Robert L. Sumwalt
United States House of Representatives, Washington, DC
9/13/2018
United States House of Representatives, Washington, DC
9/13/2018
Good
morning, Chairman Denham, Ranking Member Capuano, and Members of the
Subcommittee. Thank you for inviting the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB) to testify before you today.
The NTSB is an independent federal agency
charged by Congress with investigating every civil aviation accident and
significant incidents in the United States, as well as significant
accidents and incidents in other modes of transportation—railroad,
highway, marine, and pipeline. We determine the probable cause of these
accidents and other transportation events and issue safety
recommendations aimed at preventing future accidents. In addition, we
carry out special studies concerning transportation safety and
coordinate the resources of the federal government and other
organizations to assist victims and their family members who have been
impacted by major transportation disasters.
On November 14, 2016, we announced our Most
Wanted List of Transportation Safety Improvements for 2017–2018.[1] This
list, based on safety issues we have identified in our investigations,
highlights the 10 areas in transportation safety where we believe
improvements are most critical. One issue area on this cycle’s Most
Wanted List is “Increase Implementation of Collision Avoidance
Technologies,” which addresses the need for positive train control (PTC)
to reduce accidents, prevent injuries, and save lives.
The State of Positive Train Control Implementation
Yesterday marked the 10-year anniversary of
the tragic accident in Chatsworth, California, in which a Metrolink
commuter train and a Union Pacific freight train collided head-on,
killing 25 people and injuring 102 others.[2] Our investigation
concluded that the Metrolink engineer’s use of a personal electronic
device to send text messages distracted him from his duties and that
positive train control (PTC) could have prevented this accident. In the
aftermath of that tragedy and a number of others that the NTSB
investigated, Congress passed the Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008
(RSIA), which required the implementation of a PTC system on each line
over which intercity passenger or commuter service is operated or over
which poison- or toxic-by-inhalation hazardous materials were
transported, by December 31, 2015.[3] In October 2015, Congress extended
this deadline to December 31, 2018, and included provisions for
railroads to request an additional 24-month extension to December 31,
2020, if certain criteria are met.[4]
Now, 10 years later and nearly 3 years after
the original deadline imposed by Congress, PTC is still not fully
implemented in the United States. The NTSB strongly urges swift
implementation of the congressional PTC mandate. However, it is
important to note that even after that mandate is met, significant
portions of the rail network will not have PTC. According to reports
from railroads to the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), only about
40 percent of the rail network – or 58,000 of 134,000 route miles – will
have PTC. Significantly, Amtrak will have over 1,400 miles of track it
currently operates on that will not have PTC. If Amtrak continues to
operate on these segments, there will be a diminished level of safety
for passengers and train crews traveling communities such as Topeka,
Kansas; Grand Junction, Colorado; Portland, Maine; Memphis, Tennessee;
New Orleans; St. Louis; and many others.
In other cases, under its regulations, the
FRA has approved exceptions to the PTC requirement for other main line
tracks on which not only freight, but also other intercity passenger and
commuter railroads operate. Again, this means that there will a
significantly decreased level of safety for those passengers and train
crews that are traveling on those railroads.
NTSB Investigations of PTC-Related Accidents
Since the enactment of RSIA, there have been
22 accidents we have investigated or are currently investigating that
could have been prevented by PTC. These accidents resulted in 29 deaths,
over 500 injuries, and over $190 million in property damage. These
include:
- In September 2010, near Two Harbors, Minnesota, human error and fatigue contributed to the collision of two freight trains. Five crewmembers were injured.
- In May 2011, in Hoboken, New Jersey, human error contributed to the collision of a train with the bumping post at the end of the track.
- In June 2012, near Goodwell, Oklahoma, human inattentiveness contributed to the collision of two freight trains. Three crewmembers were killed.
- In May 2013, near Chaffee, Missouri, inattentiveness and fatigue contributed to the collision of two freight trains. Two crewmembers were injured and a highway bridge collapsed.
- In December 2013, in the Bronx, New York, fatigue contributed to the derailment of a passenger train. Four passengers were killed and 61 others were injured.
- In May 2015, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, an Amtrak engineer’s acceleration to 106 miles per hour (mph) as he entered a curve with a 50 mph speed restriction, due to his loss of situational awareness, led to a derailment. Eight passengers were killed and 185 others were injured.
Two accidents currently under investigation
occurred in DuPont, Washington and Cayce, South Carolina. Each of these
accidents happened on tracks that were unprotected by PTC. While we are
still investigating both, they are each a type of accident that a
fully-operational PTC system is designed to prevent—overspeeds and
misaligned switches.
Amtrak 501 Derailment—DuPont, Washington
On the morning of December 18, 2017, on its
first regular passenger service trip, Amtrak passenger train 501
derailed as it traversed a curve near DuPont, Washington. The lead
locomotive, the power car, and two passenger railcars derailed from an
overpass onto Interstate 5. At the time of the accident, 77 passengers, 5
Amtrak employees, and a technician from the railcar manufacturer, Talgo
Incorporated, were on the train. Of these individuals, 3 passengers
were killed and 62 passengers and crewmembers were injured. Eight
individuals in highway vehicles were also injured. Our investigation is
ongoing, but on January 4, 2018, we issued a preliminary report
regarding this derailment.[5]
Central Puget Sound Regional Transit
Authority (Sound Transit), a public transit agency in the state of
Washington, owns the Point Defiance Bypass tracks where the derailment
occurred. Sound Transit reported that the PTC system on this line was
not operational at the time of the accident. The authorized track speed
decreases from 79 mph to 30 mph as the track approaches the curve.
