CSB Releases Board Approved Regulatory Report on
Chevron Refinery Fire - Proposes a More Rigorous Refinery Industry Regulatory
System in California
Washington,
DC. November 10, 2014– In the final Regulatory Report unanimously approved by the CSB Board
and released to the public today, the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) proposes
recommendations for substantial changes to the way refineries are regulated in
California. Entitled “Regulatory Report:
Chevron Richmond Refinery Pipe Rupture and Fire,” the CSB report calls on
California to enhance its process safety management (PSM) regulations for
petroleum refineries to ensure a more robust and adaptive regulatory regime.
The Regulatory Report is the second part of three in the CSB’s
investigation of the August 2012 process fire in the crude unit at the Chevron
refinery in Richmond, California. That fire endangered 19 workers and sent more
than 15,000 residents to the hospital for medical attention.
CSB
Chairperson Dr. Rafael Moure-Eraso said, “The CSB will be holding a public
meeting in mid December to release the third part of its investigation. The
goal of the CSB’s work is to protect worker and public safety in California I
have great confidence that California will embrace the recommendations in our
Regulatory Report.”
The CSB’s
investigation of the incident found that Chevron repeatedly failed over a
ten-year period to apply inherently safer design principles and upgrade piping
in its crude oil processing unit, which was extremely corroded and ultimately
ruptured on August 6, 2012. The CSB’s
first report on the incident identified missed opportunities on the part of
Chevron to apply inherently safer piping design through the use of more
corrosion-resistant metal alloys. The first report also found a failure by
Chevron to identify and evaluate damage mechanism hazards, which if acted upon,
would likely have identified the possibility of a catastrophic sulfidation
corrosion-related piping failure. There are currently no federal or state
regulatory requirements to apply these important preventative measures. The
investigation team concluded that enhanced regulatory oversight with greater
worker involvement and public participation are needed to improve petroleum
refinery safety.
Following
the Chevron Richmond refinery incident, the state of California has worked to
revise and strengthen its PSM requirements. On September 9, 2014, the
State of California Department of Industrial Relations, Division of
Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA) released its Draft Process Safety
Management for Refineries Regulation. The draft regulation includes a
number of more rigorous requirements. . The draft regulation
incorporates a risk-reduction goal of “the greatest extent feasible” for
process hazard analyses and proposes significant new requirements such as
performing damage mechanism reviews and hierarchy of controls analysis.
Chairperson Moure-Eraso added, “California’s draft regulations address numerous
issues raised in the CSB regulatory report, and the CSB will be monitoring the
California rulemaking process closely to see if those provisions remain
in the final rule.”
At a
January 2014 public meeting in Richmond, CA the board approved a motion to
allow for additional study of this incident. Since that time CSB staff and
board members have traveled to the UK to fully study regulatory regimes of
onshore and offshore facilities in the UK– amongst a number of issues staff
examined workforce participation, continual improvement and transparency issues
as the currently exist in the UK. The CSB staff outlined these actions in
a white paper available at www.csb.gov.
Investigator
Amanda Johnson said, “The CSB’s regulatory report concludes that under the
existing U.S. and California regulatory systems, there is no requirement to
reduce risks to a specific target, such as, for example, to as low as
reasonably practicable, or ALARP, – similar principles have been adopted
in Europe and Australia in the refinery and chemical sectors, as well as the
nuclear and space sectors in the U.S.” Such a target would also require adaptability
and continuous improvement which is vital in responding to newly discovered
hazards and lessons from chemicals incidents.
Dr.
Rafael Moure-Eraso said, “The current regulatory system for process safety is
largely reactive, at both the state and federal level; companies have a default
right to operate, and are subject to penalties when accidents occur or their
activities otherwise draw negative attention from regulators. In the case
of the Chevron refinery fire, the reactive system of regulation simply did not
work to prevent what was ultimately a preventable accident.”
The
regulatory report details how attributes of a more robust and adaptive process
safety management approach would greatly enhance existing state and federal
process safety regulations. Such attributes include a more comprehensive
process hazard analysis; documented use of inherently safer systems analysis
and the hierarchy of controls to the greatest extent feasible with the goal of
continuous risk reduction to a specified risk target; analysis of the
effectiveness of safeguards intended to control hazards; the effective use of
process safety indicators that drive performance; and more thorough inspections
and audits by a technically qualified regulator. The CSB notes that these
enhancements would provide the adaptability necessary to keep current with
improving standards and advancing technology, without requiring lengthy and
often unproductive rulemaking on the part of the regulator.
