MEC&F Expert Engineers

Monday, November 17, 2014

KEY LESSONS FOR PREVENTING INCIDENTS FROM FLAMMABLE CHEMICALS IN EDUCATIONAL DEMONSTRATIONS



Key Lessons for Preventing Incidents from Flammable Chemicals in Educational Demonstrations. 




October 30, 2014, Denver, CO – Today the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) released a safety bulletin called “Key Lessons for Preventing Incidents from Flammable Chemicals in Educational Demonstrations” based on three recent serious incidents in Nevada, Colorado, and Illinois where children were burned while observing laboratory demonstrations involving flammable liquid methanol.

The first incident described in the CSB safety bulletin is the September 3, 2014, accident at the Terry Lee Wells Discovery Museum, known as “The Discovery,” in Reno, Nevada, where thirteen people, most of them children, were injured. Two CSB investigators were deployed to the site and interviewed personnel who were directly involved. 

Just 12 days after the fire in Nevada, a second similar accident occurred on September 15th at the SMART Academy in Denver, Colorado, severely burning a 16-year-old high school student. Most recently, on October 20, 2014, less than five weeks after the incident at SMART, three Cub Scouts and one adult were injured during a demonstration using methanol at a Cub Scout event in Raymond, Illinois.

All the incidents involved demonstrations of flames – usually with a color additive – using methanol as the flammable liquid. In all three cases there was a flash back to the methanol bulk containers, and fire engulfed members of the viewing audience who were not protected by any physical barriers.

The safety bulletin notes that these incidents are similar to others the CSB has identified in which laboratory demonstrations involving flammable materials have resulted in fires and injuries. These include a 2006 accident at an Ohio high school that severely burned then-15-year-old student Calais Weber. The accident took place during a demonstration of a chemical “rainbow” that involved combusting salts with methanol. Calais’ story was described in a CSB safety video released in December 2013, called “After the Rainbow.”



The CSB found that the accident at The Discovery took place during a “fire tornado” demonstration, where salts of different elements are burned in a dish along with methanol-soaked cotton balls, while spinning on a rotating tray. This produces a colored flame that looks like a tornado. 

However, on the day of the accident the cotton failed to catch fire as expected. Additional methanol was added from a four-liter (about a gallon) bottle. CSB investigators determined that unbeknownst to museum personnel, the cotton ball was likely already smoldering, which ignited the freshly added methanol. A flash fire raced back into the large bottle - and burning methanol from the bottle sprayed toward the nearby audience of adults and children.

CSB Chairperson Rafael Moure-Eraso said, “ When performed safely these kinds of demonstrations can engage students and visitors and stimulate their interest in science. But methanol, the hazardous chemical involved in The Discovery and two other recent incidents the CSB has investigated, is classified as a highly flammable liquid, and users should adopt strict safety controls.”

Methanol can ignite at room temperature and has the potential for dangerous flash fires, especially when large quantities are present. The threat is quite similar to gasoline. However, CSB investigators learned that methanol is readily sold to schools and museums in four-liter containers. 

The CSB also found that The Discovery developed the fire tornado demonstration based on YouTube video and additional online resources, where descriptions of accident risks or comprehensive safety instructions were not provided. And museum personnel who wrote procedures for the demonstration did not have an adequate background in chemistry or safety. The demonstration was performed approximately 15 feet away from museum visitors, with no barrier between the audience and the flames.




Similarly the CSB found that in the incident at SMART in Denver, the school lacked adequate safety procedures and a lab safety training program. The accident occurred during a demonstration activity of flammable properties which involved igniting a small pool of methanol to create a flame. When the flame did not rise as high as anticipated, additional methanol was added from a four-liter bulk container resulting in a 12 foot flash fire. 

The CSB found that the teacher was not aware of the potential for a methanol flash fire and had received no training about the hazards related to demonstrations involving large quantities of methanol or other flammable materials. This incident resulted in four students being burned in the flash fire, one seriously.  

Likewise the October 20, 2014, accident demonstration at a Cub Scout event in Raymond, Illinois, occurred when methanol was poured from a container onto boric acid near an open flame. Similar to other incidents, the flame propagated back into the bottle and resulted in a flash fire that burned members of the group and seriously injured one Cub Scout. Like The Discovery incident, this demonstration involved burning methanol with boric acid to produce a green colored flame.




