; AsmHolley@njleg.org; SenKean@njleg.org; AsmBramnick@njleg.org; AswMunoz@njleg.org; SenScutari@njleg.org; AswCarter@njleg.org; AsmKennedy@njleg.org; SenDoherty@njleg.org; AsmDiMaio@njleg.org; AsmPeterson@njleg.org; SenOroho@njleg.org; AsmSpace@njleg.org; AsmWirths@njleg.org; SenBucco@njleg.org; AsmCarroll@njleg.org; AsmBucco@njleg.org; SenPennacchio@njleg.org; AsmWebber@njleg.org; AswDecroce@njleg.org; SenCodey@njleg.org; AswJasey@njleg.org; AsmMcKeon@njleg.org; SenRice@njleg.org; AsmCaputo@njleg.org; AswTucker@njleg.org; SenRuiz@njleg.org; AswPintorMarin@njleg.org; AswSpeight@njleg.org; SenSinger@njleg.org
Subject: RE: MOTION TO VACATE THE VOID WRIT ENTERED ON MAY 13, 2011- F-9241-09
Importance: High

Dear Clerk of the Office of Foreclosure. 
Here is the law of this state, as is stated very clearly by the State’s own law revision commission:

Since enactment of the Anti-Eviction Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 et seq., the Summary Dispossess Act, N.J.S. 2A:18-53 et seq. has been understood to cover the eviction of nonresidential tenants and residential tenants not covered by the Anti-Eviction Act.  Source: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, NEW JERSEY LAW REVISION COMMISSION, Final Report Relating to Landlord and Tenant Law, February 10, 2012.
You took the advice of this person Pfalhert and issued a judgment and a writ  FOR A RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY without any notice to quit and without any hearing and without any jurisdiction.  Pflalert claims that the anti-eviction act was not applicable to my residential property.  However, if the anti-eviction act was not applicable, then the Summary Dispossess Act, N.J.S. 2A:18-53 et seq. covers the residential tenants not covered by the Anti-Eviction.  Just read what the law commission wrote.

How many more people have been injured by these reckless actions of your office?

I AM COPYING THE LEGISLATORS SO THAT THEY SEE THE EXTREME INCOMPETENCE OF THE PEOPLE IN THE OFFICE OF FORECLOSURE.  Hopefully they will intervene and correct this atrocity and travesty of the law.



Very Truly Yours,

Basilis (Bill) N. Stephanatos, PhD, PE, JD
Tel.: (201) 366-4588
Tel.: (973) 897-8162
Fax: (973) 810-0440
E-MAIL CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE
The contents of this e-mail message and any attachments are intended solely for the addressee(s) and may contain confidential and/or legally privileged information.  If you are the intended recipient, be aware that your use of any confidential or personal information may be restricted by state and federal privacy laws.  If you are not the intended recipient of this message or if this message has been addressed to you in error, please immediately alert the sender by reply e-mail and then delete this message and any attachments from any computer.

