CORRUPT PASSAIC COUNTY PROSECUTORS REFUSE TO PRESENT FACTUAL EVIDENCE REFUTING THE TESTIMONY OF THE STATE’S WITNESSES AND DISPROVING NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF THE ALLEGED OFFENSES

STATE OF NEW JERSEY             Plaintiff,   v. BASILIS N. STEPHANATOS,                                     Defendant

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY LAW DIVISION - PASSAIC COUNTY Indictment No. 11-09-00810-I Criminal Action RESPONSE TO THE STATE’S OPPOSITION TO THE MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND TO OTHER OMNIBUS MOTIONS

TO:      Passaic County Prosecutor’s Office

401 Grand Street

Paterson, New Jersey 07505

Attn: Assistant Prosecutor Peter M. Roby

FACTUAL DEFENSES SHOULD HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO THE GRAND JURY AS THEY WERE REFUTING THE TESTIMONY OF THE STATE’S WITNESSES AND DISPROVING NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF THE ALLEGED OFFENSES

The State is confusing the “factual defenses” (or failure of proof defenses) with the affirmative defenses.  The existence of the emails and phone records are failure of proof defenses because they refute the statements of Lucas and D’Agostino that at 8:50 am they saw the Defendant pointing a gun at them behind a storm door:  the email records show that at 8:50 am the Defendant sent an email to this client; the previous e-mail strings also show that the Defendant was at his computer for several hours prior to 8:50 am.  These email records are extremely reliable and prove conclusively that the Defendant was not pointing a gun at the two sheriff employees at 8:50 am.  Thus, the email records have disproved a necessary element of the alleged assault offense (the pointing of a gun).  Hence, the assault charges must be dismissed with prejudice.

It is important to note that the State has just admitted that it was in receipt of the email and phone logs of the Defendant and that it failed to provide them to the Grand Jury or inform the grand jury of the existence of that factual information.  The record of the emails and the phone calls indicate that at 8:50 am, when the Sheriff’s Process Service Unit arrived at the property, the Defendant was at his home office at the back of the property, about 50 feet away from the door.  This evidence directly refutes the charges of assault at 8:50 am and raises a reasonable doubt that the Defendant acted the way Lucas and D’Agostino claim.  If reliable, conclusive factual evidence refutes an element of the alleged charge, then that evidence must be presented to the Grand Jury, as the petit jury will dismiss the charges upon consideration of that evidence.  It is that plain and simple.

In fact, the DVD of Sheriff transmissions provided in Exhibit C of the State’s response brief corroborates the Defendant’s timeline facts, as it shows that calls were made by the Sheriff employees after 8:55 am.  If anything had happened at 8:50 am, then there would have been records of phone calls of these sheriff employees at 8:51 or earlier.  This information (that was available to the State), directly refutes the assertion of the State witnesses (who have obviously lied) and the Grand Jury would have investigated these factual conflicts and perhaps subpoena the Defendant to testify.  A simple examination of the scene of the house would not have corroborated the testimony of the sheriff employees and would have revealed that the Sheriff employees lied and that their testimony is simply not believable, raising a reasonable doubt that the events occurred the way these sheriff employees claimed they did.

Roby has concealed important evidence from this Court

The prosecutor, Roby, also continues to lie and mislead and hide important evidence from this Court, the same way Walter Dewey, Jr. did before the Grand Jury: these two “exemplary” and “ethical” prosecutors, are refusing to present to this Court the written investigation reports prepared by Lucas, D’Agostino, and others.  The reason is very simple: the written reports contradict the oral testimony of these two sheriff employees.

Although requested by the Defendant, Roby is trying to conceal from this Court the photographic and video and reporting evidence collected by the sheriff at 687 Indian Road, Wayne, NJ property.

Furthermore, Defendant has stated that his doors were all locked and closed.  This directly refutes the assertion of the State witnesses that Defendant’s door was wide open.  It is more likely than not that a reasonable juror would have believed that the doors were all locked, as this is what people do to avoid intruders inside their home or when people are planning to come and throw them out of their homes and business while legal proceedings still pending:  people simply keep their doors closed and locked, the same way the Defendant did.  These factual assertions of the Defendant are not “affirmative defenses”, they are “factual defenses”;  they create reasonable doubt that the events took place in the manner the State’s witnesses claim they occurred and are a failure of proof of elements of the offenses. 

The prosecution should have let the Grand Jury know of the existence of the emails and phone records.  The prosecution should also have advised the Grand Jury that the Defendant was willing to testify at the proceedings as he had discussed with Mr. Carl Herman and had also let Mr. Walter Dewy know to that effect.  The Grand Jury then would have considered if it needs some additional information or if it needs to subpoena the Defendant to testify and so on.  The State had already into its possession the letters sent by the Defendant to Judge Reddin complaining about the failure of Mr. Herman to secure his testimony at the Grand Jury.  (See Opposition to the Motion to Revoke Bail, dated March 1, 2012).  Here is what the defendant included in that letter:

Mr. Herman:

·         Failed to submit my certification/affidavit to the grand jury;

·         Failed to secure my presence to the grand jury;

·         He never found out as to the why the state refused to allow me to testify at the grand jury;

Obviously I have been very dissatisfied with the services of Mr. Herman since he failed to secure my grand jury testimony or at least the submission of a certification or affidavit or the alibi (the electronic records proving beyond any doubt that I was located 30 feet away from the location of the alleged offense and at the time of the alleged offense) or other constitutional and statutory defenses/privileges/justifications/immunities.  We had agreed for me to testify.  That was the prime reason I hired him and paid him $3,500 upfront.  But he failed completely in his duties and this resulted in a fatal breach of trust and confidence on my part.

All this factual information proves beyond any doubt that the Defendant had agreed with Mr. Herman to testify at the Grand Jury proceedings.  It is also a fact that the Defendant has written and verbally stated many times that these two sheriff employees lied about the events and that the charges are fraudulent and not believable if they are subjected to slight scrutiny or pitted against the email and phone records of the Defendant and the physical setting of the residence.

It is important to note here that the defendant’s home is in a wooded, remote and isolated area of Wayne, New Jersey.  There are no homes neighboring to the north.  There is only one home neighboring to the east (about 50 feet away) where there was only one woman present.  There is another home to the west (about 100 feet away) where the owners were at work.  Thus, the N.J.S. 2C:29-3b(2) charge is also fraudulent, as less than five people and less than five habitations were within 100 feet from defendant’s home.  Defendant would have testified to all these facts and would have caused the grand jury to return a no bill for charge N.J.S. 2C:29-3b(2).  This factual evidence also proves that the sheriff employees lied when they filed these charges against the Defendant.

The two sheriff employees did not wear the dark blue or black law enforcement uniforms and according to their testimony, they did not identify themselves as law enforcement.  In fact, they never claimed that they ever announced themselves, such as knocking at the door or ringing the doorbell, as per their testimony.  They in fact testified that they were sheriff employees, not police officers performing a criminal investigation.  Their duties during that day were not law enforcement duties, because this was a civil matter.   Defendant’s testimony would have also returned a no bill, as he was not aware that the sheriff employees were police officers;  because they are not police officers.  The prosecutor is again fraudulently writing in his response letter that the sheriff employees are in fact police officers, a very pathetic, fraudulent, misleading and ludicrous assertion.  In Exhibit A, we attach copies of the original complaints filed by Lucas and D’Agostino.  It can be seen that these two individuals filed charges under section 2C:12-1B(4), as they were not police officers.  This factual evidence produced by the State’s witnesses conclusively proves that even the sheriff employees did not know that they were in fact police officers; but, instead they were sheriff employees.

As further proof that the 2C:12-1B(4) statutes intended to protect law enforcement officers is an examination of the statute 2C:12-1b(5).  This is the statute that addresses the assault on law enforcement officer or public employee, such a sheriff.   Under this statute, the assault upon a law enforcement officer is included under 2C:12-1b(5)(a): Any law enforcement officer acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of his authority or because of his status as a law enforcement officer.

By contrast the assault on a sheriff officer is included under section 2C:12-1b(5)(h): Any … sheriff, undersheriff, or sheriff’s officer acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of his authority.

Thus, the legislature has clearly distinguished between a law enforcement officer and a sheriff officer.  These two groups of employees were not meant to be considered one and the same.

I believe that this analysis conclusively proves that the statute 2C:12-1b(9) does not include sheriff employees, but it was intended to protect police officers in their law enforcement duties.  Lucas and D’Agostino were sheriff’s officers wearing sheriff officer uniforms and not police officers.  The state legislature would have most likely included the sheriff employees in the 2C:12-1b(9) statute (the same way it did in 2C:12-1b(5)) and not simply leave it open to interpretation or ambiguity.

The phone records also prove that it was the Defendant who called Judge McVeigh at 8:56 am, to ask for the status of an application of a stay, as is allowed by all eviction statutes.  It was the Defendant who initiated that phone as this factual evidence proves, and not the judge or anyone else as the prosecutor fraudulently asserts in his letter to this Court.  This significant evidence proves beyond any doubt that the only thing the Defendant wanted was a 6-month stay that is freely granted under all circumstances and it is in fact codified under the statutes:  see NJSA  § 2A:42-10.6.

It was that simple:  a statute-based stay would have solved every issue, but the reckless judge Margaret McVeigh and the convicted conspirators did not do it for whatever reason.  Perhaps this judge was incompetent, reckless, ruthless, biased, usurped her authority, or whatever else.  It would have been up to the Grand Jurors to determine the role of the State and County employees and the conspirators and determine whether they acted prudently or whether they caused the escalation of the situation through their negligent, reckless or even criminal conduct, (improperly evicting a person is a criminal act in the State of New Jersey).

Another crucial and clearly exculpatory evidence was that Metropolitan Environmental Services, was not part of the fraudulently-obtained Writ of Possession; and that the Sheriff was not authorized to remove Defendant’s business from the premises; but the Sheriff did it anyway;  the evidence presented to the Court (the communications between Metropolitan Environmental Services and the Sheriff) shows that the Sheriff was aware that a tenant was present and that no Writ had been issued for that tenant.  This evidence was never presented to the Grand Jurors.

This crucial evidence also indicates that, since no judgment of possession and writ or warrant of possession or removal had been obtained for Metropolitan Environmental Services, Defendant had the right to defend his business and business property from intruders or attackers;  no such instructions were provided to the Grand Jurors, as the State intentionally refused to provide that evidence to the jury.  The Defendant had valid factual defenses (not merely affirmative defenses) that were never presented and thus, the prosecutor interfered with the investigation of the Grand Jury and changed the outcome of the Grand Jury proceedings.

The Defendant never threatened anyone few days prior to the eviction, as the prosecutor has fraudulently asserted in his response brief;  the Court should order the State to provide proof of these fraudulent assertions, as these lies were also made to the Grand Jurors and painted the Defendant as a violent person and affected the jury’s decision to indict;  the Defendant vehemently denies that few days prior to the eviction he had threatened the convicted criminal conspirators.  I hereby demand proof of such statements made by the Defendant few days prior to the eviction.

THE CHANCERY COURT HAD NO SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER LAND POSSESSION ISSUES AND ANY JUDGMENTS OR ORDERS ISSUED BY CHANCERY COURT WERE VOID AB INITIO, A LEGAL NULLITY

The fraudulently issued “final judgment” in May 2011, never adjudicated the subject matter of land possession, as the Chancery courts have no jurisdiction over land possession issues.  Thus, the judgment was void regarding the alleged adjudication of the possession of the Defendant’s property.  A judgment is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court has no authority to adjudicate the controversy. See Bank v. Kim, 361 N.J. Super. 331, 339 (App. Div. 2003) (mortgage foreclosure judgment void in violation of bankruptcy automatic stay).  

Subject matter jurisdiction can neither be conferred by agreement of the parties nor waived as a defense, and a court must dismiss the matter if it determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Macysyn v. Hensler, 329 N.J. Super. 476, 481 (App. Div. 2000) (indicating that such a motion can be made "at any time"); see also R. 4:6-7; Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 1 on R. 4:6-7 (2015).

Here, the Chancery court had no subject matter jurisdiction over the property possession issue and thus any judgment or order issued by that court was void, a legal nullity.  Therefore, the sheriff was enforcing a void (and fraudulent as well) court order.

We have uncovered some new HORRIFIC AND TERRIFYING ACCUSATIONS AGAINST the Chancery Judge McVeigh.   She apparently allowed the issuance of a "Final Judgment" where the following language was inserted by the Plaintiffs (convicted felon Robert Del Vecchio, American Tax Funding, and others):

“AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the plaintiff dully recover against the said defendant …possession of the premises… and that a Writ of Possession issue thereon”.

