APRIL 4, 2015
The nation's worst coal mine disaster in decades exposed lax
safety measures at some Appalachian mines, issues that persist five years later
despite the crackdown that followed, according to an Associated Press review of
federal inspection records.
Excess methane gas and flammable coal dust fueled a fireball
that raced through the Upper Big Branch mine in southern West Virginia on April
5, 2010, killing 29 men. The explosion and mass casualties rocked the mining
community, which had just recorded its safest year ever in coal mines.
The revelation that inspectors repeatedly had cited the mine
for buildups of coal dust and methane, with little disruption to the mine's
operations, drove calls for greater accountability. Federal authorities
responded by stiffening safety rules, stepping up inspection raids and going
after company higher-ups.
Prosecutors have won four convictions against former
officials at Massey Energy, the company that owned Upper Big Branch, and
secured a rare indictment on conspiracy charges against Don Blankenship, the
former CEO. He has pleaded not guilty and is set for trial April 20.
In 2014, the nation again set a new low for coal mining
deaths — 16 — in part because about a hundred underground mines have closed in
West Virginia and Kentucky over the last five years as the energy industry has
moved away from Appalachian coal.
The U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration also credits
its revamped approach to inspections. After Upper Big Branch, MSHA began
sending teams of inspectors to target problem mines, many of them underground
operations in West Virginia and Kentucky, which are still home to nearly half
of the nation's coal mines. Federal inspectors have written nearly 14,000
citations during those visits, called impact inspections.
MSHA chief Joe Main has said the increased enforcement has
reduced serious violations that could lead to injury or death by about 60
percent in mines that MSHA has kept a close watch over since 2010.
Yet some mines consistently fail to follow rules meant to curb
explosion risks, including some owned by the company that took over Massey's
operations.
In January, federal officials found excess methane and coal
dust at Mill Branch Coal Corp.'s Osaka mine in Wise County, Virginia. The mine
is owned by Alpha Natural Resources, which bought Massey's mines in 2011.
During the visit, inspectors pulled miners out of two working sections,
temporarily shutting down production. The January visit to Osaka was the fifth
impact inspection at the mine.
At another Wise County mine in November, inspectors found
2-foot deep accumulations of combustible materials and coal dust in working
areas of Regent Allied Carbon Energy's No. 2 mine. MSHA ordered the belt lines
shut down since the mine had not followed an approved ventilation plan, and
officials noted that the water supply to sprayers that suppress coal dust were
not turned on.
A worker at the Regent Allied mine referred questions to
company president Ervin Stiltner, but calls to two numbers listed in his name
were not answered.
MSHA named six more mines in an August report that have had
repeated problems meeting ventilation and dust control standards since Upper
Big Branch. Five are in West Virginia and one is in eastern Kentucky.
Source:ap.com
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THE EASTER MONDAY, 2010 UPPER BIG BRANCH TRAGIC EXPLOSION
THAT TOOK 29 WORKER LIVES: A FAILURE OF
BASIC COAL MINE SAFETY STANDARDS. “SAFETY
FIRST” IS MOSTLY A LIP SERVICE; PROFIT ALWAYS COMES FIRST.
FOREWARD
At approximately 3:02 p.m. on Easter Monday, April 5, 2010,
a powerful explosion tore through the Upper Big Branch mine, owned by Massey Energy
and operated by its subsidiary, Performance Coal Company, at the convergence of
Boone and Raleigh counties in southern West Virginia.
Twenty-nine miners died and one was seriously injured as the
enormously powerful blast rocketed through two and one-half miles of underground
work-ings nearly 1,000 feet beneath the surface of the rugged mountains along
the Coal River. The disaster has had grave consequences for a mining company, for
a com- munity and, most importantly, for the family members who lost men dear to
them.
On April 13, 2010, then West Virginia Governor Joe Manchin
III asked J. Davitt McAteer, former Assistant Secretary of Labor in charge of
the federal Mine Safety and Health Administration, to conduct an independent investigation
into the disaster. The Governor said, “We owe it to the families of the 29
miners we lost last week to find out what caused this. We owe it to them and ev-ery
coal miner working today to do everything humanly possible to prevent this from
happening again… I fully expect that we will learn ... from this and make dramatic
changes to protect our miners.”
As a result of an inquiry that continued for more than a year,
the Governor’s Independent Investigation Panel has reached the following
conclusions:
·
The explosion at the Upper Big Branch mine could
have been prevented.
·
The explosion was the result of failures of ba- sic
safety systems identified and codified to protect the lives of miners. The company’s
ventilation system did not adequately ventilate the mine. As a result, explosive
gases were allowed to build up. The company failed to meet federal and state safe
principal standards for the application of rock dust. Therefore, coal dust provided
the fuel that allowed the explosion to propagate through the mine. Third, water
sprays on equipment were not properly maintained and failed to function as they
should have. As a result, a small ignition could not be quickly extinguished.
·
Three layers of protection designed to safeguard
the lives of miners failed at Upper Big Branch. First, the company’s pre-shift/on-shift
examination sys- tem broke down so that safety hazards either were not recorded,
or, if recorded, were not corrected. Second, the U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration
(MSHA) failed to use all the tools at its disposal to ensure that the company was
compliant with federal laws. Third, the West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health Safety
and Training (WVHST) failed in its role of enforcing state laws and serving as
a watchdog for coal miners.
·
Regulatory agencies alone cannot ensure a safe workplace
for miners. It is incumbent upon the coal industry to lead the way toward a better,
safer industry and toward a culture in which safety of workers truly is paramount.
A genuine commitment to safety means not just examining miners’ work practices and
behaviors. It means evaluating management decisions up the chain of command –
all the way to the boardroom – about how miners’ work is organized and performed.
·
The politics of coal must be addressed at both a
state and national level. Coal is a vital component in our nation’s energy strategy.
The men and women who mine it also are a national resource whose lives, safety and
health must be safeguarded.