The CSB safety bulletin outlines key lessons learned as a result of the CSB’s investigation into these incidents:

- Due to flash fire hazards and the potential for serious injuries, do not use bulk containers of flammable chemicals in educational demonstrations when small quantities are sufficient
- Employers should implement strict safety controls when demonstrations necessitate handling hazardous chemicals — including written procedures, effective training, and the required use of appropriate personal protective equipment for all participants
- Conduct a comprehensive hazard review prior to performing any educational demonstration
- Provide a safety barrier between the demonstration and the audience

Chairperson Rafael Moure-Erason said, “These key lessons, if followed, will prevent future injuries. Educators should substitute or minimize the use of flammable chemicals and perform an effective hazard review prior to conducting an educational demonstration. Safety must be the absolute priority and educators should demonstrate chemical safety concepts as well as the science topic.”




The CSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating industrial chemical accidents. The agency's board members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. CSB investigations look into all aspects of chemical accidents, including physical causes such as equipment failure as well as inadequacies in regulations, industry standards, and safety management systems.

The Board does not issue citations or fines but does make safety recommendations to plants, industry organizations, labor groups, and regulatory agencies such as OSHA and EPA. Visit our website, www.csb.gov.

4 WORKERS INHALE TOXIC CONCENTRATIONS OF METHYL MERCAPTAN AND DIE AT DUPONT'S LA PORTE TEXAS CHEMICAL PLANT - UPDATE



 4 WORKERS INHALE TOXIC CONCENTRATIONS OF METHYL MERCAPTAN AND DIE AT DUPONT'S LA PORTE TEXAS CHEMICAL PLANT - UPDATE

CSB DuPont- LaPorte, TX Investigation Update   430 p.m. Monday Nov. 17, 2014




The CSB investigation into the tragic accident at DuPont's La Porte, Texas, chemical plant got underway this morning at 8 a.m.  Seven members of the eight-member team met with company and local union representatives to map out the direction of the CSB investigation. This took place in a  company building conference room at the facility.  


Subsequently, investigators began interviews of several DuPont personnel, with plans being made to interview shift workers and other possible witnesses to the events that led to a release of highly toxic methyl mercaptan, exposure to which killed four workers early Saturday morning. Those interviews were continuing this afternoon.


The CSB is coordinating the worker interviews with the help of International Chemical Workers Union Council representatives.   


The team has not yet been able to access the area where the leak and the deaths occurred, described by Investigator Banks as an approximately 5-stories high enclosed structure with piping, valves and other equipment.

Mr. Banks said, "DuPont is taking steps to assure the area is safe to access. We will be evaluating that process and when we determine it is safe for our team members to document the site we will enter. We don't know how soon that will be. We have asked the company to preserve the status of the process, valve and other equipment settings as close as possible to where they were at the time of the accident to aid in our investigation."





He continued, "At this point, obviously it is too soon for us to be able to determine the immediate cause of this accident.  We will release information to the public as soon as confirmed findings are known."

Investigators are preparing document requests which typically concern maintenance schedules, operator training, equipment histories, hazard analyses and other information critical to determining the root cause of the accident. 



DEATH BY LETHAL INHALATION: FAILURE TO USE PROPER CONDENSATE MONITORING AND MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES HAS CAUSED MANY DEATHS AND PROPERTY DAMAGE IN THE OIL & GAS INDUSTRY



DEATH BY LETHAL INHALATION: FAILURE TO USE PROPER CONDENSATE MONITORING AND MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES HAS CAUSED MANY DEATHS AND PROPERTY DAMAGE IN THE OIL & GAS INDUSTRY



                                                   Figure 1. Flowback Tanks


 What is flowback
Flowback refers to process fluids from the wellbore that return to the surface and are collected after hydraulic fracturing is completed. In addition to the hydraulic fracturing fluids originally pumped, returned fluids contain volatile hydrocarbons from the formation. After separation, flowback fluids are typically stored temporarily in tanks (figure 1) or surface impoundments (lined pits, ponds) at the well site. Liquid hydrocarbons from the separation process are routed to production tanks (figure 2). Workers periodically gauge the fluid levels in flowback and production tanks with hand-held gauges (sticks and tapes) through access hatches located on the top of the tank.