Of course, she had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of land possession.  Why did she insert or allowed that language to be inserted into that "final judgment"?

The HORRIFIC AND TERRIFYING ACCUSATIONS AGAINST Chancery Judge McVeigh is that she never even held any hearing over the land possession issue.  She just merely allowed that language to be inserted into the text, so that the convicted felon Robert Del Vecchio immediately seizes the property of Defendant without any due process and in violation of several New Jersey statutes.   So, this corrupt “Judge” not only she did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the land possession issue, but she then secretly and fraudulently allowed the above language to be inserted in the so-called “final judgment”.  As a result, they did not follow the Wrongful Entry and Detainer Act and the Anti-Eviction Act, or the Summary Dispossess Act.   The consequences of these criminal acts was that they caused millions of dollars in damages by forcibly removing tenants or land possessors without due process.  These are the true criminals, and not the Defendant.

As it was stated earlier, it was the Defendant who called Judge McVeigh at 8:56 am to ask for a stay or check on the status of a stay he had applied few weeks ago, pursuant to with NJSA § 2A:42-10.6 that allows up to a six month stay;  the Sheriff SWAT team had sharpshooters and snipers pointing at Defendant’s chest and head while he was talking to judge McVeigh and the Defendant was fearful of his life and that is why he told the Judge that there will be blood shed unless there is a stay;  a simple stay (allowed by the New Jersey statutes and routinely granted by all courts) would have prevented this incident;  but the reckless State and County employees caused the Defendant to be under stress and duress by trying to remove his business without having a Writ for removal of Metropolitan Environmental Services.

More lies and fabrications by Roby

The current prosecutor, P. Roby, is fraudulently attempting to mislead and lie to this Court by stating that the Sheriff was there to evict the Defendant from his “business/home”.  However, the fraudulent Writ makes no mention of Defendant’s business, a legal tenant at the property for many years.  Now, this obviously lying and corrupt prosecutor is claiming or appears to be claiming that the Writ covered both the Defendant and his business.  But it did not – there is no evidence to support this reckless assertion and we are asking the Court to strike these responses of the state and sanction the prosecutor.

In fact, there is no record that any Judgment of Possession was adjudicated by any Law Division court.  Judgments of Possession and other eviction issues are in the jurisdiction of the Law Division.  See Exhibit B for the legal forms used by the Passaic County courts to adjudicate the issue of possession.  These proceedings require a notice, and reason for the eviction, and an answer, and a court order signed by a Law Division judge, and so on.  We demand that the State provides a copy of the judicial record showing that there was a trial or a factual hearing where the issue of possession was adjudicated.  If the State fails to provide evidence of such record, then this Court must rule in favor of the Defendant on the issue of the adjudication of the Judgment of Possession and the subsequent Writ of Possession.  No court ever adjudicated the possession of the property by using the long-established procedures listed above; NONE. 

Please note that under the “Writ of Possession” form in Exhibit B, it states the following:

“WHEREAS, on ________ by a certain judgment of the Law Division Special Civil Part, PASSAIC in a cause therein pending, ….”

Clearly, the conspirators were required to file a suit in the Law Division, but they never did.  This is the crux of the matter.  They in fact defrauded and lied to the various courts and court clerks.  Most likely, a conspiracy between the State, County and the convicted criminals had been formed, to force out of their homes people who were disputing their tax bills. 

There is no record of any ejectment or eviction proceeding ever held before any court that had jurisdiction over such proceedings and over Defendant’s property and person.  The state has failed to provide any record that such proceedings were ever held and is lying to this Court by claiming that “a Court-ordered Writ of Possession” was issued.  No court that had jurisdiction over the property ever adjudicated a judgment of possession and therefore a Writ could not have been possibly been issued.

Certainly, no such hearings were ever held for the legal tenant Metropolitan Environmental Services.  The sheriff however, did evict this tenant from the premises in a total disregard of the law of possession and the law of tenancy.  Recklessness beyond belief.  The Grand Jurors were never informed of such illegal acts by the sheriff.

This fraudulent scheme was invented by Robert Del Vecchio, American Tax Funding, and the other convicted conspirators.  Perhaps additional conspirators include the County and Municipality and Judicial employees as they have violated the legal rights of thousands of homeowners by using these fraudulent (and criminal) ex-parte proceedings, without any hearing, without any findings of fact, without application of facts to the law, by violating the constitutional rights of the homeowners, and issuing judgments and orders without subject matter jurisdiction and so on.  Absolute disgrace.  This potential conspiracy between the County, State and the convicted conspirators is the prime reason we do not believe that fair trial and fair proceedings will be had in this County.  We hereby renew our Motion to Change Venue, based on the detailed discussion of some of the factual evidence that was intentionally and willfully not presented to the Grand Jurors.

Hogan requires both exculpatory and inculpatory statements to be presented to the grand jury, and so must this Court.  Defendant had the right to have the grand jurors hear both the incriminating and the exculpatory evidence, rather than have certain information withheld by the Assistant Prosecutor.  When a witness presents a number of versions of his story, and when the Defendant presents facts or testimony that is refuting the factual allegations of the state witnesses, all the statements must be presented to the grand jury in order for the grand jury to properly carry out its investigative function with the level of fairness to which defendant is entitled.  The grand jury "was deprived of its right to investigate and its ultimate task of determining whether the State did in fact present a prima facie case." Hogan, , 281 N.J. Super. at 299, 657 A.2d 462.  State v. Epps, 284 N.J. Super. 373 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1995 (dismissing the indictment for failure to provide both exculpatory and inculpatory statements to the Grand Jury).

In Hogan, the Assistant Prosecutor argued in the trial court that it was in her discretion to present the evidence to the grand jury. Because she personally did not believe the recantation, and believed it was coerced, and therefore not credible, she argued she did not have to present the evidence to the grand jury. Id. at 296, 657 A.2d 462. The court stated:

The prosecutor contends that her duty to disclose only arises if the statement is exculpatory and if the prosecutor believes it to be truthful. This cannot possibly be the determinative basis for the decision whether to disclose evidence to the grand jury. The standard for prosecutorial conduct may not rest on a prosecutor's belief. The decision whether to indict is solely entrusted to the grand jury, which must decide "whether a prima facie case has been made out."

*379379

[ Ibid. (citing Trap Rock Industries v. Kohl, 59 N.J. 471, 487, 284 A.2d 161 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1065, 92 S.Ct. 1500, 31 L.Ed.2d 796 (1972)).]

Similarly here, the prosecutor argues that he believes that the Defendant’s emails and phone records are incriminatory and that they would not have made any difference in the Grand Jury’s decision whether a prima facie case has been made out.  However, what the prosecutor thinks of the evidence or the testimony of the witness is irrelevant.  The email records and the phone call record of the sheriff and the Defendant show that the Defendant was not pointing a gun at both Lucas and D’Agostino at 8:50 am as he was 50 feet away behind his business computer.  Basically, the State’s witnesses’ testimony is fully contradicted by reliable electronic and physical evidence.  Although the Grand Jury proceedings are not supposed to be adversarial ones, the prosecutor must present evidence that will tend to disprove the elements of the state’s charges or that would shed reasonable doubt that elements of the alleged offenses ever took place.  The bottom line is that the prosecutor decided to withhold from the Grand Jury reliable electronic evidence and eye-witnesses and the grand jury "was deprived of its right to investigate and its ultimate task of determining whether the State did in fact present a prima facie case." Hogan, supra, 281 N.J. Super. at 299, 657 A.2d 462.

Because a target has neither a right to testify before the grand jury nor to have the grand jury hear any particular evidence, the target is completely dependent on the prosecutor to inform the grand jury of exculpatory evidence.  Although a prosecutor is not required to present “all possibly exculpatory evidence” to a grand jury, he or she must alert the grand jurors to the existence of “important exculpatory evidence.” In that category, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts includes “exculpatory evidence that would greatly undermine the credibility of an important witness, [other] evidence likely to affect the grand jury’s decision,” as well as evidence the withholding of which would cause the presentation to be seriously tainted.  The evidence proffered by the Defendant demonstrates that the withheld evidence would have distorted or “greatly undermined” the credibility of the evidence presented to the Grand Jury.

The evidence standard before the Grand Jury is whether there is “evidence, which if uncontradicted and unexplained, would carry the case to a jury and justify the conviction of the accused.”  Trap Rock Industries. Inc., v. Kohl, 59 N.J. 471 (1971).  While this evidential burden may seem low, it provides an important protection to citizens by preventing the State from abusing its power and bringing criminal charges that lack any basis in the evidence or they are contradicted by other evidence or witness testimony.  Sufficiency of the evidence is not the decision point;  the evidence presented must be uncontradicted and unexplained – this is the key decision point.  Here, all the evidence presented to the Grand Jury has been contradicted and fully explained by the Defendant’s proffered evidence.   Protecting our citizens against the possibility of unfounded criminal charges is the most important function of the grand jury. 

Here, all the statements presented to the jurors were also false or fraudulent and the Defendant was prepared to testify and provide evidence that would have refuted necessary elements of each offense that he was charged with and would have contradicted and explained testimony presented by the State.  The Defendant would have testified, among other important facts, that

·                     that no court had adjudicated a Judgment of Possession through an eviction hearing or a summary dispossess hearing; 

·                     that the Chancery Court had no subject matter jurisdiction over a land possession issue, as such issues are the jurisdiction of the Law Division; and therefore, all possession orders issued by Chancery Court were void ab initio, with no legal effect, a complete nullity;

·                     that no court had ordered a writ of possession to be issued, following an eviction hearing (a property possession hearing); it was the conspirator Robert Del Vecchio who falsified forms presented to a judge in Mercer County (Judge Jacobson) and put language to indicate that the possession issue had been adjudged – but it had not been adjudicated by any court – THIS IS AN EXTRAORDINARY IMPORTANT POINT FOR THE COURT TO UNDERSTAND;

·                     that he did not know that Sheriff employees were “police officers” as the State fraudulently states in its brief;

·                     that the Sheriff employees were not wearing the dark “police officer” uniforms, but they were wearing Sheriff civil division uniforms;

·                     that the individuals peering through Defendant’s side windows never announced that they were “police officers” or sheriff officers;

·                     that a young (neither bold and no facial hair) Sheriff employee was illegally peering through Defendant’s side window; and that he slipped and fell as he was standing at the very edge of the porch and was illegally trying to look inside Defendant’s home at about 8:53 am, about 3 minutes after he arrived at the porch at 8:50 am; 

·                     that Lucas (he may have been the sworn law enforcement officer on duty that day) was not the one peering through that side window and that he was located at least 50 feet away near his sheriff vehicle;

·                     that Lucas formed a conspiracy with the other Sheriff employees to testify that he was the one sitting on the porch of the Defendant’s home;  the reason is that none of the other sheriff employees were sworn law enforcement officers;

·                     that Lucas has testified that it was hard to see inside the home because of the sun reflection, further corroborating Defendant’s facts presented in the Motion to Dismiss;

·                     that a Writ of Possession does not allow the Sheriff to peer through inaccessible windows or perform illegal search especially if the Plaintiff (the conspirators, Robert Del Vecchio, ATF, et al.) has not arrived at the property;

·                     that a Warrant for Removal issued by a Law Division Judge was required to remove the Plaintiff from his home or business and that the Sheriff did not have a Warrant and that no such Warrant for Removal was ever obtained from a Law Division court;

·                     that the Plaintiff representative (the conspirators Robert Del Vecchio, ATF, et al) were not present during the Sheriff illegal peering through the window(s) of Defendant’s home;

·                     that the County, the Chancery Court and the conspirators also violated the New Jersey Constitution, Article I, paragraph 20 that states that  Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.  Individuals or private corporations shall not be authorized to take private property for public use without just compensation first made to the owners.  And that under no circumstances private property can be taken by private entities and that no court can issue orders to that effect, taking private property fully owned by the Defendant and delivering it to a third, private party;

·                     That no property possession hearings (eviction hearings) or summary dispossess proceedings were ever held before any court of proper jurisdiction, in violation of New Jersey law – the State has not and cannot provide evidence to this Court that a Property Possession hearing (an eviction hearing) ever took place;  the conspirators simply fooled a Court Clerk in Mercer County into believing that the property possession had been adjudicated;

·                     no bench or other trial was ever held by McVeigh on any issue before her;

