UTILITY
AIR REGULATORY GROUP v. EPA ( )
684 F. 3d 102, affirmed in part and reversed in part.
684 F. 3d 102, affirmed in part and reversed in part.
NOTE: Where
it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in
connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.The syllabus
constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the
Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber
Co., 200 U. S. 321.
SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
UTILITY
AIR REGULATORY GROUP v.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY et al.
certiorari
to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit
No.
12–1146. Argued February 24, 2014—Decided June 23, 2014 1
The Clean
Air Act imposes permitting requirements on stationary sources, such as
factories and powerplants. The Act’s “Prevention of Significant Deterioration”
(PSD) provisions make it unlawful to construct or modify a “major emitting
facility” in “any area to which [the PSD program] applies” without a permit.
§§7475(a)(1), 7479(2)(C). A “major emitting facility” is a stationary source
with the potential to emit 250 tons per year of “any air pollutant” (or 100
tons per year for certain types of sources). §7479(1). Facilities seeking to
qualify for a PSD permit must, inter
alia, comply with emissions limitations that reflect the “best
available control technology” (BACT) for “each pollutant subject to regulation
under” the Act. §7475(a)(4). In addition, Title V of the Act makes it unlawful
to operate any “major source,” wherever located, without a permit. §7661a(a). A
“major source” is a stationary source with the potential to emit 100 tons per
year of “any air pollutant.” §§7661(2)(B), 7602(j).
In
response to Massachusetts
v. EPA, 549
U. S. 497, EPA promulgated greenhouse-gas emission standards for new
motor vehicles, and made stationary sources subject to the PSD program and
Title V on the basis of their potential to emit greenhouse gases. It
recognized, however, that requiring permits for all sources with greenhouse-gas
emissions above the statutory thresholds would radically expand those programs
and render them unadministrable. So EPA purported to “tailor” the programs to
accommodate greenhouse gases by providing, among other things, that sources
would not become newly subject to PSD or Title V permitting on the basis of
their potential to emit greenhouse gases in amounts less than 100,000 tons per year.
Numerous
parties, including several States, challenged EPA’s actions in the D. C.
Circuit, which dismissed some of the petitions for lack of jurisdiction and
denied the remainder.
Held: The judgment is affirmed in
part and reversed in part.
684
F. 3d 102, affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Justice
Scalia
delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, concluding:
1. The
Act neither compels nor permits EPA to adopt an interpretation of the Act
requiring a source to obtain a PSD or Title V permit on the sole basis of its
potential greenhouse-gas emissions. Pp. 10–24.
(a) The
Act does not compel EPA’s interpretation. Massachusetts
held that the Act-wide definition of “air pollutant” includes greenhouse gases,
549 U. S., at 529, but where the term “air pollutant” appears in the Act’s
operative provisions, including the PSD and Title V permitting provisions, EPA
has routinely given it a narrower, context-appropriate meaning. Massachusetts did
not invalidate those longstanding constructions. The Act-wide definition is not
a command to regulate, but a description of the universe of substances EPA may
consider regulating under the Act’s operative provisions. Though Congress’s
profligate use of “air pollutant” is not conducive to clarity, the presumption
of consistent usage “ ‘readily yields’ ” to context, and a statutory
term “may take on distinct characters from association with distinct statutory
objects calling for different implementation strategies.” Environmental Defense
v. Duke Energy Corp.,
549
U. S. 561. Pp. 10–16.
(b) Nor
does the Act permit EPA’s interpretation. Agencies empowered to resolve
statutory ambiguities must operate “within the bounds of reasonable
interpretation,” Arlington
v. FCC,
569 U. S. ___, ___. EPA has repeatedly acknowledged that applying the PSD
and Title V permitting requirements to greenhouse gases would be inconsistent
with the Act’s structure and design. A review of the relevant statutory
provisions leaves no doubt that the PSD program and Title V are designed to
apply to, and cannot rationally be extended beyond, a relative handful of large
sources capable of shouldering heavy substantive and procedural burdens. EPA’s
interpretation would also bring about an enormous and transformative expansion
in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529
U. S. 120. Pp. 16–20.
(c) EPA
lacked authority to “tailor” the Act’s unambiguous numerical thresholds of 100
or 250 tons per year to accommodate its greenhouse-gas-inclusive interpretation
of the permitting triggers. Agencies must always “ ‘give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’ ” National Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife,
551
U. S. 644. The power to execute the laws does not include a power to
revise clear statutory terms that turn out not to work in practice.
Pp. 20–24.
2. EPA
reasonably interpreted the Act to require sources that would need permits based
on their emission of conventional pollutants to comply with BACT for greenhouse
gases. Pp. 24–29.
(a) Concerns
that BACT, which has traditionally been about end-of-stack controls, is
fundamentally unsuited to greenhouse-gas regulation, which is more about energy
use, are not unfounded. But an EPA guidance document states that BACT analysis
should consider options other than energy efficiency, including “carbon capture
and storage,” which EPA contends is reasonably comparable to more traditional,
end-of-stack BACT technologies. Moreover, assuming that BACT may be used to
force improvements in energy efficiency, important limitations on BACT may work
to mitigate concerns about “unbounded” regulatory authority. Pp. 24–27.
(b) EPA’s
decision to require BACT for greenhouse gases emitted by sources otherwise
subject to PSD review is, as a general matter, a permissible interpretation of
the statute under Chevron
U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U. S. 837. The specific phrasing of the BACT provision—which requires
BACT “for each pollutant subject to regulation under” the Act, §7475(a)(4)—does
not suggest that the provision can bear a narrowing construction. And even if
the text were not clear, applying BACT to greenhouse gases is not so
disastrously unworkable, and need not result in such a dramatic expansion of
agency authority, as to make EPA’s interpretation unreasonable. Pp. 27–29.
Scalia,
J.,
announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, Parts I and II of
which were for the Court. Roberts, C. J., and
Kennedy, J., joined that opinion in full; Thomas and Alito, JJ.,
joined as to Parts I, II–A, and II–B–1; and Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined
as to Part II–B–2. Breyer J., filed an opinion
concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Ginsburg,
Sotomayor, and Kagan, JJ., joined. Alito, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, in which Thomas, J., joined.
Notes
1 Together with No.
12–1248, American
Chemistry Council et al. v. Environmental
Protection Agency et al., No. 12–1254, Energy-Intensive Manufacturers
Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Regulation et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency
et al., No. 12–1268, Southeastern
Legal Foundation, Inc., et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency et al.,
No. 12–1269, Texas
et al. v. Environmental
Protection Agency et al., and No. 12–1272, Chamber of Commerce of United
States States et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency et al.,
also on certiorari to the same court.