MSDS for Flowback
The Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for condensate identifies it as a potentially flammable and explosive substance with vapors that may travel long distances to an ignition source and flash back.



Sulfur compounds in this material may decompose to release hydrogen sulfide gas which may accumulate to potentially lethal concentrations in enclosed air spaces. Vapor concentrations of hydrogen sulfide above 50 ppm, or prolonged exposure at lower concentrations, may saturate human odor perceptions so that the smell of gas may not be apparent. DO NOT DEPEND ON THE SENSE OF SMELL TO DETECT HYDROGEN SULFIDE! IDLH for hydrogen sulfide is 100 ppm. 

Hydrogen sulfide is listed as an EPA Extremely Hazardous Substance.

Contains benzene, a chemical known to cause cancer in humans. May cause diseases of the blood forming organs, such as leukemia, adverse effects on the immune system and adverse reproductive effects. Benzene may cause irritation to the eyes, skin and lungs, central nervous system effects and irregular heartbeats. IDLH for benzene is 500 ppm.



Some components of this material such as benzene, toluene and xylene have been shown to produce fetal toxicity and/or reduce female or male reproductive capacity in laboratory animals.




Although worker safety hazards in the oil and gas extraction industry are well known, there is very little published data regarding occupational health hazards (e.g., types and magnitude of risks for chemical exposures) during oil and gas extraction operations. To address the lack of information, NIOSH requests assistance from oil and gas stakeholders in further characterizing risks for chemical exposures during flowback operations and, as needed, develop and implement exposure controls. This blog briefly describes flowback operations and addresses reports made known to NIOSH of recent worker fatalities related to or located at flowback operations. 






Worker Fatalities









                                                Figure 2. Production Tanks





NIOSH learned about several worker fatalities associated with flowback operations through media reports, officials with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and members of the academic community. According to our information, at least four workers have died since 2010 from what appears to be acute chemical exposures during flowback operations at well sites in the Williston Basin (North Dakota and Montana). While not all of these investigations are complete, available information suggests that these cases involved workers who were gauging flowback or production tanks or involved in transferring flowback fluids at the well site. Often these fatalities occurred when the workers were performing their duties alone.





Potential Exposures during Flowback Operations



Flowback refers to process fluids from the wellbore that return to the surface and are collected after hydraulic fracturing is completed. In addition to the hydraulic fracturing fluids originally pumped, returned fluids contain volatile hydrocarbons from the formation. After separation, flowback fluids are typically stored temporarily in tanks (figure 1) or surface impoundments (lined pits, ponds) at the well site. Liquid hydrocarbons from the separation process are routed to production tanks (figure 2). Workers periodically gauge the fluid levels in flowback and production tanks with hand-held gauges (sticks and tapes) through access hatches located on the top of the tank.





Hydrogen sulfide (sour gas) is well recognized as a toxic exposure hazard associated with oil and gas extraction and production (1,2). However, less recognized by many employers and workers is that many of the chemicals found in volatile hydrocarbons are acutely toxic at high concentrations. Volatile hydrocarbons can affect the eyes, breathing, and the nervous system (3,4,5,6,7) and at high concentrations may also affect the heart causing abnormal rhythms (8,9). Recently, NIOSH conducted exposure assessments to identify chemical hazards to workers involved in flowback operations. Results from initial field studies suggest that certain flowback operations/activities can result in elevated concentrations of volatile hydrocarbons in the work environment that could be acute exposure hazards. The results, conclusions, and recommendations based on these evaluations will be detailed in a peer-reviewed journal article, a future NIOSH Science Blog posting, or other communication products.





Preliminary Recommendations



Based on the limited information on fatalities and initial NIOSH exposure assessments, NIOSH researchers have identified preliminary recommendations to reduce the potential for occupational exposures:





1) Develop alternative tank gauging procedures so workers do not have to routinely open hatches on the tops of the tanks and manually gauge the level of liquid.



2) Provide hazard awareness training to ensure flowback technicians, water haulers, and drivers understand the potential hazards and risks for volatile chemical exposures when working on and around flowback and production tanks.



3) Monitor workers to determine their exposure to volatile hydrocarbons and other contaminants. Employers should consult with an occupational safety and health professional trained in industrial hygiene to ensure an appropriate sampling strategy is used.



4) Ensure workers do not work alone in potentially hazardous areas.