·                     no fact-findings and application of the law to the facts consistent with Court Rule 1:7-4(a) were ever held; and that the Court of Appeals would have vacated every order that had been issued;

·                     no pre-eviction notices were ever provided to the Defendant, as is required by New Jersey Law;

·                     no stay of the proceedings for up to six months were ever held authorized under NJSA  § 2A:42-10.6 and no notices were provided by the conspirators advising the Defendant to apply for a stay;

·                     that during the execution of a Writ of Possession, the Sheriff is not allowed to brake the door or enter the premises without the owner being present; and that the Sheriff in this case did just that or attempted to do that without the conspirators being present;

·                     that Defendant’s business, Metropolitan Environmental Services, was not part of the Writ of Possession; and that the Sheriff was not authorized to remove Defendant’s business from the premises; but the Sheriff did it anyway;

·                     that Defendant never threatened anyone few days prior to the eviction, as the prosecutor has fraudulently asserted in his response brief;  the Court should order the State to provide proof of these fraudulent assertions, as these lies were also made to the Grand Jurors and painted the Defendant as a violent person and affected the jury’s decision to indict;

·                     that it was the Defendant who called Judge McVeigh to ask for a stay or check on the status of a stay he had applied few weeks ago, pursuant to with NJSA § 2A:42-10.6 that allows up to a six month stay;

·                     that the Sheriff SWAT team had sharpshooters and snipers pointing at Defendant’s chest and head while he was talking to judge McVeigh and the Defendant was fearful of his life and that is why he told the Judge that there will be blood shed unless there is a stay;  a simple stay (allowed by the New Jersey statutes (and granted by all courts) would have prevented this incident);

·                     that several appeals were pending, including a Suit to Vacate the Tax Deed;  and that THE Sheriff employees now claim that they did not know that appeals and suits were pending;

·                     that the Defendant was forced out of his home by the threats made by Sheriff officer Celix that the SWAT team will break into his home if he does not get out; Defendant hereby requests that the phone conversations between Celix and him become available to the Defendant;

·                     that at 1:30 pm, the SWAT team got the go-ahead to use excessive and unnecessary force and break into Defendant’s home without having a Warrant;

·                     that at no time did anyone told the Defendant that he was under arrest;

·                     that at no time did anyone told the Defendant that he had committed any offense;

·                     that at no time did anyone told the Defendant that an arrest warrant had been issued for his arrest;

·                     that at no time did the Defendant barricaded the door or windows or the property;

·                     that the Defendant only wanted (and had the right) to protect his business and business property that was not part of the fraudulent Writ of Possession, pursuant to NJSA 2C:3-6 (defense of premises NJSA 2C:3-6(a) and (b) and defense of personal property (NJSA 2C:3-6(c) and (d));

·                     that Defendant’s property was sold for $330,000, representing the fair market value of the property;  while the Wayne Township has over assessed the property at almost $500,000; this is more than the 15% allowance on over-assessments and that as result no taxes were due to the Township, as a matter of law;

·                     that the Tax Assessor of Wayne Township sent a letter to the Defendant stating that no assessments had been performed since 1995;

·                     that flooding in Passaic County had reduced the property values, including the Defendant’s and had communicated so with the Assessor.

·                     that the former home of the Defendant was located in an isolated and wooded area of Wayne where less than 5 people and less than 5 habitations were located within 100 feet from the property;

·                     that Lucas was not the person illegally peering through Defendant’s side window, as the Defendant has recently obtained a photo of Lucas and he is not the person that he saw having stuck his face onto the side window;  Defendant remembers a young person peering through his side window; that person had full set of hair and no facial hair, while Lucas is in his 50s and has facial hair and he is very-very bold.  The young sheriff employee was in his late 20s to early 30s and had full set of hair and also had very sharp eyes illegally searching inside the residence as the Defendant did not answer the door at 8:50 am.  Defendant hereby requests a list of the names of all Sheriff employees who were originally dispatched at the 687 Indian Road property at 8:50 am.  This is obviously a bomb-shell, as it will expose the conspiracy among these Sheriff employees to frame the Defendant. 

·         I am attaching the original charge filed by Lucas on 6/28/2011 under Section NJS 2C:17-2C.  As you see, he wrote the reason for the charge is “PLACING SLIVER[sic] METAL CONTAINER ON HIS FRONT STEPS CAUSING THE EVACUATION OF NEIGHBORS”.  As you know by now, this was a BLACK PLASTIC SAFETY CONTAINER FOR MY BUSINESS INSTRUMENT placed there to be picked up by the vendor, Pines Environmental.  Note that Lucas writes: “SLIVER [sic]” (he meant silver).  However, this was a black plastic instrument case.  This is another clue telling me that Lucas was not there to eye-witness the instrument.

MORE FRAUDULENT STATEMENTS MADE BEFORE THE GRAND JURY TO PORTRAY MR. STEPHANATOS AS A VIOLENT PERSON
 
In 2008, Robert Del Vecchio put a lien onto Basilis Stephanatos' residential property for unpaid taxes that Stephanatos was disputing due to alleged over assessment of his residence (in fact, after the seizure of the Stephanatos' propety, Del Vecchio sold it for $330,000 which is the fair market value of the property.  However, the property was assessed by Wayne Township at $475,000.  This is about 40 percent greater over-assessment and thus no taxes were legally owed by Basilis Stephanatos- tragic, tragic, tragic situation).

In any event, around December 2008, Robert Del Vecchio, Jr. (he was a lawyer for American Tax Funding, Inc.) sent a letter to Basilis Stephanatos , notifying him that a lien has been placed onto his property.  Then on December 26, 2008, Basilis Stephanatos sent a letter to Robert Del Vecchio demanding that the lien be removed.  Basilis Stephanatos wrote that he is filing a criminal complaint and other reporting to the media.  He basically threatened Robert Del Vecchio with legal action and not physical violent threats.

This is what Basilis Stephanatos wrote to Robert Del Vecchio in the December 28, 2008 letter:

Basil N. Stephanatos

687 Indian Road

Wayne, New Jersey 07470-4923

Phone: (973) 616-4637

bstephanatos@optimum.net

26 December 2008

Robert A. Del Vecchio, Esq.

405 Lafayette Avenue

P.O. Box 561

Hawthorne, New Jersey 07507

Phone: (973) 423-9035

Fax:     (973) 423-9036

RE:      Tax Sale Certificate #02310

Block/Lot 4503.  21

ATF, Inc.

Wayne Township, New Jersey

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is a follow-up letter to the one we sent you on 24 December 2008.  We demand that you immediately remove the lien you have placed on our property.  I am filing criminal complaint against you, ATF, Inc., Wayne Township Tax Collector and Wayne Township for violation of a number of federal civil rights.  I am also sending the file information to the newspapers.

This is not a threat – it is real.  After you see what we have in store for your client, you will beg to be instead fucked in the ass by a 5-ft long rhinoceros dick for the rest of your life.

Mary Christmas and Happy the New Year.

Very Truly Yours,

Basilis N. Stephanatos

Block/Lot 4503.  21.

 

"This is not a threat – it is real.  After you see what we have in store for your client, you will beg to be instead fucked in the ass by a 5-ft long rhinoceros dick for the rest of your life.

Mary Christmas and Happy the New Year."

So, Stephanatos never threatened Del Vecchio with violence and certainly this was 2.5 years prior to the June 28, 2011 incident.  However, Robert Del Vecchio, perhaps in a conspiracy with Judge Margaret McVeigh, stated that Mr. Stephanatos had threatened Del Vecchio few days prior to the June 28, 2011 eviction with violence and that Stephanatos told him that " I will fuck in the ass by a 5-ft long rhinoceros dick".  As the Court can see, this was a fraudulent statement Del Vecchio made in order to seize Mr. Stephanatos' property without following the Summary Dispossess Act, as is required under New Jersey Law.  Then, the state prosecutors also used this same fraudulent statement before the Grand Jury to depict Mr. Stephanatos as a violent person.  Fraudulent statements like that essentially sealed the fate of Mr. Stephanatos before the Grand Jury.

THIS IS VERY SERIOUS ALLEGATION AND THIS COURT MUST PERFORM AN URGENT INVESTIGATION.

The above is just a summary of the factual contentions of the Defendant.  These factual contentions, along with physical corroborating evidence, refute the allegations of the State witnesses and refute elements of the alleged offenses by facts and testimony and other physical and printed corroborating evidence that clearly exculpate the Defendant or at least place reasonable doubt upon necessary elements of the charged offenses.   

A Defendant’s  statement denying involvement in an alleged offense, although such a statement directly negates guilt, ordinarily would not be sufficiently credible to be ‘clearly exculpatory,’ and need not be revealed to the grand jury.

[Hogan, Id. at 237–38.  

However, in this case the eye-witness testimony of the Defendant would have provided not just a mere statement of not-guilty, but consists of numerous eyewitness observations, and corroborating emails and phone records, and written material and photographs and detailed description of the physical setting and the surroundings that would have greatly assisted the Grand Jury in its investigation.  In this particular case, it is important to note that the State has not provided not a single physical corroborating evidence to the Grand Jury and also has not provided any corroborating witness to the Lucas and D’Agostino testimony.  

The Appellate Division, in John Hogan, supra, correctly observed that a prosecutor’s obligation to instruct the grand jury on possible defenses is a corollary to his responsibility to present exculpatory evidence. 336 N.J. Super. at 341.  Since Defendant’s home and Defendant’s business and personal property was involved, the State should have presented the defenses of one’s person, the defense of his dwelling, the defense of his business and the defense of his property (both business and personal).  In Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, as well as in this reply brief, the Defendant has presented numerous facts that clearly warranted an instruction of the Defense of Home, Defense of Property, Duress, Entrapment and Self-Defense.

New Jersey self-defense law permits citizens to use force against unlawful intrusion into their homes, curtilage, or occupied motor vehicles by any person, including public servants.  This law altered the landscape of the Castle Doctrine by extending legal protection to those who would use force against the police. 

In the Preamble to the New Jersey Self-Defense Act, an act concerning the protection of persons and property, amending N.J.S.2C:3-4 and N.J.S.2C:3-6, introduced in the assembly and the senate for the 2010 session, the [New Jersey] Legislature finds and declares that:

a. It is proper for law-abiding people to protect themselves, their families and others from intruders and attackers without fear of prosecution or civil action for acting in defense of their own well-being and the well-being of others.

b. The "Castle Doctrine" is a long-standing American legal  concept arising from English Common Law that provides that one's  abode is a special area in which one enjoys certain protections and  immunities, that one is not obligated to retreat before defending  oneself against attack, and that one may do so without fear of  prosecution.

c. Article I of the New Jersey Constitution guarantees the citizens of this State the rights "of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness."

d. The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution affords the people of this nation the right to keep and bear arms.

e. All who reside in and all who visit this State have a right to expect to be unmolested and safe within their homes, residences and vehicles.

f. No person should be required, as a point of law, to surrender their personal safety or well-being to the unlawful actions of a criminal, nor to needlessly retreat in the face of intrusion or attack.

g. It is, therefore, altogether fitting and proper, and within the public interest, to ensure that law-abiding people are justified in protecting themselves, their families and others from intruders and attackers, and that they may do so without fear of prosecution or civil action.

DEFENSE OF PREMISES (N.J.S.A. 2C:3-6(a) and (b))

The State failed or refused to charge the Grand Jury with the ordinary defense of the Defense of Premises N.J.S.A. 2C:3-6(a) and (b).  The burden of proof is upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the use of force by the Defendant was not justified.  Here is what the Model Jury instructions provide for this defense:

A section of our criminal law provides that ......... the use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable when the actor is in possession or control of premises or is licensed or privileged to be thereon and he reasonably believes such force necessary to prevent or terminate what he reasonably believes to be the commission or attempted commission of a criminal trespass by such other person in or upon such premises.[1]

A reasonable belief is one that is not recklessly or negligently held[2]; it is a belief that would be held by a person of ordinary prudence and intelligence situated as defendant was.  As the statute indicates, the defense of property exonerates a person who uses force in the reasonable belief that such action was necessary to prevent or terminate the commission or attempted commission of a criminal trespass, even though his/her belief was later proven mistaken.  Accordingly, the law requires only a reasonable, not necessarily a correct, judgment.[3]

A person commits a criminal trespass if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do so, he enters or surreptitiously remains in any research facility, structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof.[4]

BURDEN OF PROOF [ALL CASES]

            The burden of proof is upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the use of force by the defendant was not justified.  Thus, if you find that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed _________________________ [the crime[s] charged in the indictment] and has also proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not justified in using force, then your verdict must be guilty.  But if you have a reasonable doubt whether his/her use of force was justified, then your verdict must be not guilty.

