Statements on the US Chemical Safety Board's DuPont LaPorte Investigation
Chairperson Rafael Moure-Eraso
and Board Member Manuel "Manny" Ehrlich
U.S. Chemical Safety Board
February 5, 2015
RAFAEL MOURE-ERASO
Good
morning, and welcome to this U.S. Chemical Safety Board – or CSB – media
briefing.
I
am Rafael Moure-Eraso, Chairperson of the CSB. The purpose of today’s briefing
is to provide an update on our ongoing investigation into the fatal methyl
mercaptan release that took place at the DuPont facility in La Porte on
November 15, 2014. Four workers’ lives were lost, and I join their
families and their coworkers in their
grief.
First,
I would thank DuPont for their cooperation with our investigative team, as well
as the International 
Chemical Workers Union
local 900C. We appreciate their assistance during what is a difficult time for
everyone involved.
Chemical Workers Union
local 900C. We appreciate their assistance during what is a difficult time for
everyone involved.
Yesterday,
Board Member Ehrlich and I visited the accident site along with the CSB
Investigation Team, the site manager and workforce representatives. I was
encouraged by DuPont’s commitment, which was restated to me, to thoroughly
investigate this tragedy, to learn from it, and to make all needed changes.
This
is my fifth and final year serving as Chairperson of the U.S. Chemical Safety
Board. During that time the CSB has investigated three major, fatal accidents
at DuPont facilities around the U.S. The frequency of these incidents is
a concern for the Board as well as for DuPont, its workers, family members, and
the communities nearby.
The
first DuPont accident investigated by the CSB, in January 2010, at DuPont’s
manufacturing plant in Belle, West Virginia resulted in the death of one worker
when a braided steel hose ruptured, releasing highly toxic phosgene gas.
The CSB investigation found that DuPont had not used the safest materials of
construction for the hose – had not replaced the hose on the required
maintenance schedule – had not installed a properly ventilated and alarmed
enclosure around the phosgene to prevent worker exposure – and finally, had not
required workers to use respirators around the phosgene storage area.
The
second DuPont accident investigated by the CSB occurred later in 2010 when hot
sparks produced by welding ignited flammable vapors inside a tank that had not
been effectively isolated from a hazardous process at the DuPont facility in
Buffalo, New York, killing one worker. DuPont had not used an adequate
gas detection system to monitor the area for the hazardous vinyl fluoride gas,
which exploded.
And
finally, the accident we are discussing today – at the DuPont, La Porte
facility here in Texas - was the most severe. Four workers were killed during
the release of what DuPont says were more than 23,000 pounds of methyl
mercaptan, a highly toxic, flammable, and volatile liquid.
Now
let me say that DuPont has long been regarded as one of industry’s safety
leaders. In fact, DuPont has been viewed an industry leader in processing
hazardous materials for most of the last two centuries. After the Bhopal
tragedy in 1984, the DuPont La Porte facility changed it’s production of methyl
isocyanate – or MIC – the same chemical involved in the Bhopal accident, to an
inherently safer method so that the highly hazardous chemical was no longer
stored in large quantities but was used as it was produced. Such action has
contributed to DuPont’s reputation as a leading light in safety, its slogan is:
“Zero” safety incidents. The company markets its safety programs to the
chemical industry.
But
we have found that not only DuPont, but the industry as a whole must do much
better. Complex process-related accidents with tragic results are taking
place across the country at companies of all sizes. This problem includes
major corporations such as DuPont, not just smaller companies that some refer
to as outliers. It is clear that the current process safety regulatory system
is in need of reform.
We
have found common factors contributing to major accidents like the one at
DuPont La Porte. These include a chemical industry that lacks safe
process designs and risk reduction targets, degraded process safety systems,
weak or obsolete regulatory standards, inadequate regulatory resources and
staffing, and overly permissive industry standards.
And
the latest accident at DuPont is one of many incidents investigated by the CSB
where we believe it will become clear that the process design was not as safe
as possible.
Lead
Investigator Dan Tillema will discuss these in more detail, but let me draw
your attention to four design issues that our investigators have already
identified in this accident.
- First: The process included several interconnections between the methyl mercaptan supply line and a chemical vent system, which allowed a toxic leak into an unexpected location, where workers were exposed with fatal consequences.
- Second: The chemical vent system - which was intended to safely remove harmful vapor from process vessels – had a design shortcoming that allowed liquid to accumulate inside. This liquid regularly caused pressure buildups in the vent, and the liquid needed to be manually drained by operators to prevent safety issues from interconnected equipment, such as reactors.
- Third: The vent drain that operators had to use was open to the atmosphere, meaning that workers were exposed to whatever chemicals were drained from the vent system.
- Fourth: The building was designed in such a way that even had ventilation fans been working on the day of the accident, it could not necessarily protect workers from chemical exposure. And we found that those vents were not, in fact, working at the time of the accident.
This
accident, like many investigated by the CSB, demonstrates that regulators and
companies should place greater emphasis on making designs as safe and possible
and updating them on a constant basis.
I
would now like to introduce Board Member Manuel Ehrlich who will update you on
the investigative team’s activities so far:
MANNY EHRLICH:
The
CSB made a decision to deploy just hours after learning of the DuPont incident
on November 15, 2015. The team of eight investigators arrived on November
16, 2014 and met with company officials.
Since
then the CSB has conducted approximately 50 interviews and has spent hundreds
of hours reviewing documents and evaluating the incident scene.
Investigators
have been inside the manufacturing building on numerous occasions evaluating
the process equipment, building layout, and safety systems. These systems
include building ventilation, toxic gas detection, availability of emergency
breathing air, and exit routes for workers, to name a few.
At
this point, the field phase of the investigation is approximately 50%
complete. In the coming weeks and months, testing of field equipment such
as check valves, block valves, and interlock systems will take place as well as
verification of critical instrumentation.
The
team is here to investigate the incident and the board is here to support our
team. The CSB is in a position to gather and disseminate data which will allow
for site management to reaffirm their commitment to process safety,
emergency planning and response, and a strong safety culture.
This
accident affected the LaPort community. The citizens of this and surrounding
communities have a right to know what hazardous materials are processed and
stored near them. That is supposed to be the case throughout the country.
Understanding
what happened here will reaffirm the right and need to know how safely they are
protected in the community and how such an incident can be prevented in the
future.
In
addition to the CSB investigation, OSHA, and DuPont are also conducting
parallel investigations.
I
believe that there will be many important and valuable lessons learned that
will benefit local citizens, regulators, and the chemical community.