5) Use appropriate respiratory protection in areas where potentially high concentrations of volatile hydrocarbons can occur as an interim measure until engineering controls are implemented. Employers should consult with an occupational safety and health professional trained in industrial hygiene to determine the appropriate respirator to be used. Note that OSHA regulations (29 CFR 1910.134External Web Site Icon) require a comprehensive respiratory protection program be established when respirators are used in the workplace. NIOSH guidance for selecting respirators can be found at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2005-100/default.html




6) Establish emergency procedures to provide medical response in the event of an incident.








NIOSH continues to work with OSHA to obtain additional information about these fatalities. We request assistance from our occupational safety and health stakeholders for information on other potentially related incidents or fatalities related to acute exposures during such flowback operations. NIOSH is looking for additional industry partners to work with us to further characterize worker exposures during flowback operations and to develop and evaluate controls, as needed. If you have questions or wish to provide further pertinent information, please contact us via the blog comment box below or by e-mail at nioshblog@cdc.gov.




Notes



The objective of this blog entry is to describe a potential emerging occupational hazard in the oil and gas extraction industry. Additionally, it is meant to request help from stakeholders for more information related to fatalities associated with flowback operations. To keep the blog discussion focused on worker health, we may choose not to respond to comments that do not pertain to worker exposures.



References



1. NIOSH POCKET GUIDE TO CHEMICAL HAZARDS, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Centers for Disease Control and Prevention National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. (2007)DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2005-149 Hydrogen Sulfide: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npg/npgd0337.html



2. OSHA Oil and Gas Well Servicing eTool: General Safety and Health: Hydrogen Sulfide Gas https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/etools/oilandgas/general_safety/h2s_monitoring.html



3.NIOSH POCKET GUIDE TO CHEMICAL HAZARDS, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Centers for Disease Control and Prevention National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. (2007)DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2005-149. Benzene: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npg/npgd0049.html



4. NIOSH POCKET GUIDE TO CHEMICAL HAZARDS, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Centers for Disease Control and Prevention National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. (2007)DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2005-149. N-Pentane: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npg/npgd0486.html



5. NIOSH POCKET GUIDE TO CHEMICAL HAZARDS, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Centers for Disease Control and Prevention National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. (2007)DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2005-149. N-Hexane: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npg/npgd0322.html



6. NIOSH POCKET GUIDE TO CHEMICAL HAZARDS, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Centers for Disease Control and Prevention National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. (2007)DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2005-149. N-Heptane: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npg/npgd0312.html



7. NIOSH POCKET GUIDE TO CHEMICAL HAZARDS, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES Centers for Disease Control and Prevention National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. (2007)DHHS (NIOSH) Publication No. 2005-149. Petroleum distillates: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/npg/npgd0492.html



8. Adgey A.A., Johnston P.W., McMechan S. Sudden cardiac death and substance abuse. Resuscitation. (1995)Jun;29(3):219-21.



9. Sugie, H., Sasakia C. Hashimotoa, C., Takeshita, H. et al. Three cases of sudden death due to butane or propane gas inhalation: analysis of tissues for gas components. Forensic Science International (2004) 143:211–214.