The State has falsely stated that this is an affirmative defense.  In an affirmative defense, the defendant has the burden to prove the defense by a preponderance of evidence.  However, the above Model Jury instructions clearly state that the burden is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the use of force by the defendant was not justified.  Thus this is not an affirmative defense and it should have been charged to the Grand Jury.

Defendant provided affidavits or certifications to Mr. Herman for submittal to the grand jury, but Mr. Herman failed to do so.  Defendant had evidence provided to Mr. Herman proving that at the time the complainants claim he was standing at his front door, he was in fact sitting in front of his computer, sending emails to his clients.  These proofs would have established that defendant could not have acted the way the complainants allege.  Also, the record reveals that counsel advised defendant of his right to testify before the grand jury and defendant eagerly decided to do so. Defendant was eager, willing and ready to testify and took the liberty to contact Mr. Dewey multiple times to ask as to when he can testify in the grand jury proceedings. 

However, defendant did not testify to the grand jury due to omissions by Mr. Herman and the acts of the prosecutors and no exculpatory or defenses/justifications/privileges/immunities were ever presented to the grand jurors.  Defendant did not testify regarding the elements of knowledge, purpose, or intent or scienter of the individual offenses.  Should defendant have testified to the grand jury on his alibi and his defenses/justifications, he would have been exonerated of all charges.

POST SALE PROCEDURE FOR MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE CASES

The applicable statutes here are the so called Summary Dispossess Act statutes. The Summary Dispossess Act, N.J.S. 2A:18-53 et seq. was enacted in 1951 and amended in 1983 and 1991.  Since enactment of the Anti-Eviction Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 et seq., the Summary Dispossess Act has been understood to cover the eviction of nonresidential tenants and residential tenants not covered by the Anti-Eviction Act.  This is a very critical issue for the Court to note. Source: STATE OF NEW JERSEY, NEW JERSEY LAW REVISION COMMISSION, Final Report Relating to Landlord and Tenant Law, February 10, 2012.

This Court should also compare the law of the state of New York, where similar process must be followed, i.e., the issue of actual possession must be decided by a Law Division Judge, after a new owner (a tax sale purchaser) has met the conditions for taking possession.  The court should note here that ATF and Robert Del Vechhio did not take possession of the property;  they only wanted to remove Dr. Stephanatos from the property.  They immediately sold the property for $330,000 to a third party.  The Court should note that the conspirators could have sold the property without violently removing Dr. Stephanatos from his home and place of business.

Based on New Jersey and New York law, including the law of all other states, to remove a person in actual possession, the owner must occupy the premises himself (this was not the case here as ATF did not take actual possession of the premises and only took constructive possession) or no rent was being paid or for breach of the peace.  In other words, only after they met few exceptions (such as not paying rent, etc.) and through an Order from a Law Division Judge could have allowed these defendants to enter Dr. Stephanatos’ property and to remove him from his dwelling in tax lien cases.

The defendants intentionally did not follow the Anti-Eviction Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 et seq., and the Summary Dispossess Act, N.J.S. 2A:18-53 et seq. and refused to follow the Unlawful and Forceful Entry and Detainer statutes of the state of New Jersey, and they willfully lied to the Mercer County Clerk in May 2011 that there were no persons in the premises (see Exhibit C for the willful misrepresentation by Robert Del Vecchio that no persons with possessory interests were present at the residence of Dr. Stephanatos) protected by either the Anti-Eviction Act N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 et seq., or the Summary Dispossess Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53 et seq. 

These criminals[5] (especially Robert Del Vecchio, Jr., Esq and Robert Del Vecchio, Sr., Esq who are both lawyers in New Jersey) knew that this was a residential property and this was not a mortgage foreclosure case and they knew that they had to comply with the Unlawful Entry and Wrongful Entry statutes – but they knowingly decided not to comply with the state law.  This way they managed to fool the sheriff (there is significant evidence, however, that Del Vecchio, D’Agostino and Lucas formed a conspiracy to violate the legal rights of the Plaintiff) to perform an unlawful search and unlawful entry and to forcefully remove Dr. Stephanatos from his lawfully-occupied residence on June 28, 2011.

State statute N.J.S.A. 2A:18-57 requires that a judgment of possession must be issued by a Law Division judge, followed by a warrant for removal.  Specifically, state law requires that a Warrant for Removal must be obtained by a Law Division judge (see N.J.S.A. 2A:18-57 for non-leaseholders and N.J.S.A. 2A:42-10.1 for leaseholders)).

2009 New Jersey Code

TITLE 2A - ADMINISTRATION OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE

Section 2A:18

2A:18-57.  Judgment for possession;  warrant for removal;  issuance

    If no sufficient cause is shown to the contrary when the action comes on for  trial, the court shall issue its warrant to any officer of the court, commanding him to remove all persons from the premises, and to put the claimant  into full possession thereof, and to levy and make the costs out of the goods  and chattels of the person in possession.

    No warrant of removal shall issue until the expiration of 3 days after entry  of judgment for possession, except as provided for in chapter 42 of this  Title.

L.1951 (1st SS), c.344; amended by L.1979, c. 392, s. 1, eff. Feb. 6, 1980.

Furthermore, Section 2 of P.L.1974, c.47 (C.2A:42-10.16) reads as follows:

    2. In any proceeding for the summary dispossession of a tenant, warrant for possession issued by a court of appropriate jurisdiction:    a. Shall include a notice to the tenant of any right to apply to the court for a stay of execution of the warrant, together with a notice advising that the tenant may be eligible for temporary housing assistance or other social services and that the tenant should contact the appropriate county welfare  …

No such notice was provided in the Writ of Possession issued by a Clerk of Mercer County (again, that Mercer County court had no jurisdiction over property that is located in other counties).

The defendants fraudulently and willfully refused to obtain such judgment of possession from a Law Division judge and a warrant for removal and instead provided a certification to a Clerk of the Mercer County that no persons with possessory interests were present, when in fact Plaintiff was in actual peaceful possession continuously since 1995.

We are providing below a summary from a document entitled Practical Guide to Foreclosures and Foreclosure Alternatives, by Ralph F. Casale, Esq., 2008, 290 Route 46 West, Denville, New Jersey 07834 to show to this Court that in order for a person to be evicted the new owner must initiate a legal process and is required to obtain a Judgment of Possession, followed by a Writ of Possession. 

The procedure listed below is for mortgage foreclosures and subsequent evictions.  The present case is a so-called tax-lien foreclosure.  In the present case, the conspirators were mandated to initiate eviction proceedings and obtain a Judgment for Possession followed by a Warrant for Possession or Warrant for Removal, but they never did.  There is not record that an eviction proceeding ever took place and the State has not (and cannot) provide with any proof that a Judgment for Possession legal proceeding ever took place.  As we have explained to this Court, the circumvention of the New Jersey legal procedures was part of the conspiracy scheme to defraud homeowners of their properties.

In a mortgage foreclosure case, if the lender is the successful bidder, the sheriff will provide a deed in due course which is then recorded. The lender then is burdened with selling the premises which obviously incurs more time and costs. The premises must be brought to saleable condition, there are the usual realtor commissions, transfer taxes and if not current, past due real estate taxes and possibly condominium association fees.

More often than not the former borrowers still occupy the premises. In order to sell and close the property must be vacant. The lender can try to persuade the borrowers to vacate the premises voluntarily. Many lenders try to provide “cash for keys”.  Sometimes the incentive of a cash payment from the lender is enough to convince the borrowers to vacate. Most often however, the lender must evict the occupant of the premises. If the occupants are the former borrowers, the process is accomplished through a Judgment of Possession, followed by a Writ of Possession and affected through the sheriff of the county. The process usually takes an additional three to six months. The lender can expect the borrower to apply to the court for the extension of the eviction for a variety of reason and the courts are generally very liberal in extending the date. Once the final eviction date is established, the lender must provide a representative at the designate time at the property along with a locksmith and mover. The sheriff only attends the eviction to insure and peaceful turnover of the property.  The sheriff is not supposed to do anything and must wait for the arrival of the owner or its representative.

If the premises are occupied by persons other than the borrowers or their relatives, the eviction process is subject to applicable tenancy laws.  This is also crucial for this Court to note, as a tenant, Metropolitan Environmental Services, was present at the premises.  New Jersey has what is generally referred to as an anti-eviction statute. The statute’s effect is that as long as a (tenant( pays the rent, the landlord cannot evict the tenant.  There must be a reason for the tenant to be evicted.  There are several steps the lender and its attorney must follow to eventually effect an eviction.  Suffice it to say that the process is much slower than the eviction of the former borrowers.  Several legal issues arise.  Are the premises properly registered with the municipality; what can the lender/landlord reasonably demand as monthly rent; should the lender offer a lease and if so, on what terms; if the property is a multi-family, is it in compliance with applicable state regulations effecting multi-family dwellings; what if the property is a FHA Section 8 premises? Clearly the lender must be in close communication with its attorney who hopefully is well versed in this area of the law. Without going into all the intricacies of the process, assuming the tenant does not pay the rent, a tenancy action is instituted which will eventually result in a Warrant for Removal which is effected by a constable along with a representative of the lender/landlord, locksmith and mover.

Source: Practical Guide to Foreclosures and Foreclosure Alternatives, by Ralph F. Casale, Esq., 2008, 290 Route 46 West, Denville, New Jersey 07834.

Similar procedure is followed in tax lien foreclosure case, with the significant difference that in residential properties (such as the one at hand) instead of a Writ of Possession, the Sheriff must obtain a Warrant.  Here, the Sheriff failed to obtain a Warrant.

The application of the New Jersey land possession statutes is explained in detail in Gary LEVIN and Donna Levin, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Adrian LYNN, et al., 310 N.J. Super. 177, decided April 1998, Appellate Division A-1537-96T2.

“The references therein, to N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53 et seq. and N.J.S.A. 2A:39-2 et seq., are to the statutory provisions concerning, respectively, summary dispossess proceedings instituted in the Special Civil Part, and Superior Court actions to establish either title or the right to possession of real property, and the intent of those amendments is clearly to prohibit a landlord or anyone else from taking possession of residential premises without following judicial procedures.   In the case of a summary dispossess proceeding (which is the method employed by the Millers to obtain a judgment of possession against plaintiffs here) that procedure includes the landlord's obtaining of a warrant for possession.   N.J.S.A. 2A:18-57.   And, it should be noted that in any action seeking possession of a residential property, the issuance of that warrant can be delayed, for good cause, for as long as six months:

[I]n any action brought by a landlord against a tenant to recover possession of premises or unit used for dwelling purposes, to which this act is applicable, whether by summary dispossess proceedings, civil action for the possession of land, or otherwise, the judge of the court having jurisdiction shall use sound discretion in the issuance of a warrant or writ for removal or writ of possession, and if it shall appear that by the issuance of the warrant or writ the tenant will suffer hardship because of the unavailability of other dwelling accommodations the judge may stay the issuance of the warrant or writ and cause the same to issue at such time as he shall deem proper under the circumstances, but in no case shall such judge stay the issuance of any such warrant or writ for possession for a longer period than 6 months after the date of entry of judgment of possession․

[N.J.S.A. 2A:42-10.6.]”

These practices by these convicted criminals have been criticized by the state of New Jersey and the Public Advocate Division.  See for example the following excerpt from the “Toolkit for Tenants Living in Foreclosed Properties”, published by the Department of the Public Advocate, Trenton, NJ 08625, dated March 2010:

Courts and Sheriffs In addition to owners and those who work for them, the courts and sheriff officers sometimes mistakenly target protected tenants during the foreclosure process. The writs of execution and final foreclosure judgments are drafted by the attorneys for the lenders. The attorneys sometimes use language in court papers that cause problems because it seems to cover tenants (for example, “and any and all persons occupying said premises”). Other times attorneys specifically name tenants and certify (swear to the court) that those tenants are not covered by the Anti-Eviction Act.  This is especially problematic because tenants often do not have the opportunity to demonstrate that they are in fact legitimate tenants until after the removal has already been ordered by the court and scheduled by the sheriff. If a court order specifically names a tenant to be removed, the sheriff must evict that person. Sometimes, however, sheriffs read the language in the order and believe that they must evict everyone. Also, some notices that sheriffs create and post on property include language, such as “occupants” instead of “owners,” that appears to include tenants. The Attorney General distributed a memo to sheriffs regarding the rights of tenants living in foreclosed properties.

