Tuesday, March 10, 2015

COMMUNITY DEBATE IS HEATING UP OVER HOW SAFE — OR HOW DANGEROUS — A PROPANE TERMINAL MIGHT BE THAT’S PROPOSED NEAR HAYDEN ISLAND IN NORTH PORTLAND.




At the proposed Portland project, liquefied propane would be transferred into pressurized rail cars as shown here.  Once here, the propane would be transferred from train cars into pressurized bullet-shaped tanks like those at gas stations, then into huge refrigerated holding tanks, and then into oceangoing ships.


MARCH 10, 2015

PEMBINA PIPELINE CORP., HAYDEN ISLAND IN NORTH PORTLAND, OR


Community debate is heating up over how safe — or how dangerous — a propane terminal might be that’s proposed near Hayden Island in North Portland. 

Pembina Pipeline Corp., the Canadian terminal developer, hosts an all-day workshop today to review safety features planned at the $500 million export terminal at the Port of Portland’s Terminal 6. In front of perhaps 35 technical experts and city and neighborhood representatives, Pembina may divulge, for the first time, preliminary findings on potential “hazard zones” surrounding the project — areas of North Portland that might be affected by gas leaks and explosions at the terminal, said Pembina’s local project manager Eric Dyck.
“Nothing else matters” if the facility isn’t safe, Dyck said at a briefing for reporters last Wednesday. 

Today’s workshop, which is closed to the media and general public, comes as nervous Hayden Island residents and environmental groups circulate a “white paper” by island residents that depicts five potential “threat zones” surrounding the site. The white paper was researched and written by physicist A. Roxburgh, computer systems architect Ron Ebersole and professor of doctoral studies Timme Helzer, collaborating with others in the Northwest Citizen Science Initiative. 

The authors describe a potential accident where propane leaks and then ignites from one pressurized rail car or bullet-shaped storage tank, sending flying shrapnel that sets off a domino reaction among 100 rail cars, storage tanks and other equipment. 

The white paper concludes anyone within one mile of the propane terminal might be killed by such an accident, known as a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion, or BLEVE. Those within 1.5 miles might be exposed to serious injury or burns to people and buildings; anyone within 2.9 miles might be exposed to ruptured eardrums and shattered glass, and shrapnel might shoot out at high speeds for up to 6.7 miles in any direction. 

Dyck, Pembina’s vice president for marine terminals, dismissed the white paper’s scenario as alarmist.   This guy is a paid biased person and  his comments should be dismissed.  According to Murphy’s law, everything that is possible to occur, will eventually occur.  Explosions and fires will happen.  He should be dismissed, as the same thing the BP Horizon people were saying prior to the Gulf disaster.

“A BLEVE’s just not going to happen,” he said.   What a moronic statement.  BLEVE will happen, as the measures he suggests could fail.  That would require an extraordinary amount of significant heat that goes totally undetected for several hours, he said, detailing Pembina’s safeguards designed to prevent that from occurring.   In our opinion, the proposed facility should plan for a BLEVE event and how to deal with the catastrophe it will cause.

The people most vulnerable to an accident would be Pembina employees, and perhaps workers at the adjacent Honda terminal, Dyck said. The nearest residents live at the Class Harbor floating homes on East Hayden Island, 1.4 miles to 1.7 miles away, he said. 

The worst-case scenario at the Portland site, Dyck said, would be a four-foot hole in a giant refrigerated propane tank holding up to 23 million gallons of propane. 

“There’s no historic failure, period” from those tanks, which are made of double-walled steel, Dyck said. “There’s hundreds of these tanks in existence” in the United States, he said. 

But a series of oil-train derailments and explosions has caused heightened fears among the public, even though propane is shipped in safer rail cars and has a reputation as a safe fuel to handle. 

Pembina didn’t ease such fears when it kept dodging questions from neighbors, environmentalists and reporters about the potential “blast zone” of its propane terminal. However, Dyck was pressed to answer the question at a Jan. 13 public hearing before the Portland Planning and Sustainability Commission. Dyck testified that preliminary estimates for another proposed propane terminal on the West Coast were for a 300-yard blast zone. 

On Wednesday, he said that referred to the inner, most dangerous zone, that might cause fatalities.
Pembina actually relies on a third party to determine hazard zones, Dyck said. That will be DNV GL, a Norwegian company that boasts it’s “the leading technical adviser to the global oil and gas industry.”
After today’s review of safety information, DNV will prepare a draft Quantitative Risk Assessment, evaluating every possible catastrophe or accident at the site — including a potential BLEVE. That risk assessment, including hazard zones, will be presented to the Planning and Sustainability Commission at its March 17 work session, Dyck said.
Then a final report will be readied for the commission’s April 7 public hearing on the project. At that time, commissioners may make a recommendation on the terminal project and forward it to the Portland City Council, which has the final say.
Of course nothing is absolutely safe.  Explosions happen all the time from lack of maintenance, human errors, failed components, adverse weather conditions, etc.  As soon as they have a contingency plan and appropriate funding to pay for the damages they cause, they should be able to build the terminal.  Good luck to them and to the the community.  They will both needed.

Safety plans 

Here’s how Pembina plans to address safety concerns at its proposed North Portland propane terminal: 

Fires: “You don’t fight a propane fire,” said Eric Dyck, Pembina’s local project manager. Neither water nor chemical foam is effective. Instead, firefighters try to contain the fire by dousing surrounding items. A large on-site water tank is planned. The Port of Portland also can extract more water from the Columbia River slough alongside the terminal. 

Fire detection: A series of automated “fire eyes” will constantly monitor for fires through an infrared heat-detection system. 

Gas leaks: Automated “sniffers” will be deployed to detect gas by mechanically smelling leaks. 

Earthquakes: Pembina must meet Oregon’s updated 2014 seismic code, so the terminal can withstand a 9.0 magnitude earthquake off the Oregon Coast and a 7.0 magnitude earthquake at the site. Two large refrigerated propane storage tanks will be buttressed with 36-inch-diameter pilings that are dug 160 feet deep. To stabilize the site and make sure the riverbank doesn’t give way, Pembina will create a massive foundation attached to below-ground bedrock: a 3,000-foot-long wall that’s 120 feet wide and 100 feet deep. 

Floods: The site is on a floodplain, so the facility must withstand 1 percent floods, the most severe type that occur, on average, once per century. 

Terrorism: The entire site is gated, with limited access, and under the authority of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 

Waterways: The U.S. Coast Guard controls safety and security in the Columbia River and slough. Canoers and kayakers will be kept away when ships are being offloaded. We are talking about a lot of costs that will be paid by the taxpayers.  So these people they better construct this facility with all the safety requirements the people want.

Trains: Propane will be shipped in pressurized form in U.S. DOT 112 trains that are no more than six years old. U.S. DOT 112 trains are much safer than the trains being used to transport Bakken crude oil.

It is funny how these people do not even mention the word explosion in their plans.  We believe this is alarming.  Such an arrogant and dismissive attitude has led to all the man-made disasters in our industrial history.  We should plan for explosions and catastrophic events, because it is not if they happen, but when they happen.

Pipeline people and companies should not be trusted at face value.  There should be an independent third-party oversight of their operations because these companies use their own biased consultants to do their design and construction and operation.  To minimize the number of disasters, we need third party oversight.  The feds are influenced by the special interests and are ineffective.  Look what happened to the crude and gas pipelines and trains and semi-truck explosions and fires and deaths and environmental pollution.
Source: portlandtribune.com