Sunday, November 16, 2014

PIPELINE REPLACEMENT UPDATES FROM THE UNITED STATES PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION




PIPELINE REPLACEMENT UPDATES FROM THE UNITED STATES PHMSA



Background
Aging pipelines
In January 2012, President Obama signed the Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011, which examines and improves existing pipeline safety regulations and provides the regulatory certainty necessary for pipeline owners and operators to plan infrastructure investments and create jobs.
Pipeline transportation is one of the safest and most cost-effective ways to transport natural gas and hazardous liquid products. As America continues to develop and place more demands on energy transportation, it becomes more necessary to invest in upgrading its infrastructure, including aging pipelines. To follow State's progress in pipeline infrastructure upgrades, or to obtain contact information and incident and mileage data, visit PHMSA’s state pipeline profiles.
In 2011, following major tragic natural gas incidents, DOT and PHMSA issued a Call to Action to accelerate the repair, rehabilitation, and replacement of the highest-risk pipeline infrastructure. Among other factors, pipeline age and material are significant risk indicators. Pipelines constructed of cast and wrought iron, as well as bare steel, are among those that pose the highest-risk.
Reports
To illustrate the progress pipeline operators are making in the replacement of aging gas pipelines, PHMSA provides an annually-updated online inventory of high-risk pipeline infrastructure by state. Specifically, the dynamic inventory highlights efforts to replace iron and bare steel gas distribution pipelines. and shows trends in pipeline miles by decade of installation.
About Cast and Wrought Iron Pipelines
Cast and wrought iron pipelines are among the oldest energy pipelines constructed in the United States. Many of these pipelines were installed over 60 years ago and still deliver natural gas to homes and businesses today. However, the degrading nature of iron alloys, the age of the pipelines, and pipe joints design have greatly increased the risk involved with continued use of such pipelines.
The Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011 calls for DOT to conduct a state-by-state survey on the progress of cast iron pipeline replacement. For updates on the states’ progress, contact information and incident and mileage data, the public should visit PHMSA’s state pipeline profiles.
The amount of cast and wrought iron pipeline in use has declined significantly in recent years, thanks to increased state and federal safety initiatives and pipeline operators’ replacement efforts.
Sixteen states have completely eliminated cast or wrought iron natural gas distribution lines within their borders, Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, New Mexico, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
Approximately 97 percent of natural gas distribution pipelines in the U.S. were made of plastic or steel at the end of 2012. The remaining 3 percent is mostly iron pipe.
About Bare Steel Pipelines
Uncoated steel pipelines are known as bare steel pipelines and while many of these pipelines have been taken out of service, some of these pipelines are still operating today. The age and lack of protective coating typically makes bare steel pipelines of higher risk as compared to some other pipelines and candidates for accelerated replacement programs.
About Decade Installed
From the early 1900’s through today, the integrity of energy pipelines have all benefited from improvements in pipe manufacturing, pipe materials, construction methods, and maintenance practices. 