From: Bill Stephanatos [mailto:bstephanatos@gmail.com]
Sent: Friday, December 07, 2018 4:11 PM
To: 'Sven Pfahlert'; 'Michelle Smith'; 'mary.jacobson@njcourts.gov'
Cc: 'Irene Komandis'; 'SenVanDrew@njleg.org'; 'AsmAndrzejczak@njleg.org'; 'AsmLand@njleg.org'; 'SenBrown@njleg.org'; 'AsmMazzeo@njleg.org'; 'AsmArmato@njleg.org'; 'SenSweeney@njleg.org'; 'AsmBurzichelli@njleg.org'; 'AsmTaliaferro@njleg.org'; 'SenMadden@njleg.org'; 'AsmMoriarty@njleg.org'; 'AswMosquera@njleg.org'; 'SenCruzPerez@njleg.org'; 'AswEganJones@njleg.org'; 'AsmSpearman@njleg.org'; 'SenBeach@njleg.org'; 'AsmGreenwald@njleg.org'; 'AswLampitt@njleg.org'; 'SenSingleton@njleg.org'; 'AsmConaway@njleg.org'; 'AswMurphy@njleg.org'; 'SenAddiego@njleg.org'; 'AsmHowarth@njleg.org'; 'AsmPeters@njleg.org'; 'SenConnors@njleg.org'; 'AsmRumpf@njleg.org'; 'AswGove@njleg.org'; 'SenHolzapfel@njleg.org'; 'AsmWolfe@njleg.org'; 'AsmMcGuckin@njleg.org'; 'SenGopal@njleg.org'; 'AswDowney@njleg.org'; 'AsmHoughtaling@njleg.org'; 'SenThompson@njleg.org'; 'AsmClifton@njleg.org'; 'AsmDancer@njleg.org'; 'SenOscanlon@njleg.org'; 'AswHandlin@njleg.org'; 'AswDiMaso@njleg.org'; 'SenGreenstein@njleg.org'; 'AsmDeAngelo@njleg.org'; 'AsmBenson@njleg.org'; 'SenTurner@njleg.org'; 'AswReynoldsJackson@njleg.org'; 'SenBateman@njleg.org'; 'AsmFreiman@njleg.org'; 'AsmZwicker@njleg.org'; 'SenBSmith@njleg.org'; 'AsmDanielsen@njleg.org'; 'AsmEgan@njleg.org'; 'SenDiegnan@njleg.org'; 'AsmKarabinchak@njleg.org'; 'AswPinkin@njleg.org'; 'SenVitale@njleg.org'; 'AsmCoughlin@njleg.org'; 'AswLopez@njleg.org'; 'SenCryan@njleg.org'; 'AswQuijano@njleg.org'; 'AsmHolley@njleg.org'; 'SenKean@njleg.org'; 'AsmBramnick@njleg.org'; 'AswMunoz@njleg.org'; 'SenScutari@njleg.org'; 'AswCarter@njleg.org'; 'AsmKennedy@njleg.org'; 'SenDoherty@njleg.org'; 'AsmDiMaio@njleg.org'; 'AsmPeterson@njleg.org'; 'SenOroho@njleg.org'; 'AsmSpace@njleg.org'; 'AsmWirths@njleg.org'; 'SenBucco@njleg.org'; 'AsmCarroll@njleg.org'; 'AsmBucco@njleg.org'; 'SenPennacchio@njleg.org'; 'AsmWebber@njleg.org'; 'AswDecroce@njleg.org'; 'SenCodey@njleg.org'; 'AswJasey@njleg.org'; 'AsmMcKeon@njleg.org'; 'SenRice@njleg.org'; 'AsmCaputo@njleg.org'; 'AswTucker@njleg.org'; 'SenRuiz@njleg.org'; 'AswPintorMarin@njleg.org'; 'AswSpeight@njleg.org'; 'SenSinger@njleg.org'
Subject: RE: MOTION TO VACATE THE VOID WRIT ENTERED ON MAY 13, 2011- F-9241-09
Importance: High

THIS WAS A RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY IN POSSESSION BY ME AND MY FAMILY.  THIS WAS A RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY WHERE SPECIFIC STATUTES REGULATE THE POSSESSION.  WHAT YOU ARE REFERRING TO, IS GENERAL STATUTES FOR UNCONTESTED PROPERTIES WHERE NOBODY LIVES IN THE HOME.  GET A GRIP ON THE LAW.  Just from your response alone I believe you are the person responsible for this.

You are missing the whole point.  Even if what you are saying is legally correct (which is not), the Clerk had no jurisdiction to enter the writ the same day as the final judgment. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF WILDWOOD v. Hayward, et al., 406 A.2d 1318, 81 N.J. 311 (1979).

See the definition of tenant in the New Jersey statutes: "Tenant" includes, but is not limited to, a lessee or tenant at will or at sufferance or for any duration, or any subtenants, assigns, or legal representatives of the lessee or tenant. Title 46A – Landlord and tenant law. Article 5, eviction, chapter 14, eviction generally.  46A:14-1: Tenant, landlord, residential rental premises; what is included.

Furthermore, former owners become tenants at sufferance and legal process is required to evict them.  The term tenants under New Jersey law includes a tenant at sufferance.

THIS WAS A RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY WHERE SPECIFIC STATUTES REGULATE THE POSSESSION.  WHAT YOU ARE REFERRING TO, IS GENERAL STATUTES FOR UNCONTESTED NON-RESIDENTIAL PROPERTIES WHERE NOBODY LIVES IN THE HOME.  GET A GRIP ON THE LAW.

Regarding the judgment for possession, do you have any proof of the required notice to quit?  How could you even issue a judgment for possession without any notice to quit and without any hearing?  The New Jersey Supreme Court said that the judgment was not valid in the case I referenced: HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF WILDWOOD v. Hayward, et al., 406 A.2d 1318, 81 N.J. 311 (1979).