Thus, the judges and the sheriff knew of the practices of Del Vecchio and ATF; yet, the sheriff employees acted as agents for Del Vecchio and intentionally violated Dr. Stephanatos’ possessory rights, including a host of other offenses.  Dr. Stephanatos had informed the two judges and the sheriff of these practices by Del Vecchio and ATF and had alerted the authorities (the sheriff, the governor, the local senator O’Toole, etc.) that these individuals are breaking a host of state and federal laws.  Dr. Stephanatos also filed appeals and suits to vacate the tax deed. 

Dr. Stephanatos also had significant possessory interest, including the filing of a Suit to Vacate the Tax Deed, the filing of two appeals, the possession of a business in the premises, and the right to buy back the rights to the property. See N.J.S.A. 54:5-104.100.  This state law is consistent with the legislative findings in N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1a.   See also Royal Tax Lien Services, LLC v Morodan, Appellate Division, Docket No. A-1211-14T3, July 20, 2015 wherein the court stated:

On the other hand, the tax sale laws and our court rules are designed to allow owners to redeem their properties where possible, and to receive relief from inequitable judgments. The analysis found in I.E. clearly favors defendants, and although not binding upon us, it clearly and convincingly outlines the equitable weight that should be accorded to a defendant’s concerns in this scenario, the consequences of which are draconian.

The equities at stake can vary when the redemption value is disproportionately low relative to the owner's equity in the property. As the court stated in I.E.'s, LLC v. Simmons, 392 N.J. Super. 520, 536 (Law Div. 2006), the law results in a "harshness of the tax sale certificate proceedings in this State, where people with substantial equity in a property, for whatever reason, fail to pay property taxes and thereafter default in the tax sale certificate foreclosure proceedings."

In that case, the redemption amount was $22,837.50 and the property's value was $275,000. Ibid. That disparity is similar in magnitude to the disparity in this case. That opinion also stated:

Until the Legislature devises a better system, courts of equity must do their best to balance the equities, taking into account the necessity of allowing the transfer of clear title and the need to compel the payment of property taxes against the necessity of ameliorating, in appropriate circumstances, the onerous impact of the procedure in circumstances where the party has remained in possession of the property and has substantial equity in it.

[Id. at 537.]

This Court should also compare the law of the state of New York, where similar process must be followed, i.e., the issue of possession must be decided by a Law Division judge:

NEW YORK STATE REAL PROPERTY ACTIONS AND PROCEEDINGS LAW(RPAPL) 

ARTICLE 7

SUMMARY PROCEEDING TO RECOVER POSSESSION OF REAL PROPERTY

Sec. 713. GROUNDS WHERE NO LANDLORD-TENANT RELATIONSHIP EXISTS.

A special proceeding may be maintained under this article after a ten-day notice to quit has been served upon the respondent in the manner prescribed in section 735, upon the following grounds:

1.   The property has been sold by virtue of an execution against him or a person under whom he claims and a title under the sale has been perfected.

2.   He occupies or holds the property under an agreement with the owner to occupy and cultivate it upon shares or for a share of the crops and the time fixed in the agreement for his occupancy has expired.

3.   He or the person to whom he has succeeded has intruded into or squatted upon the property without the permission of the person entitled to possession and the occupancy has continued without permission or permission has been revoked  and notice of the revocation given to the person to be  removed.

4.   The property has been sold for unpaid taxes and a tax deed  has been executed and delivered to the purchaser and he or  any subsequent grantee, distributee or devisee claiming  title through such purchaser has complied with all  provisions of law precedent to the right to possession and  the time of redemption by the former owner or occupant has  expired.

5.   The property has been sold in foreclosure and either the deed delivered pursuant to such sale, or a copy of such  deed, certified as provided in the civil practice law and  rules, has been exhibited to him.

Based on New Jersey and New York law, including the law of all other states, to remove a person in possession, the owner must occupy the premises himself (this was not the case here) or no rent was being paid or for breach of the peace.  In other words, only after they met few exceptions (such as not paying rent, etc.) and through an Order from a Law Division Judge could have allowed these defendants to enter Dr. Stephanatos’ property and to remove him from his dwelling.  They did not follow the Wrongful Entry and Detainer Act and the Anti-Eviction Act, or the Summary Dispossess Act and they willfully lied to the Mercer County Clerk in May 2011 that there were no tenants in the premises (see Exhibit B in Attachment 7 for the willful misrepresentation by Robert Del Vecchio that no tenants were present at the residence of Dr. Stephanatos and that Dr. Stephanatos had no possessory interests in his home). 

The defendants also knew that the Wrongful or Unlawful Entry statutes protect Plaintiff’s right to remain in possession of his residence.  Specifically, N.J.S.A. 2A:39-7 says that title shall not be an issue since Plaintiff was in continuous possession of his residence for 16 years.

N.J.S.A. 2A:39-7 Title not inquired into; defense of 3 years possession

Title shall not be an issue in any action commenced under this chapter. 3 years peaceable possession by the defendant shall be a defense to the action.

Defendants Del Vecchio and ATF failed to disclose these statutes to the sheriff that prevent the sheriff from evicting a person from a residential property without a Warrant for Removal.  This way they managed to fool the sheriff to perform an unlawful search and unlawful entry and to forcefully remove Dr. Stephanatos from his lawfully-occupied residence on June 28, 2011.  The New Jersey Law clearly says that these individuals can be charged with criminal trespass, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3, including many other criminal charges, such as Theft by Unlawful Taking, Robbery, Burglary, etc.

Dr. Stephanatos’ possessory interest in his home could not have been violated by the defendants without the very specific legal process of N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53 et seq.[1]  However, the defendants willfully violated Dr. Stephanatos’ legal rights

It is very crucial for this Court to understand that the conspirators never instituted such land possession proceedings before any court of competent jurisdiction.  It is mandatory that summary dispossess proceedings, civil action for the possession of land, or otherwise be held by the conspirators, in accordance with New Jersey law, but the conspirators intentionally did not do that.  These convicted criminals simply drafted the document entitled “Final Judgment” and they gave it to a Judge in Mercer County (Judge Jacobson) to sign the two pages.  This was part of the conspiratory scheme of these criminals, i.e., to file false certifications with the courts, to mislead the courts in signing judgements of possession without holding any hearing or any New Jersey law-mandated legal process.  The State has not and cannot provide ANY legal proceedings to this Court where the Judgment of Possession was adjudicated.  And certainly cannot provide any evidence regarding such proceedings against Metropolitan Environmental Services, a proper and legal tenant of the 687 Indian Road premises.

Importantly, the New Jersey law allows for extension of the eviction time, even in case where a valid Writ was issued.  See N.J.S.A. 2A:42-10.6.  Here, the Defendant called and wrote and pled with the conspirators and Judge McVeigh to stop the illegal onslaught and to stay the illegal eviction, but to no avail.  Judge McVeigh sure should have known that no eviction hearings (Judgment of Possession) were ever held.  She should have known that what the conspirators were doing was illegal;  she could not have been that incompetent of a judge.  Perhaps she is an incompetent judge, as she also failed to consider defendant’s full equity in his home (as is mandated by New Jersey case law (see Royal Tax Lien Services, LLC v Morodan, Appellate Division, Docket No. A-6030-12T1, July 3, 2014)) and she never conducted a bench trial to determine the facts consistent with Rule 1:7-4(a). 

Judge Jacobson in Mercer County simply issued a judgment against defendant based on the statements of the conspirators Robert Del Vecchio and American Tax Funding (ATF).  The entire panorama of circumstances indicate that defendant was denied due process.  There are issues and defenses of entrapment, duress and improper government conduct.

It is the Defendant’s position that New Jersey’s Anti-Eviction Act (N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 et seq.) and New Jersey’s Foreclosure Fairness Act (N.J.S.A. 2A:50-69 thru 72) were violated by the State’s and conspirators’ actions in this case as they evicted a legal tenant of the premises, Metropolitan Environmental Services.  The fraudulently obtained Writ of Possession cited by the State, does not include Metropolitan Environmental Services and the Defendant had the right to defend his business from illegal eviction.  Even more importantly, State Law requires a Warrant for eviction of a residential tenant.

A JUDGMENT RENDERED WITHOUT PROPER SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION IS VOID.  SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION CANNOT BE WAIVED BY THE PARTIES OR OTHERWISE AVOIDED

JURISDICTION OF THE NEW JERSEY COURTS

To further prove that a Chancery Court has no subject matter jurisdiction over land possession issues, here is the jurisdiction of the New Jersey courts, as is provided at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/civil/.  As you can see, the Chancery Court has no Jurisdiction over property possession issues.  On the other hand, the Law Division handles either the Landlord-Tenant issues (to summary dispossession actions) or actions for possession of real estate (unlawful detainer/writ of possession).  This is very critical information, as you can imagine.

Superior Court, Law Division, Special Civil Part

The Special Civil Part handles claims for monetary damages of $15,000 or less (unless the overage is waived) and unlawful detainer actions. Case types typically filed in the Special Civil Part are damage claims arising from contract, consumer debt, auto negligence property damage, and statutory penalty enforcement, and non-monetary matters such as writs of replevins and actions for possession of real estate (unlawful detainer/writ of possession). Judges without a jury typically adjudicate Special Civil Part cases. There are approximately 406,000 cases filed in the Special Civil Part each year.

The Special Civil Part, Small Claims Section handles cases in which the demand is $3,000 or less and actions for the return of all or part of a security deposit when the amount does not exceed $5000. Annually, approximately 35,000 cases are filed with the Small Claims section.

The Special Civil Part, Landlord - Tenant Section has limited, special jurisdiction. It is limited to summary dispossession actions in which the dispute arise out of a landlord - tenant relationship. The only relief available is whether possession is returned to the landlord with the tenant’s summary removal from the property. Annually, approximately 170,000 cases are filed with the Landlord-Tenant section.

For more information on Special Civil Part click here.

Superior Court, Chancery Division, General Equity

Chancery Division, General Equity handle claims for non-monetary relief, such as restrictive covenant enforcement, labor injunctions, foreclosures, and corporation or partnership governance disputes. A judge without a jury tries General Equity cases. There are approximately 8,900 cases filed in General Equity each year.

http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/civil/

The above prove beyond any doubt that the Chancery Judge had no jurisdiction over the possession issue and any orders issued by a court devoid of subject matter jurisdiction are void and cannot be enforced.  The worst part here is that this “adjudged” possession judgment was never adjudicated, as there was never a hearing or trial ever took place.  The convicted conspirators simply wrote that language into a “final judgment” issued in May 2011 and gave it to a Chancery judge in another county, Mercer County, to sign it.  Then they obtained an ex-parte Writ of Possession from a Clerk of Mercer County (note that the subject property was located in Passaic County, and the Mercer County Clerk had no jurisdiction over the Defendant’s property located in Passaic County). 

Subject matter jurisdiction can neither be conferred by agreement of the parties nor waived as a defense, and a court must dismiss the matter if it determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Macysyn v. Hensler, 329 N.J. Super. 476, 481 (App. Div. 2000) (indicating that such a motion can be made "at any time"); see also R. 4:6-7; Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 1 on R. 4:6-7 (2015).

As defined by our Supreme Court in James v. Francesco, 61 N.J. 480, 485 (1972), "a judgment is void if there has been a failure to comply with a requirement which is a condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction by the court." A void judgment is one rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction with regard to the party against whom it is rendered or lacking jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action, Restatement, Judgments (2d) Section 1 pp 30-33 (1982), and it may be set aside without the need of showing a meritorious defense. See Jameson v. Great Atlantic, 363 N.J. Super. 419, 425 (App. Div. 2003).  New Century Financial Services, Inc. v. Suk Cha Carrero, Appellate Division, Superior Court, February 2007, Docket No. A-3926-05T23926-05T2. 

Thus, the “final judgment cited by the State was void, not voidable.  It had no legal effect whatsoever.  Thus, any Writ issued pursuant to such void judgment was also void, of no legal effect.

A judgment is void for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the court has no authority to adjudicate the controversy. See Bank v. Kim, 361 N.J. Super. 331, 339 (App. Div. 2003) (mortgage foreclosure judgment void in violation of bankruptcy automatic stay).   Here, the Chancery court had no subject matter jurisdiction over the property possession issue and thus any order issued by that court was void, a legal nullity.