Recent Incidents Involving Cast Iron Pipelines
Even though the amount of cast iron pipelines is declining, there have been a number of recent incidents caused by cast iron gas distribution main failures, resurging attention to the risks associated with cast and wrought iron pipelines.
January 9, 2012 – A home exploded on Payne Ave in Austin, Texas, resulting in one fatality and one injury. The leak originated at a break in a four-inch cast iron gas main installed in 1950. The cast iron main break occurred after rainfall that followed extended drought conditions.
February 9, 2011 – A tragic explosion occurred on North 13th Street in Allentown, Pa. Local emergency responders worked to limit the spread of the fire while the operator cut through reinforced concrete to access the gas main. A preliminary investigation found a crack in a 12-inch cast iron main that was installed in 1928 and was operating at less than 1 psig at the time of incident. As a result of the explosion and ensuing fire, five people lost their lives, three people required in-patient hospitalization, and eight homes were destroyed.
January 18, 2011 – An explosion and fire caused the death of one gas utility employee and injuries to several others while gas utility crews were responding to a natural gas leak in Philadelphia, Pa. A preliminary investigation found a circumferential break on a 12-inch cast iron distribution main that was installed in 1942 and was operating at 17 psig.
Incident and Consequence Analysis
PHMSA regulations require gas distribution operators to submit incident reports when a leak causes an injury or fatality, property damage in excess of $50,000, or the unintentional release of more than three million standard cubic feet of gas. Gas distribution incident reports (excluding those caused by leaks beyond the customer meter) for 2005 through 2013 show the following:
10.5 percent of the incidents occurring on gas distribution mains involved cast iron mains. However, only 2.5 percent of distribution mains are cast iron.
In proportion to overall cast iron main mileage, the frequency of incidents on mains made of cast iron is more than four times that of mains made of other materials.
38 percent of the cast/wrought iron main incidents caused a fatality or injury, compared to only 20 percent of the incidents on other types of mains.
12 percent of all fatalities and 8 percent of all injuries on gas distribution facilities involved cast or wrought iron pipelines.
What Causes Iron Pipe Leaks?
The biggest threat to cast or wrought iron pipe is earth movement. If these pipelines are disturbed by digging, seasonal frost heave, or changes in ground water levels, leakage may occur. 
Another serious threat called graphitization is a natural process in which iron degrades to softer elements, making iron pipelines more susceptible to cracking. The extent of graphitization depends on many factors, but gas may leak from the joints or through cracks in the pipe if graphitization has occurred.
When leaks occur on low-pressure systems with cast or wrought iron distribution lines, the volume of gas escaping through the failure point is much less than what might escape through the same size failure in a system operating at higher pressures. However, even a relatively small volume of natural gas leakage can have catastrophic consequences.
History
Cast and wrought iron pipelines were originally constructed to transport manufactured gas beginning in the 1870s and 1880s, with cast iron becoming more popular in the early 1900s.
In 1970 PHMSA began collecting data about gas pipelines mileage categorized by pipe material type. In 1983, gas distribution pipeline operators reported 61,536 miles of cast iron and 4,371 miles of wrought iron pipe. Operators began submitting merged data for the two beginning in 1984.
Wrought iron pipelines were joined end-to-end using either threaded or compression couplings, while cast iron pipelines were linked using bell and spigot joints with packing material stuffed in the bell to form a gas tight seal. Since these pipelines transported wet, manufactured gas, the packing material absorbed moisture and generally did not leak.
As dry, natural gas began supplanting manufactured gas use in the mid-20th century, the packing material sealing the joints dried out, causing leaks. A variety of clamping and encapsulation techniques have been implemented over the years to repair the joints.
Distribution Integrity Management Programs
In late 2009, PHMSA implemented pipeline safety regulations for managing the integrity of gas distribution pipelines. Operators were required to create and implement Distribution Integrity Management Programs (DIMP) by August 2011. Operators are required to know the specific characteristics of their system and operating environment to identify threats, evaluate the risk, and take measures to reduce the risk.
Specifically for cast/wrought iron, operators must have knowledge of the specific characteristics of the pipe and environments where graphitization could be severe.  Evaluating past leak history and monitoring cast/wrought iron pipe during excavations are also key components of maintaining integrity.
National Transportation Safety Board Recommendations
The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent federal agency that conducts investigations to determine the probable causes of transportation accidents.
In 1986, the NTSB investigated an explosion at a restaurant in Derby, Conn., that killed six people and injured 12. The NTSB issued recommendations for corrective action only to the pipeline operator. In 1990, a natural gas explosion and fire killed one person, injured nine, destroyed two homes, and damaged two adjacent houses in Allentown, Pa. The NTSB report found that a water main leak eroded support under a 4-inch cast iron gas main. This ground disturbance results in a circumferential crack in the gas main. Natural gas migrated through the soil and into the basement of one of the homes where it ignited, exploded, and burned.  The cast iron gas main was significantly weakened by graphitization.
In 1991, the NTSB recommended that PHMSA – then called the Research and Special Projects Agency – require pipeline operators to implement a program to identify and replace cast iron pipelines that may threaten public safety.  PHMSA issued two Advisory Bulletins related to cast iron replacement programs.
RSPA Alert Notice 91-02    Encourages operators to develop procedures to identify segments of cast iron pipe that may need replacement.  Reminds operators that pipeline safety regulations require generally graphitized cast iron pipe to be replaced and protect excavated cast iron pipe from damage.
RSPA Alert Notice 92-02    Reminds operators that pipeline safety regulations require operators to have a procedure for continuing surveillance of pipeline facilities to identify problems and take appropriate action concerning failures, leakage history, corrosion, and other unusual operating and maintenance conditions.  This procedure should also include surveillance of cast iron to identify problems and take appropriate action concerning graphitization.

Cast and Wrought Iron Inventory

Reports
The inventory opens in a new window and contains three reports about each state with cast or wrought iron pipe.
 
In the first report , you can rank states by either gas distribution main miles or service line counts. Distribution mains are natural gas distribution pipelines that serve as a common source of supply for more than one service line. Service lines are the pipelines that transport gas to a customer’s meter or piping. The table is initially sorted by the number of miles of cast or wrought iron gas distribution main, but can be sorted by any of the columns.
The second report shows the change in main miles and service line counts over the years. Nationally, iron distribution main mileage has decreased by nearly 24 percent from 2004 to 2013 . The number of cast or wrought iron service lines has decreased by nearly 73 percent over the same time period. The third report shows data for each operator reporting iron pipelines since 2004.
All of the reports can be limited to a single state by using the state prompt at the top. Any state not included in the drop-down either never had cast and wrought gas distribution pipelines or all were removed before 2004.


Bare Steel Inventory
Reports
The inventory opens in a new window and contains three reports about each state with bare steel pipe.