Every state requires legal proceedings prior to entering a judgment for possession or writ.  See for example:
It is also true that under Georgia law, “[w]here former owners of real property remain in possession after a foreclosure sale, they become tenants at sufferance.” Steed v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Corp., 689 S.E.2d 843, 848 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009). When this occurs, a landlord-tenant relationship exists between the legal title holder and a tenant at sufferance, and dispossessory procedures set forth in O.C.G.A. § 44-7-50 provide the exclusive method by which a landlord may evict the tenant. Steed, 689 S.E.2d at 848.

What you did was not only reckless and illegal, but you are trying to cover up your wrongdoing and by refusing to comply with the law of the state.  Failure to perfom the official duties or failure to comply with the law is a crime in this State.

THE WRIT OF POSSESSION WAS VOID AB INITIO BECAUSE THE CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION TO ISSUE THE EX-PARTE WRIT OF POSSESSION THE SAME DAME THE JUDGMENT WAS ENTERED.  HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF WILDWOOD v. Hayward, et al., 406 A.2d 1318, 81 N.J. 311 (1979)
ATF Defendants engaged in "knowing concealment, suppression and omission of material facts," and made a false representation of fact and law which the Chancery Court and the Mercer County Clerk relied upon.  Former Judge Hochberg also coerced by the fraudulent certifications of the Defendants into dismissing the timely filed Section 1983 suit in 2012.
Plaintiff has demonstrated that he had several cognizable equitable and property interests under New Jersey law of which he could not have been deprived without due process.
It is well-established that where former owners of real property remain in possession after a foreclosure sale, they become tenants at sufferance. See In re Atlantic Business & Community Corporation 901 F.2d at 328 (3rd Cir. 1990) where the Third Circuit stated that a tenancy at sufferance creates a property interest that is protected by federal and state laws and the U.S. Constitution.
See the definition of tenant in the New Jersey statutes: "Tenant" includes, but is not limited to, a lessee or tenant at will or at sufferance or for any duration, or any subtenants, assigns, or legal representatives of the lessee or tenant. Title 46A – Landlord and tenant law. Article 5, eviction, chapter 14, eviction generally.  46A:14-1: Tenant, landlord, residential rental premises; what is included.  New Jersey law considers a homeowner who remains in a home lost to foreclosure to be a tenant at sufferance.  We have found that a tenant at sufferance is "'one who comes into possession of land by lawful title, usually by virtue of a lease for a definite period, and after the expiration of the period of the lease holds over without any fresh leave from the owner.'" Xerox Corp. v. Listmark Computer Sys., 142 N.J. Super. 232, 240 (App. Div. 1976) (citing Standard Realty Co. v. Gates, 99 N.J. Eq. 271, 275 (Ch. 1926)).  WA GOLF COMPANY, LLC v. ARMORED, INC, Appellate Division, August 6, 2014.
The ATF Defendants fraudulently certified to state and federal courts that Stephanatos had no possessory rights, when he was at a minimum a tenant at sufferance (at the very worst). And he also had superior equitable title because he fully owned his property valued at $475K while the alleged tax was $20K.
No motion and notice was provided to Stephanatos for substituting the foreclosing plaintiff ATF, LLC to ATFH Real Property, LLC.  As a result, ATFH Real Property, LLC lacked the standing to apply for final judgment and to apply for a writ of possession from the office of foreclosure. 
Furthermore, as the New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled, in HOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF WILDWOOD v. Hayward, et al., 406 A.2d 1318, 81 N.J. 311 (1979).  Even if the judgment had been entered lawfully (we hold it was not), the clerk had no *316 jurisdiction to issue the warrant of removal the same day the judgment was entered. N.J.S.A. 2A:18-57 provides that in summary dispossess proceedings "[n]o warrant of removal shall issue until the expiration of 3 days after entry of judgment for possession."
THE EX-PARTE JUDGMENT FOR POSSESSION WAS ALSO ENTERED UNLAWFULLY BECAUSE NO NOTICE TO QUIT WAS PROVIDED TO STEPHANATOS PRIOR TO ENTERING THAT LANGUAGE INTO THE FINAL JUDGMENT ON MAY 13, 2011
State law requires that prior to the issuance of a judgment for possession, the owner must provide proof of notice to quit, followed by an eviction proceeding before a judge who has jurisdiction over the property and the person.  Here are the state statutes:
2A:18-56. Proof of notice to quit prerequisite to judgment
No judgment for possession in cases specified in paragraph "a." of section 2A:18-53 of this Title shall be ordered unless:
  1. The tenancy, if a tenancy at will or from year to year, has been terminated by the giving of 3 months' notice to quit, which notice shall be deemed to be sufficient; or
  2. The tenancy, if a tenancy from month to month, has been terminated by the giving of 1 month's notice to quit, which notice shall be deemed to be sufficient; or
  3. The tenancy, if for a term other than at will, from year to year, or from month to month, has been terminated by the giving of one term's notice to quit, which notice shall be deemed to be sufficient; and
  4. It shall be shown to the satisfaction of the court by due proof that the notice herein required has been given.
Note: Unlike residential tenants, who are mostly protected by the Anti-Eviction Act, commercial tenants (like Metropolitan Engineering Services, PC and Metropolitan Environmental Services) may be evicted at the end of their lease terms. However, a Notice to Quit is still required before the eviction action may be filed.  No such notice was ever provided.  That the eviction of Stephanatos’ businesses from the property was unlawful.
The landlord-tenant law also requires the same notice for removal of residential tenants (like Dr. Stephanatos):
2A:18-61.2 Removal of residential tenants; required notice; contents; service.
No judgment of possession shall be entered for any premises covered by section 2 of this act, except in the nonpayment of rent under subsection a. or f. of section 2, unless the landlord has made written demand and given written notice for delivery of possession of the premises.
Here, no notice to quit and no eviction hearing ever took place.  What the conspirator Robert Del Vecchio did was to include language in the judgment for foreclosure order that also included a judgment for possession, without any notice for such possession hearing ever provided to Stephanatos, as is required by state law: 2A:18-56. Proof of notice to quit prerequisite to judgmentHOUSING AUTHORITY OF CITY OF WILDWOOD v. Hayward, et al., 406 A.2d 1318, 81 N.J. 311 (1979). 
The state law N.J.S.A. 2A:39-1 cited by Judge Jacobson, prohibits the unlawful entry in any real property occupied solely as a residence by the party in possession, unless the entry and detention is made pursuant to legal process as set out in N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53 et seq.  The Defendants failed to do so and instead circumvented that statutory process and applied for an ex-parte writ.
Thus, this intentional violation of state law represents a violation of Stephanatos’ procedural due process rights for both the judgment for possession and the writ of possession.  Since the Defendants’ lawyers certified (i.e. swore under oath) to Judge Hochberg that “all the proceedings were done in accordance with the law”, they lied to that judge, successfully coerced the judge into dismissing the timely-filed suit and therefore committed fraud on the court.