New Jersey Court Rule 1:13 Miscellaneous Rules as to Procedure

1:13-4. Transfer of Actions

·                     (a) On Motion. Subject to the right to be prosecuted by indictment, if any court is without jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action or issue therein or if there has been an inability to serve a party without whom the action cannot proceed as provided by R. 4:28-1, it shall, on motion or on its own initiative, order the action, with the record and all papers on file, transferred to the proper court or administrative agency, if any, in the State. The action shall then be proceeded upon as if it had been originally commenced in that court or agency.

4:6-2. How Presented

Every defense, legal or equitable, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party complaint shall be asserted in the answer thereto, except that the following defenses, unless otherwise provided by R. 4:6-3, may at the option of the pleader be made by motion, with briefs: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (b) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (c) insufficiency of process, (d) insufficiency of service of process, (e) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (f) failure to join a party without whom the action cannot proceed, as provided by R. 4:28-1. If a motion is made raising any of these defenses, it shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is to be made. No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses in an answer or motion. Special appearances are superseded. If, on a motion to dismiss based on the defense numbered (e), matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided by R. 4:46, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material pertinent to such a motion.

4:6-7. Waiver or Preservation of Defenses

Defenses (b) (c) and (d) in R. 4:6-2 are waived if not raised by motion pursuant to R. 4:6-3 or if omitted from a previously made motion to which R. 4:6-6 is applicable. Defenses (e) and (f) and an objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim may be made in any pleading permitted or ordered, or by motion for summary judgment or at the trial on the merits. Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the matter except as otherwise provided by R. 1:13-4.

Based on these above Court Rules, the Chancery Judge should have transferred the land possession issue to the Law Division.  But she failed to do so and she in fact did not even hold a hearing to adjudicate the possession.  What a rotten and corrupt to the bone “judge”.

HOW THE CONSPIRATORS MANAGED TO FOOL (OR CONSPIRED WITH) THE COURTS

Despite the luck of any fact finding by Judge McVeigh (Judge McVeigh never conducted a bench trial to determine the facts consistent with Rule 1:7-4(a)), on May 13, 2011, the Mercer County Honorable Mary C. Jacobson, P.J.Ch., entered a “final judgment” against defendant in favor of American Tax Funding, LLC (“ATFH”). (Final Judgment annexed at Da44-46) upon the presentation to that court of a form that had been prepared by the conspirator Robert Del Vecchio. 

That form includes language “AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the plaintiff dully recover against the said defendant …possession of the premises… and that a Writ of Possession issue thereon”. 

Contrary to what the conspirators wrote in this form and presented to a Mercer County Court for signing, there was never an adjudication of the possession of the premises.  There is no judicial record that the State can provide that indicates that such possession litigation ever took place.  As was stated in the previous section, the Chancery Court had no subject matter jurisdiction over the property possession issue and it could not have been adjudicated by that court.  This fact alone provides clear and convincing evidence of a conspiracy between McVeigh and the convicted criminals (Robert Del Vecchio, ATF, and others) to defraud the Defendant of his property and business.

Basically the conspirators presented to the Mercer County court a form that has adjudicated both the ownership issue and the possession issue.  The conspirators managed to fool the Mercer County court clerk by providing this fraudulently prepared form that states that the possession issue has been adjudged by the Passaic County Chancery Court.  Basically, the conspirators took advantage of the dysfunctional legal system of New Jersey where one court does the fact finding and another court signs the orders (and in this instant case, Judge McVeigh of Passaic County Chancery Court, never held any fact finding and application of the facts to the law session in violation of Rule 1:7-4(a).  The conspirator Robert Del Vecchio took full advantage of this confusion and managed to full the court system.

This final judgment also contains the language “This judgment shall not affect the rights of any person protected by the New Jersey Tenant Anti-Eviction Act (N.J.S.A, 2A:18-61.1 et seq.)” (Da45).  The significance of this clause is discussed in the Motion to Change Venue brief and it is applicable here as Defendant’s businesses (Metropolitan Environmental Services and Metropolitan Environmental Services, PC) were tenants at that property and could not have been evicted without legal process.  The Writ of Possession fraudulently obtained by the conspirator Robert Del Vecchio did not include Metropolitan Environmental Services.  However, the Passaic County Sheriff did evict these business tenants without having a Writ of Removal or a Warrant for Removal.  This is an undeniable fact and proves beyond any doubt that the sheriff employees did violate the Defendant’s possessory rights and caused massive economic and non-economic injuries in the process.

THE PROSECUTOR CONTINUES TO LIE AND MISLEAD THIS HONORABLE COURT BY STATING THAT LUCAS AND D’AGOSTINO WERE POLICE OFFICERS WHEN IN FACT THEY WERE SHERIFF OFFICERS

The prosecutor continues to refer to the sheriff officers as police officers, in a willful attempt to mislead this Court the same way the prosecutor mislead the Grand Jury.  The New Jersey Criminal Code clearly distinguishes between a police officer and a sheriff officer.   As proof that the 2C:12-1b(9) statutes intended to protect law enforcement officers in the performance of the police duties and not to protect sheriff officers, the Court should take a look at the statute 2C:12-1b(5).  This is the statute that addresses the assault on law enforcement officer or public employee, such a sheriff.  

Under this statute, the assault upon a law enforcement officer is included under 2C:12-1b(5)(a): Any law enforcement officer acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of his authority or because of his status as a law enforcement officer.

By contrast the assault on a sheriff officer is included under section 2C:12-1b(5)(h): Any … sheriff, undersheriff, or sheriff’s officer acting in the performance of his duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of his authority.

Thus, the legislature has clearly distinguished between a law enforcement officer and a sheriff officer.  These two groups of employees were not meant to be considered one and the same.  This is the reason that sheriff officers who perform civil process, wear different colored uniforms than the law enforcement officers.  Even within the Sheriff’s department, there are different groups of sheriff’s employees identified as law enforcement group, civil service group, K-9 group, etc. and they in fact wear different color uniforms to make that distinction as a law enforcement versus non-law enforcement.  Based on their testimony, Lucas and D’Agostino were employees working in the civil process division and wearing light blue uniforms and not the dark blue uniforms.

We believe that this analysis conclusively proves that the statute 2C:12-1b(9) does not include sheriff employees, but it was intended to protect police officers in their law enforcement duties.  The state legislature would have most likely included the sheriff employees in this statute and not simply leave it open to interpretation or ambiguity.

The prosecutor, fully aware that the above statute is meant to protect police officers and not sheriff officers, has fraudulently represented throughout his response brief that the sheriff’s process servers were in fact police officers.  The same fraudulent presentation was made to the Grand Jury and mislead the jurors and tainted the proceedings.

These charges under 2C:12-1b(9) must be dismissed with prejudice for the reasons stated above as Lucas and D’Agostino were not police officers but sheriff officers.

THE PROSECUTOR CONTINUES TO LIE AND MISLEAD THIS HONORABLE COURT BY STATING THAT LUCAS AND D’AGOSTINO HAD THE AUTHORITY TO EVICT BOTH THE DEFENDANT AND THE BUSINESS TENANT

The Prosecutor is lying to the Court by stating in his response brief that the sheriff officers had a Writ of Possession that included the Defendant’s business.  However, the Writ of Possession makes no reference to Defendant’s business, Metropolitan Environmental Services, that was a legal tenant of the premises. 

It is the Defendant’s position that New Jersey’s Anti-Eviction Act (N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 et seq.) and New Jersey’s Foreclosure Fairness Act (N.J.S.A. 2A:50-69 thru 72) were violated by the Sheriff’s and conspirators’ actions in this case as they evicted a legal tenant of the premises, Metropolitan Environmental Services.  The alleged Writ of Possession cited by the State, does not include Metropolitan Environmental Services and the Defendant had the right to defend his business from illegal eviction. 

NO JUDGMENT OF POSSESSION OR EVICTION PROCEEDINGS WERE EVER HELD IN FRONT OF A LAW DIVISION COURT AS IS REQUIRED BY NEW JERSEY LAW.

The State continues to make fraudulent representations to this Court that somehow a “court-ordered Writ of Possession” was issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, when in fact no Judgement of Possession was ever adjudicated and so such writ was ever issued by a competent court  as there was never an eviction action instituted against the Defendant by the conspirators.  This is extremely crucial for this Court to understand.

In is response, the State has failed to provide to this Court ANY transcripts of any legal process relating to the issue of the adjudication of the eviction of the Defendant from his fully-owned property (the Defendant had 100 percent equity in his home).  Absolutely no evidence of any eviction process exists, as no such action was brought by the conspirators before a court of competent jurisdiction and no hearing or legal process ever took place in direct violation of State Constitutional and Statutory Laws.  We explain below.

As we wrote in our Omnibus Motions Brief, the conspirators Robert Del Vecchio, American Tax Funding, et al. never applied to the Chancery Court or a Law Division Court for an eviction judgement (also called Judgement for Possession).  This is critical for this Court to understand.  After the Defendant refused to redeem the illegal tax sale certificate obtained by the conspirators, the Chancery Court transferred the title of his 687 Indian Road property (fully owned by the Defendant) to the conspirators via a so-called Tax Deed.  This occurred prior to May 13, 2011.  No further hearings or legal process occurred regarding the possession of the property that was the home and the place of business of the Defendant.  The Court must note that New Jersey Law prohibits the self-eviction from residential properties and provides that no eviction process will be adjudicated unless the owner follows notice and other requirements found in the New Jersey’s Anti-Eviction Act (N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 et seq.) and New Jersey’s Foreclosure Fairness Act (N.J.S.A. 2A:50-69 thru 72.

The New Jersey law that was intentionally violated by the State, the County and the conspirators, provides as follows:

N.J.S.A. 2A:39-1.   No person shall enter upon or into any real property ․ and detain and hold the same, except where entry is given by law, and then only in a peaceable manner.   With regard to any real property occupied solely as a residence by the party in possession, such entry shall not be made in any manner without the consent of the party in possession unless the entry and detention is made pursuant to legal process as set out in N.J.S. 2A:18-53 et seq. or 2A:35-1 et seq.

Specifically, for removing a person from a residential property, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-57 requires that a judgment of possession must be issued by a Law Division Judge, followed by a Warrant for Removal.  State law also mandates that a notice be provided to the person in possession that s/he has the right to apply to the court for a stay of execution of the warrant, along with other notifications.

The application of these statutes is explained in detail in Gary LEVIN and Donna Levin, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Adrian LYNN, et al., 310 N.J. Super. 177, decided April 1998, Appellate Division A-1537-96T2.

“The references therein, to N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53 et seq. and N.J.S.A. 2A:39-2 et seq., are to the statutory provisions concerning, respectively, summary dispossess proceedings instituted in the Special Civil Part, and Superior Court actions to establish either title or the right to possession of real property, and the intent of those amendments is clearly to prohibit a landlord or anyone else from taking possession of residential premises without following judicial procedures.   In the case of a summary dispossess proceeding (which is the method employed by the Millers to obtain a judgment of possession against plaintiffs here) that procedure includes the landlord's obtaining of a warrant for possession.   N.J.S.A. 2A:18-57.   And, it should be noted that in any action seeking possession of a residential property, the issuance of that warrant can be delayed, for good cause, for as long as six months:

[I]n any action brought by a landlord against a tenant to recover possession of premises or unit used for dwelling purposes, to which this act is applicable, whether by summary dispossess proceedings, civil action for the possession of land, or otherwise, the judge of the court having jurisdiction shall use sound discretion in the issuance of a warrant or writ for removal or writ of possession, and if it shall appear that by the issuance of the warrant or writ the tenant will suffer hardship because of the unavailability of other dwelling accommodations the judge may stay the issuance of the warrant or writ and cause the same to issue at such time as he shall deem proper under the circumstances, but in no case shall such judge stay the issuance of any such warrant or writ for possession for a longer period than 6 months after the date of entry of judgment of possession․

[N.J.S.A. 2A:42-10.6.]”

At that time, the Defendant filed two Appeals and a Suit to Vacate the Tax Deed based on the illegal activities of the conspirators.