In the first report, you can rank states by either gas distribution main miles or service line counts. Distribution mains are natural gas distribution pipelines that serve as a common source of supply for more than one service line. Service lines are the pipelines that transport gas to a customer’s meter or piping. The table is initially sorted by the number of miles of bare steel gas distribution main, but can be sorted by any of the columns.
The second report shows the change in main miles and service line counts over the years. Nationally, bare steel gas distribution main mileage has decreased by nearly 24 percent from 2004 to 2013 . The number of bare steel service lines has decreased by nearly 49 percent over the same time period. The third report shows data for each gas distribution operator reporting bare steel pipelines since 2004.
All of the reports can be limited to a single state by using the state prompt at the top.  Any state not included in the drop-down either never had bare steel gas distribution pipelines or all were removed before 2004.

Background and History
Uncoated steel pipelines are known as bare steel pipelines. While many of these pipelines have been taken out of service, some of these pipelines are still operating safely today. The age and lack of protective coating typically makes bare steel pipelines candidates for accelerated replacement programs.
The lack of protective coating on these lines requires a high level of cathodic protection current for corrosion protection of the pipeline. Surveys used to determine the effectiveness of cathodic protection on bare steel pipelines focus on identifying larger corrosion cells called “hot spots,”  However, small, localized corrosion areas are difficult to identify and can lead to integrity issues.
Bare steel pipe was used extensively in distribution pipelines until the 1960’s, when the availability of plastic pipelines had expanded to natural gas distribution systems.  Until pipeline coatings were required with the establishment of federal mandates in 1971, some transmission and distribution operators, continued to install pipelines without coatings, particularly in dry areas of the country. 
Distribution Integrity Management Programs
Pipeline integrity, refers to a system that is in sound, unimpaired condition  that can safely carry out its function under the conditions and parameters for which it was designed. An integrity management program is a documented set of policies, processes, and procedures that are implemented to ensure the integrity of a pipeline.
Cathodic protection is a method of protecting metallic pipelines from corrosion. Applied cathodic protection and external coating are important components of the pipeline corrosion protection system.
Assessing the integrity of bare steel pipelines is more difficult than for other coated pipelines as the assessment methodology employed must be closely monitored. Magnetic flux leakage is most commonly used to identify areas of metal loss. Corrosion that may exist along bare steel lines could mask some of the magnetic leakage, and cause measurement inaccuracy regarding the depth of metal loss. Inspection tools that make direct measurements, such as ultrasonic metal loss tools, will give better results on bare steel lines. Bare steel pipelines are also difficult to inspect with external corrosion direct assessment (ECDA) because many ECDA tools rely on indications of coating faults or coating conditions which are not applicable to uncoated pipelines.
Bare steel pipelines are a focus for many pipeline replacement and rehabilitation programs that are planned or in place across the country. In areas where pipe replacement by excavation is too cumbersome, bare steel pipe may be inserted with new plastic pipe.  In addition to cathodic protection surveys that identify areas of active corrosion and interference currents, leak detection surveys utilized at an increased frequency beyond minimum federal requirements can identify leaks early as well.