According to the lead locomotive’s event data recorder, the final
recorded speed of the locomotive was 78 mph. In this accident, PTC would
have notified the train engineer about the speed reduction for the
curve, and if he did not take appropriate action to control the train’s
speed, PTC would have applied the train brakes to maintain compliance
with the speed restriction and to stop the train.
Amtrak 91 Collision with CSX Train—Cayce, South Carolina
In the early morning of February 4, 2018, an
Amtrak passenger train unexpectedly entered a siding near Cayce, South
Carolina, and collided with a stationary CSX freight train. Two of the
crewmembers—the engineer and the conductor—were killed, and at least 92
passengers and crewmembers were transported to medical facilities. Our
investigation is ongoing, but on February 28, 2018 we issued a
preliminary report.[6]
At the time of the accident, a signal
suspension was in place through the area, due to signal work being done,
including upgrades to prepare for implementation of PTC. Trains were
being directed through the area by a CSX dispatcher, who would issue
warrants, or permissions, to use the main line.[7] The crew of the CSX
train had completed work in the area, moved the train to the siding, and
released their authority to use the main line back to the dispatcher.
However, the switch on the main line was left open to the siding and
locked. The Amtrak train, traveling at 57 mph, was diverted into the
siding from the main and struck the CSX train.
This is the second accident that we are
investigating involving a train being unexpectedly diverted onto a side
track because of a switch left in the incorrect position in an area of
track under “signal suspension” due to installation and testing of PTC.
On December 5, 2017, we issued an accident brief regarding the collision
of two Union Pacific Railroad freight trains that occurred on March 14,
2016, in Granger, Wyoming. One crew member received minor injuries.We
determined that the probable cause of the accident was that the
employee-in-charge incorrectly used information from a conversation with
the train dispatcher as authorization to send a train into the signal
suspension territory.
Contributing to the accident was the failure of a
crew member to check the switch position before authorizing the train to
enter the signal suspension territory.[8]
In both the Granger and Cayce accidents,
human decision making and actions likely played key roles. Safe movement
of the trains through the signal suspension depended on proper switch
alignment, which, in turn, relied on error-free manual work. The risk of
error was not safeguarded, either by technology or supervision. The
reliance on error-free human performance for safe train movement creates
a single point-of-failure given the current operating practices and
regulations. We concluded that additional measures are needed, such as
restricted speed, to ensure safe operations during signal suspensions,
especially during the movement of passenger trains, due to the
likelihood of harm to the traveling public.
Therefore, on February 13, 2018, we issued an
urgent safety recommendation to the FRA to issue an emergency order
directing railroads to require that when signal suspensions are in
effect and a switch has been reported relined for a main track, the next
train or locomotive to pass the switch location must approach with a
restricted speed. After verifying the switch position, the train crew
would be required report to the dispatcher that the switch is correctly
lined for the main track before trains would be permitted to operate at
maximum-authorized speed.[9] We only issue urgent recommendations when
we determine that the course of action requires immediate attention to
avoid imminent loss due to a similar accident.
On April 23, 2018, the FRA published a notice
of draft safety advisory in response to our urgent safety
recommendation. The proposed safety advisory recommends that railroads
adopt industry best safety practices regarding railroad operations under
temporary signal suspensions. Because FRA’s proposal would not require
adoption of such practices, as called for by our urgent safety
recommendation, the NTSB has classified this urgent safety
recommendation as “Open – Unacceptable Response.” Furthermore, it is
noteworthy that FRA has not even published proposed industry best
practices. We believe that the FRA must act now to prevent accidents
like those in Granger or Cayce.
On July 10 and 11, 2018, we held a two-day
investigative hearing to explore issues involved in the DuPont and Cayce
accidents. The purpose of the hearing was to elicit additional factual
information about the accidents as part of our ongoing investigations.
The factors involved in these accidents are comprehensive and we are
examining a multitude of aspects beyond PTC, including Amtrak operations
on host railroads and safety management systems in passenger rail.
Conclusion
The NTSB is gravely concerned that the
majority of the Nation’s railroads, particularly passenger railroads,
required to install PTC will not have fully operational systems by the
December 31, 2018, deadline. I appreciate the Committee holding another
hearing this year on the importance of PTC, and I am here today to urge
implementation of this lifesaving technology without further delay. For
each day that goes by without PTC, we are at continued risk for another
tragic accident.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I look forward to responding to your questions.
1 NTSB, 2017–2018 Most Wanted List (Washington, DC: NTSB, 2016).
2 NTSB, Collision of Metrolink Train 111 With Union Pacific Train LOF65-12 Chatsworth, California September 12, 2008, Rpt. No. NTSB/RAR-10/01 (January 21, 2010).
3 Rail Safety Improvement Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-432, § 104 (October 16, 2008).
4 Positive Train Control Enforcement and Implementation Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-73, § 1302 (October 29, 2015).
5 NTSB, Preliminary Report, RRD18MR001 (January 4, 2018).
6 NTSB, Preliminary Report, RRD18MR003 (February 28, 2018)
7 Signal suspension means train control
signals located alongside the track have been taken out of service,
oftentimes for maintenance or system upgrades. When these signals are
taken out of service, train movements are controlled by means such as
absolute blocks or by track warrants.
8 NTSB, Collision of Two Union Pacific Railroad Freight Trains, Granger, Wyoming. Rpt. No. NTSB/RAB-17-10 (December 5, 2017).
9 NTSB, Safety Recommendation Report: Train Operation During Signal Suspension. Rec. No. R-18-005 (February 13, 2018)