The State continues to make fraudulent representations to this Court that somehow a “court-ordered Writ of Possession” was issued by a court of competent jurisdiction.  Here is what the New Jersey statutes say under Article 3, Actions for Possession:

§ 2A:42-10.6. Judge to use sound discretion in issuing warrants or writs for removal or writs of possession; stay of issuance;limitation

Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, in any action brought by a landlord against a tenant to recover possession of premises or unit used for dwelling purposes, to which this act is applicable, whether by summary dispossess proceedings, civil action for the possession of land, or otherwise, the judge of the court having jurisdiction shall use sound discretion in the issuance of a warrant or writ for removal or writ of possession, and if it shall appear that by the

issuance of the warrant or writ the tenant will suffer hardship because of the unavailability of other dwelling accommodations the judge may stay the issuance of the warrant or writ and cause the same to issue at such time as he shall deem proper under the circumstances, but in no case shall such judge stay the issuance of any such warrant or writ for possession

for a longer period than 6 months after the date of entry of the judgment of possession;

Despite the luck of any fact finding by Judge McVeigh (Judge McVeigh never conducted a bench trial to determine the facts consistent with Rule 1:7-4(a)), on May 13, 2011, the Mercer County Honorable Mary C. Jacobson, P.J.Ch., entered a “final judgment” against defendant in favor of American Tax Funding, LLC (“ATFH”). (Final Judgment annexed at Da44-46) upon the presentation to that court of a form that had been prepared by the conspirator Robert Del Vecchio.  That form includes language “AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the plaintiff dully recover against the said defendant …possession of the premises… and that a Writ of Possession issue thereon”.  Contrary to what the conspirators wrote in this form and presented to a Mercer County Court for signing, there was never an adjudication of the possession of the property.  There is no judicial record that the State can provide that indicates that such possession litigation ever took place.  Basically the conspirators presented to the Mercer County court a standard form that has adjudicated both the ownership issue and the possession issue and some blanks are filled out- these forms are only applicable to mortgage foreclosure cases and not to a tax lien case where Defendant had full ownership of the property and where the alleged tax owed was a small fraction of the value of the property.  The conspirators managed to fool the Mercer County court clerk by providing this fraudulently prepared form that states that the possession issue has been adjudged by the Passaic County Chancery Court.  Basically the conspirators took advantage of the dysfunctional legal system of New Jersey where one court does the fact finding and another court signs the orders.  The conspirator Robert Del Vecchio took full advantage of this confusion and managed to full the court system.

This final judgment also contains the language “This judgment shall not affect the rights of any person protected by the New Jersey Tenant Anti-Eviction Act (N.J.S.A, 2A:18-61.1 et seq.)” (Da45).  The significance of this clause is discussed in the Motion to Change Venue brief. 

This Court should understand that in every property, there are two titles: a possessory title and a legal (ownership) title.  The above judgment (fraudulent or not), only covers the ownership and not possession of a property.  The possession of a property must be decided under the provisions of the Unlawful Entry and Detainer state law (see N.J.S.A. 2A:18-57, New Jersey’s Anti-Eviction Act (N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 et seq.) and New Jersey’s Foreclosure Fairness Act (N.J.S.A. 2A:50-69 thru 72).  The new owner must file an eviction suit against the defendant and must state the reasons for the eviction and must comply with pre-eviction notices.  An owner cannot simply self-evict a person by providing self-certification; however, this is what these conspirators and the state and county employees did here and violated the possessory rights of the Defendant as are guaranteed by the State Constitution and by State Laws.  This is very crucial for the Court to understand.

Robert A. Del Vecchio is the attorney for the conspirator ATFH, and he submitted a self-Certification (on an ex-parte basis) (filed May 13, 2011), with the Clerk of Mercer County, stating, in part, that:

The aforementioned person is not protected by the provision of the Anti-Eviction Act (the “Act”), as enunciated in the New Jersey Supreme Court Case of Chase Manhattan Bank v. Josephson, since that Act applies to tenants and this defendant is the prior owner of the property.  His ownership rights were foreclosed upon in the above-entitled action. (Da48).  The Court should note that this conspirator wrote that “”His ownership rights were foreclosed”;  however, the issue at hand was the possession of the property and not the ownership. 

This self-certification was an illegal and fraudulent ex-parte certification by the co-conspirator Robert Del Vecchio, on behalf of his client, ATF or ATFH, as Defendant’s businesses were tenants at the property.  This Court should also note that the Chase Manhattan Bank v. Josephson case refers to mortgage foreclosures and not tax lien foreclosures, as the Appellate Division in Royal Tax Lien Services, LLC v Morodan has already ruled that homeowners who hold significant equity into their properties should not lose their home:

Furthermore, as we have indicated earlier, Defendant’s business was a tenant at the subject property and was not subject of the Writ of Possession or any other legal proceeding and could not have been evicted from the premises.  This is crucial evidence before this Court and indicates the magnitude of the conspiracy against the Defendant: 

·                     The State, the County, the Chancery Court and the conspirators also violated the New Jersey Constitution, Article I, paragraph 20 that states that  Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.  Individuals or private corporations shall not be authorized to take private property for public use without just compensation first made to the owners. 

·                     no property possession hearings were ever held;

·                     no bench trial was ever held by McVeigh on any issue before her;

·                     no fact-findings and application of the law to the facts consistent with Rule 1:7-4(a) were ever held;

·                     no pre-eviction notices were ever provided to the Defendant;

·                     no stay of the proceedings were ever held consistent with § 2A:42-10.6;

As the Appellate Division in Royal Tax Lien Services, LLC v Morodan has already ruled, homeowners who hold significant equity into their properties should not lose their home:

Moreover, if the final judgment stands, plaintiff will receive property that, according to defendants, is valued at $650,000 for an approximate $65,000 investment. That is a factor that should have been taken into account when balancing the equities. See I.E.'s, L.L.C. v. Simmons, 392 N.J. Super. 520, 537 (Law Div. 2006) (tax sale certificate foreclosure system can be "Dickensian" where owners hold substantial equity in property. "Until the Legislature devises a better system, courts of equity must do their best to balance the equities, taking into account the necessity of allowing the transfer of clear title and the need to compel the payment of property taxes against the necessity of ameliorating, in appropriate circumstances, the onerous impact of the procedure").  Royal Tax Lien Services, LLC v Morodan, Appellate Division, Docket No. A-6030-12T1, July 3, 2014.

Here, the Chancery Judge McVeigh refused or failed to obey the above State case law.  Her actions violated the rights of the Defendant.  Thus, we have just provided proof that the conspirators and the County employees did in fact violated Defendant’s rights and broke State laws and the State Constitution that expressly prohibits the taking of private property for either private or public use without compensation is provided first.  A fully-owned $500,000-valued property suddenly became the property of a private entity in direct violation of Article I, paragraph 20 of the New Jersey Constitution.  These are disgraceful, as well as illegal acts; the Grand Jury was never informed, as the State and the County made sure that no such evidence was presented to them and prevented the Defendant from testifying and presenting this evidence and other testimony and physical corroborating evidence.

In summary, contrary to the fraudulent assertions of the State and County employees, no court had ever issued a Judgment for Possession as is required prior to obtaining a Writ of Possession.  And no compliance with the eviction notice requirements ever took place.  And the Writ of Possession fraudulently obtained by the conspirator Robert Del Vecchio did not include Metropolitan Environmental Services.  However, the Passaic County Sheriff did evict these business tenants without having a Writ of Removal or a Warrant for Removal.  The State has failed to provide any legal documents that the Judgment of Possession proceedings ever took place.  This proves beyond any doubt that Defendant’s possessory rights were violated by the Sheriff and the conspirators.

THE INDICTMENT MUST BE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE BECAUSE THE FOUR (4) PLUS YEAR CASE DELAY DEPRIVED THE DEFENDANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONALLY-GUARANTEED RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL CAUSING HIM SEVERE ECONOMIC AND NON-ECONOMIC HARDSHIP, LOSS OF EMPLOYMENT AND PROFESSIONAL LICENSES, AND OTHER HARDSHIPS.  BARKER V. WINGO, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. CT. 2182, 2192, 33 L. ED. 101, 117 (1972), STATE V. CAHILL, 213 N.J. 253 (2013), STATE V. JONATHAN E. DOWNS, DOCKET NO. A-0, N.J. SUPERIOR COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FEBRUARY 14, 2014

A defendant has a right to a speedy trial.  U.S. Const., amend.VI; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10.   New Jersey has adopted the four-prong test set forth in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), to determine whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial has been violated. See State v. Szima, 70 N.J. 196, 200-01 (1976).

Courts should assess “four non-exclusive factors” to determine if a defendant’s constitutional speedy trial guarantees have been violated: “length of the delay, reason for the delay, assertion of the right by a defendant, and prejudice to the defendant” Id. at 264.; see also State v. Farrell, 320 N.J. Super. 425 (App. Div. 1999); State v. Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2009).  The four factors in Barker are (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of his or her right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. See Cahill, supra, 213 N.J. at 270. Due to the lack of a specified time period, courts must engage in a balancing process, subject to the specific facts and circumstances of each case.

“There is no set length of time that fixes the point at which delay is excessive.” State v. Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. at 12.  In Cahill, the Court instructed that a gauge to a “presumptively prejudicial” delay is “the amount of time customarily required to dispose of similar charges.”  State v. Cahill, 213 N.J. at 265.

 The Cahill Court referred to New Jersey Supreme Court Chief Justice Wilentz’s July 26, 1984 Directive #1-84 instructing that DWI charges be disposed of in 60 days. Id. at 269. The Court called the 60-day period a goal, not a “bright line rule.” Id. at 270.  However, the Court said, “90 to 120 days should be the norm for disposing of [DWI] cases.” Id. at 274. The Court further noted that a case that “approaches one year” is “presumptively prejudicial.” Id. at 265.  In Cahill, the Court called the 16-month delay “too long.” Id. at 277. Likewise, in State v. Tsetsekas, the Court found that 344 days, “more than five times the stated [Supreme Court] objective” … weighted heavily for the defense. State v. Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. at 11.

In 2014, the New Jersey Joint Committee on Criminal Justice recommended that the Legislature enact a speedy trial act that sets forth time frames in which defendants must be indicted and brought to trial. If the defendant has been released pretrial, the complaint against that person would be dismissed without prejudice to it being refiled at a later time. After indictment, if a case is not tried within 180 days, an incarcerated defendant would be released. The indictment would be dismissed with prejudice after 365 days if the defendant is not in custody.  Source: Report of the Joint Committee on Criminal Justice, March 10, 2014.  Here, there is a more than 1,500 days delay since the indictment in September 2011.  Thus, the case must be dismissed with prejudice.

The Defendant first asserted his right to speedy trial before Judge Filko and Judge Reddin in 2012.  At the time, the defense lawyers indicated to the courts that they should not enforce the Defendant’s right to speedy trial.  In any event, a defendant does not have an obligation to assert his right to a speedy trial because he is under no obligation to bring himself to trial. Id. at 266. Court delays are charged to the State, not to the Defendant. State v. Farrell, 320 N.J. Super. at 450-451.

A mere presence of court backlog or overcrowded case load is insufficient to justify delay by prosecution. United States v. Goeltz, 513 F. 2d 193, 197, (10th cir. 1975).  Here, this Court took almost 3 years to decide a Motion to Change Venue, instead of deciding it within 30 days or less.  These delays cannot possibly be attributed to the Defendant.  To the extent that the Defendant's counsel waived time or requested continuances, this would not be attributed to Defendant, due to counsel's actions contradicting the best interest of Defendant.  Regardless of Defendant being bound by counsel's actions, defense continuances don't excuse lengthy delays in the disposition of a case. United States v. Lam, 251 F. 3d 852 (9th Cir. 2001).

The court instructed in State v. Farrell, “prejudice to a defendant resulting from delay is no longer confined to inability to defend on the merits. Prejudice can also be found from employment interruptions, public obloquy, anxieties concerning the continued and unresolved prosecution and the like.” State v. Farrell, 320 N.J. Super. at 452.

Likewise, the Court in Tsetsakas recognized that “significant prejudice may also arise when the delay causes the loss of employment or other opportunities, humiliation, the anxiety in awaiting disposition of the pending charges, the drain in finances incurred for payment of counsel or expert witness fees and the other costs and inconveniences far in excess of what would have been reasonable under more acceptable circumstances. State v. Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. at 13.

Here, defendant has suffered very significant losses of employment, as employers performed background checks and refused to hire defendant, even after they made employment offers.  In addition, defendant lost several professional licenses due to the outstanding charges, leading to further economic losses.  Defendant also has not been able to obtain state licenses (including the Licensed Site Remediation Professional license) to do professional work because of the pending, unresolved charges.  Several New Jersey licensing boards even denied defendant the application to sit for exams, causing defendant to lose very significant business and/or employment opportunities.  The net result of these prolonged delays is potentially multi-million dollars in economic damages.

As a professional expert engineer, defendant has also suffered irreparable reputation loss that essentially destroyed his career that he worked many decades to build. 

DEFENDANT HAS DISCOVERED SOME NEW EXPLOSIVE INFORMATION.