Effective
implementation of this system requires strong workforce involvement, proactive
inspections and enforcement by a well-resourced regulator, as well as
incorporation of best practice performance standard requirements. Don
Holmstrom, director of the CSB’s Western Regional Office noted that the Chevron
report recommends significant improvements to empower workers and their
representatives. “The report recommends that the regulator recognize worker
safety representatives who have the right to participate in improvements to
process safety and if necessary have the legal authority to stop unsafe
work—the Chevron incident showed these reforms are sorely needed.”
Chairperson
Moure-Eraso said, “Workers, the public and the industry itself would benefit
from an adaptable, robust and effective regulatory approach. The recent
bipartisan law passed last month by the California legislator to provide
regulators with detailed information concerning extensive maintenance overhauls
and repair operations at refineries within the state is certainly a step in the
right direction.” The CSB is an independent federal
agency charged with investigating serious chemical accidents. The agency's
board members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. CSB
investigations look into all aspects of chemical accidents, including physical
causes such as equipment failure as well as inadequacies in regulations,
industry standards, and safety management systems.
The Board
does not issue citations or fines but does make safety recommendations to
plants, industry organizations, labor groups, and regulatory agencies such as
OSHA and EPA. Visit our website, www.csb.gov.
For more
information, contact Communications Manager Hillary Cohen, cell 202-446-8094 or
Sandy Gilmour, Public Affairs, cell 202-251-5496.
USA, CA,
RICHMOND, NOVEMBER 13 2014. CSB RELEASES FINAL REPORT ON CHEVRON RICHMOND
REFINERY FIRE
The US
Chemical Safety Board (CSB) has issued the final regulatory report on its
investigation of the August 2012 pipe rupture and ensuing fire at Chevron
Corp.’s 257,000-b/d Richmond, Calif., refinery, in which the agency reinforced
its call for a more-rigorous approach to safety management at US refineries.
CSB released the report, which received unanimous approval by agency board
members, on Nov. 10. The second of three parts in CSB’s investigation of the
Aug. 6, 2012, process fire and vapor release at the Richmond refinery’s crude
unit (OGJ Online, Aug. 7, 2012), this latest report reiterates CSB’s previous
recommendation for California and US refiners to implement a safety case
regulatory regime similar to that already adopted by refiners in Norway, the
UK, and Australia (OGJ Online, Dec. 17, 2013). The shift to a safety-case
regime would represent a fundamental change to current US practices by shifting
the responsibility for continuous reductions in major accident risks from
regulators to the company by requiring companies to demonstrate to refinery
industry regulators—through a written “safety case report”—how major hazards
are to be controlled and risks reduced to as low as reasonably practicable.
Specifically, the report describes attributes of the safety case regulatory
scheme that would help to transform the US’s currently “reactive” PSM system
into a more proactive one, according to CSB.
Worker,
Safety Requirements
·
In
contrast to the PSM system used by US federal and state regulators today, the
safety-case regulatory regime would improve worker and public safety by
requiring:
·
More
comprehensive process hazard analyses.
·
Documented
use of inherently safer systems analysis and the hierarchy of controls to the
greatest extent feasible, with the goal of continuous risk reduction to a
specified risk target.
·
Analyses
of the effectiveness of safeguards intended to control hazards.
·
Effective
use of process safety indicators that drive performance.
·
More
thorough inspections and audits by a technically qualified regulator.
These
enhancements would provide US regulators the adaptability necessary to keep current
with improving standards and advancing technology, without requiring the
regulatory bodies to engage in the process of lengthy and often unproductive
rulemaking, CSB said. The agency also lauded the California Division of
Occupational Safety and Health’s (Cal/OSHA) recent move to revise and
strengthen PSM requirements for state refiners with the September release of
its Draft Process Safety Management for Refineries Regulation (PSMRR). In
addition to incorporating a risk-reduction goal of “the greatest extent
feasible” for process hazard analyses, Cal/OSHA’s draft PSMRR proposes new
requirements such as performing damage mechanism reviews and hierarchy of
controls analyses. “California’s draft regulations address numerous issues
raised in the CSB regulatory report, and the CSB will be monitoring the
California rulemaking process closely to see if those provisions remain in the
final rule,” said CSB Chair Rafael Moure-Eraso. CSB said it will release the
third part of its investigation into the Richmond refinery fire at a public
meeting in mid-December. In its first report on the incident, CSB found that Chevron
repeatedly failed over a 10-year period at the Richmond refinery to apply
inherently safer design principles and upgrade piping in the crude oil processing
unit, which was extremely corroded and ultimately ruptured by the time of
August 2012 incident (OGJ Online, Apr. 15, 2013). Had Chevron identified and
evaluated damage mechanism hazards, the possibility of a catastrophic
sulfidation corrosion-related piping failure likely would have been detected
and prevented, according to CSB.
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