MEC&F Expert Engineers : RAILROAD ACCIDENT BRIEF: COLLISION OF UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD FREIGHT TRAIN MSIDV 16 WITH STANDING RAILROAD CARS IN HAYS, KANSAS

Friday, April 17, 2015

RAILROAD ACCIDENT BRIEF: COLLISION OF UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD FREIGHT TRAIN MSIDV 16 WITH STANDING RAILROAD CARS IN HAYS, KANSAS





Executive Summary

On July 16, 2013, at about 1:20 a.m., central daylight time, westbound Union Pacific Railroad (UP) freight train MSIDV16 unexpectedly encountered a hand-operated main tracks witch at MP 288 in the reverse position diverting the train from the main track onto two adjacent tracks at the Sharon Springs subdivision in Hays, Kansas. 

The switch was not equipped with technology to warn oncoming trains that it was in the reverse position. 

At the time of the accident, the train was traveling in no signaled track warrant territory at a timetable speed of 49 mph. 

The lead locomotive collided with standing cars on the spur track.  

Diesel fuel leaked from the ruptured locomotive fuel tanks, ignited, and burned. 

The three crew members were injured. 

Damage was estimated by the UP to be $1.4 million.

Probable Cause

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the failure of the brakeman of train LDG8915 to return a main track switch to the normal position after the crew had secured the train on a siding track. 

Contributing to the accident was the inability of the crew of train MSIDV 16 to determine the position of the main track switch in no signaled territory.

Previous NTSB Recommendations  

Following the January 6, 2005, accident at Graniteville, South Carolina, the NTSB made the following safety recommendation to the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) (aka: the railroad lobby):
Require that, along main lines in non-signaled territory, railroads install an automatically activated device, independent of the switch banner that will, visually or electronically, compellingly capture the attention of employees involved with switch operations and clearly convey the status of the switch both in daylight and in darkness. (R-05-14)
After completing the Bettendorf, Iowa, accident investigation, the NTSB reclassified Safety Recommendation (R-05-14) from “Open—Acceptable Alternate Response,” to “Closed―Superseded ”by Safety Recommendation (R-12-27), and issued the following new recommendations to the FRA, aimed at addressing the hazard of switch misalignments:
Require railroads to install, along mainlines in non-signaled territory not equipped with positive train control, appropriate technology that warns approaching trains of incorrectly lined main track switches sufficiently in advance to permit stopping. (R-12-27)
Revise Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Section 218.105(d) (1) to require that, until the appropriate switch position technology is installed on main track switches in non-signaled territories that are not equipped with positive train control, train crews releasing track authority to the dispatcher must hold job briefings with the dispatcher and clearly convey the position of all main track switches that were used prior to releasing track warrant authority. (R-12-28)
Require that until appropriate switch position warning technology is installed on main track switches (in non-signaled territory not equipped with positive train control), when a main track switch has been reported relined for a main track, the next train to pass the location approach the switch location at restricted speed. That train crew should then report to the dispatcher that the switch is correctly lined for the main track before trains are allowed to operate at maximum authorized speed. (R-12-29)
These recommendations are for additional layers of protection intended to prevent accidents due to single point failures.
However, in response to these recommendations, the FRA responded by letter to the NTSB on December 28, 2012, stating in part, “The preliminary cost-benefit analysis conducted related to this recommendation shows that rulemakings cannot be justified as having benefits outweighing cost.”

The NTSB replied to the FRA on April 18, 2013,“…we urge the FRA to consider an appropriate alternate means of warning approaching trains of incorrectly lined main track switches. ”Pending completion of a plan for doing this, Safety Recommendation R-12-27 is classified “Open—Unacceptable Response.”