By-Decade Inventory
Reports
The inventory opens in a new window and contains four tabs with information about miles of pipeline by decade of installation.  The first three tabs contain reports for gas distribution, gas transmission, and hazardous liquid pipelines.
The first report on these tabs, shows how the number of miles installed in each decade has changed since 2005.  One bar chart shows the decades before 1970 and a separate chart shows decades after 1970.  The first report also includes a table of the data.  In the second report, you can select a single decade and see the trend line since 2005.  For gas distribution, you can choose to see data for mains or services.  For hazardous liquid, you can select one or more commodities.
The national reduction in pre-1970 pipelines in 2013 compared to 2005 is:
Pipeline Type
% Reduction in pre-1970
% of Total Installed pre-1970
Gas Distribution Main Miles
9.2
37.9
Gas Distribution Service Count
21.8
29.1
Gas Transmission Miles
9.6
57.6
Hazardous Liquid Miles
2.2
50.4
The last tab includes two reports ranking states by miles of pre-1970 pipelines.  The first report is for gas pipelines and the second report is for hazardous liquid.  The reports can be sorted by any of the columns.
Pipeline Practices over the Decades
From the early 1900’s through today gas transmission, hazardous liquid and gas distribution pipelines have all benefited through each decade from improvements in pipe manufacturing, construction, and operational and maintenance (O&M) practices. 
Pipe Manufacturing Process included improvements in steel metallurgy, seam welding techniques, seam non-destructive testing, pipe rolling practices, and quality control through pressure testing and  inspection before the pipe leaves the mill.
Lap welded, hammer welded, low frequency electric resistance (LF-ERW) and flash welded (FW) pipe were all used starting in the early 1900’s.  Pipes manufactured during the post-World War II construction boom that lasted well into the 1960’s were vulnerable to seam quality issues.  Since the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, these seam types are no longer manufactured or installed by pipeline operators.  They have been replaced with high frequency (HF) ERW pipe, submerged arc welded (SAW) or seamless pipe, which all have improved steel and seam properties.
Current manufacturing processes include improved steel rolling practices, non-destructive seam inspection, and pressure testing of the pipe before it leaves the mill.
Since the late 1960’s, the use of plastic pipe in gas distribution pipelines has steadily increased. Some vintages installed between the 1960s and early 1980s have the potential for brittle-like cracking.  The susceptibility is dependent on the resin, pipe processing, and service conditions.
Construction practice improvements have been in field girth welding and non-destructive testing (NDT), pipe coating, pipe bending, use of select backfill, in-place hydrostatic pressure testing and inspection.
Construction practices beginning in the early 1900’s included the use of wrinkle bends, threaded collars, oxy-acetylene welding, backing rings for welding, and non-coated pipe.  Beginning in the 1930’s and 1940’s improved girth welds using shielded metal arc welding (SMAW) , pipe bending practices, usage of pipe coating, and girth weld non-destructive inspection were beginning to be used by most pipeline operators.  The need for pipeline non-destructive testing (NDT) grew very rapidly with the increase of offshore gas and oil exploration in the 1970s.
O&M practice improvement have included usage of cathodic protection for external corrosion mitigation, programs for internal corrosion such as operational  pigging and inhibitor injection programs,  integrity management assessments, smart pigging, remediation of defects found, and right-of-way monitoring that  includes one-call programs.
O&M practices in the early 1900’s through the early 1950’s by some pipeline operators did not include designs for operational pigging, usage of cathodic protection, and sometimes pipe external coatings.  Beginning in the 1950’s usage of full opening valves for pigging, cathodic protection, and external pipe coatings were being used by most pipeline operators. The first smart pig was developed in the 1960s using Magnetic Flux Leakage (MFL) technology to inspect the bottom portion of the pipeline.  Development of both pipeline pigs for electromagnetic and ultrasonic detection of wall thinning, and X-ray crawlers for weld inspection in long runs of pipe occurred during the 1970s. Pigs and crawlers were the only means of inspecting for erosion, corrosion (internal and external) and other types of defect in buried pipes.  Operator Qualification (OQ) regulation was implemented in 1999 to require that maintenance personnel performing the work on the pipeline were qualified.  A critical improvement to O&M practices was integrity management program requirements to assess the condition of pipelines and remediate defects that compromised pipeline safety.  Learn more about integrity management assessment techniques:
Overall improvements in pipe manufacturing, construction, and O&M practices have been an integral part of the pipeline industry efforts to reduce risk and improve public safety from incidents beginning in the 1900’s through today.   The Gas Code (Part 192) was implemented in 1970 and the Hazardous Liquid Code (Part 195) was implemented in 1979.  Their basis was in the technical standard ASME B31.8. Many states had already adopted ASME B31.8 prior to the federal gas codes. The implementation of these codes has been an integral part in further reducing risks and improving safety through consistent regulations and standards for all pipeline operators.
Pipelines constructed before adoption of federal safety rules in 1970 were allowed a grandfathering exemption for establishing maximum allowable operating pressure (MAOP).  This allowed natural gas transmission lines installed before July 1, 1970 to be operated in some cases without having been: pressure tested in the field, higher MAOPs than allowed for new pipelines constructed after implementation of the regulations, and without material records.  Hydrostatic pressure testing can identify latent manufacturing and construction defects.
Eliminating or limiting the grandfather clause could have a significant impact on industry because about 50% of onshore natural gas transmission lines were constructed before 1970.
PHMSA held public a workshop, The Integrity Verification Process, which included discussion of possible removal of parts of the grandfather clause, remediation of pipe with seam integrity issues, and material documentation.