Corporal Ronald Lucas was not the officer looking through my side window on June 28, 2011.  That man was a young officer without facial hair.

Now I have obtained the picture of Ronald Lucas (see attached) and it shows an old man in his 50s.  That man has a shoulder brace, after his shoulder injury that he claims he suffered when he jumped from the porch.

As part of an investigation I have been performing for the last few months, I discovered that Ronald A. Lucas, a former Passaic County sheriff officer with the Civil Division lied about his on-the-job shoulder injury.  He claimed that he fell on the job on June 28, 2011 at 687 Indian Road, Wayne, NJ.  He then filed a disability claim with the New Jersey Division of Pensions and Benefits (Police and Firemen Retirement System).  He was granted disability for one year with subsequent review.  After he retired with claimed disability, he obtained a job as part-time security guard at the Pequannock High School.

We discovered that Mr. Lucas suffered shoulder injuries while playing football and lifting weights over his lifetime.  He was a linebacker with the Pompton Lakes Cardinals.  He also trained his two sons (Dean Lucas and Ronnie Lucas) into playing TE and DE positions also with the Cardinals football team.

We discovered that Mr. Lucas has been complaining about his shoulder for several years prior to the June 28, 2011 incident.  Several Passaic County Sheriff employees can attest to that.

We also discovered that based on what he said regarding the subject incident, he must have fallen (if true) onto his right shoulder.  However, the shoulder that Mr. Lucas claimed he injured was his left shoulder.  We have obtained photos where he wears a shoulder support in his left shoulder.

We have obtained photos showing Mr. Lucas lifting weights, after his alleged job-ending disability.  See for example the attached image that is dated December 2013.

This twist of events explain as to why Lucas could not get his story straight and why he made so many revisions.

We need to find out the name of the young officer who rode with Victor D’Agostino that day.   Obviously this young officer decided not to lie and Ron Lucas took his place instead.

We need to find out as to where Lucas actually fell.  There must be some testimony or some eye witness testimony that we can figure this out.  This man (Lucas) played football during high school (and afterwards) and I would not be surprised if he had injured his shoulder from sports.

These are all bombshells!!!

LETTER FROM JUDGE MCGEADY, DATED JANUARY 17, 2014

The prosecutor commented on the lack of probable cause found by Judge McGeady.  This was misleading for the Court (De la Carrera), as McGeady later suggested that I write to the prosecutors to appeal the probable cause determination.  Please see his letter dated January 2014.

When I filed criminal charges against these individuals, there was not criminal proceeding against them.  That is perhaps the reason McGeady did not find probable cause at the time.  When I submitted new evidence at a later time, he sent me the attached letter suggesting to resubmit the case.

RULE 3:12. Defendant's Obligation To Provide Notice

The Defendant hereby serves written notice on the prosecutor that he intends to rely on the following defenses:

Ignorance or Mistake, 2C:2-4(c);

Duress, 2C:2-9(a);

Entrapment, 2C:2-12(b);

General Principles of Justification, 2C:3-1 to 2C:3-11;

3:12-1. Notice Under Specific Criminal Code Provisions

A defendant shall serve written notice on the prosecutor if the defendant intends to rely on any of the following sections of the Code of Criminal Justice: Ignorance or Mistake, 2C:2-4(c); Accomplice: Renunciation Terminating Complicity, 2C:2-6(e)(3); Intoxication, 2C:2-8(d); Duress, 2C:2-9(a); Entrapment, 2C:2-12(b); General Principles of Justification, 2C:3-1 to 2C:3-11; Insanity, 2C:4-1; Lack of Requisite State of Mind, 2C:4-2; Criminal Attempt (renunciation of criminal purpose), 2C:5-1(d); Conspiracy (renunciation of criminal purpose), 2C:5-2(e); Murder (affirmative defense, felony murder), 2C:11-3(a)(3); Criminal Restraint, 2C:13-2(b); Theft by Extortion, 2C:20-5; Perjury (retraction), 2C:28-1(d); False Swearing (retraction), 2C:28-2(b); Controlled Dangerous Substances Near or On School Property, 2C:35-7; and Distributing, Dispensing or Possessing Controlled Substances Within 500 Feet of Public Housing Facilities, Parks or Buildings, 2C:35-7.1.

No later than seven days before the arraignment/status conference the defendant shall serve on the prosecutor a notice of intention to claim any of the defenses listed herein; and if the defendant requests or has received discovery pursuant to R.  3:13-3(b)(1), the defendant shall, pursuant to R. 3:13-3(b)(2) , furnish the prosecutor with discovery pertaining to such defenses at the time the notice is served. If, however, the arraignment/status conference was held within 28 days of indictment pursuant to R. 3:9-1(c), the defendant shall serve such notice on the prosecutor, along with the pertinent discovery, by a date to be determined by the trial judge, except in no event later than 14 days after the date of the arraignment/status conference.  The prosecutor shall, within 14 days after receipt of such discovery, comply with R. 3:13-3(b)(1) and (f) with respect to any defense for which the prosecutor has received notice.

For good cause shown the court may extend the time of service of any of the foregoing, or make such other orders as the interest of justice requires. If a party fails to comply with this Rule, the court may take such action as the interest of justice requires. The action taken may include refusing to allow the party in default to present witnesses in support or in opposition of that defense at the trial or to allow the granting of an adjournment or delay during trial as the interest of justice demands.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and authorities cited, the defendant Basilis N. Stephanatos respectfully submits that the indictment must be dismissed with prejudice.  Defendant also requests the specific relief delineated in the Omnibus Motions, including the cross examination of Officers Lucas and D’Agostino at a hearing to prove that their testimony before the grand jury was false, fraudulent and intentionally misleading.  The purpose of those hearings would also be to establish damages incurred to the Defendant as a result of the criminal acts of these sheriff employees.  Additionally, there must be a hearing on the motion to suppress.  Defendant will testify that his doors were all closed and locked with a deadbolt and that the two officers performed an unlawful search inside his dwelling in violation of his constitutionally guaranteed rights and in violation of state law prohibiting peering inside residences.  See Exhibit D for a similar situation in West Milford, to see how the sheriff employees behave in these matters. 

The state has admitted in proceedings before Judge Filko that the sheriff’s officers did not have a Warrant from a Law Division Judge.  They only had an ex-parte Writ issued pursuant to a void possession judgment issued by a Mercer County Chancery judge who had no subject matter jurisdiction over land possession matters.  Thus, they were illegally attempting to remove defendant from his dwelling while working as agents for convicted criminals Robert Del Vecchio, ATF, et. al.  Defendant incorporates herein his prior submissions to this Court.

                                                                        Respectfully submitted,

___________________________________

Miles Feinstein, Esq.

Attorney for defendant                                   

Basilis N. Stephanatos

Dated: March 1, 2016

ORDER TO DISMISS

Having found that the State failed to bring the instant case to conclusion of trial within the time allowed by law and Judicial Rules, this Court acknowledges that the State denied Defendant's right to a speedy trial.  This Court therefore now orders the immediate dismissal with prejudice of all charges in the instant case against the Defendant, the immediate discharge and liberation of the Defendant from bail, the return of all of Defendant's property, the immediate repair at State’s expense of all damage done to Defendant and Defendant's property during or consequent to the arrest and incarceration, immediate payment by the Plaintiff of all storage, impound, and other fees for Defendant's business instruments and other property encumbered as a consequence of Defendant's arrest, the transportation of Defendant by Defendant's choice of public or private automobile, or other public conveyance to Defendant's dwelling place at State’s sole expense, the immediate writing and hand delivery to Defendant of a  formal apology by the prosecutor in the instant case for violating Defendant's Constitutionally guaranteed right to a speedy trial, for which let execution issue forthwith.

_______________________________________  ____________

Judge Miguel De la Carrera                                        Date Ordered

EXHIBIT A

COPIES OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINTS FILED BY LUCAS AND D’AGOSTINO

EXHIBIT B

LEGAL FORMS USED BY THE PASSAIC COUNTY COURTS TO ADJUDICATE THE ISSUE OF PROPERTY POSSESSION IN THIS COUNTY

EXHIBIT C

LETTER FROM JUDGE MCGEADY, DATED JANUARY 17, 2014

EXHIBIT D

SIMILAR CASE IN WEST MILFORD, NEW JERSEY AS WAS REPORTED BY THE PASSAIC COUNTY SHERIFF TO THE MEDIA

Source: http://www.northjersey.com/news/crime-and-courts/police-blotters/man-hospitalized-and-arrested-when-eviction-goes-sour-in-west-milford-1.1274515

Here is a similar case in West Milford.  It is almost identical to my case:  D’Agostino arrived, I would not answer the door and then he (D’Agostino) called for backup.  Then they did a search, etc.  Just read the Sheriff’s release.  It is very telling.

Man hospitalized and arrested when eviction goes sour in West Milford

February 19, 2015    Last updated: Thursday, February 19, 2015, 10:52 AM

By BRYAN LA PLACA

Staff Writer | 

Suburban Trends

MILFORD - A "routine" home eviction turned into a police standoff that sent one man to the hospital yesterday morning, according to the Passaic County Sheriff's Office.

As reported in a release from Sheriff Richard H. Berdnik, at 8:24 a.m. on Feb. 18, county sheriff's officer Victor D'Agostino went to a Louis Avenue residence "to conduct an eviction."

The release states that the eviction was based on a Superior Court order due to mortgage non-payment. Authorities identified the owner of the residence as Piper Glass.

Two vehicles were in the driveway, including one owned by Glass, but no one would answer the door when D'Agostino arrived, according to the release.

The officer then called for backup, and county officers Sgt. Scott Slekis, Chris Patacco, and Liram Kaba responded along with several West Milford Police Department officers.

Berdnik said the officers investigated further and determined that Joseph Ferrell, another occupant of the house, had two active Passaic County Superior Court warrants due to an alleged violation of probation and outstanding child support payments amounting to $40,520. Ferrell is Glass' boyfriend, he added.

More than three hours after the eviction attempt began, officers reportedly saw Ferrell looking out a sliding glass door in the rear of the residence, "which because of the foreclosure should have been empty," states the release.

D'Agostino then ordered Ferrell to exit the house. Ferrell and Glass complied, coming out on the rear patio.

Several officers responded to assist behind the home, and Ferrell was taken into custody.

Berdnik said that as Ferrell was being transported to the Passaic County Jail, he started to complain that he could not breathe and was having chest pains. A West Milford officer administered oxygen, and an ambulance was called to the scene.

A West Milford officer then escorted Ferrell in an ambulance to St. Joseph's Regional Medical Center in Paterson. Ferrell was subsequently released.

Berdnik said, "In this case, a routine enforcement of a court-ordered eviction led to the arrest of an individual who was not fulfilling his child support responsibilities and had several outstanding warrants."

Email: laplaca@northjersey.com

Source: http://www.northjersey.com/news/crime-and-courts/police-blotters/man-hospitalized-and-arrested-when-eviction-goes-sour-in-west-milford-1.1274515

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[1]            N.J.S.A. 2C:3-6(a) and (c) provide that the justification for the use of force in defense either of premises or personal property is “subject to the provisions of this section and of section 2C:3-9.”  If any issues arise pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:3-9(a) or (c) in a given case, the model jury charges for those  subsections should be given after the other “provisions of this section” are explained but before the jury is instructed on the burden of proof. 

[2]           N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14 (j).  The definitions of reckless and negligent states of mind contained in N.J.S.A.  2C: 2-2 (b) (3) and (4) should be included at this point if they have not been charged previously in connection with the offense(s) charged.

[3]           State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 198 (1984).

[4]           N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3a.

[5] Robert Del Vecchio, Sr has pleaded guilty to a felony charge filed by the U.S. Department of Justice in Newark, New Jersey on September 30, 2013.

[1] 2A:39-1 Unlawful entry prohibited. With regard to any real property occupied solely as a residence by the party in possession, such entry shall not be made in any manner without the consent of the party in possession unless the entry and detention is made pursuant to legal process as set out in N.J.S.2A:18-53 et seq., as amended and supplemented; P.L.1974, c.49 (C.2A:18-61.1 et al.), as amended and supplemented; P.L.1975, c.311 (C.2A:18-61.6 et al.), as amended and supplemented; P.L.1978, c.139 (C.2A:18-61.6 et al.), as amended and supplemented; the "Tenant Protection Act of 1992," P.L.1991, c.509 (C.2A:18-61.40 et al.); or N.J.S.2A:35-1 et seq. and "The Fair Eviction Notice Act," P.L.1974, c.47 (C.2A:42-10.15 et al.).