Very Truly Yours,

Basilis (Bill) N. Stephanatos, PhD, PE, JD
Tel.: (201) 366-4588
Tel.: (973) 897-8162
Fax: (973) 810-0440
E-MAIL CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE
The contents of this e-mail message and any attachments are intended solely for the addressee(s) and may contain confidential and/or legally privileged information.  If you are the intended recipient, be aware that your use of any confidential or personal information may be restricted by state and federal privacy laws.  If you are not the intended recipient of this message or if this message has been addressed to you in error, please immediately alert the sender by reply e-mail and then delete this message and any attachments from any computer.

From: Sven Pfahlert [mailto:sven.pfahlert@njcourts.gov]
Sent: Friday, December 07, 2018 3:25 PM
To:
bstephanatos@gmail.com
Cc: Irene Komandis
Subject: RE: MOTION TO VACATE THE VOID WRIT ENTERED ON MAY 13, 2011- F-9241-09

Mr. Stephanatos,

As I have indicated to you in prior communications, the writ of possession was issued pursuant to R. 4:59-2(b) which states that “If an order or judgment is for the possession of real or personal property, the party in whose favor it is entered is, on application to the clerk, entitled as of course to a writ of possession....” The New Jersey Anti-Eviction Act applies to tenants, not prior property owners. N.J.S.A. 2A:18-51 et seq and cited case law refer to landlord/tenant proceedings. The Office of Foreclosure will take no action in this matter absent a judge’s order. Please be guided accordingly.


Sven E. Pfahlert, Esq.
Administrative Office of the Courts
Superior Court Clerk’s Office
25 Market Street
Trenton, NJ 08625

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